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Introduction: 
African social movements  
or social movements in Africa? 
 
Stephen Ellis & Ineke van Kessel 
 
 
 
This volume is the outcome of a workshop and conference held in Leiden on 
23-24 October 2008 and features the papers that were presented then, but were 
revised prior to publication. There were lively and highly focused discussions in 
the workshop on the first day of the proceedings and this introduction draws 
heavily on those debates and insights from all the participants.  
It is appropriate to begin with an explanation of the thinking behind this pro-
ject and to list some of the tentative conclusions that can be drawn. We began 
this venture with an open mind as to whether it concerned social movements as 
global phenomena that, in the present case, happen to be situated on the African 
continent or whether, on the other hand, we are dealing with social phenomena 
of a sort unique to Africa and which are therefore difficult to analyze in a com-
parative perspective. At the outset, we were unsure of the degree to which the 
theoretical work that has been done on social movements in general would be 
relevant to the study of African societies. We deliberately avoided beginning 
with a definition of a social movement drawn from the existing literature, which 
is largely based on studies of Europe, North America and Latin America, be-
cause that would risk excluding movements in Africa that might take a different 
form. We kept in mind the possibility that some social movements in Africa 
might be largely driven by outside stimuli in the form of inducements from aid 
donors. However, we also had to realize that if African movements are seen 
from the outset as sui generis, then not only does comparison with movements 
elsewhere become difficult, it also risks perpetuating the view that everything 
that occurs in Africa has its own special rationale, dictated by a context so ra-
dically different as to stand beyond global comparison. It would be better, we 
thought, first to assemble studies of at least some movements in Africa that 
2 Ellis & Van Kessel 
could conceivably be described as social movements and only then to compare 
them with the existing literature.  
To make this task possible, the first two chapters in this volume attempt a 
summary of the extensive literature that already exists on the subject of social 
movements. The first of these, by Jacquelien van Stekelenberg and Bert Klan-
dermans, presents an overview of the development of social movement theory 
over several decades. They describe how early writers on the issue tended to 
view public protest as arising from impatience with more orthodox forms of 
interaction. When people took to the streets, this was stated or implied to be a 
sign of an irrational element inherent in mass action. Over time, this classic 
paradigm became increasingly unsatisfactory and was supplemented or replaced 
by analyses of the structure of social movements by writers who emphasized its 
political element. Social constructionist theories posed a series of questions 
about how individuals and groups perceive and interpret socio-political condi-
tions, focusing on the cognitive, affective and ideational roots of contention. 
These theories tend to view social movements not only as a rational form of 
response but even as a necessary element of democracy. Many social movement 
theorists are themselves activists or former activists and they tend to emphasize 
the rational element in protest action. Some of the authors in the present volume 
have also played an activist role in the movement they describe, or in other 
social movements. Africa is quite familiar with the phenomenon of the scholar-
activist, as is illustrated in the examples of Mahmood Mamdani, Jacques Del-
pechin and many others from all parts of the continent. In this respect at least, 
Africa fits quite well into the global landscape of social movements. Most re-
cently, analysts have tended to observe the changing forms and goals of social 
movements in the light of globalization and the rise of information technology, 
which have created new possibilities for networking far beyond local neigh-
bourhoods or even the national context.  
A second theoretical chapter has been contributed by Adam Habib and Paul 
Opoku-Mensah and deals with the literature on contemporary social movements 
in South Africa and in Africa more generally, questioning how data from Africa 
relate to the debates that have emerged in the global academy. Habib notes that 
two assertions have been widely made in the literature on social movements: 
first, that the fulcrum of social struggles for a human development agenda has 
shifted from the arena of production to that of consumption, and second, that 
struggles concerning identity are replacing ones overtly oriented towards ma-
terial issues, especially in post-industrial societies. Habib feels that a more 
nuanced interpretation is required, as assertions such as these are not fully satis-
factory when applied to the evidence from Africa. It is true that social struggles, 
especially in South Africa, have expanded into the arena of consumption – 
perhaps unsurprisingly as South Africa, with Africa’s largest economy by far, in 
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some ways resembles the ‘developed’ countries of Europe and North America 
more closely than other parts of Africa do. However, not only have movements 
concerned with relations of production continued but they remain crucial to the 
sustainability of struggles concerning consumption. While identity movements 
and struggles are increasing, material issues are as relevant to these struggles as 
they were to earlier social movements. Habib argues that social movements are 
vital in many democratizing societies in providing the substantive uncertainty 
that is necessary to create accountability among political elites to their margin-
alized citizens, thereby advancing a more sustainable human-oriented develop-
ment agenda. In effect, he maintains that social movements are vital for a 
functioning democracy, particularly in states with only one dominant party. But 
it does not necessarily follow that social movements themselves are inherently 
democratic. 
After these general introductions to the literature, eight case studies are pre-
sented. These cover a wide – but not necessarily representative – range of social 
movements in Africa. They include the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia, 
Islamic social movements in southwest Nigeria, the legacy of liberation move-
ments in South Africa, Catholic social movements in Malawi, the anti-slavery 
movement in Mauritania, the global campaign against blood diamonds, and 
women’s movements in Liberia. There are also the so-called ‘campus cults’ in 
Nigeria that have emerged from the efforts by military governments to disrupt 
the student movement. These campus cults can thus be considered, quite literal-
ly, as an ‘anti-social’ movement. 
We began this project, then, unwilling to apply a definition of social move-
ments that is drawn from a literature strongly influenced by North Atlantic and 
Latin American data, and yet wanting to study a range of movements in Africa 
to see whether it was possible to discern any common threads among them. We 
decided that it was best to adopt a pragmatic approach that, at least at the start, 
was open-minded. In other words, we would bear in mind some of the provi-
sional conclusions drawn from the literature on social movements and make use 
of the instruments of social movement theory, while remaining open to the 
possibility that not all aspects of the relevant African phenomena would neces-
sarily fit into these theories.  
Clearly certain questions of a universal nature can be asked about move-
ments all over the world, and some crucial questions can usefully be posed 
regardless of geographical setting. For a long time, scholars have explored 
questions such as why people rebel or, perhaps more importantly, why they do 
not rebel.  
In view of the diversity of the movements discussed in this volume, we 
asked our contributors to address the following issues: 
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• What are the historical origins of the social movement being analyzed? 
• How does it mobilize support? Who are the people likely to participate? 
• In what ways does the social movement under scrutiny frame its message? 
• How does it relate to other social movements? 
• Is it still in existence? Has it ceased to exist? If so, how and why? 
In the discussions that ensued during the workshop and conference in Leiden, 
participants heartily endorsed our approach of not starting with an orthodox 
theory and subsequently examining the extent to which African cases fitted it. It 
became apparent that many movements in Africa that could be called social 
movements inasmuch as they are rooted in social networks rather than in state 
policy and insofar as they are concerned with broad social issues, are of a rather 
hybrid nature when considered with reference to conventional social-science 
categories. They often display social, political and religious characteristics that 
overlap one another.  
The international context 
It became clear at an early stage in the discussion among the authors repre-
sented in this volume that, more than elsewhere, the international context in 
which social movements operate is of considerable significance. African states 
in general are particularly vulnerable to external pressures of various sorts in 
Africa. When considering the flow of different sorts of resources – financial, 
moral and political – in the constitution of African social movements, we should 
take care not to limit our vision to exchanges between Africa and the West. The 
Middle East, India, China and other Asian powers are fast becoming more im-
portant in this regard. By the same token, South Africa is assuming a significant 
role by offering funds and moral leadership to the rest of the continent, some-
times providing an entry point to Africa for international networks or organiza-
tions seeking to expand their activities. 
The international human-rights discourse has provided inspiration and moral 
legitimation for a range of causes, including the campaign against slavery in 
Mauritania and that against blood diamonds in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, 
social movements in Africa frequently have a pan-African dimension. Thus, the 
president of SOS Esclaves in Mauritania drew inspiration from attending a 
meeting in Switzerland as well as from the World Conference against Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance that was held in 
Durban in 2001, while relying heavily on his alliance with an anti-slavery 
movement in Niger. Similarly, the campaign against blood diamonds in Sierra 
Leone served as a model for comparable movements in Angola and the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Activists in Uganda campaigning against a 
proposed change in the constitution to allow yet another term for President 
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Museveni sought advice from activists who had conducted a successful cam-
paign in Malawi against a third term for their country’s president. In South 
Africa, the international dimension was vital to the struggle against apartheid. 
International alliances gave access to weapons, money and ideas ranging from 
Marxism-Leninism to a liberal discourse on human rights, gender rights and gay 
rights. And the African-American connection in the United States was crucial in 
organizing sanctions. 
This international connection to social activism in Africa is not only ideo-
logical in nature but also contains an important financial and logistical aspect. 
Many social movements in Africa are dependent on funding from external 
donors. However, there are also exceptions, as Ben Soares shows in his study of 
the NASFAT movement in Nigeria. Foreign funds may come either directly or 
through locally based non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Although donor 
dependency obviously has an effect on the form assumed by social movements 
in Africa, it would be a fundamental mistake to see these movements as no 
more than an extension of Western NGOs. Even when Africans are in receipt of 
funds, they are not passive, and relations with donors do not consist solely of a 
one-way flow of resources. Organic intellectuals in Africa have learned how to 
play the system to their own advantage, in a local variation of the well-known 
pattern of interaction between the local and the global spheres. If we take a 
longer-term historical perspective on this point, we can appreciate that an initial 
pattern of ideas flowing into Africa can become a reverse current in a later 
phase. A good example is the Christian missionary movement in Africa, which 
for many years was indeed one-way traffic, but in recent decades African 
Christian churches have reversed the flow by reaching out to other parts of the 
world. It is interesting to note that Europe, the continent that historically 
initiated the modern Christian evangelization of Africa, is now seen by many 
African Christians as a godless continent in need of spiritual reawakening. 
Even when money and other resources are clearly flowing from the rich 
world to Africa, there may still be reciprocal elements to the relationship. In 
solidarity networks, the providers of money may need approval bestowed by 
their African counterparts. Without this blessing, the providers lack credibility 
and legitimacy. During the struggle against apartheid, many anti-apartheid 
movements in the West allowed the African National Congress (ANC) to set the 
agenda and define priorities. The ANC’s blessing was itself a precious resource, 
as illustrated by the intricate distinctions assumed by the ANC’s leadership in 
exile, which made subtle distinctions in addressing its Dutch allies: members of 
the Anti-Apartheids Beweging Nederland (AABN) were classed as ‘comrades’, 
while the activists of the Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika (KZA) were considered 
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merely as ‘friends’.1 Similarly, in the Sierra Leonean case described in this 
volume, Canadian activists, including some senior politicians, were legitimized 
in their campaign against blood diamonds by the support of African NGOs. 
In a relationship where an external donor brings money and other resources 
and an African movement may bestow legitimacy, it is common practice to 
present different facets of a movement to different partners in different settings. 
Thus, the ANC in exile was wont to use a human-rights discourse in Western 
capitals, while using the vocabulary of anti-imperialism in conversations with 
its socialist allies. Fundraisers for the United Democratic Front (UDF) became 
particularly agile at playing the donors, using a human-rights discourse to 
finance a struggle that increasingly took on socially radical features in South 
Africa itself. Funds for the UDF-aligned media were sought by appeals to the 
universal principle of press freedom, while media activists inside South Africa 
saw their social-movement media as a weapon of political struggle, and had 
little patience with liberal notions of plurality. It is instructive to read Ineke van 
Kessel’s chapter on how former activists now consider their activities of twenty 
years ago. But then again, the profile designed by the leadership of a movement 
may differ radically from the understanding of the same movement at grassroots 
level. In the case of the campaign against blood diamonds, which enjoyed great 
success at the beginning of this century, the international profile of the cam-
paign organization closely resembled the standard format of Western NGO 
campaigns, but on the ground in Sierra Leone it functioned as part of local anti-
war movements, as Lansana Gberie explains in his contribution in this volume. 
The particular importance of the external dimension to African social move-
ments can be placed within the context of a much wider set of relationships that 
could be termed ‘extraversion’.2 Jean-François Bayart has demonstrated that the 
accumulation of political power and social prestige in many parts of Africa has, 
sometimes over a period of centuries, been dependent on access to external 
resources. The latter have included money and imported consumer goods, but 
also less tangible benefits. In return, African entrepreneurs have supplied their 
foreign interlocutors with other assets. Until the twentieth century this notori-
ously included slaves but it could also include access to mineral resources or 
other commodities required by international traders. In the industrial age, Africa 
has itself not been a significant producer of manufactured goods. The import of 
capital and goods from outside has been balanced by the provision of other ser-
vices including political support required by donor countries for diplomatic pur-
                                                          
1  Sietse Bosgra, ‘From Jan van Riebeeck to solidarity with the struggle: The Nether-
lands, South Africa and Apartheid’, in SADET (South African Democracy Trust), 
The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 3, part I, p. 556. 
2  Jean-François Bayart, ‘Africa in the world: A history of extraversion’, African Af-
fairs, 99, 395 (2000), pp. 217-267. 
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poses, and various forms of moral legitimation. This form of exchange has 
historically taken many different forms from the age of mercantilism through to 
the age of the Millennium Development Goals, but a notable element of 
dependency has been the main characteristic of the relationship. This was seen 
many decades ago and incorporated into a formal theory, first elaborated by 
scholars of Latin America and subsequently adopted by Africanists, that was 
very influential in the last few decades of the twentieth century.3 Dependency 
theory, closely associated with Marxist scholarship, postulated that a core group 
of developed countries had historically used their power to construct a world 
system in which peripheral territories were kept in a permanent state of depend-
ency, were needed for their raw materials and other assets but were prevented 
from developing the degree of industrialization or economic sophistication that 
would enable them to break out of their peripheral status. Dependency theory 
was largely superseded in Western academies of learning in the 1980s4 but it 
has remained influential among African intellectuals.  
As Bayart hints,5 many aspects of development theory actually remain more 
relevant and cogent than may appear at first sight, provided it is recognized that 
Africa’s dependency is the historical consequence of action by various parties. 
It has not simply been imposed on Africa but has been historically formed by 
complex interactions. Dependency is a political resource that has been of 
considerable benefit to some of those Africans who have contributed to its 
elaboration. It is helpful to consider the relationship between African social 
movements and external funders in this regard. It is not just the imposition of a 
political project by the rich but an interactive relationship that has complex 
moral, political and financial elements. As Veronika Fuest points out in her 
study of the highly dynamic Liberian women’s movement, which played an 
important role in bringing peace to that troubled country and whose success was 
crowned by the election of Africa’s first elected female head of state to the 
applause of much of the world, it is also a movement that has been dominated 
by women from some of the country’s elite. Families that have made their 
fortune over generations from their success in situating themselves at the junc-
ture of Liberian society and its external links, most notably with the US, may in 
a sociological sense be carrying on a family tradition more than they are articu-
lating a ‘new’ social movement.  
                                                          
3  See notably Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Bogle-L’Ouver-
ture Publications, London, 1972). 
4  Cf. Colin Leys, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory (James Currey, Oxford, 
1996). 
5  Bayart, ‘Africa in the world’, pp. 219-220. 
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Diasporas 
Related but distinct is the relationship between social movements in Africa and 
African diaspora communities in the rest of the world. In recent decades, the 
number of Africans living permanently or semi-permanently outside their con-
tinent of origin has increased enormously. African communities are now a per-
manent feature in many parts of Europe, North America and the Middle East, 
and increasingly in Asia as well. Many diaspora communities retain a close 
interest in their countries of origin, sending remittances home for the upkeep of 
their families, making trips home whenever possible to supervise the con-
struction of a house, and often contributing money to help finance the building 
of churches or mosques. Many people living abroad naturally retain a close in-
terest in news from home, discussing matters with friends, perhaps reading the 
press online and keeping in touch by phone.  
Contacts with people living in the diaspora can have an important effect on 
social movements in Africa itself, and indeed this is one of the most prominent 
elements of numerous African social movements. Yet in our survey of the 
theoretical literature on social movements and in the expert summaries con-
tained in the first two chapters of this book, we find little or nothing about the 
role of diaspora communities in the dynamics of social movements. Similarly, 
political scientists have generally not devoted much attention to the notion of 
diaspora states such as Eritrea and Somalia, societies that are kept afloat largely 
by migrant remittances and where even the state may be heavily reliant on 
funding or other contributions from the diaspora. The latter is a source not only 
of money but may also provide remittances of a social and moral nature. From 
Islamic clerics to Marxist students and from gender activists to campaigns for 
global justice, African diaspora communities play a vital role in the flow of 
ideas. Decades ago, when diaspora communities were less numerous, the flow 
of ideas was on a relatively small scale but with the advent of the Internet, fax 
and cell phones it has developed the potential to become an instant tidal wave. 
The potential for global mobilization has become greater than ever before. The 
types of people who live in diaspora communities may vary from one context to 
another, making it important to identify the social profiles of people who move 
out of the country as well as where they move to. As Boniface Dulani notes, it 
tends to be critics of the regime in place who leave a country. This might not be 
for political reasons in the first instance but residence abroad may cause them to 
become more critical of their home government. Moreover, diasporas are to be 
found not only in the rich world but also in Africa itself. In the case of Malawi, 
many exiles in the time of Life President Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda went to 
live in Zambia and Tanzania, from where they could play an active part in the 
1990s democratization campaign that eventually succeeded in removing him 
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from office. But, as Dulani points out, actions by exiles can only be effective if 
there is also an internal challenge to the regime. 
The relationship between internal and external components of African social 
movements can draw on many other examples. Thus, the ANC mission-in-exile 
for three decades conducted both armed insurgency and a diplomatic campaign 
against apartheid but its activities only became really effective in the 1980s 
when the movement’s exiled leadership was able to link up with internal 
movements, notably the rapidly growing trade-union movement and the United 
Democratic Front. Another example is provided in this volume by Lansana 
Gberie, who describes the role played by the Liberian and the Sierra Leonean 
diasporas in the blood-diamonds campaign, which was also taken up as a 
foreign-policy instrument by countries in Europe and North America. Converse-
ly, in the case of Mauritania’s anti-slavery movement, Ould Zekeria attaches 
little importance to the Mauritanian diaspora, pointing out that Mauritanians 
abroad tend to be overwhelmingly from families of the country’s slave-owning 
elite rather than descendants of slaves or ex-slave families. Moreover, most of 
the Mauritanian diaspora is located in the Arab world where anti-slavery agi-
tation is little known. In fact, Mauritania’s slave-owners use Islam as a dis-
course to legitimate practices of slavery. This, too, strengthens the argument not 
only for considering the role of diaspora populations in Africa’s social move-
ments but also for appreciating the social nature of a particular diaspora popu-
lation. There are very few Mauritanian Arabic speakers in Europe and North 
America. The non-Arabic-speaking diaspora in those areas is larger, however, 
and has a significant impact on the internal politics of racism and ethnic con-
flict, while keeping slavery alive as an issue in the foreign media. 
State and non-state 
A further specificity of social movements in Africa is that they often exist in 
countries where the state is much weaker than it is in Europe or North America, 
or where it barely even exists at all in the sense of hosting a bureaucracy that is 
able to implement synchronized activity in fields such as policing, justice or 
other functions that would normally be regarded as essential to any state. The 
most extreme example in Africa today is Somalia, and Jon Abbink’s chapter on 
the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia raises the interesting question of whether it 
is actually permissible to speak of social movements in the effective absence of 
a state. So much of the literature produced on the basis of case studies from 
other continents implies, at the very least, that social movements are in some 
sense the natural adversary of the state since they frequently formulate demands 
for state action or, alternatively, protest against such action. By the same token, 
social movements are often considered to articulate a vision of an alternative 
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social order, realistic or otherwise. But here again, we can find examples in 
Africa of social movements that develop a pragmatic partnership with the state 
or that identify other adversaries. An example is the Treatment Action Cam-
paign (TAC) in South Africa, one of that country’s most effective civil-society 
coalitions since the end of the apartheid era, that initially targeted the pharma-
ceutical industry in its efforts to provide access to generic anti-retroviral drugs 
for HIV/AIDS patients. Only in a later phase did the South African government 
become the TAC’s main opponent, as the activist movement campaigned to 
make anti-retrovirals widely available to people living with AIDS. Ultimately, 
the TAC won its most significant battle in the courtroom, an organ of the state 
itself, even though it took years before the government effectively implemented 
the court’s verdict. Recourse to the courts is a route sometimes taken by 
environmental movements and gender activists but also by movements seeking 
broader goals, such as the UDF in South Africa. For labour movements in 
Africa and elsewhere, capital is usually the primary opponent but they may 
eventually direct their campaigns at the state with demands to initiate or enforce 
legislation on labour conditions such as a minimum wage, safety standards 
and/or social benefits. 
Another instrument associated with states but that can be mobilized by social 
movements to advance their cause is diplomacy. Of the cases analyzed in this 
volume, the one that relied on this technique most heavily was the campaign 
against blood diamonds that was primarily initiated by a Canadian NGO with an 
African connection and supported by the Canadian government. Thereafter, the 
blood-diamonds campaign came to receive the support of other governments 
and even the United Nations, which applied legal sanctions on diamonds ema-
nating from some war zones. At first sight, one might suppose that the blood-
diamonds campaign, which was remarkably successful in pricking the con-
science of consumers in the rich world and initiating international action, was 
actually non-African in almost everything but its effects. However as Lansana 
Gberie shows, the campaign was supported by local activists in Sierra Leone 
who were able to use this powerful international campaign to further their own 
agendas. It is one of many examples of where social activists in an African 
country are able to leverage their influence by recourse to various forms of state 
action, in this case overwhelming on the part of states external to the region.  
From Nouakchott to Johannesburg, shaming a government can be quite an 
effective tactic in realizing social goals. The Mauritanian anti-slavery group 
SOS Esclaves has used this strategy to particularly good effect, and each time 
Mauritania is exposed as one of the world’s last outposts of slavery, its govern-
ment feels humiliated. Since slavery has already been legally abolished in 
Mauritania, the government often simply resorts to the politics of denial. 
 Introduction 11 
There is an embedded religious element associated with many social move-
ments in Africa. In North America, Europe and other locations where social 
movements have been extensively studied, churches or other religious groups, 
considering themselves to have a special moral role as guardians of society’s 
ethics, may initiate a social campaign, for example in opposition to abortion in 
the US, that employs many of the classic tactics of social movements in general. 
In the case of the anti-abortion movement, this is largely aimed at overturning a 
Supreme Court ruling on the legality of abortion. In other instances, a social 
movement with a broad social base may enlist particular support from churches 
or other religious groups if they perceive it to have a particularly moral aspect, 
such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the UK. In an earlier period, 
religion was central to the campaign to abolish the slave trade founded in 
Britain in the eighteenth century, and this is often seen as the first modern social 
movement. In the US, religious institutions contributed powerfully to the US 
civil-rights movement that had such an enormous effect not only on US politics 
and society but also on the way social movements were perceived by academic 
writers. In Africa however, entire social movements may appear to be preoccu-
pied with religious issues to the apparent exclusion of more conventional forms 
of social action. A highly controversial case is the student Pentecostal move-
ment in Nigeria, which can be viewed simply as a religious movement operating 
outside the purview of the state or of political demands but is more persuasively 
seen as a movement for the renewal of the social contract binding society and 
state that takes a distinctive form.6 The ‘campus cults’ described in Stephen 
Ellis’s chapter can be seen as youth gangs with innocuous origins as student 
clubs that, over two or three decades, were manipulated by Nigerian military 
governments to break the power of the country’s student movement, which was 
so feared by the military on account of its potential for mobilizing force. What 
is of particular interest in this regard is that the Pentecostal movement that 
emerged on Nigerian campuses in the 1970s was also vying for the allegiance of 
students, and identified the campus gangs not merely as anti-social elements but 
as Satanic, implying a very particular theological character. This attitude is best 
understood not merely as a reaction to the violent nature of Nigeria’s campus 
cults but as a reflection of a long history of initiation societies in which social 
power is deemed to be derived from contact with the invisible world.  
Much of the academic literature on religious movements in Africa bases 
itself on a materialist analysis. It departs from the supposition that religious 
ideas and practices do not have any substance in and of themselves, viewing 
them as clues to the nature of the forces that truly shape society, assumed by 
                                                          
6  Cf. Ruth A. Marshall, Political Spiritualities: The explosion of Pentecostalism in 
Nigeria (Chicago University Press, Chicago and London, 2009). 
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many social scientists and historians to be those related to physical resources 
and material reality. However, if we think of religion in terms of spiritual 
power, and religious practice as access to that power,7 its political dimensions 
become fully apparent. The NASFAT movement in southwestern Nigeria does 
not articulate any demands that might be considered political by reference to 
conventional state politics. However in a Nigerian context where religion is 
generally considered in terms of spiritual power and where state politics are 
notoriously empty of moral content, a religious movement acquires a political 
connotation that it might not have in another context. This is even more evident 
in the case of the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia presented by Jon Abbink. In 
Somalia, where a functioning state barely exists, such a religious movement 
assumes a very obvious political role. 
For the rest, social movements in Africa can and do make use of the gamut 
of methods that are commonly associated with social movements the world 
over. These include demonstrations, the use of the mass media to broadcast a 
message to a wider audience and tactics of civil disobedience designed to attract 
public attention and frustrate the state with a view to causing it to pay attention 
to activists’ demands. 
Framing 
One of the most interesting aspects of social movements is the issue of their 
‘framing’ or, in other words, the general context in which any given action or 
repertoire of actions is presented or interpreted. In many of the best-known 
cases, a relatively simple and localized set of activities may be presented by 
skilled leaders as something much larger. An example is when the sabotage of 
an oil pipeline in southern Nigeria, perhaps even by a group that is situated half-
way between a social group and a money-making venture, is presented as an 
attack on the collaboration between oil companies and the Nigerian state. Nor is 
it only local leaders who sometimes present their movements in these broad 
terms. As research on social movements is currently fashionable in the acada-
mic world, researchers are apt to spot social movements in every corner of the 
world.  
The point of this last remark is not to suggest that there were no social 
movements before social scientists arrived to describe and analyze them in 
terms of a sophisticated theory. Similar movements surely existed prior to this 
but were labelled differently. This seems to be a particularly important point 
with regard to Africa where a great deal of writing in both academic journals 
and the press has been based on the supposition that societies steeped in tradi-
                                                          
7  Argued in Stephen Ellis & Gerrie ter Haar, Worlds of Power: Religious thought and 
political practice in Africa (C. Hurst & Co., London, 2004). 
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tion have been making their way into the modern world. It is quite easy to find 
examples of many movements intent on dealing with matters of widespread 
concern within a given society or community but that have been classified as 
anti-witchcraft movements or messianic movements or otherwise relegated to 
various categories of traditionalism. In retrospect, one may also wonder whether 
the mass mobilization of societies in the final years of colonial rule, which in 
most of Africa was in the 1950s, that was generally analyzed by historians and 
political scientists in terms of nationalist movements may not also be usefully 
seen as an example of social movements. Our purpose in saying this is not to 
argue that the people who demonstrated in favour of independence fifty years 
ago were not real nationalists but to argue that a recurring theme in African 
history is the mobilization of significant numbers of people around issues that 
preoccupy or interest them. These are socially rooted and often have a religious 
aspect but may also be articulated by leaders in terms of precise political de-
mands. The form that the latter take is strongly influenced by the nature of the 
state in any particular case. In the heyday of nationalism, it made sense to 
‘frame’ social struggles in the national context, just as in the struggle against 
apartheid it made sense to do the same with concerns about rent increases and 
electricity supply problems, presenting them as secondary consequences of the 
core problem. When a state does not effectively exist, as in Somalia today, 
struggles for social issues will be presented differently.  
This point of view finds an echo in some of the existing literature on social 
movements in Africa. In his critique of the state-centrist and society-centrist 
perspectives prevailing among Africanists in the West, Mahmood Mamdani 
questions the universalist pretensions of a civil-society-governed perspective. 
He wonders whether the civil-society discourse is no more than a restatement of 
an earlier perspective, that of modernization theory, with its notion of the 
‘traditional’ as the problem and the ‘modern’ as its salvation. In his view, the 
concept of civil society allows almost no room for the ‘traditional’. The same 
might be said about social movement theory. Ifi Amadiume, one of the con-
tributors to the volume on social movements edited by Mamdani and Ernest 
Wamba-dia-Wamba,8 argues that the idea that social movements are seeking 
social or political change is too limited. She proposes instead an example of 
anti-power movements that simply seek to defend and maintain their own auto-
nomy, and identifies this trait as the central characteristic of indigenous wo-
men’s movements in Africa. These movements, she argues, may be considered 
                                                          
8  Mahmood Mamdani & Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba (eds), African Studies in Social 
Movements and Democracy (Codesria, Dakar, 1995). 
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‘traditional’, but they are not ‘pre-modern’.9 Another relevant example men-
tioned in the same volume is the case of labour unions in Zimbabwe. These, it is 
argued, grew out of burial societies formed by workers and small traders or 
entrepreneurs. In the Eurocentric perspective on labour history, this type of 
community organization is situated on the lower levels of an evolutionary scale 
that culminates in full-blown class-conscious labour unions as the most mature 
stage. Such a perspective blinds us to the real dynamics of African labour 
movements and of a repertoire of protest and resistance that is much broader 
and more diverse than strikes and boycotts alone.10  
We consider this a valid perspective and the absence of case studies of 
‘traditional’ movements in this volume does not imply that we see social move-
ments as an exclusively modern phenomenon. While we have hardly explored 
the realm of the ‘traditional’, other perhaps than in passing in the case of the 
Nigerian ‘campus cults’ that bear such a close resemblance to traditional initi-
ation societies, we have attempted to situate the study of social movements in 
Africa in the broader context of social movement theory. 
Chronology: Generations of social movements? 
By the 1990s, it had become received wisdom in social movement theory that 
an earlier generation of social movements had been succeeded by a generation 
of so-called ‘new social movements’. Thus, the first edition of the authoritative 
book by Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani11 strongly endorsed the para-
digm of ‘new social movements’, that is movements that had developed since 
the late 1960s relating to issues such as women’s rights, gender relations, envir-
onmental protection, ethnicity and migration, peace and international solidarity. 
These new movements were perceived as having a distinctly middle-class basis. 
Sporting the label ‘new’, the movements were clearly differentiated from the 
models of working-class or nationalist collective action that had historically 
preceded them. However, in the second edition of their book, which was 
published in 2006, these authors question the neat transition from working-class 
to middle-class activism that they had earlier espoused. The reason for their 
doubts was the sustained challenge mounted by broad coalitions of very hetero-
geneous actors against neoliberal globalization. The ‘Battle of Seattle’, when 
                                                          
9  Ifi Amadiume, ‘Gender, political systems and social movements: A West African 
experience’, in: Mamdani & Wamba-dia-Wamba (eds), African Studies in Social 
Movements, pp. 35-68. 
10  Introduction to Mamdani & Wamba-dia-Wamba, African Studies in Social Move-
ments, p. 12. 
11  Donatella della Porta & Mario Diani, Social Movements: An introduction (Black-
well, Oxford, 1999). 
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large numbers of demonstrators gathered to protest during a World Trade Orga-
nization ministerial conference in 1999, was seen as the beginning of a new 
phase. It showed the ability of demonstrators from all over the world and a great 
variety of backgrounds to express their views in a context where neo-liberalism 
was no longer regarded as the only viable path to development but was highly 
contested. The global financial crisis that began unfolding in 2008 has served to 
further undermine the dogmas of the so-called Washington Consensus, giving 
new impetus to campaigns for sustainable development and global justice as 
well as new legitimacy to local struggles against privatization and commerciali-
zation. In the preface to their 2006 edition, Della Porta and Diani remark that 
there are surely continuities between the generation of ‘new social movements’ 
and the contemporary wave of global justice campaigns. However in addition to 
continuities, they also perceive new patterns of collective action that are sig-
nificantly different from the familiar characteristics of largely middle-class-
based movements. Working-class action, they observe, seems to be back with a 
vengeance. 
This shift in paradigm helps to narrow the gap between social movement 
theory and the African experience. Movements in Africa never did fit into the 
sketch of a neat chronological succession from working-class to middle-class 
activism or, in Habib’s phrase, from the arena of production to the arena of 
consumption. Labour struggles in Africa have not come ‘back with a ven-
geance’, as they have always been an integral part of a wide range of social 
movements, even if the study of working-class action became less fashionable 
in the era when so many academic researchers were preoccupied with post-
modernity. Recent examples include Zimbabwe, where the trade-union move-
ment has been instrumental in building the opposition coalition assembled 
under the umbrella of the Movement for Democratic Change. In South Africa, 
the labour movement constituted a vital part of a broader anti-apartheid coali-
tion. Even the struggle against hereditary slave labour is not over in Africa, as 
Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem’s chapter on SOS Esclaves in Mauritania shows.  
At the end of this exercise, we are left with the impression that social move-
ments abound in Africa and that they inevitably adopt particular features as a 
result of the social and political context in which they operate. When a signifi-
cant part of a country’s population lives abroad, the diaspora may take on an 
important role in framing debates or interpreting them for the outside world. 
Religious debates that might sometimes appear almost other-worldly can as-
sume a distinct social and even political colour in a situation where the state 
itself is seen as being morally void, or is hardly present at all. Traditional and 
new forms may be inextricably mixed. If this gives food for thought for theo-
reticians of social movements, then this volume has served a dual purpose: 
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documenting a few examples from the great diversity of social movements in 
Africa as well as contributing to more inclusive social movement theories. 
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When and why do people protest? And who is likely to parti-
cipate in public protests? Around 1900, influential sociologists 
regarded all street protest as deviant behaviour. The classic 
paradigms held that (relative) deprivation, shared grievances 
and generalized beliefs were determinants of protest. The early 
scholars of contentious politics depicted protest as the politics 
of the impatient, maintaining that protest had an irrational 
element to it. As dissatisfaction with these classic paradigms 
grew, new ones emerged: structural paradigms such as re-
source mobilization and political process. While resource 
mobilization theory focuses on organization as a resource, 
political process theory emphasizes the political element of 
protest. Simultaneous with the rise of the structural paradigms 
was the emergence of social-constructivistic paradigms that 
concentrate on how individuals and groups perceive and 
interpret socio-political conditions. They focus on the role of 
cognitive, affective and ideational roots of contention and are 
broadly organized around three concepts: framing, identity and 
emotions. This chapter discusses these concepts as well as the 
social-psychology approach to social movements. The socio-
political context of contentious politics is changing due to 
processes such as globalization and liberalization, and it is 
argued that these changes influence the rise and fall of social 
movements and their collective actions. Most social movement 
scholars assume that mutual integration of the structural and 
constructivistic paradigms can yield satisfactory explanations. 
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Social movements and collective action 
The reason why people protest has occupied social scientists for a long time. 
The French psychologist Le Bon, a founding father of collective action studies, 
regarded all street protest as a form of deviant behaviour and developed his 
theory on crowds during a period of great social unrest in France in the 1890s. 
He believed that the destruction of religious, political and social beliefs in com-
bination with the creation of new conditions of existence and thought as a result 
of the modern scientific and industrial discoveries of the time were the basis for 
a process of transformation of mankind’s thought. Ideas from the past, although 
half shattered, were still very powerful he believed, while the ideas that were to 
replace them were in a process of formation. The consequence, in his analysis, 
was a period of transition and anarchy. Le Bon’s ideas were reflected in classic 
breakdown theories that regarded participation in collective action as an uncon-
ventional, irrational type of behaviour.1 The classic paradigm held that (relative) 
deprivation, shared grievances and generalized beliefs were determinants of 
participation. In fact, early students of the subject depicted contentious politics 
as the politics of the impatient and maintained that protest had an irrational ele-
ment to it.2  
Times changed and so did both contentious politics and theoretical ap-
proaches to contentious politics. The late 1960s saw a huge growth in social 
movement activity: the student movement, the civil-rights movement, the peace 
movement, the women’s movement and the environmental movement all flour-
ished. Interpretations of major forms of collective action changed from being 
viewed as spontaneous ‘irrational’ outbursts to movement activities with con-
crete goals, articulated general values and interests, and rational calculations of 
strategies. Breakdown theories clearly fell short as explanations of this pro-
liferation of social movement activity, all the more so because it seemed to be 
preceded by growing rather than declining welfare. This, combined with chang-
ing forms of collective action, required new theoretical approaches, and several 
developed in the 1970s.  
These new theoretical approaches can be categorized as structural and social 
constructivistic paradigms. Resource mobilization and political process are ex-
amples of structural approaches. While resource mobilization places an em-
phasis on organizational aspects and resources, the political process approach 
emphasizes the political aspects of collective action. The social constructivistic 
perspective, on the other hand, concentrates on how individuals and groups 
perceive and interpret these conditions and focuses on the role of the cognitive, 
                                                          
1  B. Klandermans, The Social Psychology of Protest (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 
1997). 
2  N.J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (The Free Press, London, 1962). 
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affective and ideational roots of contention. It is broadly organized around three 
concepts: framing, identity and emotions (culture is also referred to but is not 
elaborated on in this chapter). These terms are also key concepts in social-psy-
chology approaches to protest. Social psychologists maintain that people live in 
a perceived world and respond to the world as they observe and interpret it. To 
understand why people protest, it is necessary to know how they see and inter-
pret their world, and social psychology focuses on subjective variables. Social-
psychology approaches are, therefore, prototypical to social constructivistic ap-
proaches.  
Obviously, the past and the present of social movement theory reveal differ-
ent paradigms stressing various aspects of social movements and the actions 
they stage. They provide different answers to questions about why people pro-
test, who protests and the forms of protest that protesters are involved in. Table 
1 provides an overview of the answers provided to these questions by the differ-
ent approaches to social movements.  
Since the 1990s the context of contentious politics has changed significantly. 
Inseparably intertwined processes such as globalization, the development of the 
network society and the information society have given the world a new look. 
Networks are becoming the prime mode of organization, with formal networks 
embodied by organizations giving way to less formal networks rooted in the 
personal life world of individuals and to more diffuse group belongings.3 More-
over, the rise of new communication technologies (the Internet, email, cell 
phones) is intensifying change and its pace.  
Fundamental changes in society can affect contentious politics. After all, the 
spread of information and networks are essential elements of mobilization and 
one assumes that such fundamental changes are having a profound impact on 
the dynamics of contention. Indeed, scholars of social movements argue that 
recent social and cultural changes have lead to a ‘normalization of protest’4 and 
have created a social movement society.5 This has posed new challenges to so-
cial movement theory. Are dynamics of contentious politics? In the final section 
of this chapter we will elaborate on what we see as the prospects of social 
movement theory and relate them to developments on the African continent. 
This is a precarious undertaking, especially considering the rapid pace of 
change. 
                                                          
3  J.W. Duyvendak & M. Hurenkamp (eds), Kiezen voor de Kudde. Lichte gemeen-
schappen en de nieuwe meerderheid (Van Gennep, Amsterdam, 2004). 
4  P. Norris, S. Walgrave & P. van Aelst, ‘Who demonstrates? Anti-state rebels, con-
ventional participants, or everyone?’, Comparative Politics, 37, 2 (2005), pp. 189-
205. 
5  D. Meyer & S. Tarrow (eds), Towards a Movement Society? Contentious politics for 
a new century (Rowman and Littlefield, Boulder, CO, 1998). 
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Table 1  Theories on participation and the emergence of social movements 
 Classical 
approaches 
 
Contemporary approaches 
 Mass society 
collective 
behaviour 
 
Resource 
mobilization 
Political 
process 
approach 
Social con- 
structivistic 
approaches 
Why people 
protest 
Grievances, 
discontent, 
anomie, 
class conflict 
Resources, 
opportunities, 
social 
networks 
efficacy 
 
Political 
opportunities 
(cognitive 
liberation) 
Social con-
struction of 
reality: 
- (meaning) 
construction 
- identity 
- emotions 
- motivation  
Who protests Alienated, 
frustrated, 
disintegrated, 
manipulated, 
marginalized 
people 
Well-
organized, 
professional, 
resourceful 
social 
networks; 
embeddedness 
Coalitions 
between 
challengers / 
political elites; 
embeddedness 
 
Countercultural 
groups, identity 
groups; 
embeddedness 
 
Forms of 
protest  
Spontaneous, 
irrational, 
expressive, 
violent  
(panics, 
fashions,  
mobs, crime) 
Rational, 
planned, 
instrumental 
(institutional 
politics, 
lobbying, 
interest 
groups) 
Rational, 
instrumental, 
polity-oriented 
(elite contention 
lobbying, 
indigenous 
minorities 
disruption i.e. 
sit-ins, strikes) 
Ideological, 
expressive, 
identity-oriented 
(cultural and 
religious 
organizations, 
self-help groups, 
alternative 
lifestyles) 
 
 
 
First however, we discuss the past and the present of social movement theory 
and sketch our subject of interest, namely social movements and collective 
action. There are numerous definitions of what a ‘social movement’ is. In this 
chapter a few definitions will be given, all departing from different theoretical 
angles and emphasizing different aspects of the phenomenon. A working defi-
nition of what we see as social movements and (their) collective actions is as 
follows: social movements are interlocking networks of groups, social networks 
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and individuals, and the connection between them is a shared collective identity 
that tries to prevent or promote societal change by non-institutionalized tactics.6  
Breakdown and marginalization: The past 
Classical approaches, for example collective behaviour theory, mass society 
theory and relative deprivation, rely on the same general causal sequence mov-
ing from ‘some form of structural strain (be it industrialization, urbanization, 
unemployment) [that] produces subjective tension and therefore the psychologi-
cal disposition to engage in extreme behaviours such as panics, mobs etc. to 
escape from these tensions’.7 The various versions of classical approaches agree 
on this basic sequence and differ only in their conceptualization. To appreciate 
the similarities underlying these various formulations, let us briefly review a 
number of them.  
Le Bon, as mentioned earlier, can be seen as the founding father of collective 
action studies and his ideas are reflected in several subsequent theories. He did 
not conceive of contentious politics in a very positive manner, perceiving 
crowds as primitive and irrational. He believed that individual members of a 
crowd become submerged in the masses, assuming a sense of anonymity and 
losing their sense of responsibility. Today, however, it is felt that Le Bon exag-
gerated the violent and irrational character of crowds.  
Smelser8 and Blumer9 are viewed as breakdown theorists. Both held that 
political protest had its inception in tension and societal transition as a result of 
industrialization, urbanization and unemployment, and that it derived its moti-
vational power from dissatisfaction with current forms of life. For Blumer, the 
motivating forces for collective action were, in addition to dissatisfaction and 
subsequent agitation, ‘wishes’ and ‘hope’ for a new scheme or system of living. 
In this way he dissociated himself from the notion that contentious politics were 
irrational acts rooted solely in agitation and frustration. Implicitly, in emotional 
terms, he depicted a rational, efficacious side to contentious politics. This per-
ceived probability of making a difference was later described as ‘cognitive lib-
eration’.10 
                                                          
6   D. della Porta & M. Diani (eds), Social Movements: An introduction (Basil Black-
well, Oxford, 1999). 
7  D. McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-
1970 (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982), p. 7. 
8  Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior. 
9  H.G. Blumer, ‘Collective behavior’, in A. McClung Lee (ed.), Principles of Socio-
logy (Barnes and Noble Books, New York, 1969). 
10  McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency. 
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Kornhauser11 popularized the notion that people were vulnerable to the ap-
peals of dictatorship because of a lack of restraining social networks. He argued 
that Nazism developed in Germany because Hitler was able to appeal directly to 
the people due to their alienation and anomie. This conforms to Putnam’s more 
recent discussions of the alleged decline of social capital12 but stands in contrast 
to social movement studies that consistently show that it is people who are 
firmly embedded, rather than those who are alienated, who are politically ac-
tive.13 Indeed, ‘very little participation [is found] in either ordinary political 
activity or revolutionary outbursts by misfits, outcasts, nomads, the truly mar-
ginal, the desperate poor’.14 
Gurr15 argued that when changing social conditions cause people to experi-
ence ‘relative deprivation’, the likelihood of protest and rebellion significantly 
increases. Feelings of relative deprivation result from comparisons of one’s 
situation with some standard be it in one’s own past or in someone else’s situa-
tion, or some cognitive standard.16 If one concludes that one is not receiving the 
rewards or recognition one deserves, the feelings that accompany this assess-
ment are referred to as relative deprivation. If people assess their personal 
situation, this is egoistic or individual deprivation; if they assess the situation of 
their group, it is called fraternalistic or group deprivation. It was assumed that 
fraternalistic relative deprivation was especially relevant in the context of 
movement participation.17 
In conclusion, classical approaches tend to describe contentious politics as 
spontaneous, irrational, expressive and often violent outbursts of collective ac-
tion in reaction to felt grievances, discontent and anomie. Protesters, according 
to classical approaches, are stressed, alienated, frustrated, deprived, disinte-
grated and marginalized individuals affected by economic crises, an unfair dis-
tribution of welfare, social rights, and normative breakdown. 
 
                                                          
11  W. Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (The Free Press, London, 1995). 
12  R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic traditions in modern Italy (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1993). 
13  McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency; B. Klan-
dermans, J. van der Toorn & J. van Stekelenburg, ‘Embeddedness and grievances: 
Collective action participation among immigrants’, American Sociological Review, 
73 (2008), pp. 992-1012. 
14  C. Tilly, The Contentious French (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1986). 
15  T. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1970).  
16  W.G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (Routledge, London, 
1966). 
17  Ibid. 
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Resources, opportunities and meaning: The present 
With the growth in social movement activity on both sides of the Atlantic in the 
late 1960s, protest started to be perceived as positive and a way of improving 
politics. It was even seen as essential in a mature political system, rather than as 
threatening or undermining democracies.18 Social movement scholars of the 
1970s and 1980s, who often happened to be activists themselves, were not per-
suaded by theories that labelled them as alienated, frustrated and disintegrated 
and their protest behaviour as irrational. They felt that the psychological make-
up attributed to movement participants by the classical approaches did not fit 
them and argued that, if anything, movement participants were integrated rather 
than isolated.19 Clearly, the classical approaches failed to account for this out-
burst of social movement activity being seen as positive rational politics and 
preceded by a growth rather than a decline in welfare. 
The changing perspectives on contentious politics and the growth of social 
movement activity in prosperous times made researchers in the US and Europe 
question where, if not from deprivation, social movement activity comes from. 
The answer was sought in different directions. In the US, structural approaches 
shifted attention from deprivation to the availability of resources, political op-
portunities and mobilizing structures to explain the rise of social movements, 
while in Europe, the social constructivistic ‘New Social Movement’ (NSM) 
approach focused attention on the growth of new protest potential, with griev-
ances and aspirations resulting from the developing post-industrial society.20 
While the structural approaches in the US tend to pay a great deal of attention to 
the how of collective action, the social constructivistic approaches in Europe 
attempt to explain why individuals are inclined to such actions.21 We will ex-
plore these approaches in turn. 
Structural approaches 
Structural approaches investigate how characteristics of social and political 
context determine the opportunities or constraints for protest. These approaches 
reject grievances and ideology as the explanation for the rise and decline of 
movements. Structural approaches have always taken as their point of departure 
the fact that grievances are ubiquitous and that the key question in movement 
participation research is not so much why people are aggrieved, as why ag-
grieved people participate. Two main paradigms emphasize, firstly, the distri-
                                                          
18  Ibid. 
19  McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency. 
20  B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi & S. Tarrow (eds), From Structure to Action: Comparing 
social movement research across cultures, Vol. 1 (JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, 1988). 
21  Ibid. 
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bution of resources and the organizational characteristics of social movements 
(‘resource mobilization’) and, secondly, contextual factors such as the political 
and institutional environment (‘political process’).  
Resource mobilization theorists wanted to move away from strong assump-
tions about the centrality of deprivation and grievances to a view that sees 
grievances as being a component – sometimes a secondary one – in the genera-
tion of social movements.22 Assigning grievances a subordinate position in 
theories explaining the rise and fall of social movements leads directly to an 
emphasis on mobilization processes or the dynamics and tactics of social move-
ment growth, decline and change.  
The resource mobilization approach examines the variety of resources that must be 
mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of 
movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to 
control or incorporate movements.23 
Resources can mean anything from material resources – jobs, income, sav-
ings and the right to specific goods and services – to non-tangible resources, 
such as authority, leadership, moral commitment, trust, friendship, skills and 
habits of industry. The reasoning goes that group conflict in its dynamic aspects 
can be conceptualized from the point of view of the mobilization of resources. 
Mobilization refers to the processes by which a discontented group assembles 
and invests resources for the pursuit of group goals. Conflict and change can be 
analyzed from the point of view of how resources are managed and allocated 
and the manner in which these resources can be redirected in the pursuit of 
group goals. 
Resource mobilization scholars view social movements as a set of opinions 
and beliefs in a population that represents preferences for promoting or 
preventing social change.24 To predict the likelihood of preferences being 
translated into protest, the mobilization perspective focuses on pre-existing 
organization and the integration of those parts of a population that share the 
preferences. Social movements whose related populations are highly organized 
internally are more likely than others to spawn organized forms of protest. Re-
source mobilization theorists focus explicitly on the organizational component 
of activity. They argue that resources (money, labour, legitimacy, etc.) must be 
mobilized for action to be possible. The degree of activity directed towards the 
accomplishment of goals is perceived by resource mobilization theorists as a 
function of the resources controlled by an organization. In summary, people 
                                                          
22  J.D. McCarthy & M.N. Zald, ‘Resource mobilization and social movements: A 
partial theory’, American Journal of Sociology, 82, 6 (1977), pp. 1212-1241.  
23  Ibid., p. 1212. 
24  Ibid. 
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protest from a resource mobilization perspective because they are able to mobi-
lize resources and feel politically successful. Prototypical protesters are rational, 
well-organized, professional and resourceful people who undertake well-
planned collective action with the goal of solving social problems. 
Resource mobilization theory has not escaped criticism. It borrows its 
concept from the vocabulary of economics (the flow of resources, costs and 
benefits, supply and demand, organization, movement entrepreneurs, movement 
industries) and is particularly suited to the depiction of social movements such 
as rational entities weighing up the costs and benefits of their action.25 How-
ever, expressions such as ‘costs and benefits’ may make activists and scholars 
of social movements feel uncomfortable, as they convey notions of cold calcu-
lation being applied to social action which instead is often inspired by ideals 
and passion. But this is exactly the notion that resource mobilization theorists 
want to convey, namely that the ebb and flow of social movement activity re-
sults from the ability to mobilize resources and the perceived chances of success 
rather than from rising or declining grievance levels. In addition, it has been 
argued that resource mobilization theorists fail to acknowledge the strength of 
indigenous resources. For instance, McAdam shows that the growth of the black 
insurgency movement in America in the 1960s was related to ‘injected’ re-
sources from elites but that indigenous resources such as informal networks 
providing solidarity, trust and leadership were important as well.26 Finally, ‘re-
source mobilization theorists are to be faulted for their failure to acknowledge 
the power inherent in disruptive tactics’.27 Piven and Cloward have argued that 
opportunities for protest occur when broad social changes and the restructuring 
of institutional life take place. Under such circumstances, the poor will take the 
opportunity to use the only power resource they have, namely protest. However, 
these ‘extraordinary occurrences’ that are ‘required to transform the poor from 
apathy to hope, from quiescence to indignation’28 are limited in number. In nor-
mal circumstances, the struggle to survive takes up all the time and energy poor 
people have, and only when daily life severely breaks down does protest 
emerge. 
While resource mobilization theorists explain the rise and fall of social 
movements by features internal to the movements themselves, such as the avail-
ability of resources and organizational aspects, political process theorists focus 
on external features, like changes or differences in the political and institutional 
environment of social movements. They argue that political environments vary 
                                                          
25  Ibid. 
26  McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency. 
27  Ibid., p. 30. 
28  F.F. Piven & R.A. Cloward, Poor Peoples’ Movements: Why they succeed, how they 
fail (Random House, New York, 1977), p. 14. 
 Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 26
over time and between areas. The paradigm proposes changes in or differences 
between political structures as the main explanation for the rise and fall of so-
cial movements and that differences from one country or era to another stem 
from the process by which a national political system shapes, checks and ab-
sorbs the challenges confronting it.29 
Three ideas are central to the political process approach: first, a social 
movement is a political rather than a psychological phenomenon; second, a 
social movement represents a continuous process from its creation to its decline 
rather than a discrete series of developmental stages; and third, different forms 
of action (‘repertoires of contentions’) are associated with different spatial and 
temporal locations.30 For Tilly, one of the leading theorists of the political proc-
ess approach, action repertoires are specific actions such as riots, demonstra-
tions, strikes, sit-ins, petitioning or lobbying that are carried out by collective 
actors over a specific period of time. Tarrow expands this concept and suggests 
that ‘actions are not only what people do when they are engaged in conflict with 
others, it is what they know how to do and what others expect them to do’.31 
The form of action chosen by social movements depends on factors including 
the structure of the political system (e.g. democratic institutions, the existence 
and structure of political parties, and possibilities for direct participation), the 
level of repression, and cultural traditions. The actions of social actors are, 
therefore, not purely random. Instead, action repertoires are shaped by structural 
variables and the cultural context in which they originate. 
By studying the changing action repertoires in France over the last four 
centuries, Tilly32 demonstrated that social movements draw on action reper-
toires that develop over long periods and change in conformity in an evolving 
context. If a prevailing repertoire of contention changes significantly at some 
point, the change is a symptom of a substantial alteration in the structure of 
power. An expansion of the state in nineteenth-century France, including a 
nationalization of politics, was, for instance, accompanied by a major change in 
the repertoire of collective action. The more spontaneous tax rebellions and 
bread riots aimed at the local authorities more or less disappeared and were 
replaced by more coherent forms of contention. The centralization of the state 
played an essential part in the creation of modern social movements with a 
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repertoire that is still present today: the strike, the demonstration, and the pro-
test meeting. 
Tarrow33 studied the cycle of protest that swept across Italy from the late 
1960s through the early 1970s and showed how protest spread from students’ 
and workers’ movements to virtually every sector of Italian society and gave 
rise to extra-parliamentary groups, violence and, finally, a return to traditional 
political patterns. In other words, by utilizing the political opportunities offered 
by the system, social movements create an ideologically and socially favourable 
environment for new social groups to mobilize. 
Political structures have also explained differences in protest activity be-
tween countries.34 For instance, the protest repertoire of social movements in 
Switzerland that were struggling within a direct democracy appeared to be more 
moderate than the radical repertoire employed by French social movements 
fighting their cause in a closed democracy.35 To strengthen the case for the 
argument that direct democratic procedures have a moderating effect on the 
action repertoires of social movements, Kriesi and Wisler36 showed that within 
one country, the Swiss federal state, differences between Swiss cantons regard-
ing direct democratic procedures had an impact on the action repertoires em-
ployed within these cantons. The German-speaking cantons were more open 
than the Latin ones and, not surprisingly, social movements based in the Ger-
man cantons employed a less radical action repertoire than their Latin counter-
parts.  
McAdam is a political process theorist who, while emphasizing structural 
aspects of the environment, also focuses on subjectivity. He explained the rise 
and fall of the civil-rights movement in the United States between 1930 and 
1970 with reference to political opportunities, political efficacy and institutions 
like black churches and black colleges.37 While classical theorists saw a direct 
link between social instability and political insurgency, McAdam saw only an 
indirect relationship, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
McAdam argues that two necessary conditions need to be in place to turn 
social instability into political insurgency: (i) available resources and open  
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Figure 1  McAdam’s 1982 political process model 
 
 
 
 
political opportunities, and (ii) cognitive liberation. Although the political pro-
cess model builds upon the resource mobilization approach, in contrast to this 
approach, it also takes the indigenous organizational capabilities of aggrieved 
populations into account. The second condition, that of cognitive liberation, 
proposes that the subjectivity of actors makes resources usable and collective 
action viable, and helps actors and groups to frame their situation as unjust and 
liable to change.38 Political opportunities and organization alone do not produce 
social movements. Mediating between political opportunities and organizational 
strength are people and their hopes and fears. In general, the political process 
approach argues that the ebb and flow of movement activity is related to the 
opening up and closure of political opportunities. Protesters are rational, in-
strumental, polity-oriented people who seize opportunities by lobbying and 
forming coalitions with political elites. 
Several studies make a convincing case for the political process approach but 
some fail to explain political protest, and others show that the approach is more 
effective in one context than another. The lack of theory concerning the specific 
mechanisms that link political process to movement activity is identified as the 
fundamental problem in explaining these divergent results.39 Moreover, incen-
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tives and expectations necessarily involve interpretation, just like opportunities 
and constraints.40 Indeed, if there were a perfect correlation between objective 
and subjective environments, there would be no need to distinguish between the 
two, whereas research suggests that this is often not the case.41  
Social constructivistic approaches 
The development of social movement activity in the prosperous times of the 
second half of the twentieth century shows differences between the US and 
Europe. While there was an emphasis in the US on structural aspects such as 
resources and political opportunities, answers were formulated in Europe in 
terms of new constituencies with new needs, values and aspirations arising from 
developing post-industrial societies, producing what were dubbed New Social 
Movements. This ‘NSM approach’ argued that processes of modernization 
created two groups of constituencies. The first were groups that had lagged 
behind due to marginalization processes related to industrial modernization 
(youth, women and the elderly were especially seen as groups threatened by the 
automation of productive work). The second were groups with a specific vul-
nerability resulting from modernization processes.42 In particular, the post-war 
generation, whose material needs were satisfied, developed post-material values 
from which emerged such new needs and aspirations as self-actualization and 
participation.43 This group came into conflict with a political and social system 
that was chiefly materialistic. The NSM approach was social constructivistic in 
emphasizing social changes in identity, lifestyle and culture. NSM scholars 
utilized identity as their core concept, with Melucci arguably being the most 
explicit.44 He thought collective identity ‘bridge[s] the gap between behavior 
and meaning, between “objective” conditions and “subjective” motives and 
orientation, between “structure” and “agency”’.45 
However, social constructivistic approaches were not an exclusively Euro-
pean matter and the hegemony of structural approaches in the US began to be 
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challenged in the mid 1980s.46 The social constructivistic perspective concen-
trates on questions of how individuals and groups perceive and interpret mate-
rial and socio-political conditions. Social constructivists argue that if we want to 
understand why people protest, we need to know how they perceive and inter-
pret their social-political context. A number of European and US social move-
ment scholars with social-psychology backgrounds called for attention to be 
paid to meaning and its construction and identity. They referred to explanations 
founded in emotion, such as interpretation, symbolization and meaning, and to 
social-psychology expansions of structural approaches such as resource mobili-
zation.47 They argued that structural explanations are limited because individu-
als who are in the same structural position do not display identical behaviour. A 
shared position can never provide sufficient explanation of individual behav-
iour.48 Even if people display identical behaviour, their motivational back-
ground and their accompanying emotions may still be different.49 
This social constructivistic approach draws on past views but is not a return 
to the classical approaches of the 1950s. While both classical and social con-
structivistic approaches recognize that emotions and cognition are important to 
collective action, the classical approaches see them as pathological, whereas 
social constructivistic approaches perceive them as the normal, ubiquitous 
aspects of social and political life. Social constructivistic approaches try to 
understand why people who are seemingly in the same situation respond so 
differently. They question why some people feel ashamed of their situation, 
while others take pride in it; why some are aggrieved, while others are not; why 
some define their situation as unjust, while others do not; why some feel power-
less, while others feel empowered; and why some are angry, while others are 
afraid. These are the issues that social constructivistic approaches to social 
movements seek to answer. We now turn to meaning (or construction), identity, 
and emotional and motivational explanations as examples of contemporary so-
cial constructivistic approaches. 
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The first involves the meaning that people attach to their social environment. 
This is the direct or indirect subject of investigation by students of protest. 
Perceptions are not fixed but are susceptible to interpretation and thus play a 
role in the construction of meaning.50 And participation in collective action thus 
depends not only on perceptions of structural strain, availability and the de-
ployment of material resources, the opening up or closing of political oppor-
tunities or a cost-benefit calculation more generally but also on the way these 
variables are constructed and framed and the degree to which they resonate with 
targets of mobilization.51 
Social movements play a significant role in the diffusion of ideas and values 
to the extent that some scholars see the construction of meaning as a move-
ment’s primary function.52 Through processes such as consensus mobilization53 
or framing,54 activists seek to disseminate their definition of a situation to the 
public at large. Participating because of common interests or ideologies requires 
a shared interpretation of who should act, and why and how. Movements affect 
such interpretations by the information they disseminate, a process known as 
‘framing’. Social movements do their utmost to communicate how they inter-
pret a social, political or economic change (its diagnosis) and what should be 
done (the prognosis) as a reaction to perceived losses or unfulfilled aspira-
tions.55 The more individual orientations, values and beliefs become congruent 
with activities, goals and ideologies of social movement organizations, the 
greater the level of sharedness. Gerhards and Rucht’s study56 of flyers produced 
by the various groups and organizations involved in protests against the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in Berlin is an excellent 
example in this respect. The researchers showed how links were constructed 
between the ideological framework of the organizers of the demonstration and 
those of the participating organizations to create a shared definition of the situ-
ation.  
With regard to social identity, the clearest definition that has been located in 
the social-psychology literature is presented by Tajfel and Turner. According to 
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them, identity is ‘that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from 
his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the 
value and emotional significance attached to that membership’.57 Hence a social 
identity makes people think, feel and act as members of that specific group. But 
people have many social identities. Why do some social identities become 
central to mobilization while others do not? Probably the most powerful factor 
that brings group membership to mind is conflict or rivalry between groups, and 
in times of inter-group conflict, people are inclined to take to the streets on 
behalf of their group. 
Collective action is a group rather than an individual phenomenon but in the 
end it is individuals who decide whether or not to participate. This raises the 
question of what connects the individual to the collective. Identification with 
the group involved seems to be the answer. The influence of identification proc-
esses on protest participation refers to the circumstances in which people iden-
tify with the others involved. People participate not so much because of the 
outcome associated with participation but because they identify with the other 
participants. Group identification changes the focus from what ‘I’ want to what 
‘we’ want. Collective action participation is seen as a way to show who ‘we’ are 
and what ‘we’ stand for, and people experience commitment and solidarity with 
other members of the group. In addition, group members have the idea that ‘we’ 
have much in common (by way of shared grievances, aims, values or goals). 
Group identification seems to be a powerful reason for participating in protest.58 
Little is known about the influence of emotions on protest behaviour. Yet it 
is acknowledged that emotions permeate all the stages in social movement 
participation: recruitment, staying in and dropping out. Emotions function as 
accelerators or amplifiers,59 making things move more quickly or sound louder. 
In the world of protest, ‘accelerating’ means that one’s motives for joining, 
staying in or leaving a social movement translate into action more quickly due 
to emotions, while ‘amplifying’ means that these motives become stronger. Few 
researchers have focused on the complex emotional processes that channel fear 
and anger into moral indignation and political activity. Those of us who have 
been part of protest events or have watched reports on protest events in the 
media may find this hard to believe. However partly as a reaction to the classi-
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cal approaches that stressed the irrational character of movement participation 
and partly because they are complicated phenomena, emotions have not fea-
tured prominently in the social movement literature. Even ‘affective’ phenom-
ena such as moral shocks60 or suddenly imposed grievances61 have been primar-
ily approached from a cognitive point of view. But all demands for change 
begin with discontent. Emotions warn people of threats and challenges and 
propel behaviour. Moreover, affective measures, such as affective commit-
ment62 and injustice,63 have the biggest impact on behaviour. Thus if one wants 
to understand engagement in collective action, one must understand the work-
ings of emotions.  
Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta argue that emotions are socially constructed 
but that ‘some emotions are more [socially] constructed than others, involving 
more cognitive processes’. 64 In their view, emotions that are politically relevant 
are at the social construction end of the scale. For these emotions, cultural and 
historical factors play an important role in the interpretation (i.e. perception) of 
the state of affairs by which they are generated. Obviously, emotions can be 
manipulated. Activists work hard to create moral outrage and anger and to 
provide a target against which these can be vented. They have to weave a moral, 
cognitive and emotional blanket of attitudes. Framing theory has provided a 
way to link ideas and the social construction of ideas with organizational and 
political process factors. These studies, however, deal almost entirely with the 
cognitive components of frames and neglect any emotional components. Power-
ful frames might, however, be related to the values and emotions that they con-
tain and it might be argued that frames not only resonate cognitively but also 
emotionally. 
These issues are all related to questions of motivation. Demands for change 
are rooted in a notion of belonging (identity) and experienced grievances (con-
structed meaning) in combination with emotions related to a specific grievance. 
Although, typically, many members of disadvantaged groups are dissatisfied 
with their collective situation and strongly sympathize with the goals of collec-
tive actions, often only a small proportion actually participate in protest to 
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achieve these goals.65 In collective action research therefore, the motives under-
lying participation have become a key issue.66  
Over the last two decades, social psychologists have investigated the motives 
behind participation and demonstrated that instrumental reasoning, identifica-
tion, emotions and ideological factors form a motivational constellation in 
response to the question about why people participate in contentious politics.67 
Interestingly though, this motivational constellation seems to be context de-
pendent: Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans and van Dijk ,68 for instance, showed 
that, in demonstrations organized by a labour movement, people tend to be 
instrumentally motivated whereas demonstrators against neoliberalism are more 
ideologically motivated. In more general terms, people are inclined to take the 
instrumental path if a conflict is framed in terms of material interests and the 
ideological path if it is framed in terms of conflicting principles. 
In conclusion, social constructivistic approaches argue that protesters live in 
a perceived reality and that threats and opportunities are socially constructed 
and/or framed by social movements and other social and political actors. Group 
identification plays a key role in what protesters think, feel and do and protest-
ing is as rational or irrational as all social behaviour. People participate there-
fore not only in collective action for instrumental reasons but also because they 
identify with others involved or because they want to express their anger and 
indignation at a target if they believe that their values have been violated. Social 
constructivistic approaches investigate how perceptions, emotions and identities 
shape a person’s motivation to take part in contentious politics. There appears to 
be a great deal of merit in utilizing social constructivistic approaches alongside 
structural approaches when studying contentious politics. However, social con-
structivistic approaches are characterized by their variety. They have four key 
themes – the construction of meaning, identity, emotions and motivation – but a 
common framework to allow the integration of these variables is clearly miss-
ing. Social constructivistic studies tend to consist of single case-studies that 
inevitably have little to say about contextual variation. However, one needs to 
understand the characteristics of the socio-political and mobilizing context to 
make sense of the findings in a specific country or period of time. This requires 
comparative studies rather than single case-studies. 
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The social constructivistic approach thus runs the risk of fragmentation and 
decontextualization. In an attempt to bridge the gap between the objective exis-
tence of the opportunities and resources in the environment, as opposed to the 
protesters’ subjective perception, social constructivistic approaches clearly need 
a common framework that integrates key themes and takes the socio-political 
context into account. 
Contextualized contestation: The prospects 
In the rapidly globalizing world of the network society and the information 
society,69 streams of migration are creating diasporas in which flows of ideas 
and resources are influencing contentious politics in both their homelands and 
in their host countries. At the same time, globalization has resulted in more 
transnational and supranational political institutions such as the European 
Union, the United Nations and the IMF that are having an ever-increasing 
impact on people’s daily lives. Some scholars believe they can detect the emer-
gence of a new social fabric, which they have baptized the ‘network society’,70 
arguing that networks have become the prime mode of organization and struc-
ture of society. Formal organizations have turned into networks of networks, 
which in turn are intersected with informal networks rooted in personal life 
worlds and more diffuse interpersonal group settings. The logic of the network 
society pervades all spheres of social, economic and cultural life.71 In addition, 
new communication technologies are giving rise to the information society,72 as 
new technologies intensify societal change and pace. As Held puts it:  
… what is new about the modern global system is the chronic intensification of 
patterns of interconnectedness mediated by such phenomena as the modern commu-
nication industry and new information technology and the spread of globalization in 
and through new dimensions of interconnectedness.73  
It should be noted that Held made his statement at a time when the real 
communication revolution was still to come.  
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Societies are changing fundamentally and this affects contentious politics. 
After all, information and networks are essential elements of mobilization and 
one could assume that such profound changes must be having an impact on the 
dynamics of contention. And as a result of these transformations, the field of 
contentious politics has changed significantly.74 Protest as a political tactic has 
diffused across a range of constituencies and claims. Contributing to and re-
sulting from such diffusion is an increased tolerance for protest so that engaging 
in political protest is no longer stigmatized. Moreover, protest in Western demo-
cracies has generally been an effective tool for politically disadvantaged groups 
both on the left and the right.75 This conveys the message that the tactic is not 
only legitimate but also effective. Simply because more citizens have protested 
more frequently and on more diverse issues, more experienced protesters are 
available for subsequent protest calls.76 The legitimacy of protest, its proven 
efficacy and the ample experience of protest among citizens will all influence 
the dynamics of contention.  
Changing society, changing paradigms? 
Perhaps more than in any other sector of comparative politics, the study of 
contention is sensitive to developments in the real world.77 We therefore assume 
that, just as in the 1960s, contemporary changes in society will give rise to new 
approaches. Contentious politics is a multi-faceted phenomenon with socio-
political, organizational and social-psychology roots. To investigate who rebels 
and on what issues requires inclusive models. Yet the connection between 
structures that canalize grievances into contentious politics is a thorny but rela-
tively underexposed issue in the protest literature.  
This observation is not new. In 1988 Klandermans, Kriesi and Tarrow sug-
gested a research agenda with the emphasis on comparative research and the 
integration of structural, cultural and motivational factors.78 Their book was the 
first tangible outcome of a prolonged exchange between representatives of the 
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American and European approaches and this resulted in an increasingly closely 
knit network of contacts across the Atlantic that was instrumental in organizing 
a series of conferences and edited volumes. In 1996 a book edited by McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald79 was released with a widely shared synthesis of three broad 
sets of factors to analyze the emergence and development of social movements: 
the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the move-
ment; mobilizing structures; and framing processes. Two additional synthesiz-
ing efforts came in 1999 from Della Porta and Diani80 and in 2004 from Snow, 
Soule and Kriesi,81 all of whom drew together political opportunity, movement 
framing and the social network theory. So although social constructivistic 
approaches are usually framed as being opposed to structuralist accounts, the 
contemporary research agenda calls for an integration of structural, political and 
sociological theories of movements with social constructivistic approaches 
rooted in social psychology and cultural sociology. Yet research agendas 
focusing on comparative research and theoretical syntheses of structure and 
agency are as relevant today as they ever were. To be sure, theories of conten-
tious politics are currently more sophisticated than previously but many ques-
tions remain unresolved, such as how the political and mobilizing context 
‘translates’ into contentious politics. These questions require interdisciplinary 
and comparative studies. Such studies have not featured prominently in the 
social movement literature, perhaps because truly interdisciplinary and com-
parative studies are so complex. Therefore, the question as to how characteris-
tics of socio-political structure might translate into action is as relevant now as 
it was in 1988 when Klandermans, Kriesi and Tarrow first drew attention to it.  
An explanatory framework, which we developed in collaboration with 
Stefaan Walgrave, might be useful here because it highlights precisely the inter-
action between structure and action as its point of departure. It crosses interdis-
ciplinary boundaries that connect the micro level of individual protesters with 
the meso level of social movements, and the macro level of national political 
systems and supranational processes. We started from the notion that the answer 
to questions such as who protests, why people protest (i.e. the issues) and the 
forms of contention (e.g. grassroots activity, civil war) lies in the interaction of 
supranational processes, political processes at the national level and the mobi-
lizing context (see Figure 2).  
What follows elaborates on contextual variation. Given that this is a chapter 
in a book on social movements in Africa, the framework will be discussed 
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against the background of the continent’s (contextualized) contestation. Conflict 
in Africa is still widespread and tenacious and is often rooted in material 
poverty, scarcity, ecological decline and inequality. Inter-group conflicts are 
partly related to historical and current international engagements in Africa but 
also emanate from local tensions and the workings of unequal and corrupt 
socio-political systems. These international, national and local conflicts trans-
late into and shape daily life and have long-term effects that fuel conflict in new 
forms. Indeed, if anything, Africa is the continent in which to observe contextu-
alized contestation. 
 
 
Figure 2   Contextualized contestation 
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In the social movement literature, it is increasingly acknowledged that social 
movement activity is evolving in response to processes of globalization,82 and 
how contention is moving from the national to the transnational level is being 
examined.83 Scholars have identified, for instance, the mechanisms and paths 
along which this scale shift is occurring,84 the close relationship between global 
governance institutions, nation states and transnational social movements,85 and 
the multilayered opportunity structures in which movements operate nowa-
days.86 Briefly, all these studies show that the socio-political context in which 
movements operate to spread their aims and ideas is not simply national or only 
supranational but there is a mix of supranational, national and local influences. 
National processes. Countries vary in terms of the circumstances they create 
for contentious politics. The political opportunity structure, the openness of the 
political system for challengers, the access points available for people to defend 
their interests and express their opinions and the temporal political configura-
tion have all been identified as determinants of the incidence and type of protest 
in democratic polities.87 With regard to Africa, states are often said to be failing, 
levels of democratization tend to be low and many are being led by corrupt 
dictators. Apart from pervasive misgovernance and gross abuses of state power, 
the nature and role of ‘ungoverned political spaces’ across the continent is 
poorly understood: how do they enhance conflict and translate it into conten-
tious politics? Although the social movement literature is quite elaborate as far 
as the effects of repression are concerned, little is yet known about the influence 
of supranational processes on contention within a state. How do, for instance in 
Zimbabwe which is arguably one of the world’s most repressive states, interna-
tional lobbies, boycotts, the absence of food and medical care or resources 
provided by diasporas create chances for social movements to prevent or 
promote social change? While misgovernance or non-governance, failing states, 
repression and corruption are not unique to Africa, their direct political impact 
is probably greater than elsewhere, inhibiting institution-building, development 
and the fair distribution of resources. Again it remains a question of how the 
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sphere of governance, politics, power and the state in specific countries influ-
ences the mobilizing context and the quality and extent of contentious politics.  
Mobilizing context. The mobilizing context in a country can be described in 
terms of supply, demand and mobilization.88 While the demand side of protest 
refers to the protesters’ potential in a society; the supply side refers to the 
characteristics of the social movement sector in a society. Mobilization refers to 
the techniques and mechanisms that link supply and demand. We will consider 
these factors one by one.  
A demand for protest begins with levels of grievance in a society.89 The deep 
insecurities of life in many African countries – ecological, material, social, 
political and health-related (notably due to AIDS) – may have a direct impact 
on perceived grievances and thus on conflict behaviour. New religious identities 
are also developing in some forms and settings, resulting in radical contentious 
politics. In addition, it seems plausible that a demand for change is defined by 
the diasporas as well. How these grievances are shaped by the (supra)national 
context and translated into demand for protest is an interesting but so far unan-
swered question. Even less is known about the role of the mobilizing context as 
translator, facilitator and organizer of ethnic conflict, religious confrontations 
and resource-related conflicts. Why do certain grievances end up in contentious 
politics that originate in conflicting principles while others end up in conten-
tious politics originating in conflicting material interests? 
With regard to the supply side of contentious politics, this concerns the char-
acteristics of the social movement sector in a society, its strength, diversity and 
contentiousness. Traditionally, the social movement sector is conceived of as a 
conglomerate of movement organizations, such as trade unions, associations, 
liberation movements or civil-society organizations,90 that provide the more or 
less formalized infrastructure from which contentious politics is built.91 Increas-
ingly however, we are seeing protest participation rooted in every-day networks 
of participants and social movement actors involved in diffuse and decentral-
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ized networks.92 How does the political system (repressive or otherwise) shape 
the supply side? Is it because of repression and/or bans on open mobilization 
that organizations go underground and turn into loose networks? Egypt and 
Yemen, where inclusive informal social networks (rather than formal organiza-
tions) are an essential mechanism for spreading Islamist ideas,93 offer examples. 
Does religious identification influence the political arena in divided countries 
with a failing political system (e.g. Nigeria) as religious community leaders 
create alternative routes for mobilization? What do activists and political actors 
of a previous generation do after their ‘projects’ have ended in success or 
failure? Examples here are the evolution of the former leaders and membership 
of anti-apartheid movements in South Africa and their changing careers. These 
political actors emanated from social movements and have transformed them.94 
How do social movements and actors evolve in current post-colonial African 
conditions shaped by liberalization and globalization? How do, for instance, 
large resourceful organizations, like the UN, with their influential global justice, 
human rights and democratization framework shape and influence the supply 
side? Globalization in Africa also entails the rapidly growing role of China (and 
other Asian countries) on the continent and often evokes counter-responses by 
Africans.  
Finally, processes of mobilization bring demands for protest together with a 
supply of protest opportunities. Globalization and the development of the net-
work society and the information society have radically changed mobilization 
techniques. New information and communication technologies have altered the 
ways in which activists communicate and mobilize. Is typical grassroots mo-
bilization changing as a result of the use of these new communication tech-
nologies? How are social actors mobilizing for change in a repressive political 
system and who is being addressed in a situation of non-governance or mis-
governance? How does the spread of innovative ideas and practices, which is 
playing a central role in the shift of scale,95 influence the mobilization tech-
niques employed by activists? At a general level, supply, demand and mobiliza-
tion are supposedly shaped by the supranational and national context. At a 
certain level, the mobilizing context is further coloured by characteristics of 
contestation, most notably the specific issue concerned. Little is known about 
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the way mobilizing contexts vary, how such variation is determined or how it 
impacts on the characteristics of contestation. 
In short, we could ask a series of questions concerning contestation with 
regard to Africa: Who participates in protest? What are their socio-demographic 
characteristics? Are they the elite or ordinary people? Why are they protesting 
(i.e. on which issues)? What forms of protest are being employed (i.e. demon-
strations, sit-ins, lobbying, riots)? How are they being mobilized? 
First, let us look at who the participants are. Some scholars argue that new 
information and communication technologies are helping to fabricate new 
connections among people from diverse backgrounds, resulting in mobilizing 
structures that might be more diverse and inclusive on gender, race and eth-
nicity, and nationality.96 Indeed, protest participation has gradually normalized 
and all sorts of people are resorting to protest to demand change.97 But it is not 
clear whether this is the case in Africa too. Are the most deprived people taking 
to the streets or is it only the elite? Moreover, the question remains as to 
whether new information and communication technologies are as influential in 
Africa as they appear to be in the Western world. 
The question of what people are protesting for focuses on issues and mo-
tivation. Issues may have different origins, in the form of conflicting principles 
or conflicting material interests. For extremely deprived people, the struggle to 
survive takes up all their time and energy. Does this imply that mainstream 
African protest has its origin in material interests and that instrumental 
motivations push people on to the streets?  
Concerning forms of protest, the action repertoire is influenced by the 
(supra)national and mobilizing context. This may have an effect on whether 
activists organize large mass-based organizations, whether they lobby and or-
ganize petitions, or whether discontent turns into bread riots. Obviously, all 
these forms of contestation have their own motivational dynamics and appeal to 
different people.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed how developments in the real world have influenced 
the study of contention. It started with classical approaches, such as mass 
society and collective behaviour theories, that tried to explain large movements 
before the Second World War like Nazism and Communism. The growth of 
social movement activity with a goal-oriented and rational focus in the 1960s 
called for more structural and rational approaches such as the political process 
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and resource-mobilization approach and for more social constructivistic ap-
proaches derived from cultural sociology and social psychology. Since the 
1990s, activists mobilizing for social change have been operating in a drama-
tically changing social-political context. Social movement scholars have reacted 
with arguments about synergy, making the case for synergizing structural and 
social constructivistic approaches. The final sections therefore presented an 
explanatory framework for contextualized contentious politics in which we can 
integrate influences from supra(national) and mobilizing contexts within a 
particular country. Obviously, a comprehensive master framework that brings 
these elements together is still to be built. The most important challenge is 
probably the integration of the concepts proposed. In this regard, moving from 
static to more dynamic explanations of contentious politics is important. The 
recent conceptual shift, proposed by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly,98 to look for 
mechanisms and processes that occur in many different kinds of movements and 
that lead to different outcomes depending on the specific contexts within which 
they occur may be a useful direction. Indeed, studying contentious politics in a 
more dynamic way would do justice to the theoretical and empirical richness of 
the concepts and could be crucial for gaining better insight into the processes at 
hand. The study of contentious politics is now much richer, more sophisticated 
and more synergized than it was sixty years ago. The ‘war on paradigms’99 of 
the 1980s and 1990s seems to have been replaced by a new decade of ‘synergy’. 
The ‘roadmap’ presented here has tried to exemplify the approaches used in 
the study of social movements over the last sixty years and it is hoped that the 
explanatory framework will be useful to social movement scholars all over the 
globe, but especially in Africa. Social movements have been well studied in the 
European and Latin American contexts but only sporadically in Africa, and then 
mainly in South Africa. Current developments across African societies might 
invite social movement scholars to try and explain these dynamics of contention 
by applying insights from the social movement literature as developed in non-
African contexts. 
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This chapter reflects on the empirical cases of contemporary 
social movements in South Africa and Africa in relation to the 
debates that have emerged in the global academy. In particular 
it responds to two assertions that have become common in this 
debate; first, that the fulcrum of social struggles for a human 
development agenda has shifted from the arena of production to 
consumption, and second, that identity movements and strug-
gles are replacing the overtly material ones, especially in post-
industrial societies. Studies of social movements in South Africa 
and Africa, however, suggest that both these assertions are too 
simplistic, and that in reality a more nuanced interpretation is 
required. While the scale of social struggles has expanded in 
the arena of consumption, the South African and African case 
studies suggest that movements in the arena of production not 
only continue to retain vibrancy, but also are crucial to the sus-
tainability of struggles of consumption. Moreover these same 
case studies suggest that while identity movements and strug-
gles are indeed on the increase, material issues are as relevant 
to these struggles as they have been to the earlier social move-
ments. Finally the chapter concludes with the argument that 
these movements are crucial in many of the democratizing so-
cieties for creating the substantive uncertainty that is necessary 
for facilitating the accountability of political elites to their mar-
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ginalized citizens so that a more sustainable human-oriented 
development agenda is realized.   
Introduction 
The study of social movements has undergone something of a revival in recent 
years, partly due to the resumption of social struggles on the international plane. 
The most prominent is of course the anti-globalization movement that first 
made its public presence felt on the streets of Seattle but has since mobilized in 
almost every city where any of the international financial agencies have held 
their meetings. Indeed, this explosion of global struggle has spawned an un-
precedented number of transnational organizations, the vast majority of which 
are directed at reforming some element of the global order.2 
Social struggles have not only increased on the international plane or in 
OECD countries but have also become a prominent feature of the political scene 
in many of the countries of the South. This is especially so in the Third Wave of 
democracies where a decade or two of market-oriented economic reforms have 
eroded the popular support and legitimacy of newly established democratic 
regimes.3 One of the most prominent cases of national struggle is the Chiapas 
rebellion in Mexico but similar popular revolts have manifested themselves in 
many parts of the developing world and have even toppled governments. 
Where social struggles emerge, academics and scholars often follow. The 
explosion of global and national struggles has provoked a plethora of studies on 
global and national social movements4 but there was also an independent im-
petus for these social movement studies. An earlier generation of studies polar-
ized into three distinct blocs inspired by resource mobilization, political op-
portunity and identity-oriented theories. In recent years however, there have 
been a number of initiatives to bridge the divides and develop a comprehensive 
explanation of the rise, operations and decline of social movements.5 
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Contemporary social movement theories are not only distinguished by the 
way they resort to a multiplicity of explanatory variables but also to the rise of 
new popular orthodoxies. Two of the most prominent of these are that identity 
movements and struggles are replacing the previously overtly material ones, and 
that the fulcrum of social struggles for a human-development agenda has shifted 
from the arena of production to consumption, both of which are seen to ex-
pressly manifest themselves in post-industrial societies. This chapter speaks to 
these two assertions in the global academy but from the perspective of the Afri-
can experience.  
The empirical foundation of the analysis is the first comprehensive national 
study of contemporary social movements in South Africa, which was convened 
by the Centre for Civil Society and the School of Development Studies at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, and was funded by Atlantic Philanthropies and 
the Ford Foundation. It represented the collaborative engagement of over twen-
ty academics and researchers and studies of seventeen social movements, strug-
gles or organizations were undertaken over a two-year period. Similar research 
questions on the character, leadership, operations and significance of the move-
ments were addressed in each of the studies and resulted in a level of generali-
zation about South African social movements.6 The case studies are supple-
mented by an ever-growing body of empirical analyses of contemporary social 
movements across Africa, a collection that constitutes a unique conceptual lens 
through which the assumptions of and the debates in the global academy can be 
tested and reflected upon respectively. 
Is the African experience an appropriate reference point for engaging the de-
bates in the global academy? African societies are, of course, not post-industrial 
societies and so it may seem unfair to respond to the theoretical assertions on 
social movements from a context that is so socio-economically different. But is 
it intellectually sustainable for the global academy to develop a theory of social 
movements – with universal ambitions – on the narrow experiences of post-
industrial societies? Even if it were, one African experience – the South African 
one – would still be relevant as the country represents an interesting hybrid, 
reflecting the post-industrial and developing worlds. And it is also a transitional 
society in constant evolution and a state of flux, with elements of both the past 
and the present. This makes it a useful social laboratory within which social 
scientists can investigate collective expressions of protest, state response and 
societal evolution. 
This chapter thus addresses the debates on social movements in the global 
academy from the perspective of the African continent’s, and in particular 
South Africa’s, contemporary social struggles. It begins by summarizing the 
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debates in the social movement literature on the relevance of identity and ma-
terial struggles, and the arenas in which they can be mobilized. This is followed 
by an analysis of the South African and African case studies and how they 
speak to the global debates. The chapter then considers the relevance of these 
movements for democracy and a human-oriented development trajectory, with 
the conclusion drawing together the major threads of the analysis. 
New-found dogmas in contemporary social movement theory 
Current explanations of social movements are built on three foundational ele-
ments: the political structure that defines opportunities and constraints,7 the 
human and financial resources that enable a movement’s mobilization and 
operations,8 and the identities that provide the impetus for actors to become 
involved and provide legitimacy for the movement. Of course these three 
distinct elements were, as indicated earlier, the explanatory variables that were 
advanced by three distinct schools in social movement theory. Yet it is the third, 
which focuses on the central role of identity, that has been particularly influ-
ential in contemporary explanations of social movements. This identity-oriented 
paradigm insists that the identity, status and the values of actors are what make 
the ultimate difference in the mobilization of collectives.9 These subjective ele-
ments, they argue, create what Melucci10 terms systems of reference that enable 
the shared feelings of grievance or outrage that prompt people to form collec-
tives and actively enter the political arena. 
It is important to remember the context in which this theory originated. 
Largely developed to explain the rise and influence of so-called ‘identity-based’ 
movements – racial or religiously constructed, women’s, gay rights and even 
environmental collectives – in economically developed western democracies, it 
challenged Marxist interpretations that placed distributional issues at the centre 
of explanations of social movements. Yet this paradigm, while initially popular 
within the academy, nevertheless lost its shine as it was subjected to a barrage 
of criticism in the 1990s. However the explanations once again came into vogue 
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with the explosion of transnational organizations and mobilizational collectives, 
many of which questioned and challenged the neoliberal tenets of official glo-
balization initiatives.  
The point to note is that this explanatory paradigm’s popularity returned 
among not only its earlier advocates but also among many of its earlier critics 
within the academy and the movements themselves. The well-known sociolo-
gist Michael Buroway11 makes the case for why an identity-based explanatory 
paradigm is more useful for understanding the myriad of social struggles against 
the various elements of official globalization. In his view, globalization as it is 
defined and advanced by its political, policy, and corporate architects has en-
abled the expansion of the market in hitherto uncharted territory. The net effect 
is that its consequences have begun to impact on a far wider set of stakeholders 
than in earlier epochs. He thus concludes that in this ‘post communist era pro-
gressive struggles have moved away from distributional politics to focus on 
identity politics or what Nancy Fraser calls a politics of recognition’.12 
A related but distinct assertion in the contemporary explanation of social 
movements and struggles is the increasingly widely held belief among both 
scholars and activists that the fulcrum of mobilization and anti-hegemonic po-
litical activity is shifting from the realm of production to that of consumption. 
Again, Buroway’s article makes this assertion explicit. Drawing on Polanyi,13 
he suggests that counter-hegemonic potential lies not only in the realm of pro-
duction, as classically understood, but also in the domain of consumption and 
the market:  
Everyone suffers from the market in as much as unrestrained it leads to the 
destruction of the environment, global warming, toxic wastes, the colonization of 
free time, and so forth. ... Whereas alienated and degraded labour may excite a 
limited alternative, it does not have the universalism of the market that touches 
everyone in multiple ways. It is the market, therefore, that offers possible grounds 
for counter hegemony. We see this everywhere but especially in the amalgam of 
movements against the many guises of globalization.14 
And he is not the only one with this view in the academy. David Harvey15 in 
The New Imperialism arrives at a similar conclusion on the basis of his analysis 
of neo-liberalism, which he argues is Capital’s response to the problems of 
over-accumulation that emerged in the last three decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. His analysis holds that the dominant logic of capital accumulation in the 
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contemporary period is what he calls, following Rosa Luxemburg, ‘accumu-
lation by dispossession’ which forces ‘the costs of devaluations of surplus capi-
tals upon the weakest and most vulnerable territories and populations’.16 The 
result is an explosion of struggles outside the arena of production around the 
privatization of basic services and the displacement of the poor and marginal-
ized. Harvey concludes that greater attention needs to be paid to the struggles 
occasioned by accumulation through dispossession and that links need to be 
forged between these and proletarian struggles at the point of production. 
While there is not much that can be disputed in Harvey’s carefully con-
structed and nuanced conclusion, the more extreme readings of these processes 
both within the academy and among social-movement activists must be ques-
tioned. In the case of the latter, a growing perception has been that unions have 
lost their potential to serve as institutional agents for counter-hegemonic strug-
gle, and the only hope now remains in a range of radical social movements lo-
cated in the arena of reproduction. Ashwin Desai has explicitly expressed this 
view, as has Richard Pithouse who asserts that: 
... the idea of the multitude has freed many from both the fetish of the proletariat as 
the only viable agent of challenge to capital and the fetish of the nation as defender 
against capital. Given the reality that most resistances in contemporary South Africa 
are at the point of consumption (basic services, housing, health care, education etc) 
rather than production, and are largely community rather than union driven, as well 
as the complete immersion of the South African elite into the trans-national elite, 
these are very welcome releases.17 
How then do these two assertions, which have effectively become the do-
minant orthodoxies not only within the social-movement literature but also 
among progressive social-movement activists themselves, stand up to the South 
African and wider continental case studies? It is this question that the next 
section considers. 
Reflections on the South African and continental case studies 
It may be useful to begin this reflection on social movements in contemporary 
Africa by focusing on South Africa and with the obvious and perhaps banal 
remark that these institutions are essentially the products of the post-apartheid 
moment. However this is not to suggest that they are emerging from a vacuum. 
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Clearly their strategies, activities and orientations draw on the experiences, 
repertoires and other rich heritage of struggle in South Africa. Nevertheless, the 
post-apartheid moment has imparted a particular character to them. Whether it 
is the economic crisis of the post-apartheid South Africa as is manifested in its 
unemployment and poverty rates, the cost recovery initiatives of the local state, 
made mandatory by the policy choices of post-1994 state elites or the demo-
cratic and essentially liberalized political environment of this period, all crucial-
ly influenced the genesis of these movements, their evolution and their strate-
gies and tactics. But this is where their similarity ends.  
This is important to note because in the emotive atmosphere within which 
political debate occurs these movements are often implicitly projected by both 
state elites and public officials, and social-movement activists themselves as a 
coherent homogenous entity. Some political leaders and public officials have 
intimated that these movements undermine democracy because of their engage-
ment in extra-institutional action. And some social-movement activists and in-
tellectuals, on the other hand, portray the movements in romanticized terms, 
describing them as arenas of free democratic debate and participation epito-
mized in a ‘principled internationalism, a socialist vision, and an independent 
mass-based mobilisation and struggle as an ideological and organisational alter-
native to the capitalist ANC’.18 
The South African and continental case studies of social movements both 
challenge the assumption of homogeneity underlying these views, for not only 
do they speak to a somewhat hypothetical ideal rather than to the current reality 
of social movements but they also generalize the respective ideal as charac-
teristic of all within the social-movement universe. As a way of reminding our-
selves of the heterogeneity of grassroots activism, it is useful to undertake a 
typology of what it is that social movements in South Africa and the wider con-
tinent oppose. 
First, a large swathe of activism in South Africa is directed against govern-
ment policy on distributional issues, particularly with regard to the inability of 
many poor South Africans to access basic services. Privatization and cost re-
covery are perceived as the key elements debilitating delivery. Movements that 
reflect such campaigns include, among others, the Soweto Electricity Crisis 
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Committee,19 the Anti-Privatisation Forum,20 the former Concerned Citizens 
Forum,21 the now-divided Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign,22 and the 
Treatment Action Campaign.23 
Similarly, the emergence of social movements on the African continent has 
taken place within the context of deprivation, rights denial and injustice. This 
context is characterized by a lack of access to basic services like water, 
medicine, housing and electricity. It is the various claims to and demands on 
governments for these rights that have shaped the logic and coherence of the 
various movements that have emerged on the continent. These include but are 
not limited to the Ghanaian, Zambian and Zimbabwean Anti-Privatisation Fo-
rums that are similar to the one operating in South Africa.24 
Second, some movements oppose the state, banks and private landlords 
through opposition to eviction and attempts to secure land tenure. Movements 
in South Africa that have taken up these struggles are the Landless People’s 
Movement,25 the Concerned Citizens Group,26 and the Western Cape Anti-
Eviction Campaign.27 Social movements in other parts of Africa have mobilized 
in response to similar issues, including the land question. This includes, for in-
stance, the San people in Botswana who achieved global visibility in December 
2006 following a court decision that affirmed their right to their ancestral lands 
in the Kalahari Desert, a right that had been usurped by the Botswana govern-
ment.28 In Kenya too there is an emerging land movement that is often 
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associated with the organization commonly known as the Kenyan Land Alli-
ance.29 
Third, there is a base of familiar unions in post-apartheid South Africa that 
are targeting government policy on employment conditions as well as labour 
practices in the private sector. Most of these unions are housed within COSATU 
which, although in alliance with the current government, has nevertheless con-
tinued to engage in adversarial mass action.30 The limitation of these formal-
sector unions has, however, been their inability to deal with the changing nature 
of work and the growing layers of informal workers. This challenge has been 
taken up by nascent campaigns like the Self-Employed Women’s Union 
(SEWU) that target the local state on accommodating workers and traders rather 
than challenging their bosses about conditions of service. Notwithstanding the 
SEWU’s demise in 2004, its agenda is continuing to impact on mainstream 
unions.31 
Although African trade unions have lost their traditional dominance as they 
now have to share their political space with other actors, they still remain cen-
tral to employment issues. Across the continent, they have been at the forefront 
of mass demonstrations to change standards of employment32 and in fact remain 
one of the few organizations that have continuously had continental reach 
through the Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU). Other 
organizations, like the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), have also 
worked in this area to highlight the plight of workers in export-processing zones 
(EPZ) and those working on flower farms.33 Moreover, oil workers on several 
of the delta platforms have similarly pressed vigorously not only for higher 
wages but also for broader community demands through their movements in 
Nigeria’s delta region.34 This ‘social movement unionism’35 is typical of trade-
union activity across the continent, including South Africa, and has most 
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recently been demonstrated in the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Union’s 
(ZCTU) participation in the democratic struggle in Zimbabwe. 
Fourth, significant activism is being directed against corporations and the 
government on issues of pollution and the environment. One such action in 
South Africa that has been sustained over a long period of time is community 
action in South Durban. In addition, the Environmental Justice Networking 
Forum represents a group of organizations that have been instrumental in 
shifting popular environmental consciousness from green conservation issues to 
brown issues that emphasize social justice.36 The environment also provides a 
target for social-movement mobilization in the rest of Africa. Two of the more 
visible movements at the forefront of such mobilization include Kenya’s Green 
Belt movement founded by the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize winner Wangari 
Maathai37 and the environmental movements in the Niger Delta whose stra-
tegies have included sit-ins at the local offices of multinational companies and, 
increasingly, more radical and violent actions involving the kidnapping of 
foreign workers.38 
Fifth, some organizations in South Africa have sought to counter social pre-
judice against refuges,39 sexual minorities40and women,41 especially through 
reforms of government policy infrastructure. The HIV/AIDS crisis provides a 
natural target for social-movement mobilization against the policy and service-
delivery infrastructure in Africa. While it is a stand-alone movement in some 
regions, in others it is part of the economic justice movement and/or the 
women’s movement.42 The core of the movement is predominantly women, 
although its leadership tends to be primarily male. It is fighting against the 
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prejudice and stigma associated with HIV/AIDS as well as for permanent 
treatment for HIV/AIDS patients. It thus involves diverse actors ranging from 
healthcare and/or home-based care providers, people living with HIV/AIDS, 
educators, professionals, the gay, lesbian and bisexual communities, trade 
unions and some faith-based communities. Examples include the Pan African 
Treatment Access Movement (PATAM); Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe 
(GALZ); Zimbabwean Activists on HIV/AIDS (ZAHA) and the Kenyan Net-
work of Women with AIDS/HIV (KENWA). These movements all frame the 
HIV/AIDS challenge within the context of human rights and economic justice, 
with the objective of achieving universal, accessible and comprehensive treat-
ment and care for all those living with HIV/AIDS. For instance KENWA, with 
its more than 3000 members, has focused its mobilization on issues of human 
rights (especially women’s rights), treatment access, stigma, reproductive rights 
and access to credit, insurance and mortgages.43 
Finally, movements in Africa that oppose multilateral organizations and 
transnational corporations (TNC’s) because of their links with broader global 
movements like the Jubilee campaigns.44 The most notable of these is Jubilee 
South Africa, which opposes multilateral organizations and foreign corporations 
in relation to debts that cannot be paid or in terms of claiming compensation 
from businesses that operated in South Africa during apartheid.45 It has also 
lobbied the current South African government to take a stronger social-justice 
approach, particularly regarding reparations for victims identified through the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Other African examples include the 
Third World Network (TWN), the Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Develop-
ment (ZIMCODD), the Uganda Debt Network, the Third World Forum, the 
West African Social Forum, the Forum of African Alternatives and the Senegal-
based Environment and Development Action-Third World (ENDA).46 In ad-
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dition to working primarily on debt cancellation, trade and foreign aid, the 
Jubilee Campaigns and debt and development groups like AFRODAD are also 
engaged in the interconnected issues of access to services. Trade unions, other 
forms of organized labour, political parties and think tanks – many of them anti-
capitalist in orientation – also engage with this movement at varying levels.47  
In summary, social movement mobilization in Africa and South Africa is a 
product of, and responds to, a concrete context of deprivation, rights denial and 
injustice. The continent’s social-movement landscape is incredibly heterogene-
ous but for analytical purposes it is possible to categorize African movements as 
follows: Anti-Corporate Globalization/Economic Justice; Democracy and 
Transparency; Environmental; HIV/AIDS; and Women and Youth.48 
This heterogeneity is exhibited not simply in terms of activities or issues. 
Increasingly, it is being reflected in the strategies adopted by social movements 
in Africa too. Even movements that operate under the rubric of anti-globali-
zation adopt different strategies against multilateral organizations like the IMF, 
the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and governmental 
bodies like the African Union. While some movements are willing to colla-
borate with these institutions, others are adopting a more confrontational ap-
proach. The willingness to collaborate and engage seems to vary by region, with 
movements in Southern Africa, particularly in South Africa, preferring non-
engagement. West Africans, by contrast, appear to have the largest number of 
organizations willing to engage with the African Union and the international 
financial institutions. Overall, a radicalization and militarization of Africa’s 
social movements would seem to be under way, with the use of violence by the 
movements in the Niger Delta providing the best example of this phenom-
enon.49  
This typology of social movements and the thematic concerns they are 
mobilizing around suggest that distributional issues are still central in Africa. 
Indeed, a good proportion of the movements in categories one, two, three and 
six, have emerged as a response to the economic crisis and its manifestations, 
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and were deliberately founded to effect a redistribution of scarce resources in 
favour of marginalized communities. It is only categories four and five, those 
addressing environmental concerns and prejudices directed against specific 
communities respectively, that are not overtly organized to speak directly to 
distributional deficits.  
Even in these explicitly identity-based movements however, distributional 
issues colour their politics. The case studies in South Africa of the gay,50 
environmental,51 women’s52 and refugee53 movements show that even while 
identity is an important driver within these movements, distributional questions 
have by no means been marginalized. In fact, these case studies demonstrate 
that a huge contestation exists within these movements around distributional 
issues. As Dirsuweit54 points out, the gay movement is divided over the ques-
tions of distribution that are raised by the poverty of a significant proportion of 
its members. The same is true of the environmental movement, which is 
increasingly being forced to take on ‘brown’ rather than ‘green’ issues, thus 
addressing the socio-economic concerns of marginalized communities and 
highlighting the principle of environmental justice.55 Similarly a study of two 
prominent environmental movements in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Movement for 
the Survival of Ogoni People of Nigeria’s Niger Delta and the Green Belt 
Movement of Kenya, demonstrates that they operate within a transformative 
logic in which struggles for power over environmental resources connect with 
broader popular social struggles for empowerment and democracy. Many en-
vironmental conflicts in Africa are driven by a challenge to dominant power 
relations that continue to benefit the ‘few’ and threaten the survival of the 
majority.56 
These case studies suggest that identity-based social movements in Africa, 
typical of those in the developing world, are being driven by an intricate mix of 
identity and distributional pressures. And there is no reason to assume that this 
is a peculiarly African phenomenon. Indeed, Teresa Dirsuweit57 suggests that a 
similar mix of pressures defines movements in the industrialized world too. 
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After all, there is growing evidence that inequalities and poverty are increasing 
in industrialized countries. This, together with the fact that a large part of the 
world where social movements are active are developing contexts, suggests that 
distributional issues need to be an explicit component of the theory-building 
agenda of social-movement scholars.  
What of the second assertion that the arena of production is no longer as 
relevant for organizing counter-hegemonic struggles? Implicit in this view is the 
suggestion of union impotence in the face of a resurgent community activism to 
represent the interests of marginalized communities. But the South African case 
studies suggest that this is too easy a read of contemporary developments. After 
all, even in the pre-1994 era, community struggles accounted for a significant 
number, if not the majority, of the struggles against the apartheid state from as 
far back as the 1950s.58 Even more important is the fact that the union move-
ment today is a vibrant component of the social-movement universe, notwith-
standing its alliance with the ruling party. COSATU may not phrase its agenda 
and activities in counter-hegemonic terms but this has not completely disarmed 
the federation.  
This is the central message of Habib and Valodia’s 59analysis of COSATU’s 
evolution, operations and politics in the contemporary era. They argue that a 
political disjuncture with the dominant element in the ANC leadership has 
emerged following the government’s adoption of the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy in 1996. Indeed they maintain that this has 
translated into a progressively more adversarial stance on the part of COSATU 
vis-à-vis the government and the ANC leadership. 
This has manifested itself in general strikes and struggles against GEAR, 
AIDS and Zimbabwe in recent times. Some social movements, like TAC, have 
of course recognized this and explicitly entered into an alliance with this social 
movement in the realm of production. It needs to be noted that in pure mem-
bership terms, COSATU, which had a registered membership of 1.8 million in 
2003, dwarfs almost all the other social movements combined.60 
The problem of course is the impression created by the union federation’s 
alliance with the ANC, an alliance that has at times placed the federation on the 
defensive, forcing it to conduct some struggles within the institutional para-
meters of the Tripartite Alliance. But the movement’s combativeness resurfaces 
from time to time. The most recent examples are COSATU’s vociferous attacks 
on Mbeki’s leadership and his presidency: he was accused of sliding the country 
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towards a dictatorship61 and supporting Jacob Zuma’s bid for the leadership of 
the party and the country. These developments, together with COSATU’s 
social-movement orientation, suggest that the unions are still alive and very 
relevant to the struggle to represent marginalized communities. Again this 
suggests, if only because South Africa’s socio-economic context is so similar to 
those in the rest of the developing world, that the realm of production cannot be 
ignored as an arena of mobilization and organization of counter-hegemonic 
struggle and that, as a result, unions must be retained as one of the institutional 
agencies as they are capable of conducting and leading such struggles. The 
South African case studies imply that the arena of production is as relevant as 
that of consumption in hosting organizations for the counter-hegemonic struggle 
prompted by the multiple manifestations of globalization. 
This is also true for other parts of Africa, both at the national and continental 
levels. In the latter arena, OATUU still remains a visible player in institutional 
politics62 but perhaps the role of the trade unions is most visible in the 
democratic movements that have challenged and overthrown dictatorships in a 
number of African countries. In Zambia, for instance, the Chiluba-led oppo-
sition that challenged and eventually defeated the entrenched rule of Kaunda’s 
United Independence Party was the product of the Congress of Trades Unions. 
Similarly, opposition in Zimbabwe to Mugabe’s dictatorial regime has been 
facilitated by the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a pro-democracy 
network whose membership comprises the main civil-society organizations in 
Zimbabwe including the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, the Zimbabwe Na-
tional Students’ Union, and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). 
The main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), is 
itself a product of the NCA, having been formed by the Zimbabwe Congress of 
Trade Unions in 1999.63 Across the continent, with weakened opposition parties 
and legislatures, trade unions still remain the vanguard of the democratic move-
ment.  
The African case studies, including the South African one, strongly contest 
two of the orthodoxies evident in the contemporary global literature on social 
movements. At best, they recommend a more nuanced reading, one that stresses 
the relevance of distributional concerns and their ability to mobilize collectives, 
and the importance of the sphere of production as a site for counter-hegemonic 
activity. Of course it is recognized that these orthodoxies speak to some aspects 
of current realities, but only partially. More detailed and extensive descriptions 
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of social-movement realities would recognize the equal relevance of identity 
and distributional concerns, as they would the simultaneous importance for 
contemporary social movement struggle of the arenas of both production and 
consumption. This experience is not necessarily peculiar to Africa. In fact given 
the bifurcated economic realities of contemporary South Africa and the in-
creasing inequalities around the world, these African case studies could speak to 
the full realities of social-movement activity across the industrialized and 
developing worlds.  
Social movements, development and democracy in (South) Africa 
What is the impact of these movements on the development trajectory and the 
consolidation of democracy in South Africa and the rest of Africa? As indicated 
earlier, some have argued that these movements undermine the democratic 
project by explicitly challenging, through extra-institutional action, legitimate 
and democratically elected governments. The essential problem with these 
interpretations is that they conflate and confuse the stated aims of social 
movements with their immediate systemic effect. Whatever the ultimate distant 
goals of these movements may be, their impact needs to be assessed in relation 
to their immediate systemic effects. And the most obvious tangible effect of 
social movements on the political landscape of this continent is that they re-
present the interests of the poor and marginalized, and put pressure on govern-
ments to pay greater attention to the welfare of these groups. Social movements 
are thus an avenue for marginalized people and those concerned about their 
possibility to impact on material distribution and social exclusion and to claim a 
certain degree of influence and power over the state itself. In contexts where 
formal political systems have failed to produce significant political parties to 
directly champion the cause of the poor, social movements contribute to the 
restoration of plurality in the political system. 
This then raises the more significant contribution of contemporary social 
movements in Africa. The fundamental purpose of a democracy is to make state 
elites accountable to the citizenry. This is the only way to effect not only public 
participation but to guarantee a development trajectory in the interests of all the 
citizenry, including its most marginalized and dispossessed.64 Such accounta-
bility is founded on the emergence of substantive uncertainty in the political 
system, and political uncertainty is of course the essence of democracy. It takes 
one of two distinct forms; institutional or substantive. Institutional uncertainty – 
uncertainty about the rules of the game – implies a vulnerability of the de-
mocratic system to anti-democratic forces. Substantive uncertainty – uncertainty 
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about the outcome of the game – is about the perceptions of ruling political 
elites in a democratic system and whether they will be returned to office.65The 
former – institutional uncertainty – is bad for democracy as it raises the prospect 
of a return to authoritarianism in the Third Wave of democracies. The latter – 
substantive uncertainty – is good for democracy because it keeps politicians on 
their toes and makes them responsive to their citizenry. 
There has been a great deal of investigation into and reflection on institu-
tional uncertainty66 but little work has been done on substantive uncertainty. 
This should not be surprising given that researchers and activists concerned 
with democratization have been preoccupied with the business of transcending 
authoritarian regimes and institutionalizing democratic ones. Nevertheless, the 
lack of attention to substantive uncertainty has significant political costs and 
indeed the weakness of many contemporary democracies lies precisely in this 
arena. Despite the presence of institutional mechanisms to promote substantive 
uncertainty – legislative elections, the separation of powers, civil liberties, op-
position political parties, an independent press – this goal still eludes much of 
what Huntington67 has called the ‘Third Wave’ of democracies. One reason for 
this is the shift in power from the legislature to the executive of governments 
around the globe over the last two decades. Another emanates from the in-
clination of democratizers and democratization scholars not to rock the boat in 
societies undergoing democratic transition. Fearful of the very real danger of a 
reversion to authoritarianism, these actors have focused on procedural aspects 
of democratization and made significant political and institutional concessions 
to the state and economic elites of the authoritarian order. Finally, it can be 
explained by the honeymoon phenomenon during which citizens are reluctant to 
vote against liberation parties that were responsible for coordinating popular 
rebellions that brought down authoritarian regimes.68 
As a result of these developments and peculiar contextual factors, such as the 
racialized or ethnic character of South Africa’s principal opposition parties – the 
Democratic Alliance (DA), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the New 
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National Party (NNP) – the ANC has not been seriously threatened at the polls. 
This lack of substantive uncertainty has eroded the citizenry’s leverage vis-à-vis 
state elites. The ANC, as the dominant party in the liberation movement, came 
to office with an overwhelming electoral mandate but, despite this, its policy 
concessions over the last decade have been largely to foreign investors and 
domestic capital (both black and white) because it was able to take its citizens’ 
votes for granted. Policy concessions in favour of capital are most graphically 
reflected in the abandonment of the Reconstruction and Development Program-
me (RDP) and the adoption of GEAR. The net effect has been a transition that 
has de-racialized the apex of the class structure and economically favoured the 
upper echelons and strata of South African society.69  
An antidote to this state of affairs is the reintroduction of substantive uncer-
tainty into the political system. Of course there may be much debate on the 
precise institutional mechanisms that could facilitate substantive uncertainty. 
Some might maintain that it need only involve electoral reform and the 
emergence of social movements70 while others suggest that it would require the 
former coupled with the break-up of the tripartite alliance and the abandonment 
of corporatist institutions.71 All of this could facilitate uncertainty, which is 
necessary to loosen the existing configuration of power in South African 
society. What it is important to note in this debate, however, is that none of the 
other elements except the presence of social movements exists or is likely to 
emerge in the foreseeable future. For now at least, social movements are the 
only hope for introducing substantive uncertainty and thereby facilitating the 
accountability of state elites to the citizenry.  
It is instructive to note that the South African government’s recent shift to a 
more state interventionist and expansive economic policy with a more welfarist 
orientation coincided with the emergence and heightened activity of social 
movements in South Africa. While it would be difficult to establish direct 
causality between the shift in state policy and the emergence of social move-
ments, very few observers of the South African scene would deny that social 
movements contributed to the emergence of a political climate that encouraged 
state elites to become more responsive to the country’s most marginalized 
                                                          
69  A. Whiteford & D.E. Van Seventer, ‘South Africa’s changing income distribution in 
the 1990s’, Studies in Economics and Econometrics, 24, 3 (2000), pp. 7-30. 
70  R. Mattes & R. Southall, ‘Popular attitudes toward the South African electoral 
system’, Democratization, 11, 1 (2004); Ballard, Habib & Valodia (eds), Voices of 
Protest. 
71  A. Habib & R. Taylor, ‘Political alliances and parliamentary opposition in post-
apartheid South Africa’, Democratization, 8, 1 (2001); A. Desai & A. Habib, 
‘Labour relations in transition: The rise of corporatism in South Africa’s automobile 
industry’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 35, 3 (1997). 
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citizenry. This shift in state policy is naturally not without problems and has as 
yet not gone far enough.72 It could also be argued that such shifts are the 
enlightened twin of the strategy of repression. For Harvey, drawing on Gramsci, 
‘[t]he power of the hegemon ... is fashioned out of and expressed through an 
ever-shifting balance between coercion and consensus’.73 Realizing that it has 
opened the door for others to gain support through more explicitly worded anti-
poverty manifestos, the ANC government shifted to recapture ground in the 
build-up to the 2004 election. 
South Africa is again not unique in Africa in this regard. The one-party 
regimes of the post-colonial era were not very responsive to the interests of their 
citizens, corruption and patronage flowered, and elite interests predominated. 
These only came under sustained attack and political elites became more open 
to citizens when civil society coalesced in opposition or when violence erupted 
in society. The most recent demonstration of this is Zimbabwe. It was when the 
MDC emerged, itself a product of the NCA, that the Mugabe regime started to 
talk about the socio-economic rights of rural peasants. Of course ZANU-PF also 
resorted to violence, which spiralled the economy into crisis. Nevertheless, it is 
the challenge to one-party dominance as a result of social mobilization that has 
conditioned Zimbabwean political elites to be more socially responsive.  
This pattern repeats itself time and time again across the continent: Zambia, 
Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe and many others are all examples of 
this political process. Recognition of it enables us to conclude that the effective 
operation of social movements is a necessary, if not a sufficient political 
condition to prompt a sustainable shift in state policy in the interests of South 
Africa’s poor and marginalized. A more human-centred development trajectory 
and the consolidation of democracy require, in part, the systemic presence and 
effective functioning of contemporary social movements in South Africa.  
 
                                                          
72  A. Habib, ‘The politics of economic policy-making: Substantive uncertainty, poli-
tical leverage, and human development’, Transformation, 56 (2004). 
73  Harvey, The New Imperialism, pp. 37-38. 
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‘People are very angry. They want to say, ‘God, why did diamonds be, 
you know…? Why did you let diamonds be put in Sierra Leone?’ We 
do not know how come ... Sierra Leone with such a wealth can be, you 
know, in such a global mess.’ 
Abu Brima, National Coordinator, Network Movement for Justice 
and Development, Freetown, Sierra Leone; Interview with Voice 
of America (VOA), 13 January 2000. 
 
The campaign against ‘conflict’ diamonds – those defined as 
having been illegally mined and sold by rebel armies to fund 
wars in Africa – was a singular phenomenon of NGO/civil-
society activism in Africa. Beginning inauspiciously with re-
search by little-known and poorly funded groups, the campaign 
quickly attracted the attention of dozens of governments and the 
diamond industry and came to dominate discussions on the civil 
wars in Sierra Leone, Angola and elsewhere in Africa. It pro-
vided material and background for books, journal articles and 
academic dissertations, development programmes; an award-
winning song by the American rapper Kenye West; a major 
Hollywood blockbuster and several documentaries and films 
(including a Nigerian one). In both its intensity and effect, the 
‘conflict diamonds’ campaign qualifies as a highly successful 
social movement – a campaign which, though loosely organized 
and coordinated, was sustained over a significant period of 
time and was geared towards specific social goals, namely eco-
nomic and social justice and peace.  
This chapter examines how the campaign started, the role of 
African civil-society groups in sustaining it and why it was so 
successful and led to sanctions against rebels in Sierra Leone 
and the Liberian government (thereby no doubt significantly 
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helping the peace process in both countries). It was also in-
volved in the introduction of the Kimberley Process Certifi-
cation Scheme (KPCS) – a global, UN Security Council-
endorsed system requiring the tamper-proof certification of all 
rough diamonds traded (worth annually at the time about US$ 
7 billion). 
 
[The] high influx of foreign mining companies and the lack of pro-poor mining 
policies coupled with inadequate implementation mechanisms reinforce the power-
lessness of the people and undermine their livelihood goals. Artisanal [diamond] 
mining is largely uncontrolled and uncoordinated resulting to [sic] high rate of 
smuggling, environmental hazards and poor living/working conditions. The gov-
ernment is largely promoting the economic agenda of the International Financial 
Institutions to the extent that the real livelihood needs of the poor are compromised 
in favour of foreign mining companies/investment. [Our] programme seeks to pro-
mote good corporate governance, environmental protection, community benefici-
ation and strict adherence to international standards. 
Statement by the Just Mining Campaign, Freetown, 2001 
The ‘conflict’ or ‘blood’ diamonds campaign effectively lasted for a little 
over three years, probably a shorter lifespan than any other comparable cam-
paign in history. Largely because of its short duration, the highly successful 
social movement it generated as a global human-rights campaign was rather 
inchoate. Many observers and some of its leading participants primarily experi-
enced its international dimension. As a movement, it was mainly driven by 
Western activists and NGOs and it led to the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme (KPCS), the international system of control for the movement of rough 
diamonds. From this vantage point, the campaign was of a largely intellectual 
nature, driven by well-researched reports, manipulation of media reporting, and 
high-level lobbying by NGOs and liberal Western politicians. What has been 
almost completely ignored in the assessment of the phenomenal success of the 
campaign is the great impetus that it enjoyed from the very beginning by the 
involvement of African NGOs operating in such troubled spots as Sierra Leone 
and Congo,1 two countries where resource-driven warfare came to attract mas-
sive international attention. In these two countries, the issue fed into important 
local concerns about social justice and economic development, and became a 
rallying ground for civil-society activists spearheading peace movements. As a 
                                                          
1  Following Crawford Young, I refrain from using the official designation ‘Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo’. As Young writes, the ‘democratic’ title remains ‘a gro-
tesque misrepresentation of political practice,’ making the designation ‘Congo-Kin-
shasa’ or simply ‘Congo’ the most appropriate in the circumstances. See Crawford 
Young, ‘Contextualizing Congo conflicts,’ in: John F. Clark (ed.), The African 
Stakes in the Congo War (Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 2002), p. 29. 
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result, it gained enormous traction within a very short period, overtaking other 
rights-related international campaigns like those against residual forms of slav-
ery in Sudan and the somewhat narcissistic campaign against the fur trade. It 
moved swiftly from accusations and denials to concrete steps taken by over 42 
governments around the world and the UN Security Council to effectively ad-
dress the problem, namely that diamonds mined illegally and traded internation-
ally by anti-government or insurgent groups in Africa were being used to fund 
their violent campaigns. The steps introduced included sanctions against groups 
and countries held to be culpable and, more creatively, the launch of the Kim-
berley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). The campaign was undoubtedly 
also the strongest influence in the indictment and subsequent trial for crimes 
against humanity and other offences, by the UN-backed Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, of Liberia’s President Charles Taylor, the first African head of state to 
face such a judicial process. 
In both its intensity and effect, the ‘conflict diamonds’ campaign clearly 
qualifies as a highly successful social movement, a campaign which, though 
loosely organized and coordinated, was sustained over a significant period of 
time and was geared towards the specific social goals of economic and social 
justice, and peace.  
This chapter examines how the campaign started, the role of African civil-
society groups in sustaining it, and why it was so successful. It resulted in sanc-
tions against rebels in Sierra Leone and the Liberian government (thereby no 
doubt significantly helping the peace process in both countries), and the KPCS, 
the global UN Security Council-endorsed system requiring the tamper-proof 
certification of all rough diamonds (worth annually about US$ 7 billion) before 
they are traded internationally. 
How it started 
The term ‘conflict diamonds’ has gained such currency and evokes such passion 
that it is hard to believe that the issue was first brought to public attention in late 
1998 by Global Witness, a small British NGO operating from an untidy office 
in London. The group’s chief campaigner was a young London former disc 
jockey with a taste for designer suits – Miami Vice rather than Savile Row. The 
group had been investigating the illegal timber trade in Cambodia – from which 
the murderous Khmer Rouge guerrillas were making US$ 20 million a month at 
its height in the early 1990s – but in 1998 it turned its attention to Angola, a 
state ravaged by decades of bloody warfare. In a report entitled ‘A Rough 
Trade’2 that was released in December 1998, Global Witness reported that the 
                                                          
2  Global Witness, ‘A Rough Trade: The role of companies and governments in the 
Angolan conflict’,  
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National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a rebel group 
with a reputation for psychotic brutality that then controlled over 60% of 
Angola’s rich diamond reserves, had generated US$ 3.7 billion between 1992 
and 1998 to underwrite its war effort, effectively making it one of the most 
profitable business enterprises in Africa.3 
The disclosure was significant in more ways than one. The Angolan war had 
started as a war of liberation in the late 1960s and, after independence in 1975, 
morphed into a full-scale ‘ideological’ war with important Cold War implica-
tions. With the end of the Cold War and with it the loss of American and later 
South African support, UNITA, led by ex-Maoist Jonas Savimbi, seemed to 
have lost political justification and support for continued warfare. UNITA’s 
campaigns effectively devolved into banditry, and Global Witness’s findings 
made it clear that diamonds had become the main explanation for the continuing 
violence in Angola, as the principal source of funding for UNITA. Pillage rather 
than politics had become a goal of warfare. This violence had led to the deaths 
of nearly one million Angolans, the displacement of millions more, and had 
rendered a potentially wealthy country into one of the most miserable, not to 
say dangerous, in the world.4  
At the time that Global Witness published its report, the South African-based 
De Beers, which controlled about 80% of the global rough diamond trade, had 
been boasting about its ability to mop up diamond supplies from even unstable 
areas like Angola, and continued to buy offices in Guinea, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and elsewhere in Africa. This meant that techni-
cally it could not deny buying diamonds from a group like UNITA. Global Wit-
                                                          
 
(http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/90/en/a_rough_trade, 
December 1, 1998). 
3  The US$ 3.7 billion figure is, of course, a guesstimate, but a reasonable one. 
Christopher Cramer, who has attempted to present a more nuanced picture of the 
reasons for the continuation of the Angolan war (rather unsuccessfully, in my view) 
suggests that the cumulative revenue from diamonds traded by UNITA from 1989 to 
1998 was ‘probably US$ 2-3.5 billion’. To put this figure into perspective, Cramer 
notes that the Reagan-era US aid to UNITA ‘peaked around US$ 40-60 million a 
year between 1989 and 1991’. Though critical of the overly economistic interpre-
tation of the war, Cramer notes that even Angolan army officers (technically at war 
with UNITA) and ‘running supply businesses in the Lundas would trade openly with 
UNITA diamond bosses, selling and exchanging goods across a river that was also a 
frontline’. See Cramer, Civil War is not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for violence in 
developing countries (Hurst and Co, London, 2006), p. 155.  
4  On the devastating impact of the Angolan war, see Inge Brinkman, ‘Angolan 
civilians in wartime, 1961-2002,’ in John Laband (ed.), Daily Lives of Civilians in 
Wartime Africa: From slavery days to the Rwandan genocide (Greenwood Press, 
London, 2007), pp. 169-194. 
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ness was unequivocal about the purpose of its publication. Its intention, it 
stated, was ‘to stimulate debate and action on a well known and much reported 
issue: the key role that diamonds have played in the Angolan conflict in the last 
ten years’. It added that: 
[there] is a dangerous acceptance amongst the international community that the 
mechanics of the trade in diamonds, particularly from UNITA controlled areas, are 
beyond any real controls. Global Witness investigations show that governments 
flout the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) embargo on unofficial Angolan 
diamonds (those not sold under the control of the Angolan government diamond 
parastatal, Endiama).5 
Global Witness’s report quickly elicited denials and prevarications and, be-
cause the Angolan war had complex origins, the objection that diamonds were 
only incidental appeared reasonable to some.6 The issue was, however, taken up 
by others and the focus was then on a war where criminality was easy to 
establish: the Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) war in Sierra Leone. This 
chapter focuses on this particular conflict and how it shaped (and was in turn 
shaped by) the ‘conflict’ diamonds campaign. 
The heart of the matter 
From 1991 Sierra Leone suffered devastating attacks by the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF), a uniquely brutal rebel group that used terror tactics, like 
amputations, to force the mass displacement of people and the occupation of 
productive areas of the country for the sole purpose of pillage. The country's 
rich alluvial diamond reserves were among its early targets. By 1998, the RUF’s 
                                                          
5  Global Witness, ‘A Rough Trade’. The Global Witness report was supported by a 
UN Panel of Experts report on Angola less than two years later. Headed by 
Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler, the panel documented UNITA’s extensive net-
work of support and collaboration with shady business people and some African 
governments. The report, released in March 2001, estimated UNITA’s diamond 
trade as being worth between US$ 3 billion and US$ 4 billion between 1992 and 
1998. The report noted that diamonds played ‘a uniquely important role within 
UNITA’s political and military economy’. See Section 111 (1) 77 “The Significance 
of Diamonds for UNITA” (http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/angolareport_eng.htm, 
September 22, 2008). 
6  Ibid. The Fowler Report noted three reasons why diamonds were so important to 
UNITA’s ability to continue its deadly operations: ‘First, UNITA’s ongoing ability 
to sell rough diamonds for cash and to exchange rough diamonds for weapons pro-
vide the means for it to sustain its political and military activities. Second, diamonds 
have been and continue to be an important component of UNITA’s strategy for 
acquiring friends and maintaining external support. Third, rough diamond caches 
rather than cash or bank deposits constitute the primary and the preferred means of 
stockpiling wealth for UNITA’.  
68 Gberie 
campaign had caused the death of upwards of 50,000 people, displaced two-
thirds of Sierra Leone’s population of about 5 million and destroyed over half of 
the country’s already limited infrastructure. Yet little was known of this war in 
the wider world. Throughout the 1990s the RUF was a mysterious, deadly force 
and its leader, a cashiered army corporal called Foday Saybanah Sankoh, only a 
disembodied and inarticulate voice that was occasionally heard on the BBC 
African Service. Areas under its control were inaccessible to outsiders, includ-
ing journalists. Consequently, RUF violence was simply dismissed as ‘sense-
less’ and, therefore, incomprehensible. 
After a particularly devastating attack on Freetown in 1999 by the RUF and 
its allies of renegade soldiers from the Sierra Leonean Army, Partnership Africa 
Canada (PAC) decided to do a study of the war for the purpose of policy advo-
cacy. The group’s three researchers adopted the methodology used by Global 
Witness to understand the Angolan conflict and focused on the RUF’s looting 
of Sierra Leone’s vast alluvial diamond fields. The reasoning behind this was 
that the rebel group had not articulated any coherent political platform, was 
completely devoid of ethnic or regional support, and appeared viable only be-
cause it had access to significant resources – as yet not fully determined – with 
which it was underwriting its campaign. 
The result was ‘The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and 
Human Security’,7 which was launched simultaneously in Ottawa (Canada) and 
Freetown (Sierra Leone) in January 2000. The launch was the result of an 
ingenious strategy that came to sustain the campaign and make it so effective: it 
involved active collaboration between the Canadian-based group and an influ-
ential Sierra Leonean-based NGO called the Network Movement for Justice and 
Development (NMJD). NMJD had been established in 1998 with the aim of 
‘promoting justice and sustainable development at all levels in society’ and was 
coordinated by Abu Brima, an outspoken, not to say militant, long-term activist 
who hailed from Kono, Sierra Leone’s main diamond district, and a place 
despoiled by largely unregulated mining activity. Collaboration between his 
group and the Canadian-based PAC was forged during the research, and contin-
ued throughout the campaign and beyond. The Canadian-based authors partici-
pated by telephone during the launch of the report in Freetown in a live radio 
discussion of the report and its recommendations. This was organized by NMJD 
                                                          
7  Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie & Ralph Hazleton, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra 
Leone, diamonds and human security (Partnership Africa Canada, Ottawa, 2000). 
The title is borrowed from the novel by Graham Greene, who was a British secret 
service agent posted in Sierra Leone during the Second World War. Greene investi-
gated suspicions that diamonds from the then-British colony were being smuggled to 
Germany through Vichy French territory (neighbouring Guinea).  
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and is an indication of the crucial role that the mass media can play in such 
campaigns. 
The PAC report was an attempt to understand the war, not the diamond 
industry itself. However by examining the role of diamonds in the political 
economy of Sierra Leone in the context of the war, the report was able to trace 
the long and slow corruption of Sierra Leone’s diamond industry since the 
stones were first commercially exploited in the country in the 1930s. It showed 
that mainly through illicit mining and smuggling, in which Sierra Leone’s 
successive leaders from the British colonial overlords to the country’s post-
independence leaders colluded, diamond exports dropped from a peak of two 
million carats a year in the 1960s to less than 50,000 carats by 1988. Sierra 
Leone’s populist president during most of this period, a former trade-union 
leader named Siaka Stevens, tacitly encouraged illicit mining and he himself 
became involved in criminal or near-criminal activities. The RUF’s rebel war 
began in 1991 and, from the outset, Charles Taylor, the Liberian warlord and 
later president who helped train and launch the rebel group, acted as a supplier 
of weapons, diplomatic supporter, banker, trainer and mentor to the RUF.  
The report claimed that the rich alluvial diamond fields of Kono District and 
Tongo Field were among the RUF’s earliest and most prized targets and argued 
that diamonds were a key part of Taylor’s calculation. ‘The Heart of the Matter’ 
concluded that: 
... only the economic opportunity presented by the breakdown of law and order 
could sustain violence at levels that have plagued Sierra Leone since 1991 … it is 
ironic that enormous profits have been made from diamonds throughout the conflict, 
but the only effect on the citizens of the country where they are mined has been 
terror, murder, dismemberment and poverty. 
The PAC report showed conclusively that there was virtually no oversight of 
the international movement of diamonds and that, during the 1990s, billions of 
dollars worth of diamonds were imported into Belgium from Liberia, even 
though Liberia produces very few diamonds itself. Big companies and small 
were colluding in the laundering of stolen diamonds. The same was true of 
Congo Brazzaville, which is conveniently adjacent to Congo Kinshasa, and 
which also mysteriously became a major diamond producer. UNITA too, as 
Global Witness had noticed, financed much of its war in Angola through the 
sale of diamonds and traded with impunity throughout Africa and Europe. 
The report’s key argument was that diamonds had, in the course of the long 
war, become indispensable for the RUF: the gems in Sierra Leone were mainly 
of an alluvial nature which meant that they were widespread and easily mined. 
Their trade was highly unregulated internationally. Lacking political support 
and a motivating ideology, the RUF was able to enhance its power and political 
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significance by criminally expropriating these valuable resources to acquire 
weapons and hire mercenaries.  
By laying bare the political economy of Sierra Leone’s decade-long war, the 
PAC report found an explanation for the dynamics of the conflict and the rea-
sons for its intensity, apparent ‘senselessness’ and almost intractable nature. 
The explanation helped to shift discussion of the war, in academic, journalistic 
and policy-related circles, away from complacent and somewhat racialist expla-
nations evoking notions of mindless African savagery and nihilism to more 
easily grasped and appreciated preoccupations: resource exploitation, criminal 
appropriation and power. 
NMJD and CENADEP 
While the international dimension of the trade was the galvanizing element for 
Western NGOs and researchers, the more immediately important and tangible 
issue for Brima’s NMJD was related to internal governance: official corruption, 
the lack of proper regulatory mechanisms in Sierra Leone, and the tendency for 
local politicians to protect foreign companies or mining interests at the expense 
of the long-suffering indigenous population. NMJD declared its position on 
internal governance in Sierra Leone in these searing terms: 
Corruption is endemic in Sierra Leonean society; all sectors ranging from the central 
government right down to local communities have been affected by high levels of 
corruption. This is manifested in mismanagement of national resources, weak ca-
pacity of service providers and lack of monitoring and punitive mechanisms to 
discourage perpetrators of corrupt practices. This has led to a culture of impunity. 
There is also an apparent lack of responsiveness of successive governments to the 
needs and aspirations of the populace (irresponsible leadership).8 
In September 2000 and working through its Just Mining Campaign that had 
been launched immediately after the release of ‘The Heart of the Matter’, 
NMJD convened a National Consultative Conference on diamond mining in 
Sierra Leone. It brought together hundreds of civil-society activists from all 
over the country but particularly from the diamond-mining areas, dozens of 
artisanal miners, chiefs, journalists and some politicians. The main topics on the 
agenda were: security (‘rebel control of major mining areas and how to gain 
control of those areas’); the role of the government in diamond mining; the 
impact of mining on the environment; the generation and distribution of revenue 
from mining; the role of civil society in framing mining policy; the cultural 
dimension of diamond mining; and, lastly, the international dimension of dia-
mond mining (with ‘a healthy international environment favourable to peace 
                                                          
8  Position paper issued by NMJD in 2000, shortly after the launch of ‘The Heart of the 
Matter’ (in this author’s possession). 
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and development’). Among the key resolutions was a ban on diamond mining 
for five years until all mining areas had been liberated from rebel control and 
proper regulations had been put in place; the declaration of a UN trusteeship 
over diamond-mining areas; the removal of all foreigners from mining areas and 
a new definition of citizenship for those who were to have access to diamond-
mining areas restricted ‘by birth and not by ownership of Sierra Leonean pass-
port’; and, the allocation of 10% of government royalties on diamonds to 
mining communities for ‘community development programmes’. Civil society, 
led by the Just Mining Campaign, was to play an active role in shaping govern-
ment policy towards mining.9 
Brima explained what followed: 
[Our] aim was ensuring that the Sierra Leone diamond industry operates legally, 
openly, and for the benefit of Sierra Leoneans – diamonds must become an asset, 
rather than a detriment, to peaceful long-term development. [We demand] that the 
country and the [diamond] industry adopt a human rights framework in mining 
policy formulation and implementation. In the past, mining was the preserve of 
government and a few individuals, mainly foreign nationals. The [Just Mining] 
Campaign had to develop new ways to incorporate civil society. This entailed inno-
vative strategizing. To empower the people and make them owners and beneficiaries 
of their resources, we formed alliances with numerous sectors of civil society, 
educated the public, and confronted those with a vested interest in maintaining the 
status quo.  
The first step was to establish task force coalitions of civil society groups all 
over the country. After significant outreach, task forces comprised of human rights 
groups, environmental organizations, academic institutions, the Bar Association, 
student and trade unions, community development organizations, individual activ-
ists, theatre groups, youth, nurses, and women’s groups began to develop. The 
establishment of task forces – at the national, provincial, and … district levels – 
allows for participatory structures for education, mobilization, and action on mining 
issues. The rights of the people to participate fully in policies and decisions affecting 
their lives are essential to establishing accountability and social responsibility in the 
mining industry and to curtailing the abundance of weapons of war bought with the 
proceeds from minerals.10 
In this effort, ‘expanding and strengthening strategic alliances with interna-
tional organizations was essential,’ Brima wrote. ‘The task force coalitions 
worked in close collaboration with international groups such as Partnership 
Africa Canada, Global Witness, International Peace Information Service, Action 
Aid, Oxfam, and Amnesty International. This collaboration focused interna-
tional attention on the issue of conflict diamonds and elevated the struggle to an 
                                                          
9  See (http://www.sierra-leone.org/nmjd093000.html, January 2009). 
10  Abu Brima, ‘Mining for the People’, Human Rights Dialogue, 
(http://www.cceia.org/resources/publications/dialogue/2_09/articles/945.html, 
February 9, 2003) 
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international level.’ Brima’s account is a welcome corrective because the global 
coverage of the ‘blood diamonds’ issue – for example, the Hollywood produc-
tion Blood Diamond featuring Leonardo DiCaprio, Djimon Hounsou and Jenni-
fer Connelly – tended to portray the campaign as entirely Western-driven, with 
Africans appearing simply as props. As a result of the Just Mining Campaign, 
the Sierra Leone government established the Diamond Area Community Devel-
opment Fund, assigning part of the proceeds from the export tax on diamonds to 
the development of mining communities, and legislated to streamline the cum-
bersome process for obtaining mining licenses and make the industry more 
transparent. 
Thousands of miles away from Sierra Leone, in Central Africa, the Centre 
National d’Appui au Développement et à la Participation Populaire 
(CENADEP) was trying to grapple with the effects of the far more complicated 
and tragic conflict in Congo (Kinshasa). It was inspired by the work of PAC and 
NMJD to become the focal point for a civil-society Natural Resources Network. 
The group began in 2002 by monitoring the exploitation of natural resources, in 
particular diamonds, in Congo as well as investigating issues of transparency 
and (human) security in the extractive economy.11 The programme was finan-
cially supported by Partnership Africa Canada and aimed to contribute to ‘the 
search for a lasting peace and the development of the Congo by combating 
illegal and criminal practices in sectors that have been at the root of conflicts in 
the country: extractive mining and the exploitation of natural resources’. Within 
two years, CENADEP was able to establish focal points in every province in the 
vast and logistically challenging Congo. It also developed an advocacy cam-
paign at national and international levels. By 2003, it was undertaking activities, 
such as conferences, debates and roundtable discussions, with the government 
on issues relating to the management of natural resources. It was also leading 
missions to various provinces for research and the dissemination of information, 
as well as producing a documentary on diamond dealers in Kinshasa.12 In Janu-
ary 2009, when this author visited Hamuli in CENADEP’s offices in Kinshasa, 
the group was still working on the issue of resource management and main-
taining programmes around artisanal mining in two provinces in Congo. How-
ever in such a vast and complicated country, progress like that achieved in 
Sierra Leone by NMJD appeared to be elusive and parts of the country, in 
particular the diamond-rich eastern regions, were still enmeshed in war. Issues 
of governance appeared to be secondary to the more urgent task of ending the 
fighting, disarming tens of thousands of combatants and unifying the country. 
                                                          
11  Interview with Baudouin K. Hamuli, Director-General of CENADEP, Kinshasa, 
January 2009. 
12  See Partnership Africa Canada’s Year in Review 2002-2003 (www.pacweb.org, 
January 2009). 
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Britain, Canada and the UN 
The impact of ‘The Heart of the Matter’, mainly due to the widespread and 
compelling publicity it received in the international media, was especially 
dramatic in some Western capitals. Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axwor-
thy, who had made human security the linchpin of his policy, welcomed the 
report and used it in his extensive advocacy on behalf of Sierra Leone in the UN 
Security Council and elsewhere. In quick order, his department organized a one-
day seminar on the economic dimensions of civil war, to which he invited the 
authors of ‘The Heart of the Matter’ (this author was the rapporteur) and leading 
scholars interested in the issue, and appointed David Pratt, an MP (and subse-
quently Defence Minister), as Special Envoy for Sierra Leone. This was a role 
that allowed the Canadian government to become more actively involved in the 
Sierra Leone peace process and play a central role in the debate about reforming 
the corrupt international diamond industry. 
The British government, Sierra Leone’s most important foreign ally and 
biggest aid donor, took the report equally seriously. Shortly after it was 
launched, British Foreign Office Minister Peter Hain visited Sierra Leone, 
where he referred to the report in a stirring speech to parliamentarians and civil-
society activists:  
I am determined to look for ways to stamp out the theft of Sierra Leone’s diamonds, 
and the way they have been used to fund conflict. […] Why is it that the government 
of Sierra Leone derives almost no revenue from diamond sales? And why am I being 
told that the Liberian annual diamond exports are beyond its diamond mining 
capacity? 
In London a week later, Hain told UK government officials that the RUF’s 
access to the diamond fields was the key reason for the lack of progress in the 
Sierra Leone peace process and called for an aggressive UN military deploy-
ment in those areas: 
I want to see the United Nations peacekeepers, in particular the Indian contingent 
which I saw camped at the main airport outside Freetown, deployed across the 
country where they ought to be, which is the eastern side of the country where the 
RUF rebel combatants have been, and are still in large numbers, where the diamonds 
are and where a lot of trouble has occurred.13 
The first attempt by a UN contingent to deploy in the areas was botched a 
few months later, leading to the capture of hundreds of UN troops by the RUF. 
A UN Panel of Experts was appointed by the Security Council shortly after this 
debacle to investigate ‘the link between trade in diamonds and trade in arms and 
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related materiel’ that was helping to sustain the RUF war effort. It found 
conclusively that diamonds constituted ‘a major and primary source of income 
for RUF’ in ‘sustaining and advancing its military ambitions’. The panel re-
leased its report in December 2000 stating that the ‘bulk of the RUF diamonds 
leave Sierra Leone through Liberia’, whose president, Charles Taylor, sold them 
to dubious contacts, pocketed most of the proceeds and arranged weapons and 
other deals (including drug purchases) for the RUF. The United Nations esti-
mated the RUF’s diamonds exports as being ‘from as little as US$ 25 million 
per annum to as much as US$ 125 million per annum’.14 
The UN report was solid amplification of the PAC findings, and after its 
release, the UN General Assembly immediately adopted the resolution with the 
aim of breaking the link between rough diamonds and conflict in Africa. The 
Security Council soon imposed targeted sanctions on Liberia and the RUF, and 
similar sanctions were also imposed on Sierra Leone’s diamonds until a UN-
monitored certification system was introduced in September 2000. Perhaps the 
most interesting finding in the PAC report, from the point of African activists 
and Western NGOs, was that there was virtually no oversight on the interna-
tional movement of diamonds: the diamond business was shrouded in total 
secrecy that suggested massive levels of corruption. A previous report by a UN 
Panel of Experts on Angola – the Fowler Commission’s report that was issued 
in March 2000 – had drawn similar conclusions. It noted that the diamond in-
dustry: 
... [had] failed to establish an effective import identification regime with respect to 
diamonds. Nor has any effective effort been made to monitor the activities of 
suspect brokers, dealers and traders – virtually all of whom appear to be able to 
travel freely and operate without hindrance… 
The unwillingness or inability of the diamond industry, particularly in Antwerp, 
to police its own ranks is a matter of special concern to the Panel. Persons known 
within the industry to be dealing in UNITA diamonds have as a general rule neither 
been exposed by the industry, nor subjected to any sanction by the industry … Lax 
controls in some producing countries may enable UNITA diamonds to be passed off 
as diamonds of different origin, and a number of countries that do not produce any 
diamonds still export rough diamonds as originating from their territory. Moreover, 
diamonds on the open market have traditionally been handled without controls as to 
the origin, and it has been sufficient merely to record provenance, i.e. where the 
diamonds have been shipped from as they arrive at the markets. It can sometimes be 
difficult for the countries of destination to differentiate between the countries of 
provenance and origin.15 
Liberia was one of the most glaring examples of a place where this kind of 
laundering was happening, but other countries were also apparently complicit. 
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The Gambia, for example, was found by the UN panel on Sierra Leone to have 
been the source of diamonds worth US$ 500 million traded on the Antwerp 
markets over the years, even though the country produces no diamonds whatso-
ever. Clearly a great deal of diamond laundering was going on. This finding, as 
suggested by the Fowler Report, triggered interesting arguments about the 
‘origin’ and ‘provenance’ of diamonds, an issue settled only by the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), a system that significantly helped to 
curtail the flow of money to rebel and associated groups in the region and be-
yond, thereby helping to end the war. 
Primary resources and conflict 
It is important at this point to underline the intellectual context in which the 
‘conflict’ diamonds campaign thrived. At the end of the 1990s, an interesting 
debate on the economic dimensions of violent conflict in Africa gained huge 
momentum. Perhaps the most influential product was ‘Greed and Grievance: 
Economic Agendas in Civil Wars’16 and a World Bank report17 that was a some-
what more detailed and dramatic illustration of the key points of ‘Greed and 
Grievance’ and argued that: 
While objective grievances do not generate violent conflict, violent conflict gener-
ates subjective grievances. This is not just a by-product of conflict, but an essential 
activity of a rebel organization … The task in post-conflict societies is partly, as in 
pre-conflict societies, to reduce the objective risk factors. However, post-conflict 
societies are much more at risk than implied by the inherited risk factors, because of 
this legacy of induced polarizing grievance. Either boundaries must be re-estab-
lished between the political contest and violence, or the political contest must be 
resolved. Neither of these is easy, which is why, once a civil war has occurred, the 
chances of further conflict are so high. 
Perhaps in no other conflict in Africa could Collier’s depressing analysis 
better apply than to the bloody rebel war in Sierra Leone. Beginning as armed 
incursions from Liberia, the conflict devolved into a savage civil war in which 
the RUF, backed by Taylor, wreaked havoc primarily on civilians in the coun-
tryside and gained control of the alluvial diamond-rich regions of eastern and 
southern Sierra Leone. Understanding the predatory nature of the Sierra Leone 
war took some time but once this had happened, efforts to end it, including UN 
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sanctions on diamonds and timber, accelerated. Thousands of UN troops had to 
be deployed to disarm the militia factions, help the state restore normative order 
and curb the widespread criminality the war had helped trigger. 
William Reno was probably the first scholar to emphasize the economic 
motives of insurgents spearheading the war in Sierra Leone, which he correctly 
saw as being intimately linked to Charles Taylor’s insurgency (preferring the 
term ‘warlordism’) in Liberia. He argued that the key driver of the conflicts was 
Taylor’s continued looting of Liberia’s hardwood timber, and his access to 
Sierra Leone’s diamond reserves. Warfare in this view was simply profitable 
theft: pillage rather than politics was the key driver of the conflict.18 
A number of salient issues tended to support this view. Firstly, although the 
corruption and irregularities of Sierra Leone clearly helped set the stage for its 
unravelling in the 1990s, the violent RUF was certainly not motivated by any 
evident desire for social justice or a wish to reconfigure the country in ways that 
would make it more responsive to its overall citizenry. In other words, govern-
ance and democracy were not the issues. The spread of violence and its per-
petuation undoubtedly had more to do with the weaknesses and failure of the 
state the insurgents took on than with any mass appeal or intrinsic strength 
enjoyed by the RUF. The grievances of the majority of the people against the 
estranged elites in the capital city were real but there is no evidence that the 
insurgents represented those grievances in any meaningful sense. 
Secondly, the RUF, as mentioned earlier, was desperate from the start to 
latch on to and exploit the diamonds, Sierra Leone’s primary resource, that were 
abundant in the country’s vast alluvial fields. This desperation became an ob-
session. In the end, whatever high ideals some of the insurgents might have 
held, the control and exploitation of diamonds became their primary motivation. 
According to the UN, the RUF made millions of dollars from the illegal ex-
ploitation of diamonds, money that served mainly to enrich the rebel leaders. 
Perhaps most importantly, the RUF targeted mainly civilians, rather than any 
armed opponents, and there was little or no attempt to win over the general 
populace. There was no systematic political programme that would appeal to 
the general citizenry, nor any coherent ideology that might serve to provide 
insight into what the insurgents would do once they gained power. When they 
temporarily took power at the invitation of rogue soldiers in 1997, the result 
was continued pillage, violence and destruction, and a total inability to set up 
any stabilized form of governance. Indeed the behaviour of the RUF in power 
was so wanton and destructive that hundreds of thousands of Sierra Leoneans 
fled the country and there were mass protests and nationwide anti-government 
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demonstrations. The regime was ostracized by the international community, 
with no country at all opting to recognize it. This gave Nigeria, as the regional 
power, the impetus to work with a growing civil defence group in February 
1998 to oust the junta – the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) – of which 
the RUF was an integral part. Once out of power, the rebels regrouped and, 
aided by the capture of the diamond-rich Kono district, re-armed and launched a 
devastating attack on Freetown in January 1999. The attacks led to another 
round of negotiations with the government that were brokered by the UN and 
the US and led to the Lomé Peace Agreement in July 1999. This agreement 
instantly became notorious for granting general and unconditional amnesty to 
the RUF as well as, even more outrageously, control of the country’s diamond 
mining to its leader, Foday Sankoh. 
The Kimberley Process 
The ‘blood diamonds’ campaign quickly came to include a wide and diverse 
cast of characters – academic researchers associated with Western NGOs and 
think tanks; freelance writers and journalists; traditional human-rights groups 
and Western NGOs and advocacy groups like Partnership Africa Canada 
(PAC), Global Witness, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, 
World Vision and Action Aid; African civil-society groups like NMJD and 
CENADEP; politicians and diplomats; and, later, movie stars and award-
winning musicians. The stakes, at least from the point of view of the campaign-
ers and many others, were very high and involved the lives of millions of Afri-
cans. Ian Smillie, a Canadian development specialist who was research coordi-
nator for Partnership Africa Canada, put it in these dramatic terms: 
Conflict diamonds have contributed to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people 
over the past decade. They have fuelled wars; they have led to massive civilian dis-
placement and the destruction of entire countries. They have capitalized on the much 
larger traffic in illicit diamonds that are used for money laundering and tax evasion, 
or are simply stolen from their rightful owners. While conflict diamonds represent a 
small proportion of the diamond trade, illicit diamonds represent as much as 20 per 
cent of the annual world total ... This level of illegality created the opportunity and 
the space for conflict diamonds, and regardless of how current conflicts unfold, it 
will continue to present a threat to peace and stability in Africa. Conflict diamonds 
are a major human security problem, and illicit diamonds are their spawning 
ground.19 
The sense of urgency that the campaign represented was captured even in the 
sedate language of the United Nations. At the height of the ‘blood’ diamonds 
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campaign, in December 2000, the United Nations General Assembly unani-
mously adopted Resolution 55/56 on the role of diamonds in fuelling armed 
conflict in Africa with a view to ‘breaking the link between the illicit transac-
tion of rough diamonds and armed conflict, as a contribution to prevention and 
settlement of conflicts’. It noted that the General Assembly:  
recognize[s] that conflict diamonds are a crucial factor in prolonging brutal wars in 
parts of Africa, and underscored that legitimate diamonds contribute to prosperity 
and development elsewhere on the continent. In Angola and Sierra Leone, conflict 
diamonds continue to fund the rebel groups, the National Union for the Total Inde-
pendence of Angola (UNITA) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), both of 
which are acting in contravention of the international community’s objectives of 
restoring peace in the two countries.20 
The UN defined ‘conflict diamonds’ as ‘diamonds that originate from areas 
controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recog-
nized governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those 
governments, or in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council’.21 
Estimates of ‘conflict diamonds’ were put at between 4% and 15% of the 
world’s total at different times. In purely financial terms, this was clearly im-
portant because even the low figure represented a significant volume of cash in 
impoverished Africa when set against the US$ 7.5 billion annual trade in rough 
diamonds. In fact, it was estimated that as much as 20% of the world’s rough 
diamond trade was illicit in nature and characterized by theft, tax evasion and 
money laundering.22  
Meetings leading to the KPCS began in May 2000 when South Africa’s 
Minister of Minerals and Energy, concerned about the threat to the legitimate 
industry posed by growing media and NGO publicity around ‘blood’ diamonds, 
convened a conference of interested parties, including De Beers, other diamond 
consortia, governments and NGOs, in Kimberley, the home of South Africa’s 
first diamond mines. A month before the meeting, Minister Phumzile Mlambo-
Ngcuka (who later became Thabo Mbeki’s deputy president) visited Canada 
and requested a meeting with the authors of ‘The Heart of the Matter’. This 
author had an hour-long meeting with her and members of South Africa’s pow-
erful trade unions at the South African consulate in Toronto. The Minister, the 
embodiment of charm itself, stressed that her government was very concerned 
about the role that diamonds were playing in conflicts in parts of Africa but 
insisted that diamonds were playing a far more positive role in South Africa and 
Botswana. She mentioned that the livelihood of tens, if not hundreds, of thou-
sands of people in her country and elsewhere depended on the diamond industry 
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(a point stressed by the trade-union representatives) and that, as a result of these 
two considerations, South Africa was spearheading a process to try and put an 
end to the ‘conflict’ diamond business and make the industry clean. ‘Let’s try 
this process first,’ she urged, ‘and if it doesn’t work, you can then, as we say in 
South Africa, “go into the bush”.’23 The PAC report had, in fact, suggested this 
kind of engagement but raised the spectre of a consumer campaign, and not a 
boycott. This implicit threat appeared to be enough: an opening for engagement 
with governments and the industry had been sedulously created and it was now 
being taken up by a powerful player in the diamond industry. 
PAC (as well as Global Witness) duly received an official invitation from 
the South African government to the May 2000 meetings in Kimberley. Nego-
tiations were held with governments, the diamond industry and NGOs on the 
creation of a global certification and monitoring system. The Kimberley meet-
ing was followed by another in Luanda (Angola) in June and a third in London 
in July. Although the NGO presence at these early meetings was at first limited 
to PAC and Global Witness, other far more powerful groups, like Amnesty 
International, Oxfam International, a European ‘Fatal Transactions’ consortium 
and representatives of a coalition of 80 American NGOs, including all the major 
US church organizations and led by World Vision and Physicians for Human 
Rights, began to attend the meetings of the Kimberley Process (as it came to be 
known). 
In the year the process started, the international diamond industry produced 
more than 120 million carats of rough diamonds with a market value of US$ 7.5 
billion. At the end of the diamond chain this would be converted into 70 million 
pieces of jewellery worth close to US$ 58 billion. The big South African com-
pany De Beers purchased by far the majority of the rough diamonds, and could 
more or less set the price. But other important players were emerging which 
made the process of regulation more urgent. In fact, it would emerge that coun-
tries engaged in cutting, polishing and trading polished (not just rough) dia-
monds needed to be brought on board as well. In 2000, for example, Israel 
exported US$ 5.3 billion in polished diamonds to the US, India US$ 2.5 billion 
and Belgium US$ 2.4 billion.24 
A month after the first Kimberley Process meeting, an iconoclastic diamond 
trader and publisher of an influential journal on diamonds, Martin Rapaport, 
visited Sierra Leone. A mercurial and flamboyant American with diamond 
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interests in Israel, Antwerp and elsewhere, Rapaport published a feisty and 
widely circulated article entitled ‘Guilt Trip’ on his return in which he cursed 
‘the bastards [who are] not just stealing [Sierra Leone’s] diamonds’ but are also 
‘trading them for guns’. The real challenge facing Sierra Leone and the world 
diamond trade, he wrote, ‘is how to stop this horrific murderous cycle of illegal 
diamond activity’.25 Rapaport posted ‘The Heart of the Matter’ report on his 
website in its entirety. 
It was in this overheated climate that the RUF made the disastrous error, in 
May 2000, of attacking and capturing over 500 UN peacekeeping troops, killing 
some in the process. Civil-society groups in Sierra Leone, many of whom were 
now active in the campaign against the conflict and who had long been inflamed 
by the foolishness of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement that had given control of 
the diamond industry as a bribe to Foday Sankoh to encourage his participation 
in the peace process, mounted a massive demonstration in front of Foday 
Sankoh’s villa. Sankoh’s bodyguards responded by firing live bullets at the 
unarmed crowd, killing 19 people including a journalist. The world’s media 
descended on Sierra Leone after this outrage and the forgotten war quickly 
dominated newspaper front pages and news broadcasts around the world. The 
events were almost unanimously described as ‘The Diamond War’. 
Pressure was also emerging from other powerful and influential sources. 
After a visit to Sierra Leone in December 1999, US Congressmen Tony Hall 
and Frank Wolf – a Democrat and a Republican respectively – introduced a bill 
in the House of Representatives aimed at preventing the flow of illicit or ‘con-
flict’ diamonds into the United States. And after the launch of the PAC report in 
January 2000, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy decided to use 
Canada’s position on the UN Security Council to expand the diamond discus-
sion from a narrow focus on Angola to one that would embrace the issues in 
Sierra Leone as part of his focus on human security. Axworthy would himself 
make a well-publicized visit to Sierra Leone later. 
Shortly after the Kimberley Process meetings started, a joint Belgian/UK/US 
mission to Sierra Leone was undertaken to develop an experimental tamper-
proof certification system for rough diamonds, the details of which were ap-
proved by the UN Security Council in August 2000. Just prior this, the World 
Diamond Congress was held in Antwerp from 17-19 July. Normally devoted to 
the technical and commercial aspects of the industry, this Congress was almost 
entirely given over to the issue of conflict diamonds. Representatives from 
governments and NGOs, including PAC, participated and the industry agreed 
on reforms that would represent the most fundamental set of changes it had ever 
tried. It called, for example, for ‘redline’ legislation in all countries that im-
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ported diamonds as producers, manufacturers or dealers. Banks, insurance com-
panies, shippers and others would be included in the system. A World Diamond 
Council was proposed and subsequently inaugurated to help move the process 
forward. The industry proposals were taken to government meetings in London 
in July 2002, the third in the Kimberley Process and, as before, NGOs were also 
present. The London meetings were followed by two days of hearings at the 
Security Council’s Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee to explore the connection 
between diamonds and guns in the war. Of great significance was the fact that 
the hearings included testimony from governments, the diamond industry and 
individual experts. The Council refused to invite NGOs like PAC because some 
member nations objected to their presence but some of the strongest language 
up to that point on the issue of conflict diamonds was added to the record by 
‘individual experts’ from PAC, Global Witness, Amnesty International and 
others. A noteworthy feature of the hearings was that, for the first time in the 
UN’s history, a hearing of this nature was open to the public and was widely 
reported on. 
About forty countries and dozens of NGOs continued to meet for a couple of 
years after the first meeting in Kimberley in 2000 but tensions between gov-
ernments and NGOs became apparent at a meeting in Brussels in April 2001 
when the NGOs expressed their frustration with delays in creating a global cer-
tification system in a widely circulated press release that noted disappointment 
over the ‘lack of progress in efforts to end the trade in conflict diamonds’. The 
NGOs continued:  
Further stalling and inaction will damage the credibility and the viability of the dia-
mond industry, and the jobs it provides for hundreds of thousands of people. More 
importantly, it will allow rebel armies in Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to continue their brutal wars against innocent men, women and 
children.26 
Though the relationship between NGOs and governments had never been 
easy, it was the first time that such a rupture was made public. No one, least of 
all the NGOs, wanted conflict in the delicate process and soon afterwards the 
two parties were brought together. 
Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness continued to ratchet up 
interest in the issue by producing reports showing the various dimensions of the 
diamond trade: (i) on Guinea after RUF rebels and Taylor’s mercenary army 
invaded the country in late 2000 and early 2001, striking at its rich alluvial 
fields in the forest regions;27 (ii) on Southern Africa, putting a question mark 
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against the overall economic benefits of diamonds;28 (iii) the criminal nature of 
the diamond industry in Congo;29 (iv) a study of the Kimberley Process itself, 
setting out a case for monitoring the rough diamond trade;30 and (v) on Sierra 
Leone following the UN intervention in late 1999 and the implementation of a 
diamond-certification scheme, showing how RUF diamond-mining interests 
were hampering the peace process there.31 Global Witness had earlier published 
a paper setting out the possibilities of identifying and certifying rough diamonds 
as an effective way of controlling the trade.32 
A powerful impetus to the process came from a somewhat unexpected 
source. A major article in The Washington Post in November 2001 alleged that 
operatives from the Middle Eastern terrorist group, al Qaeda, had visited RUF-
held diamond-mining areas several times and arranged to purchase diamonds in 
deals worth millions of dollars prior to the 9/11 attacks in the US, implying that 
diamonds might have helped fund the attacks. Correspondent Douglas Farah 
stated in his article that the al Qaeda network ‘reaped millions of dollars in the 
past three years from the illicit sale of diamonds mined by [RUF] rebels in 
Sierra Leone’ and that one of the RUF’s senior officials, Ibrahim Bah, of Sene-
galese origin, acted as ‘a conduit between senior RUF commanders and the 
buyers from both al Qaeda and Hizbollah, a Shi’ite Muslim organization linked 
to Lebanese activists who have kidnapped numerous Americans, hijacked air-
planes and carried out bomb attacks on US installations in Beirut’. The West 
African Shi’ite Lebanese community had always been suspected of having 
sympathies for Hizbollah, an organization that is ‘active in all these countries 
and [is] deeply involved in many businesses across the [West African] region’.33 
Interestingly, three months before 9/11 and five months before the Washington 
Post article appeared, the names of two of those associated with the alleged 
relationship, Ossailly and Nassour, were placed on a travel ban announced by 
the United Nations Security Council. A member state had supplied these names 
to the Security Council. The ban also affected senior Liberian government offi-
cials and ‘other individuals providing financial and military support to armed 
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rebel groups in countries neighbouring Liberia, in particular the RUF in Sierra 
Leone’.34 The 9/11 Commission, set up by the US government to investigate the 
forces behind the terrorist attacks in September 2001, would later play down 
any connection between the attackers and Sierra Leonean diamond interests.35 
However for a time, the disclosures in The Washington Post significantly 
boosted the argument for tighter controls of the international diamond trade and, 
by implication, support for the Kimberley Process where it mattered most, 
namely in the US, which is by far the biggest consumer of diamond products 
(accounting for over half of jewellery sales worldwide). 
The pressure could no longer be resisted and agreement was reached in 
March 2002 on the principles and most of the details of a system that would be 
introduced in January 2003. Provisions for the regular independent monitoring 
of national control mechanisms were not, however, agreed and remained an 
issue of serious contention for the NGOs concerned about the system’s credi-
bility and effectiveness. A final agreement was drawn up in Interlaken, Swit-
zerland, in November 2003 requiring participating countries to ensure that all 
rough diamonds for export carry a Kimberley Process certificate of origin. The 
UN Security Council endorsed the agreement, making it international law.  
The Kimberley Process is now backed by national legislation in more than 
70 countries and, under it, each agrees to issue a certificate to accompany any 
and all rough diamonds to be exported from its territory and clearly certifies that 
the diamonds are ‘conflict-free’. Technically, it requires each country to track 
the diamonds being offered for export back to the place where they were mined 
or to the point of import – a solution to the issue of provenance and origins – 
and a set of standards for these internal controls must be met. All participating 
countries that import rough diamonds are bound by agreement not to allow any 
rough diamonds into their territory without an approved KP certificate. The 
Kimberley Process system requires the same levels of compliance in Belgium, 
the UK and Canada as it does in Sierra Leone, Guinea, China, Russia, Brazil 
and Congo, implying the same levels of technological and bureaucratic compe-
tence. This is probably its main flaw but in spite of this, however, Ian Smillie 
has suggested that the system has been a success: 
We believe that the Kimberley Process is a success. It is a success because although 
there are still pockets of conflict diamonds in Côte d’Ivoire, the worst of the wars 
fuelled by conflict diamonds have now ended. It is also a success because it has 
forced a huge volume of illicit diamonds to the surface and out of the trade… 
One of the reasons for the success of the KPCS, now acknowledged by everyone 
involved, is that it was a process, not a formula imposed from outside, and it was a 
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process that involved governments, industry and civil society organizations like 
PAC. That is the good news. The KPCS has helped to consolidate the peace in 
several African countries...36 
As further examples of this success, Smillie rightly cited the boom in dia-
mond exports since the Kimberley System was introduced in Sierra Leone and 
Congo, the latter registering its best exports since the discovery of diamonds in 
the country about a century ago. A Diamond Certification system, anticipating 
the Kimberley System, was instituted in Sierra Leone in September 2000, four 
months after the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1306 that placed a ban 
on diamond exports from Sierra Leone. It was primarily meant to deny the RUF 
a market, and was complemented by a ban on Liberian diamond exports several 
months later. The certification system was created with the assistance of the 
Belgian Diamond High Council, which had been criticized in the PAC report 
for ignoring the problem of conflict diamonds. In addition to a Sierra Leonean 
diamond valuer, an independent valuer was also appointed. Official exports of 
Sierra Leonean diamonds have increased dramatically. In 1999, the country 
officially exported only US$ 1.3 million worth of diamonds but in the 12 
months after the certification system was introduced (i.e. between October 2000 
and September 2001), legal exports jumped to US$ 25.9 million (210,675 
carats). Exports for the year 2001 (January to December) totalled 222,500 
carats, which were valued at US$ 26 million. This figure represented a monthly 
average export of US$ 2.17 million, which was extraordinarily high compared 
to the years prior to the introduction of the system. This trajectory has since 
continued, with exports rising almost every year. Diamond exports in 2003 were 
worth US$ 75 million, in 2004 the figure was US$ 126 million; and in 2005, it 
was US$ 142 million. The value of diamond exports dropped slightly in 2006 to 
US$ 125 million but rose again in 2007 to US$ 141 million.  
Conclusion 
Two US congressmen, Tony Hall (D-Ohio) and Frank Wolf (R-Va.), as well as 
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), nominated PAC and Global Witness for the 
2003 Nobel Prize. ‘We are convinced that the goal of ending the scourge of 
conflict diamonds is achievable primarily because of the length to which Part-
nership Africa Canada and Global Witness have gone’, the legislators wrote in 
their letter to the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Parliament. They also 
noted that the groups: 
                                                          
36  Ian Smillie, ‘Diamonds, Kimberley Process, and the Development Diamond Ini-
tiative’ (http://www.ccafrica.ca/nrc/Ian%20Smillie%20Speach.pdf, November 28, 
2006). 
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succeeded because they have avoided polarizing campaign tactics that could have 
alienated the diamond industry and key governments, whose support is critical to a 
solution. They understood that, despite the shocking difference between the adver-
tised image of diamonds and the often harsh reality of the trade, a boycott could re-
sult in a backlash against a product whose legitimate trade is the backbone of many 
economies.37 
The groups were not awarded the Nobel Prize – it went to an Iranian female 
activist in 2003 – but the fact that they were nominated at all for this prestigious 
award just three years after the campaign started is testimony to how effective 
and timely the ‘conflict’ diamonds campaign was deemed to have been. 
As so often happens, the work of groups like NMJD and CENADEP that 
added a great deal of moral gravitas and energy to the campaign sadly went 
unrecognized. But because they were based at the scene of the devastation that 
propelled the campaign and worked tirelessly to sustain it, they were the true 
heroes. Too often campaigns of this nature, spearheaded by Western NGOs, 
appear as narcissistic indulgence, and fringe radical groups too often substitute 
doctrine for knowledge, and irritation with their own political and economic 
systems out of concern for the world's truly disadvantaged. The result can then 
be confusion and harm to the people they profess to represent. The lesson to be 
learnt from the ‘conflict diamonds’ campaign is that for advocacy to be taken 
seriously it has to be well-informed and sensitive, and should take on board the 
interested parties, particularly representatives of the people the advocates pro-
fess to be concerned about. 
As for the countries, Sierra Leone, Angola and Congo, that inspired the ‘con-
flict diamond’ campaign, there has been significant progress in peace consoli-
dation and infrastructural development although there are naturally still prob-
lems. The former Minister for Mineral Resources in Sierra Leone, Mohamed 
Swaray-Deen, appeared very pleased with efforts made by his government to 
better govern the diamond sector but frankly admitted that problems remained. 
‘Without doubt,’ he said, ‘[the key] problems are illegal mining and smuggling, 
but especially smuggling.’38 And illegal mining and smuggling, as the minister 
well knew, have been the key problems in the industry since the commercial 
exploitation of diamonds started in Sierra Leone in the 1930s. Importantly, 
government revenue from the increased diamond production remains minimal. 
Diamond exporters pay an export tax of 3% of the value of the goods. In addi-
tion, there is income tax, which is calculated for companies at 30% of their 
                                                          
37  Rob Bates, ‘Conflict diamond NGOs nominated for Nobel Prize’, JCK Online.com, 
see also  
(http://www.professionaljeweler.com/archives/news/2002/040402story.html,  
April 4, 2002). 
38  Interview with Mohamed Swaray-Deen, Freetown, December 2005. 
86 Gberie 
income after other applicable deductions. But where the holder of a mining 
lease has yet to make a profit, or where the chargeable income is below 7% of 
the investment, the company pays a flat 3.5% rate of income tax. There are also 
the license fees paid for mining (minimal), dealing (also fairly insignificant) and 
exporting (at US$ 500,000 annually, this is a significant sum). However all 
these taxes totalled less that US$ 10 million in 2007. Still, the government 
considered it necessary to grant special tax concessions to some mining compa-
nies. For example, it granted the biggest diamond-mining venture in the coun-
try, Koidu Holdings Limited, duty-free facilities for the equipment and other 
mining-related goods it imports into the country, along with waivers regarding 
residential permits for dozens of its foreign employees. Such concessions are 
not limited to diamond companies. An internal government review of the min-
ing industry estimated in 2006 that accumulated revenue losses from several 
concessions granted to the titanium mining company, Sierra Leone Rutile, will 
amount to US$ 98 million from 2004 to 2016. 
These concessions are part of the legacy of the war. Poor infrastructure and 
the image of a violent and unstable place have made the country unattractive to 
foreign investors and such concessions, the government argues, are needed to 
attract investments. The struggle continues in Sierra Leone. 
 
 5 
 
 
The Islamic Courts Union: 
The ebb and flow of a Somali 
Islamist movement 
 
Jon Abbink 
 
 
The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia was a social-reli-
gious movement with a political programme. This internally 
diverse movement emerged from local Islamic courts active in 
Mogadishu in the late 1990s. In the absence of state authority 
and public security in 2004, it responded to the social needs of 
local people and grew into a large militia force that, by late 
2006, controlled much of southern Somalia. In December 2006 
a military campaign by Ethiopia, in support of the Somali Tran-
sitional Federal Government, ousted the ICU. The movement 
subsequently declined, split and withdrew to transform itself 
into a new military grouping. Its socio-religious programme 
waned, its violent militant agenda re-emerged and it morphed 
into a new nationalist movement.  
This chapter considers the ICU as a social movement and 
questions its precedents, its social-reformist agenda and ideol-
ogy, and its mobilizational procedures. The reasons for the 
rapid rise of the ICU in 2006 within the unstable and milita-
rized society of southern Somalia have to be understood against 
the background of Muslim movements that existed in the coun-
try in earlier decades and unsuccessful attempts to establish a 
national government. This is marked by a mixture of political 
segmentation determined by the Somali clan-family system, 
socio-religious innovation, economic competition and local 
political manoeuvring in the stateless environment of southern 
Somalia since 1991. While local political dynamics are very 
important, the analysis also relates ongoing conflicts in Somali 
society to global geopolitics and Islamist radicalism.  
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Introduction: Locating the Somali case in social movement theory 
This chapter presents an interpretive case study of the Islamic Courts Union 
(Midowga Maxkamadaha Islaamiga in Somali) in southern Somalia, an Islamist 
movement that was active from c. 2004 to 2008 and had social and political 
aims reflecting both internal diversity (and division) and a new international 
positioning. A study of this movement reveals the crucial role of international 
contacts of all the actors on the Somali scene. This was not only evident in the 
persistent presence of neighbouring countries but also in the growing influence 
of transnational Islamic ideologies and networks, including that of Somali dias-
pora communities.1 These external sources provided funding, new narratives of 
nationalism and religious identity, and foreign-trained cohorts that impacted on 
socio-religious practices and ideologies in Somalia. It can be argued that seem-
ingly local developments, like clan-militia fighting, religiously motivated 
battles, piracy, looting, terrorist actions and the work of Islamic charities are 
inextricably linked to global flows and thus highly relevant to politics and secu-
rity developments in the region as a whole.2 
Somalia has been in the midst of major societal transformation since 1991, 
not only due to the destructive civil war and the internal struggle that wrecked 
the country (at least its southern part), but also the transformation of customary 
religious life and social structures. One part of the story is the emergence of 
radical forms of Islam and these, although representing a minority of Somalis, 
seem to have become entrenched in society and redefined people’s social and 
religious identification. The ICU, originally known as the ‘Supreme Council of 
Islamic Courts of Somalia’, was founded in 20043 and is an intriguing example 
of a movement that emerged in extreme conditions of statelessness, civil war, 
humanitarian crisis and social disarray in southern Somalia.4 It was character-
ized by mobilization and recruitment on the basis of (a specific form of) Muslim 
                                                          
1  One in every ten Somalis lives in the diaspora, mainly in the US, Western Europe, 
the Middle East (Gulf States, Saudi Arabia) and neighbouring countries in the Horn. 
2   Cf. Said S. Samatar, ‘Unhappy masses and the challenge of political Islam in the 
Horn of Africa’, Horn of Africa 20, (2002), pp. 1-10. See also Andre Le Sage & Ken 
Menkhaus, ‘The rise of Islamic charities in Somalia: An assessment of impact and 
agendas’, Paper for the 45th Annual International Studies Association Convention, 
Montreal, 17-20 March 2004. 
3  In Somali: Golaha Sare ee Makhamaddaha Islaamiga ee Soomaaliya. 
4  I do not discuss Somaliland here as it is a quite different story. See Seth Kaplan, 
‘The remarkable story of Somaliland’, Journal of Democracy, 19, 3 (2008), pp. 143-
157, and Mark Abley, ‘Successful country doesn’t exist’, Toronto Star, 11 Septem-
ber 2007. 
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identity as expressed via local (clan-based) shari’a courts. In a comparative 
sense, the movement was challenging and perhaps puzzling to outsiders.  
While social movements in Africa were present in the late-colonial and post-
colonial era as nationalist insurgent groups, neo-traditional movements or in the 
more classic form of trade unions and civic organizations, variations based on a 
predominantly religious agenda have been rare5 and little studied. Compared to 
other parts of the world, similar ideas on recruitment, ideology and socio-politi-
cal agendas around grievances or political aims in Africa were always present 
but cultural commitments and value orientations of movements as well as their 
strategies differed markedly. In Africa, movements with an allegedly religious 
identity basis are growing in importance, often as their adherents see the classi-
cal social movements, such as trade unions, parties and civic associations, as 
ineffective or conservative. 
This plethora of new socio-political movements in Africa has broken the 
framework of social movement paradigms that we know from the mainstream 
literature and that have been developed on the basis of mainly European and 
American cases.6 New combinations of social, neo-ethnic, religious and crimi-
nal elements of collective self-definition have emerged and are taking shape in 
semi-collective, often opportunistic, alliances resonating with recent theories 
about ‘low intensity conflicts’ and ‘new wars’. When studying these movements 
in Africa, the challenge is to explain their emergence, mobilization potential and 
evolving agendas as they unfold.  
In much of the literature one comes across a conception of social movements 
as primarily grievance-based and democratically oriented collectivities of 
people or social groups, usually neglected by the state, that are striving for the 
public good. This idea of legitimate grievances and of democratic aspirations 
cannot, however, be part of the definition of social movements, as it would 
prejudge their nature. As the Somali case will illustrate, some movements are 
political groups aimed at imposing their agenda and exercising power in a coer-
                                                          
5  The Kenyan Mungiki movement, which emerged in the 1990s, is another example of 
a complex, ‘neo-ethnic’ social movement based on a mixture of religious and socio-
political elements. However subject to brutal government repression, it lost its 
leadership and has transformed into a movement where criminal and violent activ-
ities have undermined its socio-political agenda. See for a recent study, Awinda 
Atieno, ‘Mungiki, ‘Neo-Mau Mau’ and the prospects for democracy in Kenya’, Re-
view of African Political Economy, 34, 13, 2007, pp. 526-531. 
6  South Africa is the only country in Africa where social movements have occurred in 
significant measure and been studied in recent years. See for example, Richard Bal-
lard, Adam Habib, Imraan Valodia & Elke Zuern, ‘Globalization, marginalization 
and contemporary social movements in South Africa’, African Affairs, 104, 417 
(2005), pp. 615-634. 
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cive fashion, with social aims or issues as secondary. Others want to impose an 
exclusivist programme on society, merging the social and the political in a 
comprehensive religious cloak. The definition of social movements must, there-
fore, be more nominal and open, focusing on mobilization and public action 
towards an aim at variance with the state, other movements or forces in society. 
In this chapter I use the general definition offered by Olzak7 and define a social 
movement in its broader sense as a purposive collective movement voicing 
demands for fundamental change in society, mobilizing around one or more 
public causes and following a strategy of change. A broad variety of issues can 
be addressed by a movement, ranging from state discrimination, neglect, socio-
economic and political marginalization to perceived value differences. 
In the case of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), questions can be asked about 
whether it is, or was, a social movement and, if so, how it differs from those 
known from the literature. It was certainly a movement of people acting collec-
tively with a social and political programme, claiming public causes and dress-
ing their actions in a religious garb, sincere or otherwise. They addressed social 
problems that emerged in the vacuum of post-1991 Somalia and the collapse of 
its central state. However, according to sociologist Tilly,8 the ICU would proba-
bly not qualify as a social movement because in his strict definition, based on 
Western European experience, it seems to lack the specific complex of defining 
elements (campaigns against target authorities; action repertoires, public dis-
plays).9 However I claim that the ICU and its predecessors should be tested 
against historical examples and in this case it could be said to be a collective 
action movement adapted to the quite specific, stateless environment of a clan-
divided society. It is of prime importance here to look at the emergence and 
actions of movement elites. 
A challenge when studying African cases is how to address cultural frame-
works10 and the – often disruptive – religious factor in social movement re-
                                                          
7  See Susan Olzak, ‘Ethnic and nationalist social movements’, in: David A. Snow, 
Sarah A. Soule & Hanspeter Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Move-
ments (Blackwell/Malden, Oxford/Carlton, 2004, p. 666. 
8  Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004 (Paradigm Publishers, London/Boul-
der, 2004), pp. 3-4, 7. 
9  His definition of a social movement in his essay ‘From interactions to outcomes in 
social movements’ (in: M. Giugni et al. (eds), How Social Movements Matter, p. 
257) is equally restrictive and although perhaps applicable to Europe may not be so 
for many other societies. 
10  See Stephen Hart, ‘The cultural dimension of social movements: A theoretical re-
assessment and literature review’, Sociology of Religion, 57, 1 (1996), pp. 87-100. 
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search.11 Cultural-religious factors are quite different and probably more impor-
tant for social movements in Africa than elsewhere. A movement that observers 
may see as religious or social is often at the same time inherently political (or 
vice versa) because the domains are fused and drawn upon opportunistically. 
This is certainly true in the Somali case. It could be contended that religion was 
the ‘master frame’12 of the ICU for their view of Somali society and their course 
of action but it should not be forgotten that Somali clan-group thinking (i.e. 
social organization based on the segmentary patrilineal principle, or tol in 
Somali) interacted with this. I refrain here from fully answering the question 
about whether the ICU was really a social movement and instead aim to explain 
the movement with the help of insights from social movement theory (cf. van 
Stekelenburg’s chapter in this volume). Within the various theoretical traditions 
of social movement research, a ‘political process approach’13 seems promising 
in explaining the ICU, although a more comprehensive social-constructivist 
point of view would also be helpful in view of the strong identity aspects in the 
movement (Islamist ideology) that gave it additional mobilizing capacity. 
The Somali civil conflict is fully connected to transnational global politics 
and can no longer be explained solely as a part of the country’s socio-political 
crisis and its divisive clan system: the ICU was not only responding to a do-
mestic agenda of social grievances. Somali actors have placed themselves in 
alliance with transnational flows of funds, organizational forms and ideologies. 
Indeed both the current Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the 
ICU were decisively influenced by foreign connections, with the ICU opting 
exclusively for those in the Muslim world.  
The Somali arena today:  
Fragmentation, insecurity, persistent violence 
Somalia has been bad headline news in recent years: political disorder, persis-
tent civil strife,14 terrorist actions, military abuse, a catastrophic humanitarian 
                                                          
11  Cf. Christian Smith, ‘Correcting a curious neglect, or bringing religion back in’, in: 
Christian Smith (ed.), Disruptive Religion. The Force of Faith in Social Movement 
Activism (Routledge, London/New York, 1996), pp. 1-25. The role of the symbolic-
cultural dimension in social movement is treated well in: Donatella della Porta & 
Marco Diani, Social Movements: an Introduction (Blackwell/Malden, Oxford/Carl-
ton, 2nd edition, 2006), but they do not touch on the role of religious elements. 
12  Cf. Della Porta & Diani, Social Movements, p. 79. 
13  Ibid., pp. 16-18. 
14  See Hussein Adam, From Tyranny to Anarchy: The Somali experience (Red Sea 
Press, Trenton, NJ/Asmara, 2008). 
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situation for 30-40% of the population,15 extortion, the kidnapping and killing 
of aid workers, and a piracy-infested coastline unsafe for international ship-
ping.16 While there are huge numbers of studies and reports on Somali and a 
good general understanding of the underlying problems of state failure, social 
(dis-)organization and economic life in the literature, the country’s politics are 
exceedingly complex. 
Although two parts of the former state of Somalia – self-declared independ-
ent Somaliland and the less-successful but fairly stable Puntland17 – are enjoy-
ing relative calm, southern Somalia and notably the capital Mogadishu and its 
environs have remained locked in insecurity and political fragmentation, first 
under warlords and clan militias (1991-2005) and since 2006 in devastating 
violence between parts of the ICU and TFG troops supported by Ethiopian 
forces that have been in the country since December that year. At least 10,000 
people, about 60% of them civilians, have been killed since the December 2006 
war, many more have been wounded and hundreds of thousands have become 
internally displaced persons (IDPs). 
Since the collapse of the central state in Somalia, the various insurgent 
movements have not succeeded in forging a new state and have plunged the 
country into civil war and a predatory economy. The history of the ensuing civil 
conflict and war is too complex to cover here.18 However, communal conflicts 
and population movements have created deep antagonisms between various clan 
and sub-clan groups, opportunistic alliances for economic gain and massive 
victimization of minorities and non-clan Somalis.19 For example, in the wake of 
the expansion of the then-powerful USC militia of General Mohammed Farah 
‘Aydeed’, Mogadishu was flooded with many Hawiye clan people (notably the 
Habr-Gedir sub-clans of Murosade, Suleimaan and ‘Ayr) who replaced or 
                                                          
15  See the alarming report by the Food Security & Nutrition Analysis Unit Somalia, 
Quarterly Brief (Nairobi, issued 12 September 2008. Online at:  
www.fsausomali.org, accessed on 1 September 2008. 
16  Piracy along the Somali coast was already being recorded in 1998. A major action 
was the capture on 4 January 1999 of the MV Sea Johana by units of the radical 
Islamist Al Ittihad Al Islami group. See S. Coffen-Snout, ‘Pirates, warlords and 
rogue fishing vessels in Somalia’s unruly seas’.  
(www.chebucto.ns.ca/~ar120/somalia.html, June 1, 1999); R. Middleton, Piracy in 
Somalia. London: Chatham House, Briefing Paper, October 2008. 
17  Their armed border conflict in 2007, however, shows that one cannot speak of 
stability here either. 
18  See Hussein Adam, From Tyranny to Anarchy, p. 81f. 
19  The popular perception of Somalia as a homogeneous country is not true. There are 
significant minorities and groups falling outside the clan system (with its five major 
clan-families of Dir, Darod, Hawiye, Rahanweyn and Isaaq). 
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chased out non-Hawiye inhabitants, a lot of whom were from the Darod clan. 
Similar displacement happened in the countryside, for example in the Rahan-
weyn agricultural areas. The many unresolved conflicts of interest and illegal 
appropriations constitute an important sub-text surrounding the perennial con-
flicts in Somalia today.  
Heavily hit by repression and war in the final years of the rule of President 
Mohammed Siyad Barre who was in power from 1969-1991, Somaliland 
declared independence in 1991 and disassociated itself from the idea of a pan-
Somali state. Puntland followed in 1998 by declaring autonomy but not inde-
pendence. Southern Somalia has remained divided and stateless. In spite of the 
absence of a central state since 1991, not all has been chaos and mayhem. While 
Somali society fell back on clan territories, the rule of clan elders, local NGO 
activity and Islamic organizations, local self-governing units emerged and to a 
large extent stabilized the rural areas. In the cities, predatory militias and war-
lords were dominant and insecurity, especially in the large towns like Moga-
dishu, remained rampant. But even there, efforts at community regulation 
emerged, although largely within same-clan units.  
Paradoxically, the Somali economy has had a mixed record over the past 
years. While poverty is deep-rooted, state services non-existent and the agro-
pastoral sector in serious crisis, there is a free, mostly unregulated economy 
with a booming trade and telecom sector20 as well as a transnational crimi-
nal/racketeering sector that brings in money. And in the last two years millions 
of dollars have also come from piracy off the coast. The qualified economic 
success of the entrepreneurial sector has allowed Somali businessmen and 
movements to tune in to global economic networks and forge new political-
ideological connections. Not only are hundreds of millions of dollars being 
transferred from the Somali diaspora21 each year (flowing to all parties in the 
conflict but especially to the Islamic Courts movement) but religious funding 
and arms flows from Middle Eastern countries and Eritrea are also relatively 
easily arranged.22 The informal, trust-based and highly effective hawala money 
                                                          
20  See Bob Feldman, ‘Somalia: amidst the rubble, a vibrant telecommunications infra-
structure’, Review of African Political Economy, 113 (2007), pp. 565-572. 
21  A recent World Bank report mentions the very high amount of $ 1 bn annually, or 
71.4% of GNP. See Samuel M. Maimbo (ed.), Remittances and Economic Develop-
ment in Somalia. An overview (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2006), p. 5. The 
UNDP in 2007 estimated half this sum. 
22  Well-documented in the reports of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia. See for 
instance the amazingly detailed report of November 2006  
(www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/109th/S2006913.pdf, November 21, 2006). 
Eritrea’s support was also admitted by the former ICU leader back in 2006, see 
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transfer systems have undoubtedly contributed to the funding of militants and 
terrorists23 in Somalia as well,24 and economic interests are an important driver 
of the conflict.25 
Over the past eighteen years, various efforts have been made to rebuild a 
nation state, often at the instigation of outsiders such as the UN. These efforts 
were perhaps premature and unduly top-down because they sidetracked the 
then-ongoing ‘building blocks’ approach to Somali political reconstitution, 
which was widely seen as the best way forward.26 The external state-building 
effort gave rise to the Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2000 which 
was constituted at a conference in Arta, Djibouti. After its collapse, it became a 
somewhat more representative Transitional Federal Government in 2004, with a 
five-year mandate. It was based on difficult negotiations in Mbagathi, Kenya, 
offering a compromise between clan-families on representation and the division 
of power. The TFG, led by the former Puntland president and veteran Somali 
politician/warlord Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (of the Omar Mahmud/-
Majerteen/Harti/Darod clan), was recognition, to an extent, that a future So-
malia should be significantly federal in structure.27 However it soon ran into 
trouble and was not able to relocate to Mogadishu due to the insecurity and lack 
of authority there. One problem was that Abdullahi Yusuf, although experi-
enced and strong, was controversial due to his authoritarian style and his close 
relationship with Ethiopia. He was not a conciliatory president. 
The other forces providing alternative sources of survival and social order 
were Islamic movements, notably the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu. Before they 
appeared on the scene as an organized movement in early 2006, they had been 
building a constituency based on a range of service-oriented Islamic associa-
                                                                                                                                               
‘Somalia: Islamists refuse talks, acknowledge Eritrea’, Reuters news message, 26 
July 2006. 
23  Terrorism is defined in this chapter as unpredictable violent action against non-com-
batants and innocent people with the intent to kill and destroy, create existential fear 
and subvert the public order, usually with a stated political aim. 
24  Robert Feldman, ‘Fund transfers-African terrorists blend old and new: hawala and 
satellite telecommunications’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 17, 3 (2006), pp. 356-
366. 
25  Cf. Sabine Grosse-Kettler, External Actors in Stateless Somalia. A war economy and 
it promoters (Bonn International Center for Conversion, Bonn, BICC paper 39, 
2004). 
26  Cf. Matt Bryden, ‘No quick fixes: coming to terms with terrorism, Islam and 
statelessness in Somalia’, Journal of Conflict Studies, 23, 2 (2003), pp. 24-56.  
27  Incidentally, its Charter also recognized Islam as the state religion and shari’a as an 
important source of national law. 
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tions and charities that had existed in the country for decades (founded on the 
Muslim duty of zakāt). 
Earlier Muslim movements in Somalia: A religious infrastructure 
Somalia has been a Muslim country since at least the thirteenth century and has 
known a wide range of (mostly Sufi)28 Islamic associations with their important 
mystical orders and holy men as mediators and models of piety. Virtually all 
Somalis are nominally members of a Sufi order, the most important being the 
Qadiriyya, the Idrisiyya and the Salihiyya. Women are also members. These 
orders are usually non-political but can be used as organizational vehicles for 
resistance when faced with external enemies, as in the rebellion by Mohammed 
Abdulleh Hassan against colonial rule in 1900-1920. While Islam is a core 
element in the identity of Somalis, they also recognize clan affiliation and 
customary or contract law (heer) as defining elements in their heritage. The rise 
of the ICU was due to the long, organized presence of Islam in Somalia. A 
number of the organizations are mainstream Muslim associations of a social, 
educational and/or religious nature, and some are militant, with a programme of 
coercive or violent expansion and international connections and ambitions. 
Among the indigenous Somali organizations the most important are: 
• Harakat al Islah (Movement for Revival) This movement was founded in 
1978 with the aim of reconciling Islam and the modern world. It did not 
openly operate under the Siyad Barre regime but was more of a network of 
educated urban professionals and students. It ran social, humanitarian and 
educational activities and was said to opt for ‘Islamic democracy’. Their 
programme rejects Salafism and the use of force, and the organization is 
known to be open to contact with foreign organizations, also those in the 
West.29 
• Ahl As-Sunna wal Jama’a (People of the Sunna and the Community) This 
was set up in 1991 and has its basis in Somali Sufism, to which it claims to 
provide national leadership. It is a movement with branches elsewhere, is 
opposed to militant/reformist Islam and claims to represent traditional, main-
                                                          
28  See Lee V. Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the history of 
a pastoral people, 1600-1900 (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 
1982); Ioan M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and state in the Horn 
of Africa (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1988). 
29  International Crisis Group, Somalia’s Islamists (ICG, Brussels, 2005, Africa Report 
no. 100), p. 14. A longer study of Al Islah is contained in Andre Le Sage, Somalia 
and the War on Terrorism. Political Islamic movements and US counter-terrorism 
efforts (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, unpublished PhD thesis), pp. 
159-184. 
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stream Muslims in Somalia.30 They specifically tried to counter Salafist-
Wahhabist versions of Islam, and thus inevitably became involved in poli-
tics. The group played a role in the peace negotiations in Mbagathi (Kenya) 
that led to the TFG in 2004. Its efforts to mediate between politics, radical 
Islam and Somali Muslim traditions have often placed it in a difficult posi-
tion. In late 2008 it started to form militias to counter the al Shabaab insur-
gents. 
• Al Ittihad al Islami (Islamic Unity) This movement was founded in 1984, 
bringing together the two earlier Islamic groups of al Takfir al Wahda (also 
called Wahda al-Shabaab al-Islaami) and the Somali branch of the Salafi 
Ikhwan al Muslimiin (Muslim Brotherhood) that were both formed in the 
1960s but suppressed by former President Mohamed Siyad Barre. Al Ittihad 
al Islami was first led by the Somaliland sheikh Ali Warsame, a Saudi-
educated Wahhabist cleric still active today.31 While al Ittihad had a social 
component, it was primarily a political Islamist movement of militants, 
aiming to islamize Somali society, install an Islamic state in Somalia and 
agitate among Somali Muslims in Ethiopia. It became embroiled in violent 
disputes and battles with a variety of opponents in and outside Somalia and 
had a record of imposing its Islamist agenda (see below). 
• There are also Islamic missionary groups like the Jama’at al-Tabligh, the 
Ansar as-Sunna32 and an association of Somali ‘ulemas called Majma’ 
‘Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya. While these have no social or charitable 
programmes, their ideological influence is significant and impacts on tradi-
tional forms of Somali Islam. 
These various groups are best considered as religious rather than social 
movements with a clear programme and agenda of social protest. They were 
primarily organizations bent on fostering Somalia’s Islamic identity and fur-
thering the interests of Somalis in a state where political opposition was impos-
sible. The exception is perhaps Al Ittihad al Islami. Since the early 1980s it has 
been a constant presence in Somalia in various forms, both as a social move-
ment with its own services and propagandist-educational activities and as a 
religiously motivated militant movement.33 It formed various opportunistic alli-
ances with some of the Somali Muslim civil-society associations outlined 
above. It has a record of terrorist attacks within Ethiopia that were part of its 
attempt to stir up unrest among Ethiopian Somali Muslims. Its bases in the 
                                                          
30  Matt Bryden, ‘No quick fixes’, p. 34. 
31  He is a member of the Somaliland Habr-Ja’elo/Isaaq clan. 
32  International Crisis Group, Somalia’s Islamists, pp. 16-18. 
33  For a detailed account by an Ethiopian academic, see Medhane Tadesse, Al-Ittihad: 
Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia (Mega Printing, Addis Ababa, 2002). 
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Gedo region just across the Ethiopian border provoked a campaign by the 
Ethiopians in 1996-1997 that dislodged them and killed many of their leaders. 
After this defeat, Al Ittihad Al Islami abandoned its international ambitions 
and developed a domestic agenda aimed at creating a semi-legal social network 
within Somali society, which was reminiscent of the National Islamic Front in 
Sudan before the 1989 coup. Though never renouncing its international links, it 
went into social projects, education and organizational activities to win a grass-
roots constituency and gain adherence for its views on Islam and society among 
the general population.34 It built up a network of sympathetic clerics, most of 
whom had trained in other Muslim countries and were asserting their views of 
‘proper Islam’ as opposed to Somali variations, i.e. a rejection of saints and 
Sufism. Al Ittihad Al Islami became active not only in southern Somalia but also 
in Somaliland and Puntland, trying to gain a public presence by calling for 
stricter Islamic morality in the public sphere in the two countries. The assassi-
nation of various foreign humanitarian workers, teachers and civil-society 
figures were also attributed to the movement. Their actions were controversial 
and generated unrest,35 but they had a following. After the TNG’s formation in 
2000 they were close to the new government36 and are still around today 
although they have lost some of their momentum in the wider society. 
Filling the state vacuum: From Al Ittihad al Islami to the ICU 
The Islamic Courts Union, later called the Supreme Islamic Courts Council, 
emerged as an organized force in 2004 and, with a military wing, in early 2006. 
This marked their arrival on the political scene. The ICU’s rapid rise and 
decline in the unstable and militarized society of southern Somalia are intrigu-
ing. The organization was led by several former Al Ittihad Al Islami figures, 
most importantly by former army colonel and al Ittihad leader Hassan Dahir 
‘Aweys’, (of the Ayanle/‘Ayr/Haber-Gidir/Hawiye clan) who became chairman 
of its Shura or Advisory Council. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (of the Agon-
yare/Abgal/Hawiye clan), a former teacher and an Ahlu as Sunna wal Jama’a 
member, has been its Executive Council head since 2004 and has always been 
presented as a moderate leader. When it was set up, the ICU was internally 
                                                          
34  Cf. Andre Le Sage, ‘Prospects for Al Itihad and Islamist radicalism in Somalia,’ 
Review of African Political Economy, 28, 89 (2001), p. 475. 
35  See Somali journalist Bashir Goth’s interesting article, ‘Thwarting the menace of 
Islamism in the Horn of Africa’, on the Somaliland website  
(www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=4146, November 8, 2004). 
36  According to Medhane Tadesse, (Al Ittihad, pp. 113 and 126), the TNG was domi-
nated by al Ittihad people. 
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diverse and had radicals, (ex-)terrorists, Salafists and mainstream Muslims 
within its ranks. Islamist clerics like Sheikh Fuad Mohamed Qalaf were its 
ideologues.37 As stated above, the ICU emerged from a number of shari’a 
courts in the Mogadishu region and its predominant clan base was Hawiye/-
Habr-Gidir. In the course of late 2005-2006 it evolved into a movement with a 
large militia force with its own ‘technicals’ (pick-up trucks with machine guns 
mounted in the back) and other weaponry. It acted as another armed force, 
rejecting the TFG and planning its military downfall. The ICU could thus in 
many respects be compared with the warlord/clan militia forces, pursuing a 
similar armed struggle to power but in this case in the name of Islam. 
Their significance can be explained by the practical concerns of ordinary 
Somalis and business people with improving public safety and eliminating the 
predatory warlords and loose militias. While many ordinary people had cooper-
ated with and profited from warlord or militia activities (if they were of the 
same clan), the general perception was that the warlords and militias had over-
played their hand by holding with impunity the city of Mogadishu in a strangle-
hold of violence, abuse and extortion. The Islamic Courts responded to an 
increasingly felt need among Somalis for public order and an end to the whole-
sale insecurity that had become a serious impediment for business and progress. 
To consider the ICU from its start as a front for radical Islam is, therefore, a 
mistake.  
New modes of national governance and judicial structures in the clan-
ordered anarchy of Somalia had constantly been sought since 1991, with at least 
a dozen attempts to constitute a national government. It should not be forgotten 
though that in the meanwhile many local solutions to the problems of instability 
and state absence were also developed. Indeed before the formation of both the 
TNG in 2000 and the TFG in 2004, Somalia had already gone a long way to 
creating working local/regional units based on a combination of clan-elder rule, 
deep-rooted customary law (heer), Islamic law and NGO activity (mainly those 
of Somali women). This was the so-called ‘building blocks’ approach.38 How-
ever, the hotspot of Mogadishu remained violent. In the socio-political and legal 
vacuum of the city – and several other towns like Beledweyn and Kismayo – 
the Islamic Courts emerged as the only force with authority, providing a prag-
matic regulation of disputes, combating street crime and protecting business 
deals. In the urban context, clan elders and customary law had lost much of 
their relevance as sources of judicial regulation.  
                                                          
37  Remarkably, he had worked in Sweden for 12 year as the imam of a Stockholm 
(Rinkeby) mosque before returning to Somalia in 2004. 
38  Cf. Patrick Gilkes, ‘Briefing: Somalia’, African Affairs, 98, 1999, p. 577. 
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The courts were originally regular shari’a courts, like those found all over 
the Muslim world. The first phase of the courts’ movement began just after the 
collapse of the state in 1991 when the Islamic group Al Ansar as-Sunna set up 
the first court in the Madina neighbourhood of northern Mogadishu, and was 
active within the Abgal sub-clan of Hawiye. Others followed, in Mogadishu and 
elsewhere, like the Hawadle clan court in Beledweyn, but this first wave of 
courts declined in the late 1990s due in large part to intra-Abgal clan competi-
tion, radical elements trying to take them over and a growing resentment to 
harsh shari’a punishments like the amputation of limbs. After a few years, a 
second wave of courts emerged in Mogadishu and Merca, and in 2000 they 
formed a shari’a Implementation Council, on which Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ 
reappeared. He was chairman of the Ifka Halane court (predominantly of the 
‘Ayr sub-clan), which was founded in 1998 and was known to be a hard-line 
court. 
At the Arta peace conference in Djibouti in 2000, the Islamic Courts were 
represented as a movement.39 In the next few years, eleven courts appeared in 
Mogadishu: ten from Hawiye sub-clans and one from the Jareer-Bantu people. 
They tried to transcend clan interests and appeal to wider principles of conflict 
regulation and justice ‘on the basis of Islam’, and partly succeeded. Their 
spokesmen often drew explicit parallels with the time of the Prophet Moham-
med who, when establishing Islam as the dominant religion, had agitated 
against Arab clan divisions. The courts forged an alliance, thus increasing their 
relevance as an incipient social movement, and the ICU found support among a 
growing number of local businessmen, some of whom became the movement’s 
core financiers. Members of the individual courts were Muslim clerics but also 
business people and clan elders and they became popular by creating order, 
cleaning up the streets and finding solutions to the problems of crime and inse-
curity caused by the warlords and criminal bands. That an Islamic message was 
part of the deal was accepted for the time being. As Ken Menkhaus noted, 
‘Though many Somalis were deeply uneasy with the radical and reckless direc-
tion the ICU leadership gradually took, they were willing to tolerate almost 
anything in return for public safety’.40 This was realized by mediation in intra-
clan dispute resolution, a furthering of inter-clan cooperation, the imposition of 
fines and compensation payments, and the enforcement of judgements and 
agreements, for which militia were used. Most of the courts, interestingly, took 
                                                          
39  See ‘Interview with Islamic Courts chairman Hassan Sheikh Mohamed Abdi’, in the 
In-Depth IRIN report ‘Somali National Peace Conference’  
(www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=54&ReportId=72096&country=y
es, July 2000). 
40  Ken Menkhaus, ‘Who broke Mogadishu?’, The Guardian, 17 January 2007. 
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care not to go against the principles of Somali customary law (heer), certainly 
not before their takeover of power in Mogadishu. They were usually supported 
in local communities and received voluntary financial contributions from both 
businessmen and the general population.  
The ICU was formed in 2004 and sought an extension of the authority of the 
courts that morphed into a social movement with a more structured leadership 
and wider socio-political aims derived, in part, from Islamic charities and 
movements that existed before the Courts’ movement emerged. They tried to 
bring the entire country under their influence, stabilize it and form a new struc-
ture of (religious) authority to replace the state.  
This success, having responded to social needs and built up momentum, 
attracted Islamist militants, activists and former Al Ittihad leaders who saw in 
the Islamic identity and popular acceptance of the courts a way to move forward 
with their agenda of islamization, denying the relevance of Somali customary 
law and other sources of legislation. In addition, they saw the chance to subvert 
their main opponent, namely the TFG and its strongly anti-al Ittihad president 
Abdullahi Yusuf (who had prevented an Al Ittihad coup in Puntland in 1992).41 
At this juncture and fuelled by former Al Ittihad members, the expansion of the 
courts, by taking on militias as their executive arm and enforcing their rule, 
went beyond its regular jurisdiction and brought them to the threshold of poli-
tics. It was a crucial moment in recent Somali history when a potentially posi-
tive social movement turned into a political force, but one jeopardizing the 
chances of its own success by embarking on expansion using violent means. 
This was also a development that most Somalis did not appear to approve of, 
although it was indicative of the fundamental changes in Somali society and 
Somali Islam. 
ICU rule: June-December 2006 
The ICU was a heterogeneous alliance of Islamic groups, Islamic courts and 
radical-Islamists in opposition to the TFG. As noted, it had its roots in the 
earlier Al Ittihad al Islami that was formed in 1984,42 which explains why parts 
of the ICU were already geared to a radical Islamist agenda. The ICU took over 
power in Mogadishu in June 2006 after it chased out a coalition of clan-militia 
leaders and warlords from Mogadishu. These warlords had divided southern 
Somalia and Mogadishu into personal business fiefs and were responsible for 
the road blocks, arbitrary rules, the extortions and most of the violence against 
                                                          
41  For a good survey, see International Crisis Group, Somalia’s Islamists, pp. 5-6. 
42  See Matt Bryden, ‘No quick fixes’, p. 28, and Sunguta West, ‘Somalia’s ICU and its 
roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami’, Terrorism Monitor, 4, 15, 27 July 2006. 
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civilians. Some of them had loosely declared their allegiance to the TFG but did 
not submit to its authority.43 In a notoriously ill-judged policy, the US govern-
ment, concerned about terrorist al Qa’eda operatives in Somalia, had been sup-
porting an alliance of such warlords with logistics and funds since early 2006.44 
Surrealistically called the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-
Terrorism (ARPCT), the US believed them to be a bulwark against terrorist 
elements within the ICU.45 
After the ICU defeated the ARPCT in June 2006, it reigned in Mogadishu 
for six months and extended its rule to most of southern Somalia, bringing 
increased security and public order. Road blocks were removed, garbage was 
collected and many criminal gangs were taken off the streets. Its ideology had, 
however, become clearer in its leaders’ pronouncements46 and was unambigu-
ous. As the Islamic Courts’ first vice-chairperson Abdelrahman M. Jinikow said 
in September 2006: ‘We will only approve a constitution based on theology 
because an Islamic constitution is the only one that serves all of us justly’. He 
added that the TFG government’s current ‘man-written constitution has nothing 
to do with Islam’ and that ‘[a] secular constitution, whether it is democratic or 
any other, is never fair and right, and Muslims have only one constitution which 
is entirely based on Allah’s Koran that will avail all Muslims in the world now 
and Hereafter’.47 They tried to impose strict shari’a-based rule, which soon 
evoked resentment. The idea that the ICU was a benign and fully accepted 
regime has to be dismissed in view of the violence they inflicted48 and the un-
                                                          
43  Many warlords, notably in the countryside and the smaller cities, remained outside 
the ARPCT. An example is the notorious Yusuf Mohammed Siyad ‘Indha’adde 
(Hawiye, ‘Ayr sub-clan), who had established himself in Merca and appropriated 
plantations and other property there. In 2006 he joined the ICU and became one of 
its most uncompromising spokesmen. 
44  See ‘U.S. secretly backing warlords in Somalia’, Washington Post, 17 May 2006. 
45  See also Matt Bryden, ‘Washington’s self-defeating Somalia policy’, CSIS, Africa 
Policy Forum comment (http://forums.csis.org/africa/?p=18, December 6, 2006). 
46  See for example an interview with Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ in Rod Norland, ‘Heroes, 
terrorists and Osama’, Newsweek, 22 July 2006, and also ‘Militia leader calls for 
Islamic rule in Somalia’ (AP news message, 13 October 2005). An interesting confi-
dential document on their programme is a letter by Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’  
(http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Category:series/Inside_Somalia_and_the_Union_of_Islam
ic-_Courts , November 9, 2005). 
47  See ‘Somalia: we accept no constitution other than Islamic – Islamic courts’, Sha-
belle News Media message  
(www.benadir-watch.com/2006%20News/0906_Islamic_courts.pdf, September 6, 
2006). 
48  A few examples: after they took over they had women without veils publicly lashed, 
they introduced shari’a law punishments literally, like amputations and stonings, 
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popular measures they took.49 The independent media and women’s NGOs were 
threatened as well and is evidence of how the ICU quickly marginalized the role 
of civil society. 
With inflammatory rhetoric, the ICU set out its wider political ambitions in 
the region: ‘uniting all Somalis in the Horn of Africa’,50 ‘[the] installation of a 
shari’a-based Islamic state’ and ‘jihad against Ethiopia’.51 This reflected the 
ICU’s immaturity as a movement.  
An important result of the ICU victory was its takeover and appropriation of 
many of Somalia’s economic activities. Some of the ICU’s major financial 
backers were indeed important businessmen, like Ahmed Nur Jim’ale, former 
chairman of the telecom/remittance company Al Barakat, and trader Abukar 
Omar Adani who had his own militia.52 In fact, the start of the ICU offensive in 
2006 may have been sparked by a conflict over the control of the profitable El 
Ma’an port (30 km north of Mogadishu) between Adani, calling in ICU militias, 
and militia leader Bashir Raghe.53 In addition, in late 2006 many of the thou-
sands of former warlord militia members of the defeated ARPCT, the moryaan 
(marauding armed youths), turned up in ICU militias, perhaps less out of reli-
gious conviction than because of perceived economic prospects (a fixed salary 
of US$ 70 to US$ 150 per month).  
                                                                                                                                               
they shot and killed people watching television, and in one incident they dragged 
wounded, loyal TFG supporters in Bu’ale from their hospital beds and killed them 
(cf. United Nations Joint Logistics Center, NGO-SPAS, ‘Somalia – security update, 
report no. 44/06’, 26 Oct. – 01 Nov. 2006). The Al-Shabaab militia, the main per-
petrator, had already built up a record of abuse and violence in previous years, 
including targeted abductions, the assassination of aid workers and civil-society 
activists, and other grave desecrations. This fits with the record of terrorist actions of 
its predecessor Al-Ittihad al-Islami. 
49  This led Somali researcher Said S. Samatar to note that if Somalia were to be left to 
sort itself out alone, the movement would be absorbed by clan-based politics and 
lose its prominence and radicalism. See his ‘Why Somalia is no territory for Islamic 
terrorists’ 
(http://wardheernews.com/Articles_06/August_06/15_somalia_no_territory_for_terr
orists_samatar.html, August 16, 2006).  
50  For example, they also threatened Somaliland and made pronouncements against its 
budding democracy and relative stability. 
51  For example, ‘Somali militia declares jihad against Ethiopia’, International Herald 
Tribune, 9 October 2006, and ‘Somali hardliner calls for foreign jihadists’, The 
Observer, 24 December 2006. 
52  See: Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council reso-
lution 1676 (2006), UN document S/2006/913, p. 10. 
53  Both men were members of the Warsangeli/Abgal/Hawiye sub-clan. 
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In the six months up to December 2006 there were half-hearted negotiations 
between the ICU and the TFG on power-sharing. When in December that year 
the ICU threatened to conquer Baidoa, the town where the weak but interna-
tionally recognized TFG of Somalia was entrenched, the Ethiopians, who were 
fearful of an Islamist government on their doorstep and committed to the IGAD 
peace process,54 moved in ‘at the request of the TFG’ with thousands of soldiers 
and defended the TFG. A quick push towards Mogadishu ousted the ICU from 
the capital, forced them to disperse and go back to their (mainly Hawiye) clan 
territories where they were reproached by clan elders for having provoked the 
Ethiopian intervention with their armed campaigns.  
International dimensions: Impact of the Ethiopian intervention 
Before 2006 Ethiopia had followed developments in Somalia with an apprehen-
sive eye, wary of the ICU’s Islamist element. Ethiopia sees itself as having 
legitimate security concerns regarding Somalia in view of two previous wars 
and a possible radicalization of its own Muslim population (ca. 38% of the 
total). While its role has not always been positive, Ethiopia appears to be 
working for a stable and manageable Somalia. Its relations with Somaliland and 
Puntland are good but the South is a problem. The Addis Ababa government 
also fears ethno-nationalist sentiments among the Ogaden Somalis, some of 
whom had links with Al Ittihad al Islami in the 1990s and have been waging an 
armed rebellion against the Ethiopian administration in Somali Region 5, which 
intensified in 2007 with a terrorist attack by the ONLF (Ogaden National Lib-
eration Front founded in 1984) on an oil exploration site in eastern Ethiopia in 
which 65 people were killed. 
Ethiopia has consistently supported the Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
(SSDF) of the current TFG president Abdullahi Yusuf and various non-Islamist 
groups among the Digil-Rahanweyn in the Bay-Bakool regions bordering 
Ethiopia. It rejected the previous transitional national government that emerged 
from the 2000 ‘Arta Process’ in Djibouti and gave rise to an even weaker 
government with less legitimacy than the current TFG.  
Within the IGAD framework, Ethiopia supported Abdullahi Yusuf’s bid for 
the presidency in 2004 and made itself ‘guarantor’ for the newly constituted 
TFG. The seat of this government in Baidoa was protected in part by Ethiopian 
troops, as was the case when the ICU forces, having refused meaningful nego-
                                                          
54  This process of negotiations under the auspices of the IGAD (International Govern-
mental Authority on Development, an organization of states in the region) in Kenya 
in 2002-2004 involving Somalia’s various clan factions led to the Mbagathi agree-
ment to establish the TFG in October 2004. 
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tiations with the TFG, advanced on Baidoa in December 2006 with the intention 
of conquering it. Their ultimatum to the TFG and the Ethiopians, made in the 
same reckless manner as most of their other actions, was met with a rapid offen-
sive by the TFG and the Ethiopians that militarily cleared out the ICU from 
Mogadishu, destroyed much of their militia and infrastructure, and allowed the 
TFG (but not Parliament) to enter Mogadishu.  
Ethiopia was aware of the (still ongoing) support that Eritrea was providing 
to those opposed to the TFG and their own forces, including al Shabaab and 
other militant groups. The UN Somalia Monitoring Group reports of 2006 and 
2007 documented the arms flows and other foreign assistance in remarkable 
detail.55 A proxy war is thus still being fought out, preventing easy domestic 
resolution of the conflict.  
The impact of the Ethiopian intervention on the domestic scene since early 
2007 has been substantial. It has led to the ICU dividing into at least three 
sections, reflecting the various social bases and ideological currents of Somali 
Islam, as well as different responses to the military defeat and offers by the TFG 
to negotiate.  
ICU defeat and transformation 
In addition to the military campaign by the TFG and the allied Ethiopian armed 
forces, there are also underlying societal reasons for the ICU’s fragmentation, 
like centrifugal political segmentation (determined by the complex and ever-
present Somali clan-family system), problems resulting from economic compe-
tition (land grabs, extortion and control over export products), local political 
manoeuvring in the stateless environment, and ideological differences rooted in 
ambivalent Somali nationalism and cultural identities.  
While the ICU as such has been dissolved since its defeat, some remnants 
centred on the militias have slowly reconstituted themselves in the countryside 
with foreign and local support. And as the ICG noted in 2007, the ‘grassroots 
network of mosques, schools and private enterprises’ that was part of the ICU 
movement and had spread ‘the Salafist teachings and their extremist variants 
remains in place and continues to expand’.56 This includes Somaliland where 
                                                          
55  Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 
1676 (2006), UN document S/2006/913, pp. 11-17; Report of the Monitoring Group 
on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (2006), UN document 
S/2007/436; Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Coun-
cil resolution 1766 (2007), UN document S/2008/274, pp. 20-21. 
56  International Crisis Group, Somalia: The tough part is ahead (ICG, Brussels, 2007, 
Africa Briefing no. 45), pp. 1, 9. 
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several of the Al Ittihad and ICU leaders came from57 and where Islamists have 
been working underground to disrupt the prevailing political system.  
In January 2007, core remnants of the ICU militias renamed themselves the 
Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRM). Two 
other names also surfaced: the Brigades of Tawhid and the Jihad in the Land of 
Somalia. They were committed to armed resistance by every possible means 
and, in the meantime, also developed their commitment to a radical, though not 
well-elaborated Islamist ideology. 
On the political front, the ICU leadership, including what the media always 
calls the ‘moderates’, reorganized in Asmara, Eritrea, and formed the Alliance 
for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS). After being released from Kenyan 
custody and debriefed by the Americans in early 2007, former ICU head Sheikh 
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed became the leader, but with Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ still in 
the background. Initially supporting any kind of armed action against the TFG 
forces, government officials and the Ethiopians, including shellings, ambushes, 
targeted killings and suicide attacks, they later chose to negotiate. On 9 June 
2008 a deal was struck at a conference in Djibouti by the TFG and the ARS. 
They agreed to end all violence (on condition that there was a timetable for the 
departure of Ethiopian troops) and work towards power-sharing and reconcilia-
tion.58 But this approach lacked significance among the radicalized militias. 
The ICU’s legacy was notably claimed by a radical sub-group led by the Al 
Ittihad Al Islami veteran Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’, and younger activists like 
Afghanistan veterans Aden Hashi Farah ‘Ayro’59 (of the Ayanle/‘Ayr/Habr-
Gidir/Hawiye clan), Mukhtar Robow (Leysan/Sideed/Mirifle/Rahanweyn clan) 
and Mukhtar Abdirahman (probably a Habr-Ja’elo/Isaaq). The latter three were 
leaders of a militant group known by the name of Harakat al-Shabaab (or 
Mujahidiinta/Hizb al-Shabaab, i.e. Fighters/Party of the Youth). This group en-
gaged in systematic attacks on Ethiopian troops and Somalis loyal to the TFG. 
A campaign of classic urban terrorism was unleashed, resulting in hundreds of 
civilian victims. al Shabaab was in many respects a continuation of the Al 
                                                          
57  When working on this chapter in late 2008, news was received of a fivefold suicide 
bombing by Al Shabaab-affiliated militants in Somaliland that had left 28 civilians 
dead and dozens wounded. See ‘Suicide bombers kill at least 28 in Somalia’ 
(www.africanews.com/site/Suicide_bombers_kill_28_in_Somaliland/list_messages/
21336).  
58  See ‘Agreement between Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for Re-
liberation of Somalia  
(www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/SOMALIPAX9JUN
08.PDF?link_id=29&slink_id=6044&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3, 
June 9, 2008). 
59  He was killed in an American air strike on 1 May 2008. 
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Ittihaad Al Islami movement, and had originally been a militia allied to two 
radical Islamic courts in Mogadishu (Sherkoolo and Ifka Halane). After defeat 
in December 2006 it turned to a violent, non-compromising insurrection, led by 
the figures mentioned above as well as other Islamists. Former warlord Yusuf 
Mohammed ‘Indha’adde’ and jihadist Hassan Hersi ‘al Turki’ followed the 
same path, although they are not formally part of al Shabaab. They were able to 
draw support from a network of radical Somali Salafist clerics known for their 
jihadist pronouncements and statements against westerners, non-Muslims and 
dissidents.60  
Al Shabaab-affiliated leaders in the 1990s undoubtedly served as contact 
men and protectors of (non-Somali) al Qa’eda operatives,61 amongst whom 
were the three involved in the 1998 and 2002 bomb attacks in Kenya.62 Al 
Shabaab thrives on foreign funding from Arab countries and a radicalized/-
nationalist Somali diaspora.63 They thus flout the domestic Somali constituency 
and feel accountability to no one except Allah.64  
Despite the pounding the ICU and its militias received from the Ethiopians 
and the TFG and the unpopularity of their violent political agenda among large 
sections of the Somali public, including many of the (divided) Hawiye clan-
family, the presence of a radical Islamist social movement in Somalia has now 
been established. This is in no small part due to support from foreign players, 
such as Eritrea and some Middle-Eastern Muslim countries, and will be a 
feature of the Somali political scene for years to come. In the process of their 
                                                          
60  See, for instance, the statements of sheikh Nur Barud Gurhan, chairman of the 
Kulanka Culimaada, a Salafist group in Mogadishu, in ‘Western aid workers ac-
cused of conversion’, Reuters news message, 22 April 2004. 
61  For al Qa’eda’s presence in East Africa, see Andre Le Sage, Somalia and the War 
on Terrorism, Chapter 3. 
62  Fazul A. Muhammed (who narrowly escaped arrest in Kenya in September 2008), 
Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, and Tariq Abdullah (Abu Talha ‘al-Sudani’). Other al-
Qa’eda men include Ali Swedhan, Samir Said Salim Ba’amir, Mohamed Mwakuza 
Kuza, Issa Osman Issa and (probably) the Somali Ahmed Abdi Godane. Cf. Inter-
national Crisis Group, Somalia: Countering terrorism in a failed state (ICG, 
Brussels, 2002). See also a report on Gouled Hassan Dourad, a Somali detainee in 
Guantanamo (www.dni.gov/announcements/content/DetaineeBiographies.pdf, Sep-
tember 15, 2008). See also Roland Marchal, ‘Islamic political dynamics in the 
Somali civil war’, in A. de Waal (ed.), Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of 
Africa (C. Hurst & Co., London, 2004), p. 139. 
63  Cf. Stig Jarle Hansen, ‘Misspent youth – Somalia’s Shabab insurgents’, in Jane’s 
Intelligence Review (http://jir.janes.com/public/jir/terrorism.shtml, September 1, 
2008). 
64  Cf. Robert Walker, ‘Meeting Somalia’s Islamist insurgents’, BBC news item,  
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7365047.stm, April 28, 2008). 
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(re-)emergence, the social agenda of Muslim movements, including that of the 
Islamic Courts, has been pushed aside in favour of a religious-political one that 
is bent on exclusive power and the coercive institution of a new ‘moral regime’, 
subverting the civic dynamics of Somali social forces and the agency of estab-
lished grassroots interest groups.  
The ICU and its associates have thus been militarized and transformed by a 
radical Islamist section that has defeated the aims of the social movement that 
established it. No doubt the brazen Ethiopian campaign and US anti-terrorism 
actions like air strikes on militants have contributed to this. But it is also a sign 
of the fundamental transformations that Somali Islam and its social infrastruc-
ture have been going through in the last decade: the decline of authority struc-
tures based on clan law and elders, the fragmentation of clans, the emergence of 
new independent economic power bases, and the rise of a new generation of 
foreign-funded and supported activists and religious men combating Somali 
culture, customary law and mainstream Islam dominated by Sufi orders. Apart 
from the subversion of customary law and the clan elders’ influence, this devel-
opment has marked the weakening of other social forces like traditional socio-
religious associations and locally rooted Muslim movements, such as Al Islah 
and the Ahl as-Sunna wal Jama’a, that recognized the traditional dual nature of 
power in Somalia65 and rejected an exclusivist, politicized Islam, as well as a 
decline in the fortunes of local NGOs, notably women’s groups. 
ICU fragmentation and the growth of the jihadist movement 
The dominant insurgent force today is again the al Shabaab which, despite 
showing some internal diversity, is committed to an al-Qa’eda-type ideology. It 
has been the most important movement on the ground (up to mid-2009) and has 
done most of the fighting. It is organized in regional, relatively autonomous 
units and is becoming rooted in local communities that contribute funds and 
supplies, either on a forced or voluntary basis. Al Shabaab is trying to fuse 
Somali nationalism, which appeals to many (provoked by the presence of 
Ethiopian forces in the country), and radical Islamism conceived in global 
terms. In 2007, in a script well-known in global jihadist discourse, the PRM 
started showing suicide-bomber videos online. And in September 2008, some al 
                                                          
65  See Ioan M. Lewis, ‘Dualism in Somali notions of power’, Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute, 93 (1963), pp. 109-116. While religious leaders could 
become involved in (armed) struggle against a perceived external threat, within 
Somalia this duality was respected and reflected the socio-political organization of 
society, and political power was not translated or validated in religious terms (Ibid., 
p. 115). 
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Shabaab spokesmen publicly admitted their affinity to al-Qa’eda ideology and 
were clearly set on the road to terrorism.66 Their subsequent shelling of Moga-
dishu airport and the Ugandan and Burundian AMISOM forces, in which many 
civilians were killed, confirmed the trend. 
Global militant-jihadist discourse has taken root among Somalis and is being 
spread by foreign-educated clerics and activists (in Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Egypt 
and the Gulf States), leading many of these groups to propagate a ‘pure Islam’ 
and an anti-clan and anti-Somali policy. Several Muslim countries and private 
individuals are providing funds for Islamic charities, mosques, madrasas and 
private universities, not to mention other material support including arms and 
supplies (from Iran, Libya and Syria).67 Predictably, the above-mentioned 
Islamist fighting groups, following the global discourse of jihadist Islamism, 
started propagandist Internet sites68 calling for jihad and the ‘liberation’ of 
Somalia. 
The deal made by the ARS with the TFG in June 2008 is evidence of a 
careful road to rapprochement, but the chance that the radicalized past of the 
ICU will accept it is slim. It appears to be too late because militant armed 
elements, such as al Shabaab and related Islamist militias that follow a narrow 
and uncompromising agenda, are likely to fight on using terror tactics.69 They 
have faced criticism from many of their own clan members, with parts of the 
Hawiye and Rahanweyn clan-families (where key leaders of al Shahaab come 
from) disavowing their violent tactics.70 In response, al Shabaab activists have 
targeted those who speak out and assassinated several of them, including clan 
elders. This development shows that clan dynamics are again impinging on the 
Islamist agenda and may limit its appeal. Despite this, radical Islamist opposi-
                                                          
66  Cf. one of the most notorious al Shabaab leaders, Mukhtar Robow, cited in Ed 
Sanders, ‘Conditions may be ripe for Al Qaeda in Somalia’, Los Angeles Times, 25 
August 2008.  
67  See the report cited in footnote 38, pp. 21-26. 
68  See (www.qaadisiya.com), announcing the PRM’s formation on 19 January 2007. It 
soon appeared they were al-Shabaab and were regrouping. Other websites were: 
www.kataaib.net (the official Al Shabaab site until 23-01-2009, when it was closed 
down) and www.abushabaab.worldpress.com (in English), also closed down in early 
2009. 
69  In March 2007 they summarily executed and mutilated several captured TFG sol-
diers. See ‘Somalia, Events of 2007’, in Human Rights Watch Report 2008 (Human 
Rights Watch, Washington, DC, 2008).  
(http://hrw.org/englishwr2k8/docs/2008/01/31/somali17757.htm, 2008). 
70  See for instance, ‘Somalia - Mogadishu community leaders appeal to al Shabaab’, a 
news message  
(www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Mogadishu_comm
unity_leaders_appeal_to_al_Shabaab.shtml, October 7, 2008). 
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tion forces have been regaining the upper hand on the battlefield as a result of 
their international connections with other Muslim countries and networks in 
terms of funds and other support. In late 2008 they occupied the major city of 
Kismayo and installed an Islamist regime there, including shari’a criminal 
law.71 In December 2008 the announced withdrawal of Ethiopian troops 
materialized and in early 2009 al Shabaab forces took Baidoa as well. The 
reluctance of the Ethiopians to perpetually buttress the TFG is explained by the 
fact that the TFG did not meet their expectations of forming a government, and 
without the promised support from the AU and the international community, 
they with drew. The TFG did not succumb to the pressure but saw the resigna-
tion of Abdullahi Yusuf and, in a surprise move, the election by an extended 
Somali parliament of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed of the ARS-Djibouti as the 
new Somali president. His more moderate and conciliatory tone has invited 
support from Somalis and undermined the support base of the radicals. But the 
TFG will remain vulnerable, if not succumb, at some point,72 and there may still 
be an Islamist regime in Mogadishu. In March 2009 the new president declared 
that shari’a would be the main law of Somalia, giving in to another demand by 
the Islamist radicals. But al Shabaab showed themselves to be rejectionist by 
not accepting the new TFG under the leadership of their erstwhile ally. Hassan 
Dahir ‘Aweys’ of the ARS-Asmara initially rejected the new TFG but in April 
2009 announced his intention to return to Mogadishu and conditionally work 
with the new TFG. However, when he had returned in May, he denounced 
contacts with the Sheikh Sharif government and called for its removal. As 
leader of the Hizbul Islam coalition of four smaller radical-Islamist factions, he 
clearly aimed to become government leader himself. Violence fuelled by al 
Shabaab and Hizbul Islam actions has continued. It also provoked the formation 
of militias under the banner of the mainstream Sufist-oriented Ahl as-Sunna wal 
Jama’a who in early 2009 chased al Shabaab out of several towns in central 
Somalia. Thus a new round of fighting began, indicating that al Shabaab had 
reconfigured itself as a militant movement superseding the ICU and was aiming 
                                                          
71  On 28 October 2008 it was reported that they had started to stone Somali women for 
committing adultery. BBC news message, ‘Somali woman executed by stoning’ 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7694397.stm, October 28, 2008) and ‘Rape victim, 
13, stoned to death in Somalia’, The Guardian, 2 November 2008,  
(www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/03/somalia-rape-amnesty, November 2,  
2008). 
72  See Steve Bloomfield, ‘Troop pull-out leaves government on brink’, Sunday Herald, 
11 October 2008. The ongoing offensive of the al Shabaab, supported by terror at-
tacks, brought this moment near in June 2009. 
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to achieve its goals (of gaining power and installing a theocratic state) through 
violent means rather than a broad social programme. 
Conclusion: The transformation of a social movement 
The ICU and its constituent parts undoubtedly had traits of a grassroots social 
movement by being involved in dispute resolution and exercises in social justice 
and attempts to restore some degree of social order. It certainly was, to cite 
Olzak’s definition, ‘a purposive collective movement voicing demands for 
fundamental changes in society, mobilizing around one or more public causes 
and following a strategy of change’. ICU activities could be claimed to have 
been beneficial to an urban constituency and came to stake claims for funda-
mental change in a wider national arena, although they were not al all democ-
ratic. The fact that in 2006 this movement quickly went on to take economic 
and political functions and violently claim exclusive socio-political space was 
because the state in Somalia had not only collapsed but had effectively dis-
solved so that the movement – and its religious currents – had no political 
structures or powerful state adversary to confront, unlike social movements in 
Europe, Latin America or South Africa. The ICU had to fill a vacuum to not 
only provide services but also create new narratives of legitimacy and authority. 
It decided to seek a basis in Islam, offered as an encompassing, absolutist ideol-
ogy claiming to fill civic space and ground people’s social identity. But any 
social movement, as an invented institution, is prone to change and metamor-
phosis, as Tilly noted.73 That the ICU allowed itself – perhaps having no choice 
on a playing field dominated by violent competition for power and allegiance 
and no other ‘unifying’ discourse than Islam available – to be taken over and 
dominated by radical Islamists as to leadership and political ideology was a 
result of its inexperience and its unclear, perhaps underdeveloped, socio-politi-
cal programme. It was likely also a reflection of the basic impossibility of 
developing a real political Islam. Many in Somalia feel this to be a contradiction 
in terms, notably in view of the deeply engrained duality of notions of power in 
Somali culture – the religious people (wadaad) versus the politicians or warriors 
(waranle).74 Political power is, furthermore, usually seen as corrupting religious 
values, and perhaps vice versa. It is the old problem that beset Sayyid Moham-
med Abdulleh Hassan back in the early 1900s.75 
                                                          
73  Tilly, Social Movements, p. 14. 
74  Cf. Lewis, ‘Dualism in Somali notions of power’, p. 114. 
75  Cf. J. Abbink, ‘Dervishes, moryaan and freedom fighters: cycles of rebellion and the 
fragmentation of Somali society, 1900-2000’ in J. Abbink et al. (eds), Rethinking 
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The social movement of the ICU has fragmented and lost direction. The 
broader-based ARS has taken its place since 2007 as a political opposition force 
but as such was not present in Somalia. The courts could regain legitimacy and 
make an impact by refocusing on what they do best, namely dispensing justice 
in local social and other disputes, seeking reconciliation and accommodation 
between different groups and clan units, and refraining from politicizing their 
role. In these domains they can still do more than the perennially weak, erratic 
and unreliable TFG, which has not been able either to institutionalize itself or 
gain sufficient loyalty76 and work towards national inclusiveness. It has the 
character of a phantom government without a social presence and with its 
various units like the army, police or security forces often operating fully on 
their own and not responding to the cabinet ministers who are nominally in 
charge. Its record of abuse and the bad name its Ethiopian allies have inevitably 
received in Somalia due to the ongoing violence are preventing progress. A 
compromise formula between the two – the TFG and the ARS – is inevitable 
but realities on the ground have so far prevented this.  
The ICU movement yielded various moderate as well as militant/violent 
parts in 2008, with the latter subverting anything good that the ICU had 
achieved when in power in Mogadishu. Among them, al Shabaab turned in fact 
into an ‘anti-social movement’, targeting its own people and predictably rigidi-
fying its policies with, as the core issue, the unconditional withdrawal of the 
Ethiopians (thereby hoping that an implosion of the TFG would follow) and the 
coercive establishment of shari’a rule in a theocratic state. Beyond this, no 
specific political ideas have been voiced. For them, all means to these ends are 
justified. The following incident is characteristic: 
On 7 October 2008 the chairman of a traditional elders’ council in the Hiraan region, 
Mr Da’ar Hersi Hoshow, was shot and killed. Hundreds of protesters took to the 
streets in Beletwein, the capital of Hiran, following the assassination. The protest 
turned violent with demonstrators throwing rocks at Islamic Courts fighters, who 
effectively control Beletwein and the surrounding regions after Ethiopian troops 
withdrew last month [September 2008]. No group claimed responsibility for the 
murder, but the assassination came a day after he publicly renounced the al Shabaab 
insurgents’ threats against the aid agencies CARE International and International 
                                                                                                                                               
Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History (Brill, Leiden, 2003), pp. 328-
365; and Hussein, From Tyranny to Anarchy, p. 76, 221.  
76  Although it probably commands the nominal allegiance of the majority of southern 
Somalis: the Darod and Rahanweyn clan-families, the larger part of the Abgal-
Hawiye clan, and many minority groups. 
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Medical Corps. He had also suggested that al Shabaab’s threat was intended to 
‘starve’ the local people.77 
This killing, not the first to be directed against a legitimate social current in 
Somali society, namely the clan elders who represent legitimacy and authority 
in the local context, confirms that Islamist radicals have taken over the struggle 
and annexed the social-movement element in Somali insurgency. Clan-family 
divisions and competition for power and resources of any kind (money, guns, 
land, water and women) have come to dominate the struggle in southern Soma-
lia based on earlier struggles in the 1990s and are not easily resolved.78 This is 
reminiscent of the deep divisions and violence left by Sayyid Mohammed 
Abdulle Hassan, the anti-colonial militant and proto-nationalist of the early 
twentieth century.79 It took decades to overcome the damage done by his 
Islamist armed movement and the current antagonisms in Somalia may indeed 
have revived the conflict and memories of the divisions he generated.  
The present conflict shows that the ICU, which originally emerged as a 
partial solution to the challenges of social disorder and the problems of degen-
erated clan mediation mechanisms and failing social support systems in Soma-
lia, has been overtaken by a radical Islamist ideology based on foreign models. 
This ideology is carried by certain clan groups and elites within those clan 
groups more than by others. The clan system is not, as often alleged, inherently 
divisive (see the experiences in Somaliland and Puntland) but only becomes so 
when Islamist ideology is let loose on it. The Islamist politicization of the 
country’s problems has subverted the courts’ potential and their socially recon-
stitutive role. It has made a particular form of Islam dominant: the Salafist-
jihadist version that fuses religion and politics in a violent narrative, presenting 
armed force and terror as the apocalyptic means to the goal of Islamist theo-
cratic rule, and which is not popular among most Somalis. This has prevented 
authentic social movements from developing.  
The result appears to be a Somali society more divided than ever and one 
burdened by a discourse of violence and revenge. There is a Somali saying that 
                                                          
77  Based on the news story ‘Somalia: chairman of elders’ council assassinated in 
central Somalia’ (http://allafrica.com/stories/200810080085.html, October 7, 2008). 
Since October 2008 and in a fully predictable scenario, there have been many other 
reports of the stoning of rape victims, the cutting off of thieves’ hands and even the 
beheading of sheikhs by Al Shabaab forces. One example is Abdi Sheikh and Abdi 
Guled, ‘Somali Islamists behead two sheikhs’ group’, Reuters news message, 20 
March 2009. 
78  See Ken Menkhaus, Somalia. A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare (ENOUGH 
Project, Washington, DC, 2008)  
(www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/somalia_rep090308.pdf). 
79  See Abbink, ‘Dervishes, moryaan and freedom fighters’, p. 346. 
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goes as follows: Nabar doogi ma haro (‘An old wound will not go away’). If 
this is true, the Somalia conundrum, which is following a historically familiar 
cyclical pattern of group rivalry and violence, will probably be with us for 
another generation at least.  
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This chapter explores the historical and socio-political factors 
that have facilitated the emergence of the women’s peace 
movement in Liberia, which has been credited with the election 
of the first female African head of state. It highlights specifics of 
the country’s settler history, of autochthonous/indigenous con-
stellations of gender relations, and precursors of women’s col-
lective action. On the one hand, shared experiences of the civil 
conflict have activated the potential for female modes of organi-
zation. On the other hand, ‘identity work’ by the leadership of 
the movement, which was instrumental and indispensable in 
bridging internal class, ethnic and other divides, has also been 
informed by international feminist discourse. Special attention 
is devoted to the role of the international community and the 
national government in shaping the structure of political oppor-
tunities, allowing for the emergence, maintenance and trans-
formation of the movement.  
Introduction 
In 2005, Liberian voters chose a woman, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, to be their 
president. This has generated worldwide interest. The first-ever election of a 
female head of state in Africa can be seen as a sign of a wider social movement 
associated with peace. Indeed, a number of scholars have credited women’s 
organizations with exceptional social inclusiveness and a concomitant potential 
for peace-building.  
The fact that gender identities play an important role in determining levels of trust – 
with much higher levels of trust in women-dominated organizations than in those 
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dominated by men – has important implications for the potential role of different 
organizations in rebuilding social capital …1 
This chapter explores the factors that have facilitated the emergence of the 
women’s peace movement in Liberia, including specifics of the country’s 
history and processes of ‘identity work’,2 and discusses some of the aspects of 
its social range and internal divisions. Special attention is devoted to the role of 
the international community and the national government in shaping the ‘struc-
ture of political opportunities’3 concerning the emergence, maintenance and 
transformation of the movement.  
After the outbreak of civil war at the beginning of the 1990s, Liberia wit-
nessed the formation of a number of women’s organizations. These appear to 
have increased exponentially particularly since the end of the conflict in 2003. 
Various informal women’s organizations at the local level have emerged in 
response to local problems and offer self-help in areas of, for example, joint 
production, reconstruction, marketing, security, ‘trauma healing’ and traditional 
skills training. To some extent, the flourishing of women’s groups reflects 
entrepreneurial attempts to gain access to donor funding in general, and some of 
the local organizations have been established in response to aid agencies’ fre-
quent preference to channel funding to women’s groups. In Monrovia and other 
cities in the centre and northwest during the war, women were highly visible ‘as 
activists for peace and as agents of reconciliation’.4 Leaders and members of 
these organizations worked across faction lines and acted as mediators, often at 
great personal risk. They organized marches, formulated petitions and attended 
national and international conferences.5  
                                                          
1  C.O.N. Moser & F.C. Clark (eds), Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, armed 
conflict and political violence (Zed Books, London/New York, 2001), p. 10. Cf. also 
Swanee Hunt & Cristine Posa, ‘Women waging peace’, Foreign Policy, May/June 
(2001), pp. 38-47; and K.H. Karamé (ed.), Gender and Peacebuilding in Africa 
(Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, Oslo, 2004). 
2  David A. Snow & Doug McAdam, ‘Identity work processes in the context of social 
movements: Clarifying the identity/movement nexus’ in: Sheldon Stryker et al. 
(eds), Self, Identity and Social Movements (University of Minnesota Press, Minnea-
polis, 2000), pp. 41-67. 
3  Cf. Jacquelien van Stekelenburg & Bert Klandermans, ‘Social movement theory: 
Past, presence and prospects’, in this volume. 
4  Mary H. Moran & M. Anne Pitcher, ‘The “basket case” and the “poster child”: 
Explaining the end of civil conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique’, Third World 
Quarterly, 25, 3 (2004), p. 506. 
5  Nadine Puechgirbal, ‘Involving women in peace processes: Lessons learnt from four 
African countries (Burundi, DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone)’, in K. Karamé (ed.), 
Gender and Peacebuilding in Africa, pp. 47-66; African Women and Peace Support 
Group, Liberian Women Peacemakers: Fighting for the right to be seen, heard, and 
counted (World Press, Trenton, NJ, 2004). 
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When considering the emergence of Liberian women’s groups, it can be seen 
that, according to Tilly, there are three main elements to a social movement: 
campaigns (a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on 
target authorities); a repertoire (the employment of different forms of political 
action involving associations and coalitions, public meetings, processions, 
vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in the public 
media, and/or pamphleteering); and the concerted public representation by par-
ticipants of unity, numbers and commitment.6 These elements were all operative 
in the organized actions of Liberian women during and after the civil war.7 
Various external observers have agreed that, compared to other countries, there 
has been an extraordinary degree of determination and militancy in the Liberian 
women’s peace movement. And this was years before Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf 
was elected as Africa’s first female head of state in 2005. For example, Moran 
reports that anthropologists in the 1990s were struck by the democratic nature 
of the gender dialogue and the ‘empowered females’.8 In a comparative article, 
Moran and Pitcher noted ‘that there was far more peace-oriented activity by 
explicitly women’s organisations going on in Liberia; furthermore, these orga-
nisations existed at all levels from the most powerful urban elites to illiterate 
villagers’.9 More recently, the Liberian women’s peace movement was given 
international recognition in the film entitled Pray the Devil Back to Hell.10 
Research was undertaken in the capital, Monrovia, and in urban and rural 
locations in the northwest, centre and southeast of Liberia (in Bong and Lofa 
counties from 2005 to 2007, and in Grand Gedeh and Sinoe counties in 2008). 
Participant observation was used at village meetings, gender workshops and at a 
women’s conference, and interviews were held with business women, male and 
female farmers, urban residents of all ages and key informants such as leaders 
of women’s organizations, local and national politicians, development agencies 
and staff working for non-governmental organizations (NGOs).11  
The results presented here acknowledge the complexities of the social differ-
ences and divisions in Liberian society. Firstly, the people living in Liberia’s 
north, centre and west can be distinguished as being socio-politically, ecolo-
gically, agriculturally, linguistically and demographically different from the 
                                                          
6  C. Tilly, Social Movements, 1768–2004 (Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2004). 
7  Cf. African Women and Peace Support Group, Liberian Women Peacemakers. 
8  M.H. Moran, Liberia. The Violence of democracy (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia, 2006), p. 43. 
9  Moran & Pitcher, ‘The “basket case” and the “poster child”’, p. 504. 
10  Fork Films (http://www.praythedevilbacktohell.com/nonflash/about.htm, October 
22, 2008). 
11  The author is grateful to the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/-
Saale, Germany, and to the Welthungerhilfe for providing funding for field research. 
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population in the southeast.12 Liberia’s northwest and centre constitute the so-
called Mande-speaking ‘Poro complex’ of secret societies, a region historically 
marked by a distinct socio-political system of ranked lineages with powerful 
elders or chiefs and gendered, mutually exclusive, secret societies, colloquially 
known as Poro (for the male society) and Sande (for the female society). By 
contrast, the Kruan-speaking groups in the southeast are characterized by ace-
phalous communities, less important secret societies and the institutionalized 
participation of women in traditional government.13A second important dimen-
sion of socio-political variation is constituted by Liberia’s history of ‘black 
colonialism’, which is considered unique in Africa. Descendants of freed slaves 
that were resettled from the US and elsewhere in the nineteenth century founded 
Africa’s first republic in 1847 and, as a small minority, they dominated the 
country’s political, social and economic life for more than 130 years. These so-
called Americo-Liberians and ‘Congos’ (the name originally given to slaves 
intercepted while being illegally transported on the high seas, and put ashore in 
Liberia) fought, suppressed, exploited, traded and mixed with various African 
groups and constituted the country’s ruling elite. A coup d’état in 1980 brought 
Afro-Liberians to power and the ensuing corrupt and repressive government, 
dominated by the president’s ethnic group, was overthrown by ‘rebel’ forces 
that invaded Liberia under Charles Taylor in 1989 and ignited a civil war that 
would last for fourteen years.  
Social and political antagonisms between Americo- and Afro-Liberians in 
the twentieth century were reflected in the social distinctions that emerged 
involving the label ‘civilized’, which is a notion loaded with religious and moral 
meanings and became an important identity marker of contextual claims to elite 
membership.14 Thus historically, Liberia’s women, and men for that matter, 
were both divided and united by a dichotomy juxtaposing educated/‘civilized’/ 
‘Congo’ (Americo-Liberian) with ‘country’/‘traditional’/‘native’ identities. In-
digenous Africans had limited access to certain elite positions through formal 
education and assimilation into the Christian settler community, as a result of 
which they too could acquire a ‘civilized’ identity. 
Thirdly, the war resulted in an emphasis on religious antagonisms between 
the Christian and Muslim sections of the population, and ethnic polarization. 
                                                          
12  For example, Warren L. d’Azevedo, ‘Some historical problems in the delineation of 
a central west Atlantic region’, Annals New York Academy of Sciences, 96 (1962), 
pp. 512-538. 
13  Moran, The Violence of Democracy. 
14  Elizabeth Tonkin, ‘Model and ideology: Dimensions of being civilized in Liberia’, 
in L. Holy & M. Stuchlik (eds), The Structure of Folk Models (Academic Press, 
London, 1981, ASA Monograph 20), pp. 307-330.  
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Two of the major warring factions were constituted by an ethnic group with a 
predominantly Muslim identity. 
Concerns of women’s organizations 
Social movements offer an important vehicle for ordinary people's participation 
in public politics. In the sense of ‘politics by other means’, they may constitute 
the only means open for relatively powerless groups to challenge the dominant 
political structures or processes and the distribution of resources.15 The dis-
tinction between the practical and strategic needs of women, first delineated by 
Molyneux,16 seems useful in capturing the heterogeneous currents and concerns 
of the movement under discussion here. ‘Practical needs’ addressed by the self-
help organizations (and many NGOs) include the most pressing basic needs for 
safe shelter, adequate nutrition, health care, clean water etc. By contrast, strate-
gic needs address women’s institutional opportunities and status in society, such 
as legal protection, access to education, employment and land rights, and an end 
to gender violence. By extension, they include the end of fighting in times of 
war. The organizations devoted to peace activism and later to political advocacy 
have been the motors of the women’s peace movement. The following sections 
illustrate the scope and activities of the movement.  
The Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia (AFELL), the Mano River 
Union Women Peace Network (MARWOPNET), and the Women in Peace 
Building Network (WIPNET) are among the most influential and visible orga-
nizations.17 AFELL was established in 1994 to offer legal assistance to women 
and children who had suffered from violence and has effected the passing of 
two laws: the Act to Govern the Devolution of Estates and Establish the Rights 
of Inheritance for Spouses of Both Statutory and Customary Marriages (2003), 
in short the ‘inheritance law’ that aims to regulate women’s marriage rights, 
rights to property and access to their children after divorce or the death of their 
spouse, and the ‘rape law’ (2006), which has turned rape into an non-bailable 
offence. MARWOPNET was established in 2000 by women peace activists 
from Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia on the occasion of a conference in 
Conakry of the regional economic grouping, the Economic Community of West 
                                                          
15  Cf. the contribution by Habib & Opoku-Mensah in this volume. 
16  M. Molyneux, ‘Mobilization without emancipation? Women’s interests, the state, 
and revolution in Nicaragua’, Feminist Studies, 11, 2 (1985), pp. 227-254. 
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African States (ECOWAS). Internationally, it has been the most visible of 
Liberia’s women’s organizations as it was given considerable attention by the 
media and international agencies, and was awarded the United Nations Prize in 
the Field of Human Rights.18 Without invitation, this organization produced a 
declaration during the peace negotiations in Accra in 2003. The women de-
manded inclusion in peace negotiations in line with the Resolution on Women, 
Peace and Security (SC Resolution 1325) adopted by the UN Security Council 
in 2000, which formally recognizes women’s particular vulnerability in wartime 
and calls for their equal participation and full involvement in peace-making. 
WIPNET was founded in 2002 under the auspices of the West African Network 
for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and has been Liberia’s most comprehensive wo-
men’s organization with over 5,000 members in all of the counties involved in 
it. WIPNET’s strategic goals have dominated from the start and its activists are 
acutely aware that external aid projects differ in their objectives or in the stra-
tegies they employ to achieve improvements in women’s lives. They question 
well-meaning training programmes for women that pass on traditionally West-
ern female skills and occupations. 
WIPNET and MARWOPNET are umbrella organizations that have both 
made a special effort to embrace women from all ethnic and socioeconomic 
backgrounds to expand their basis for mass action, especially at the famous 
peace demonstrations in April and May 2003. Some activists have taken steps to 
narrow the social gap, for example by discouraging the use of ‘big English’ at 
meetings, workshops and conferences, which the ‘civilized’ habitually use to 
distinguish themselves from the ‘country people’. Representatives of rural wo-
men have been consciously included, facilitation methods have been adapted to 
the needs of illiterate participants and interpreters provided for those lacking a 
good command of English. MARWOPNET’s leaders determinedly took illite-
rate rural women to the Mano River Union conference in Conakry in 2001, to 
the astonishment of representatives from other countries, and WIPNET has also 
pointedly included women of different religious denominations in its orga-
nization in an attempt to reduce the dominance of Christian activists in NGOs. 
In practical terms, for example, Muslim women leaders have frequently been 
asked to deliver the opening and/or closing prayers at workshops and confer-
ences.  
The movement has commanded a range of symbolic resources on which the 
existence of shared identities depends.19 In addition to slogans and songs, the 
women wear white T-shirts and white head-ties as symbols of their unity during 
their peace campaigns. Liberia’s ‘women in white’ or ‘white women’ have been 
                                                          
18  Puechgirbal, ‘Involving women in peace processes’. 
19  Snow & McAdam, ‘Identity work processes in the context of social movements’. 
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active conflict mediators in the years since the war and are widely recognized 
beyond national boundaries. At the WIPNET conference in May 2006, the 
founder of WANEP, a key speaker, stressed that whenever he travelled outside 
Liberia, he felt ‘proud of being recognized by the white T-shirt women and the 
football star George Weah’. On International Women’s Day in March 2007 and 
in 2008 the white T-shirts could still be seen at marches in Monrovia and in the 
distant coastal city of Greenville.  
After the 2003 peace agreement, the main goal of the movement shifted to 
demands for the institutionalized political and economic participation of wo-
men, and the radical stance taken by organizations such as WIPNET in favour 
of strategic needs seems to have been accepted by the Ministry of Gender and 
Development (MGD). Women activists have lobbied for legislative reforms to 
reserve at least 33 per cent of all seats in local and national elections for 
women. They have demanded balanced employment, law enforcement, access 
to and ownership of land, and training for legal staff such as land commis-
sioners. They advocate special leadership training programmes for women and 
girls and are encouraging more female candidates to contest local elections that 
are scheduled for 2009. An emergent class of business women, which formed in 
the entrepreneurial vacuum during the war,20 seems to be accommodating its 
interests within the movement too. Credit programmes and training to advance 
female entrepreneurship are also being called for. Pointing specifically at the 
constraints women face in the lucrative cross-border trade, a recent policy paper 
addressed the harassment women face from customs and immigration officers 
and demanded that gender-sensitive training manuals be developed for all offi-
cials working at border posts.21  
Formative and supporting factors  
The formation of novel gender stereotypes, the maintenance of a collective 
female identity and the organization of activities have been nurtured by factors 
including internal identity politics and external markets. An obvious example is 
that the pattern, speed and spread of a movement depend on a functioning 
communications network. Communication has been vastly facilitated by the 
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exponential spread of mobile phones since the end of the war. Social 
networking in general has been dramatically transformed by this technology and 
is an area of study that merits further investigation. However, as a social cate-
gory, women have had reasons for relating to the war in particular ways. The 
following sections differentiate for heuristic purposes three domains that inter-
sect both conceptually and in (social) practice and that have contributed to the 
forming and maintaining of the movement. 
The socioeconomic and political roles of Liberian women vary in many 
ways, the most obvious dimensions being generation, lineage status in the 
northwest, age-group identity in the southeast, and ethnic belonging including 
the Americo-Liberian sub-sections of society. However, images and practices 
central to the movement – of women as leaders and female collective action – 
have been built on traditionally cultural and social capital. As many scholars 
have demonstrated,22 social movements typically emerge out of existing 
organizations and associational networks. 
Firstly, Liberian society has always conceived women’s agency and their 
collective action as being essentially separate from the realm of men. Moran 
stressed the importance of the traditional ‘dual-sex’ organization in Liberia, and 
for that matter in West African societies: 
Women simply do not view men as capable of representing them and their interests. 
At one level, this conviction may stem from the highly segregated nature of wo-
men’s and men’s productive activities in West African farming systems. Although 
complementary, these separate tasks may bring women and men into competition for 
such resources as land and labor. More important, however, may be the cultural 
constructions of women and men as radically different kinds of beings, manifest in 
such structures as the dual-sex political system, which underlies the belief that men 
cannot adequately represent women and vice versa.23  
This dual organization of the sexes has not prevented women’s organizations 
from the time-consuming consultation of powerful and knowledgeable senior 
males in times of need either in the past or the present. (Leaders of the women’s 
secret society have also been accountable to male seniors of the Poro.) The fact 
that one of WIPNET’s founders is male can be attributed to his network con-
nections within West Africa, which have been useful in eliciting support from 
the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP).  
Secondly, Liberian women historically organized a wide range of collective 
activities in different contexts. The most influential traditional organization, 
which involved trans-ethnic inclusive activities, was the Sande in the country’s 
northwest. In southeastern Liberia women organized themselves traditionally 
                                                          
22  Cf. Snow et al., ‘Identity work processes in the context of social movements’. 
23  Moran, ‘Collective action and the “representation” of African women: A Liberian 
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and supported their women’s chief and councils of female elders, which are 
parallel institutions to the male-dominated structures in local politics. 
Thirdly, notwithstanding ideologies of male dominance and corresponding 
institutions of social control, Liberian history has encompassed powerful wo-
men in both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ settings. Looking at the historicity of the 
status of women in other African countries, it could be suggested that the colo-
nial ‘disempowerment’ that women suffered in other countries was not present 
in Liberia.  
Female power in local public realms has, therefore, been a traditional feature 
in Liberia, notwithstanding women’s structural constraints within a traditional 
system that has generally been labelled ‘wealth-in-people’ in a generalizing 
perspective inspired by political economy. Where labour has been a crucial 
political and economic resource in environments with a relative abundance of 
land, powerful men have accumulated women, the major workforce, and con-
trolled and redistributed women’s sexual and reproductive services to establish 
political alliances and win clients. Accordingly in Afro-Liberian societies, wo-
men’s reproductive capacities and labour have been controlled by their lineage 
elders and their husbands’ lineages.24 
Women in the southeast of Liberia tend to perceive men and women as 
different and complementary instead of the latter being inferior. The ‘cultural 
ideal woman is the hardworking wife and mother, the provider for her house-
hold. The ideal husband is generous and is expected to provide his wife or 
wives with gifts ...’.25 In the southeast, parallel political structures for men and 
women in village governance have existed and survived,26 involving institutions 
like ‘women’s chiefs’ and councils of female elders with a deliberative role and 
the power of veto over certain decisions made by male councils. (For example, 
over-enthusiastic warriors in the past could reportedly be checked by the 
women’s council.) 27 Such institutions have been absent in the more hierar-
chically organized societies of the north and west. Evidence suggests that 
among the Kpelle, for example, women have always been considered inferior to 
men. The dominant ideology of male superiority has centred on the male role of 
protection, support for women and provision for their children.28  
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In the northwest, traditionally gender-specific codes of behaviour have been 
transmitted by the secret societies. Boys’ and girls’ initiation, involving circum-
cision, was compulsory, with seclusion in so-called ‘bush schools’ that were 
separated by gender and originally lasted for several years. Sande and Poro 
leaders cast themselves as brokers and exclusive ritual managers between the 
realms of male and female and between the supernatural and daily life. Mar-
riage and reproduction were mediated by the elder female leaders of secret 
societies who claimed to be in spiritual control of the well-being and repro-
ductive capacities of initiated girls. Sande leaders and important members, such 
as midwives, could extract considerable fees and labour services from senior 
relatives of the initiates and their prospective husbands. Such entitlements were 
based on claims to command esoteric skills and knowledge enabling them to 
control a girl’s fertility and health.29 Although women as a class could not adopt 
any public political roles, individuals and particularly those belonging to ruling 
lineages could command space for socio-political manoeuvring. They could, for 
instance, generate considerable power by playing ‘the male game’ of controlling 
male and female junior dependents and securing male labour and allegiance.30  
The traditional principles of hierarchical organization – gerontocracy, line-
age status, patriarchy – became increasingly negotiable as they were crosscut by 
other principles evolving from the differentiation of Liberian society in the 
course of the twentieth century, such as formal education, employment in the 
public sector and access to the higher echelons of Liberian networks of patron-
age. Notwithstanding the dominant patriarchal ideology in Liberia, there was a 
comparatively large population of educated, professional women when the war 
broke out. Probably due to the heritage of matrifocality in the (former) slave 
families from the United States, Liberia’s settler women enjoyed social and 
economic privileges/rights unheard of in the Western world of the nineteenth 
century. And since the middle of the twentieth century Liberia has revealed a 
striking representation of women in public office.31 From the 1950s onwards, 
President Tubman carefully cultivated a new constituency among women, ex-
tended suffrage to women and appointed some to positions of authority,32 and 
his supporters organized a women’s political and social movement. 
There have been precedents for collective female action as well as inclusive 
organizations. The historical experience of female pressure groups concerned 
with the good of the community can be seen as being grounded in a tradition of 
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women’s collective action/mass protest in Liberia’s southeast since pre-war 
times. The position of women chiefs has required support from collective 
female action; having a voice but not an equal voice requires women to act 
collectively to counteract the power of a political hierarchy in which they are 
junior partners.33 
The Sande seem to have fostered an ideology of solidarity among women 
and female strength in the face of male harassment, inasmuch as certain skills 
for manipulating men were passed on at initiation and consolidated action was 
mobilized against men who transgressed society’s rules. Initiated peers (of the 
same status) are reported to have practised mutual help in times of need. How-
ever, it is doubtful that the Sande asserted anything like local ‘women’s rights’ 
in any institutional sense. Occasional enactments of solidarity seem to have 
been counterbalanced by the hierarchical cleavages within society and the inte-
rests of the leaders in enriching themselves, including the fabrication of charges 
of wrongdoing against men to create occasions for fines.34 
Women’s organizations with their various tasks in the agricultural cycle 
have existed since time immemorial. All over Liberia there are seasonal work 
cooperatives, for which the Kpelle term kúú has become a generic designation 
in Liberian English. Women’s associations have long been a traditional feature 
of urban social life and women’s savings and marketing cooperatives have been 
recorded since the middle of the twentieth century. In particular, church-based 
women’s organizations of different denominations have provided an important 
site of cross-class, interethnic contact and collaboration. In Liberia’s southeast, 
voluntary associations have generally been of greater significance than in the 
northwest. Beyond savings and loan cooperatives (susu), women’s clubs also 
meet to save for entertainment, funerals and social insurance.35 Evangelical and 
independent churches engaging in charitable and self-help activities multiplied 
in the 1980s as a result of increasing poverty and social polarization, with the 
majority of members being recruited from among the increasing numbers of 
urban women in the informal sector.36  
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Shared experiences of the war:  
Identity enhancement and identity politics 
Experiences of gender-specific violence have become a collective concern 
requiring measures to mobilize mutual help and external support. Different 
sources agree that about 70 per cent of women and girls experienced sexual 
violence during the war.37 The peculiar paradox that increasing numbers of 
incidences of rape may correlate with a growth in women’s organizations and 
women’s status has been noted by Ibeanu with respect to Nigeria. In her study, 
many Ogoni men and women (61% and 82% of respondents) felt that a violent 
crisis raised the profile of women and their confidence to deal with problems 
confronting them and their community, and generally enhanced respect for 
women who are praised for their positive contributions. As a result, a number of 
traditional stereotypes about women have been challenged, such as their weak-
ness and submissiveness.38  
Liberian women’s self-confidence seems to have increased too, challenging 
the traditional ideology of male superiority.39 Urban as well as rural women 
stress that the experience of war made them realize that they were ‘in the dark’ 
before and are now ‘waking up to the issue of leadership’. Many women are 
conscious, if not proud, of having coped during the war with crises without 
male support. They assumed responsibility for tasks previously performed only 
by men and they learned new skills such as brick making, building and roofing 
houses, and clearing farms. The war opened up new spaces for collective action. 
Local narratives refer to women who organized themselves to ensure their 
community’s survival, mediated conflicts involving local (war) leaders, and/or 
calmed trigger-happy fighters. Women appear to have developed special ne-
gotiating powers with commanders, who could have perceived them as less 
threatening than men. Women were certainly able to organize crossing the lines 
of fighting more easily than men. And most significantly, an increase in wo-
men’s political ambitions and in the legitimacy of women’s political partici-
pation at national and local level seems to have been increasingly accepted by 
the male sector of the population. In view of what has been perceived (and 
constructed) as overwhelming evidence of men’s multiple failures during the 
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conflict, women’s social and economic achievements and their impressive con-
tributions to the common good during the war are discursively being empha-
sized. Female refugees were exposed to novel practices and ideas during their 
time in exile in other West African countries.40 As an essay in informed specu-
lation, I suggest that the sheer spatial extension and intensity of the Liberian 
civil war as well as the long-term displacement of at least half of the population 
resulted in particularly extensive experiences in new female roles. 
As with social movements elsewhere, Liberia’s women’s movement is con-
stituted by a bundle of narratives. Positive, binding functions demand audiences 
to concur and respond emotionally and produce comparable stories. Shared ex-
periences are traditionalized through discourse grounded in moral expression. 
The recognition of a set of shared, repeated and meaningful references results in 
a collective identity that facilitates collective action.41 Discourses around the ex-
perience of rape have contributed to the conceptualization of women as victims 
and as a group in need of special assistance. This aspect of humanitarian aid and 
solidarity (involving the formation of victim-perpetrator dichotomies) has been 
nurtured by support from the churches and by international NGOs since the 
early 1990s. Other references include stories of mutually achieved success as 
single providers for their families, and constructions from the past and present 
in terms of power structures characterized by gendered suppression. Women are 
not only the victims of rape: Liberian women are, retrospectively, also con-
strued to have been mere objects of exploitation by men and treated like chattels 
in traditional society.42 Their capabilities as (better) leaders surfaced during the 
war. (Women activists rarely mention particularistic interests or divisive prac-
tices such as the suppression and exploitation of young women by female 
elders.) In principle, groups and individuals can be seen to be drawing on a 
repertoire of positions and arguments. The traditional image of the modest, 
pious, unthreatening woman, the role of the peaceful mother and the caring 
household provider may be discursively emphasized in certain public situations, 
and the image of women as political animals with legitimate claims to power 
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(based on human rights) in others. Most of these images resonate with those of 
the ‘civilized’ woman, which have been analyzed by Moran.43 
The point of departure of the women in the peace movement was the re-
alization that ‘men were at the root of the war’.44 The Minister of Gender and 
Development argued at a conference in June 2005 that: 
… evidence has shown that women’s participation in political decision-making 
bodies improves the quality of governance. Studies have also shown a positive 
correlation between increased women’s participation in public life and a reduction in 
the level of corruption.45 
The image of peaceful women-in-leadership – which is also essentializing in 
substance – is being activated to support claims to political leadership: women 
are needed as leaders to secure enduring peace and good governance. 
MARWOPNET, like other actors in this arena, tends to stress the propensity of 
mothers as ‘natural’ experts in the reintegration of child soldiers, not threaten-
ing the traditional patterns of gender dominance but capitalizing on an essential-
izing image of women as providers/caring mothers. A prominent member of 
AFELL stated that:  
Women are … a bedrock of any society whether educated or uneducated. ... The 
women artfully cross all lines of the various warring factions in search of food, 
water and medical services for their families as well as others who could not make 
it, and to earn an income to support the families. … In war torn societies and out of 
war torn societies, it is the women who keep the society going…  
At another conference in 2006, it was stressed that ‘the challenge that we 
must face is to realise that women in other parts of the world happen to be far 
ahead from where we are’.46 In the words of a prominent activist: 
… for us, the task is far from over. This is only the beginning….. The women’s 
movement must continue to be the watchdogs for the government and must continue 
to work towards the attainment of gender equality and women’s empowerment at all 
levels and all areas … and strategise on how to promote women’s leadership in post-
conflict peacebuilding in Liberia….  
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Support from international agencies 
Studies of women’s movements have often omitted the role of foreign actors, 
notably multilateral and bilateral aid and peace-building agencies. Reports on 
Liberia’s ‘women in peace’ movement have usually stressed the indigenous 
agency of Liberian women. While I do not wish to diminish the important role 
and intrinsic motivation of the committed women who have participated in the 
movement, the possibility that without external support the women might not 
have been mobilized to such an extent should not be overlooked. Since the civil 
conflict, international support for women’s organizations has gained momen-
tum, particularly in those parts of Liberia that have constituted the major catch-
ment areas of national and international aid, namely the urban centres and the 
counties or districts that are relatively easy to access by road from the capital. 
The peace movement was reportedly initiated in 1994 by a group of women 
who had been trained extensively in peace-building processes by international 
NGOs. A UN organization facilitated the participation of a comprehensive dele-
gation of Liberian women at the Fourth Women’s World Conference in Beijing 
in 1994, with this international experience working as a trigger in the unfolding 
of the Liberian women’s movement. The endeavours of AFELL and other fe-
male activists in the field of legislation concerning women’s rights have been 
supported by international consultants, organizations in the US and the UN 
Human Rights Office in Liberia. MARWOPNET’s foundation was supported 
by the international NGO Femmes Africa Solidarité. Multilateral agencies have 
continued engaging women’s organizations in demobilization, disarmament, re-
construction and rehabilitation programmes, and in the civic education projects 
preceding the 2005 national elections. 
International agencies have provided, on the one hand, symbolic and mate-
rial resources for the movement and, on the other, fora of communication which 
are essential to any kind of social movement. The most pertinent social spaces 
in the women’s movement have been the leagues of conferences and workshops 
supported by the UN offices in charge of gender affairs in Liberia and inter-
national NGOs. Many of the recent policies pursued by the UN resonate with 
the measures proposed by Hunt and Posa within a policy framework of ‘in-
clusive security’.47 The so-called international community has been a parti-
cularly forceful factor and seems to dictate the direction that the movement is 
taking. 
As elsewhere, the peace-building policies of the international community in 
Liberia include efforts at restructuring social relationships. International actors 
have been heavily engaged not only in areas of practical need – an estimated 
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180 foreign charities are said to be active in Liberia today48 – but also in gender 
mainstreaming activities either directly or indirectly by sponsoring local NGOs. 
Concepts of gender equality and women’s human rights have been transferred 
to Liberia from a variety of external sources. In recent years, UNIFEM, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other international agen-
cies have provided funding for projects to integrate gender concerns into the 
government’s national reconstruction and peace-building programmes. Aid is 
often only meted out to so-called ‘community-based organizations’ that can 
prove they have support from 50 per cent of the female representation in their 
leadership. Male and female staff in local NGOs employed by UN agencies or 
international NGOs have been exposed to gender mainstreaming workshops. 
Male and female Liberians have been trained as facilitators in peace-building, 
usually in other African countries (but sometimes in Europe) since the begin-
ning of the 1990s. Such courses invariably involve gender issues, in particular 
the topics of leadership and gender-based violence, the concomitant discourse 
that contributes to polarizing the roles of perpetrator and victim according to 
gender. Members of local women’s organizations, including those from rural 
communities, have been trained in the subject matter by different NGOs. Civic-
education projects funded by international agencies have emphasized women’s 
potential for leadership,49 and workshops have been backed up by correspond-
ing messages in media broadcasts with regional or nationwide coverage, in par-
ticular by UNMIL Radio and county-based radio stations sponsored by inter-
national organizations. With external support, WIPNET, for example, has run a 
Voices of Women radio programme in three counties for a number of years and 
the messages put across are reinforced by interactive theatre performances in 
some regions. Slogans and songs about gender equality and women’s empower-
ment seem to be activated, often teasingly, as a kind of ‘folk’ wisdom in semi-
urban contexts even in the country’s interior. Not surprisingly since the election 
of the female president, gender issues have become an even more pervasive 
topic in the media, and various government affirmative action programmes are 
targeting girls and women directly. WIPNET, supported by UNDP, continues to 
be very involved, moving from women in peace building and women in 
leadership to civic education on women’s human rights. 
US-based agencies in particular support the strategic needs of Liberian 
women and President Johnson Sirleaf even received an award from the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) for her work in promoting democracy in Liberia. 
                                                          
48  ‘Liberia. With a little help from her friends’, The Economist, 23 August 2008, p. 34. 
49  For example, in November 2007, a programme was launched by UNDP and the 
MGD to conduct leadership training for 300 women leaders in all counties; ‘Liberia: 
LIPA, Gender Ministry Sign Agreement’, The Inquirer (Monrovia), 6 November 
2007. 
130 Fuest 
The encouragement of gender equality has been linked discursively to the 
‘building of democratic strength in your nation for years to come’ by the 
Speaker of the US House of Representatives.50 Liberian women have reportedly 
participated in training programmes run by the Women and Politics Institute at 
the American University to learn the tricks of the trade from top political 
leaders. However Liberia’s women do not need to leave their home country to 
receive training. For example, the NDI and Women's Campaign International 
train women in how to become more politically empowered in their own coun-
tries.51 Women in rural Liberia are being encouraged to actively fight for their 
rights with support from the National Endowment for Democracy, an American 
organization, in a project that seeks to strengthen the advocacy capacity of rural 
women and sensitize them in their participation in local and national politics.52 
The UN mission in Liberia, UNMIL, is working closely with the Women’s 
NGO Secretariat, the MGD and AFELL to disseminate the laws and policies for 
the protection and promotion of women and girls’ rights in the country. 
Constraints and divisions 
As with any type of collective identity, gender identities do not constitute stable 
entities. They are flexible, subject to intra-group variation and intersect with 
ethnic, religious, class and other shared identities. Depending on the context, 
any one of these differences may be attenuated by groups or individuals.53 In 
war-affected societies one may want to distinguish women analytically 
according to their differential access to economic resources, information, wealth 
and status, old from young women, women in remote rural areas and women in 
urban centres, but also according to new or recently emphasized roles (com-
batants, women who did not take up arms, ‘bush wives’, refugees, internally 
displaced people etc.), widows from married women, women intent on lasting 
change in gender relations and those who want to return to what they perceive 
as the stability of their pre-war arrangements. To complicate matters, the rela-
tive values and importance of those identities may be relevant only at certain 
stages in any woman’s life. In addition to the ethnic, religious and class divides, 
the unity within the women’s movement is jeopardized by yet further lines of 
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division. As Hebert54 has argued, feminist scholars have usefully offered ex-
planations as to why women’s social movements emerge but rarely have they 
explored why the goals of these movements remain out of reach. Many theorists 
acknowledge that the formation and functioning of social movements inevitably 
entail exclusionary practices concerning the collective identity that is identified 
as underlying these movements. Hebert has demonstrated that multiple lines of 
inclusion and exclusion associated with women’s movements have occurred 
most notably along lines of ethnicity/race, class and gender. In addition, she 
mentions competitiveness among movement activists. Anecdotal evidence does 
indeed attest to problems within the movement under consideration that are 
arising from conflicts among the leaders of the various organizations and from 
the fact that the women’s movement is run by members of the social elite.  
Questions are also emerging about the inclusive range of the movement. 
Women certainly do not benefit from the gender discourse and affirmative 
actions if they do not have access to workshops, do not listen to the radio and/or 
do not understand English and live in an area where there are few programmes 
in local languages. In the remote southeastern border towns or the northwest of 
the country, discourse on gender equality is perceived as being ‘something of 
the city’, as respondents in the distant villages in Lofa and Grand Gedeh coun-
ties put it.  
Here I want to focus on the religious/civilized identity which also includes 
aspects of a class and urban-rural divide in Liberia. It appears to entail not only 
the exclusion of Muslim women, notwithstanding efforts like those mentioned 
above to involve them, at least symbolically, but also implies conflict with 
uneducated women, in particular those non-Christian ‘native’ women with a 
stake in Sande society. In a variety of contexts both Americo- and Afro-
Liberian women have been able to claim status as social seniors. In particular, 
the prestige of civilized status was enhanced by the Christian churches and their 
affiliated women’s clubs and organizations that are open only to civilized wo-
men.55 Significantly, Americo-Liberian women, women raised by Americo-
Liberian families or by Christian missionaries have been crucial functionaries in 
the movement. Since before the war, Christian NGOs have played a major role 
in educating girls and given women leadership positions in their organizations, 
for example in the Christian Health Association of Liberia. A report on the 
movement states: 
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… religious beliefs, reflected in extremely high levels of affiliation to churches and 
mosques, are the foundation of many Liberian women’s commitments to peace-
making and their conviction that peace must start with the individual. As threats to 
survival grew and the need for personal peace intensified, non-traditional spiritual 
movements [emphasis mine, VF] became stronger and were often led by powerful 
women whose followers crossed ethnic and class lines. That these leaders were 
‘persons of God, who can be trusted’ was an additional basis for solidarity among 
women.56 
Women were particularly mobilized in the cities and funds were raised by 
establishing or employing international connections. (More than ever today, 
literacy is a crucial leadership skill, even in the rural areas. The leaders of the 
new Muslim women’s organizations are literate because they have attended 
government schools in addition to their Qur’anic education.) Although rural and 
uneducated urban women have been impressively active members of the peace 
movement, there appear to have been serious ‘class’ divisions among them. In a 
sense the social and cultural capital that the movement was been built on and 
the religious identity of the majority of activists are harbouring seeds of dis-
sention.  
Since 1994 when educated women activists founded the network, there has 
reportedly been major conflict between the uneducated/‘country’ and educated/ 
‘Congo’ women. It would seem that the uneducated have to some extent been 
instrumentalized by their leaders. It was not the elite women who were reported 
to have been seen ‘sitting on the airfield’, in other words performing the tedious 
task of daily peace demonstrations and praying in the rain and sun for hours, but 
rather ‘the common women’ in their white T-shirts. Educated members of the 
movement may also indirectly associate being ‘civilized’ with claims of being 
‘emancipated’ or ‘empowered’. ‘We have seen the light’ is one of many reli-
gious idioms used to express a new feminist consciousness in public discourse. 
What may be called a maternalistic attitude is surfacing concerning the agency 
of change, which is reminiscent of the historical commitment to the old ‘civil-
izing mission’ as an important dimension of the settlers’ identity. In public 
contexts, ‘civilized’ activists may emphasize the necessity to ‘lift up’ their un-
educated sisters who ‘are still in darkness’. Rural women are construed to be in 
dire need of education and sensitization about ‘their’ women’s rights in order to 
be delivered from male suppression. Christian women tend to stress their reli-
giosity and perform as respectable members of society (perhaps to neutralize 
fears of the conservative men in power). The support of church leaders is being 
sought to build legitimacy. WIPNET women, after their march through the city 
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of Monrovia following their May 2006 conference, presented a peace torch to 
the President of Liberia, announcing that it had previously been blessed by the 
Catholic Church’s archbishop. Even though WIPNET has made special efforts 
to be inclusive as a network, the traditional Christian-Muslim divide is main-
tained in practice for political expediency. 
Many, if not all, leaders have capitalized on the training they have received 
in workshops and on the cultural and social capital they have gained as parti-
cipants at international conferences. Women qualified in this way constitute a 
small minority of the well-educated who have become the coveted experts, 
trainers and managers employed by the international agencies that are con-
stantly in search of female project partners (for reasons of political correctness). 
A decline in commitment to the women’s collective cause has been observed 
among the elite women who are said to have found new pastures in government 
or in positions with international agencies. This appears to have weakened the 
movement. This process of concentration may even have reinforced class dis-
tinctions within the movement. 
It should be mentioned that, ironically, the policies related to the law on rape 
whereby an increasing number of rape cases have been taken to court (albeit 
with dubious outcomes) throughout the country in the last two years and the 
ensuing debates may turn out to be a possible divider. First, women disagree 
about the reason for the increase in rape cases. The young urban women may be 
blamed by more traditionally minded female elders for their provocative ways 
of dressing and lack of morals. Secondly, women’s concepts of female person-
hood differ. In the traditional rural context, rape tends to be perceived as a 
violation of property (of the family or the husband), which is shameful in prin-
ciple and is therefore glossed over, particularly if the perpetrator is a relative. Or 
it is treated as a family affair, involving indemnification fees to the family con-
cerned. Such practices do not match the conceptions of urban female human-
rights activists who put the physical and psychological damage of the victim 
centre stage. Ideological debates about this issue can be heard even in the coun-
try’s remotest villages. 
Unwittingly, the international community seems to be contributing to divi-
sions in the movement in yet another direction. The centralized organization of 
Sande society, which, like the Poro, had been courted and to some degree in-
corporated in Liberian government since the time of President Tubman,57 served 
to organize self-help activities (meeting ‘practical needs’) for thousands of Li-
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berian women during the war.58 The society was mobilized to join the peace 
marches but in a wider societal context, the Sande appears to have suffered a 
crisis of legitimacy in the wake of the war. Its activities were disrupted in many 
regions and a significant group of women in Liberia’s north and west no longer 
consider membership of the Sande as being important in their lives (like men 
with respect to the Poro). In this domain, Liberian society has become divided 
down to the family level. Many urban girls – and the great majority of the urban 
population is female59 – would not consider being initiated. Mothers refuse to 
send their daughters to the ‘Sande bush’ (often opposing the wishes of elder 
rural kin). Before the war such challenges were only heard of in the context of 
isolated incidents of Christian fundamentalism in missionary contexts.60  
The fact that traditional institutions, in particular the Sande and Poro soci-
eties, have been weakened or even dissolved is discursively linked by elders, 
both male and female, to the perceived lack of respect and loss of discipline in 
young women, especially in the urban areas of the interior. (‘The war has turned 
their minds.’) Elders and leaders returning from exile have lobbied for the 
revival of initiations camps (bush schools) and praised the virtues of the secret 
societies regarding their (purported) regulatory and stabilizing functions but this 
spiritual vocation may of course be linked with the motivation of generating 
income from initiates’ families. In many parts of the northwest, the secret so-
cieties are reported to have resumed their activities, sometimes with external 
support from NGOs in a (perhaps misconceived) effort to promote indigenous 
authorities that are assumed to hold legitimate offices in conflict regulation. It is 
worth mentioning that the re-legitimization of the Sande in Liberian society has 
been fostered by the current president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who courted the 
Sande network as one of her constituencies in the run-up to the elections in 
2005. In this context, it is significant that one of the outcomes of a women’s 
conference in May 2008 has been an appeal to the donor community to support 
the Ministry of Education and to schools and community leaders ‘to develop 
innovative strategies … to harmonize traditional and academic schools sche-
dules to encourage girls (sic) retention in schools’.61 This indicates that ‘bush 
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school’ sessions have been resumed on a large scale because, as before the war, 
the sessions compete with the annual cycle of schooling times and parents often 
take their children out of school to have them initiated. 
As an example of disjointed measures of donor support, other NGOs have 
tried to raise awareness about the damage caused by female genital mutilation 
(FGM) which is an integral part of initiation into the Sande. Apparently under 
pressure from the international community, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is 
working towards banning the practice but Sande leaders reportedly walk out of 
meetings whenever the issue of FGM is raised; considering it outrageous to 
discuss it with men or non-members. The oath they took obliges them to keep 
secret the circumstances surrounding the circumcision ritual and it prevents 
them from discussing the topic with non-members. Even though some Sande 
leaders are said to be very aware of the consequences of FGM, they cannot 
apparently stop the practice. They fear the punishment that will befall them if 
they do not fulfil their duty, as the penalty expected from the spirits is death, 
disgrace or life-long suffering. I cannot even begin to judge whether this is their 
personal/social ‘truth’ or whether it is a spiritual discourse employed to defend 
the order that privileges them. For the women’s movement, it is politically 
expedient to embrace the Sande leaders as representatives of both traditional 
leaders and rural women at any public performance, such as a conference. 
Backstage, however, ‘enlightened’ (urban) women leaders are very critical of 
the revitalization of ‘bush schools’: they reject the transmission of traditionally 
submissive female roles and the practice of FGM.  
Moving where? Conclusion and prospects 
African women’s participation in national politics has often been based in 
women’s movements, even in the wake of civil conflict.62 Liberia’s women’s 
movement, which is clearly a child of the civil war, contributed significantly to 
the election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, and the movement has certainly enhanced 
the self-confidence of many women. While educated women cultivate new 
identities as agents of change, peace makers and professional or political 
leaders, the movement also appears to have brought about non-adherent po-
tential beneficiaries in many sectors. School girls and illiterate women strug-
gling to survive in the fields, streets and markets have expressed pride in the 
achievements of visibly powerful women, particularly the president.  
However, the women’s movement in Liberia seems to be crumbling. It has 
never been a united network of heterogeneous groups of actors united to serve 
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the cause of peace. Since 2003 the differences in interests among its members 
have become ever more important and, having been promoted by the inter-
national community since the early 1990s, the movement appears to have turned 
into a branch of the peace-building and development business. Many of its 
leaders are using their skills to engage in politics, international trade and busi-
ness, and/or they are acting as ‘development brokers’ on behalf of their commu-
nities. 
The movement has been led by women from national and local social elites 
who have successfully mobilized a range of women’s organizations for peace 
activism, and subsequently for individual political participation. International 
agencies have offered massive support to institutionalize women’s human 
rights. The big Monrovia-based organizations are still riding on the ticket of 
‘inclusive security’ as promoted by the international community, particularly in 
the context of activities surrounding the ‘rape law’ and the pending local elect-
ions. Another crucial strategic need has recently been addressed by AFELL and 
the UN: women’s rights to land. Local organizations, however, continue to be 
concerned with practical needs, where possible using the movement’s network 
to mobilize external funding. 
The perceived benefits of the women’s movement seem to be recognized by 
many Liberian men, albeit selectively. As a force promoting security, peace, 
moral communities and conflict regulation, the movement is considered as a 
common good. In public discourse, the fact taken for granted in pre-war Li-
berian society that women were the sole providers for their families is gene-
rating more explicit respect today. Women’s new opportunities for access to 
international resources are welcomed as assets for households, families and 
their communities. However, the emergence of new public domains of female 
activities, women’s rights and women’s direct competition for political re-
sources is disconcerting for male asset-holders. The women’s movement has 
also provided symbolic resources for girls and women striving to escape the 
control of their social seniors. In the cities, they are following well-established 
pre-war strategies of multiple partnerships;63 and novel gender discourses are 
adding a new dimension to conflicts with the authority of the elders. They 
refuse to be told what to do by rhetorically referring to their rights. (To what 
extent this development is related to the observed dramatic increase in domestic 
violence is an issue still to be investigated.)  
The movement’s future continuity will depend on coherence between insti-
tutional reform, practical experience and the narratives and ideologies in place. 
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The efforts of committed women activists and affirmative action, represented by 
the Liberian president as well as the policies, resources and discourses offered 
by the international community and US-based organizations in particular, will 
contribute to upholding the women’s movement. 
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Most accounts of the wave of democratization that swept across 
the African continent in the early to mid-1990s point to the 
pivotal role played by movements that successfully forced 
authoritarian regimes to embrace democracy. But how did 
these movements emerge in an environment where the political 
space was closed or severely limited? Drawing on Malawi’s 
transition from authoritarian to democratic rule in the early 
1990s, this chapter discusses how democracy movements in 
Africa came about through a process of regime rupturing after 
the intervention of exogenous actors in the political arena. In 
the case of Malawi, the Catholic Church was such an actor 
when, in 1992, it intervened in the political arena by issuing a 
highly critical pastoral letter that challenged the legitimacy of 
the thirty-year dictatorship of the then president-for-life, Has-
tings Kamuzu Banda.  
Social movements and the democratization process in Africa 
The history of post-independence African politics can be divided into two 
periods. The first, coming immediately after independence, was dominated by 
authoritarian forms of government that ranged from military to civilian dicta-
torships while the second is the era of democratization that started in the last 
decade of the twentieth century. 
During the authoritarian era, African leaders devoted a great deal of energy 
to suppressing political dissent at both group and individual levels. Political 
parties were often completely outlawed, which was common practice in military 
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dictatorships, and opposition parties were banned in one-party states.1 Individ-
uals who expressed even the mildest forms of dissent were imprisoned, fre-
quently without trial. Some were assassinated or murdered by state security 
agents while the (few) lucky ones managed to escape and live in exile. In other 
instances, the business interests of individuals who were perceived to hold 
critical views were frustrated, in some cases, being expropriated by the state.2 
The disbursement of patronage to supporters and opponents of the regime 
served as another instrument for the ruling elites to entrench power. As Medard 
notes, ‘through patronage, the leaders [were able to] co-opt potential opponents 
and regulate the recruitment of the ruling class’.3 Patronage networks thus 
served to undercut civil society by blocking opportunities for the emergence of 
strong and well-organized pro-democracy groups. Popular associations and or-
ganized groups, such as trade unions, that were considered to be hotbeds of 
dissent and to pose a potential challenge to the ruling elites were subsequently 
eradicated or emasculated. The only civic structures that were spared during the 
authoritarian era were those headed by hand-picked loyalists and that therefore 
posed no significant threat to the ruling elite As a result, political opposition 
was either wholly undermined and/or so weakened that the continent’s autho-
ritarian rulers were able to enjoy long years of unchallenged authority. Notable 
African leaders in this category include Malawi’s Hastings Banda, Ivory 
Coast’s Felix Houphouёt-Boigny, Omar Bongo of Gabon, Paul Biya of Came-
roon, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, Daniel arap Moi in Kenya and Robert Mu-
gabe in Zimbabwe, to name but a few.  
By its very nature, authoritarian rule created a lot of losers. Individuals who 
fell foul of the regime were either sent to prison, went into exile or were al-
lowed to operate but in a severely restricted environment. These groups, to-
gether with other sympathizers, served as a latent opposition even if they faced 
significant obstacles to organizing and operating publicly. 
The 1990s marked a new era in African politics that was characterized by the 
introduction of democratic politics. Between 1990 and 1993 for example, 27 of 
the continent’s 53 countries made the transition from a one-party system or a 
military dictatorship to a multi-party democratic system. By 1994, single-party 
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authoritarianism had been formally abolished and replaced by multi-party 
democracy throughout almost the entire Sub-Saharan African region.4  
The democratic transitions of the 1990s were, in most cases, contested 
events. On the one hand, the long-serving political elites resisted the intro-
duction of democratic politics and used a variety of strategies to suppress any 
challenge to their hold on power. On the other hand however, there were the 
democracy movements – loose coalitions of groups that were united in their 
opposition to authoritarian rule – that emerged to play a decisive role in forcing 
the continent’s numerous authoritarian regimes to democratize.5  
As a social force, Africa’s democracy movements were coalitions of groups 
united in their shared antipathy towards authoritarianism. They included wo-
men’s movements, trade unions, university student groups, farmers’ associat-
ions, university staff, civil servants, political exiles, underground opposition 
groups, business and lawyers’ associations and other professional groups.6 
While the interests and backgrounds of these groups differed, they had a com-
mon denominator in seeking democratic change. 
The potency of the democracy movements across Africa in forcing a tran-
sition to democratic forms of governance is demonstrated by Bratton and Van 
de Walle, who point out that out of the 21 cases of democratic transition that 
took place between November 1989 and 1991, sixteen (representing 76% of the 
total) were initiated by pro-democracy protest groups.7 The critical role played 
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by the democracy movements in forcing regime change in Africa suggests that 
the wave of democratization in Africa in the 1990s was a bottom-up process 
that was forced upon reluctant elites by social movements united in their de-
mands for political change.  
This bottom-up process of democratization challenges some of the leading 
theories that try to explain how regime change occurs and how social move-
ments emerge. With regards to the literature on regime change, studies of demo-
cratization in Latin America and Eastern Europe have tended to emphasize the 
role of the ruling elites in initiating the process of change. In their ground-
breaking work on democratic transition in the Americas, O’Donnell and 
Schmitter argued that regime change occurs through a process of elite frac-
turing. They went on to assert that ‘there is no transition whose beginning is not 
the consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions within the autho-
ritarian regime itself’.8 The African cases, however, fail to fit into this ‘elite 
fracturing’ model of democratization. Instead, the social-movement-driven pro-
cess suggested a process of system rupturing from below, with the elites being 
compelled to introduce institutional change without any internal divisions. 
Meanwhile the literature on social movements tends to locate their emer-
gence within the framework of political opportunity structures, which emerge 
from institutional changes by the ruling elites that open up the political space to 
other actors. McAdam, for instance, argues that the emergence of widespread 
protest activities is the result of ‘a combination of expanding opportunities and 
indigenous organization, as mediated through a process of collective organiza-
tion’.9 This position is shared by Tarrow who contends that opportunities for 
collective action against contentious politics emerge ‘when institutional access 
opens, rifts appear within elites, allies become available and state capacity for 
repression declines’.10 In more recent work, Ngoma-Leslie also embraces this 
institutional perspective, arguing that the emergence of the women’s movement 
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in Botswana politics was ‘dependent on the receptivity of the political pro-
cess’.11 
While structural accounts offer a powerful framework for understanding the 
rise of democracy movements, they do not give sufficient information as to why 
the ruling elites would consent to introducing those structural changes in the 
first place, especially since they undermine their ability to remain in power. It is 
precisely because those who are entrusted with the responsibility to initiate any 
institutional changes are also often those with the most to lose that the North 
contends that, once created, institutions become sticky and only change incre-
mentally.12 The introduction of the institutional changes that enabled democratic 
movements to emerge and effectively challenge authoritarian regimes in Africa 
poses a major puzzle that I seek to address in this chapter. Why would autho-
ritarian regimes make changes that create opportunities for the emergence of 
organized movements that threaten their own political survival? The discussion 
that follows attempts to unravel this by examining the emergence of the demo-
cracy movement in Malawi and the role played by the Catholic Church there in 
the process. I demonstrate that the origins of the democracy movements lay not 
in a process of wilful concessions by the ruling elites but instead were a result 
of the rupturing of the state apparatus that happened after the intervention of an 
exogenous actor in the political arena. In the case of Malawi, the rupturing 
resulted from a pivotal decision by the Catholic Church’s hierarchy to intervene 
in the political arena by challenging the legitimacy of the one-party authori-
tarian regime in a way that served as a catalyst for the emergence of a demo-
cracy movement that subsequently went on to force the authoritarian regime to 
accept the introduction of institutional changes that led to the introduction of 
democracy.  
‘Living our Faith’ and the birth of the democracy movement in 
Malawi  
The period between Malawi’s independence in 1964 and 1992 was character-
ized by tight control of the political space by the ruling elites. Under the 1966 
Constitution, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) was designated as Malawi’s 
only legal political party, thus closing off any avenues for organized political 
opposition. The designation of Malawi as a constitutional one-party state was 
followed by a constitutional amendment in 1971 that conferred the status of 
President for Life on President Hastings Banda.  
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In the ensuing years, Banda embarked on a systematic and sustained process 
of consolidation of his hold on power by ruthlessly suppressing opposition 
voices. Membership of the MCP was made compulsory and was enforced by the 
party machinery. Meanwhile, the state’s coercive institutions, the army and the 
police were frequently used to silence critical voices, detaining, torturing and 
sometimes even murdering individuals thought to hold anti-government views. 
Sindima, for example, captures the extent to which the Banda regime dealt with 
any opposition when he pointed out that: 
those who crossed paths with Dr. Banda and his MCP ... suffered untold physical 
and emotional pain inflicted on them and their family members ... a good number of 
political detainees spent many years in prison … and some were never again heard 
of after they had been picked by the [Police] Special Branch or the Malawi Young 
Pioneers.13 
In addition to the harsh treatment that was meted out on critics, the Banda 
regime had tight control of the media as part of its broader strategy of ensuring 
that the public would only have access to government-controlled propaganda. 
Private media sources were banned, while the censorship board became very 
active in restricting access to publications perceived as having contaminating 
political content. Meanwhile the trade unions, which had supported the Banda-
led nationalist movement in the struggle for independence, were either legis-
lated out of existence or brought under MCP control. Within six months of 
gaining independence, fourteen trade unions had been deregistered and all the 
civil-service unions were banned. At the same time, a number of the more fire-
brand union leaders were co-opted and offered positions in government.14 
It was within this tightly controlled political space that the country’s Catho-
lic bishops issued their historic pastoral letter entitled ‘Living Our Faith’15 on 8 
March 1992. Although ostensibly addressed to the Catholic faithful, the pastoral 
letter clearly targeted a wider audience and was written in a language designed 
to provoke public action for political change. A total of 16,000 copies of the 
letter were distributed nationwide. In a bid to reach the largest possible audi-
ence, 10,000 were printed in Malawi’s national language, Chichewa, which is 
spoken by more than 65% of the country’s population, a further 5,000 were 
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printed in Tumbuka which is the main language spoken in northern Malawi, and 
the other thousand copies were printed in English. The pastoral letter was read 
out in all the Catholic churches across the country, with members being en-
couraged to get copies for discussion in their communities and villages.16 All 
this combined to ensure that the message of political change advocated in the 
letter reached a significant proportion of the country’s citizens. 
Through references to Biblical texts and a language of freedom and justice, 
‘Living our Faith’ identified some of the key weaknesses and failings of one-
party, one-man rule. Specifically addressing what were considered the key 
socio-economic and political failings of authoritarian rule, the letter highlighted 
Malawi’s need to move beyond one-man rule by making allusions to traditional 
proverbs that emphasized the benefits of shared leadership: 
[The strength] of African society ... resides in recognizing the gifts of all and in 
allowing these gifts to flourish and be used for the building of the community. ‘Mutu 
umodzi susenza denga’ – no one person can claim to have monopoly of truth and 
wisdom. No individual – or group of individuals – can pretend to have all the 
resources needed to guarantee the progress of a nation … the contribution of the 
most humble members is often necessary for the good running of a group.17 
It is noteworthy that the pastoral letter’s language did not portray the bishops 
or the Church as the agents of change. Instead, ‘Living our Faith’ was framed as 
a call for action, requiring Malawians to rise up and ‘respond to this state of 
affairs and work towards a change of climate … participation in the life of the 
country is not only a right; it is also a duty that each Christian should be proud 
of’.18 ‘Living our Faith’ was a critique of authoritarian rule and a call for the 
emergence of a democracy movement to challenge the status quo. 
Suffice to say, ‘Living our Faith’ marked the first time that the Banda regime 
had faced a domestic challenge of any magnitude. The atmosphere of fearful 
and silent acquiescence that had limited Malawian political discourse for three 
decades had been challenged, not by a small circle of activists and political 
exiles but from the pulpits in churches in every district in the country. ‘Living 
our Faith’ was subsequently seen as an invitation for bottom-up mobilization for 
regime change. In the words of Chirwa et al., the pastoral letter: 
… served as ferment, challenging various groups, especially the workers to organize 
and go on strike … while at the same time, the exiled opposition felt emboldened 
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and saw the Letter as offering much needed moral support for their agitation for 
political change.’19 
The 1992 pastoral letter almost instantaneously emboldened the anti-authori-
tarian movement in Malawi. As Lwanda puts it, ‘Living our Faith’ served as ‘a 
spark that ignited Malawi’s democracy revolution’.20 The letter’s ability to elicit 
such public response was due in large part to the fact that its overall message of 
change touched on issues that most of the public identified with and had longed 
for someone to voice. Within a week, students from the University of Malawi 
issued their own letter of solidarity, observing that the bishops had become the 
‘mouthpiece for the voiceless and powerless … [and that] the people of Malawi 
needed more than just political freedom at independence, they also needed a 
social and economic emancipation’.21 This was followed by a march by uni-
versity students to the residence of the Catholic Bishop of Zomba Diocese to 
demonstrate their solidarity. When the government responded to this demon-
stration by closing Chancellor College campus in Zomba, students from two 
other constituent colleges of the University of Malawi in Blantyre and Lilongwe 
staged their own street demonstrations in support of the bishops and their fellow 
students and called for the introduction of democracy.22 
Other leading churches also weighed in embracing the message of ‘Living 
our Faith’ and echoing calls for urgent political reform. Among the churches 
that supported the Catholic prelates were the Church of Central Africa Pres-
byterian (CCAP) Blantyre and Livingstonia Synods, which issued their own 
statement on 4 June 1992 reiterating calls for social, political and judicial 
reform.23 The decision by these two CCAP synods to show solidarity with the 
Catholic Church and the pro-democracy movement magnified the potency of 
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the demands for political change because these church groups together ac-
counted for more than half of Malawi’s entire population. 
For their part, private- and public-sector workers seized the opening created 
by the pastoral letter and staged a series of unprecedented wild-cat strikes that 
began in April 1992 and continued into the following year.24 As with the uni-
versity students, the strikers referenced their actions on the Catholic bishops’ 
calls for the equitable distribution of the benefits of development through im-
proved wages and better working conditions. Elsewhere, democracy activists, 
who until then had been operating underground, emerged and formed pressure 
groups that began to campaign openly for the introduction of democracy. These 
included the United Democratic Front (UDF) that had been formed in October 
1991 as an underground group of influential Malawians who were disillusioned 
with authoritarian rule. The extent to which the 1992 pastoral letter provided the 
opportunity for the UDF to surface was captured by one of the group’s founding 
members, Aleke Banda, who pointed out that the pastoral letter ‘was a source of 
great strength to the pressure group and probably brought forward its existence 
by at least ten years’.25  
The immediate aftermath of ‘Living our Faith’ saw the creation of new civil-
society groups that aimed to promote and advance a democracy agenda. One of 
the most influential civil-society organizations to emerge during this period was 
the Public Affairs Committee (PAC), in September 1992, with its primary ob-
jective of taking a strategic lead in socio-political initiatives in the country.26 
Operating as an umbrella organization for the nascent pro-democracy groups, 
PAC drew its membership from the major religious groups in Malawi including 
the Catholics, the CCAP, the Anglican Church, the Muslim Association of Ma-
lawi and the Christian Council of Malawi. Other members included the two 
leading political pressure groups, the UDF and the Alliance for Democracy 
(Aford), which was formed in Zambia by a group of Malawian political exiles 
and intellectuals at the end of March 1992. Influential professional groups, such 
as the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the Malawi Law 
Society, were also among PAC’s founder members. Elsewhere, non-govern-
mental organizations focusing on issues of governance began to emerge as key 
players in the democracy movement. Notable in this period were the Civil 
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Liberties Committee (CILIC), the Human Rights Consultative Committee and 
the CCAP ‘Church and Society’ programmes, to mention but a few.27 
In addition to rousing and energizing domestic opposition to one-party rule, 
‘Living our Faith’ made another important contribution by bringing together for 
the first time domestic and exiled political opposition groups to work as one 
united front. Although the exiled opposition had long been in existence, it had 
failed to establish a domestic presence within Malawi, which had allowed 
Banda to dismiss it as an isolated group of disaffected individuals that had no 
domestic support. However the 1992 pastoral letter gave the opposition in exile 
a measure of credibility as well as a moral rallying point for regime change.28 
Long years of political activism meant that they had the experience to give the 
fledgling democracy movement a big lift once domestic opposition surfaced. 
They brought with them new ideas for political organization that helped reshape 
and re-energize the democracy movement. 
The extent to which the 1992 pastoral letter helped to galvanize the exiled 
opposition was demonstrated by the formation of Aford in Zambia towards the 
end of March 1992 by a group of Malawian exiles who were responding to the 
reformist message of ‘Living our Faith’. Aford’s objectives included campaign-
ing for human rights and democracy in Malawi and the group chose Chakufwa 
Chihana, a former secretary-general of the Southern African Trade Union Coor-
dinating Council, as its chairman. Capitalizing on the weakness of the one-party 
state that had resulted from the stinging criticism in ‘Living our Faith’, Chihana 
returned to Malawi on 6 April 1992 and immediately used the pastoral letter as 
the moral justification for political reform.29 
The rupturing effect of the 1992 letter was further reflected in the emergence 
of a new and critical media. A total of sixteen newspapers were launched onto 
the market between March 1992 and early 1993, with the majority supporting 
the nascent democracy movement. Among the most vocal to emerge were the 
Malawi Democrat, Michiru Sun, the Monitor and the Nation. In addition to 
these new newspapers, pro-democracy groups used shortwave radio to broad-
cast messages from outside the country to the Malawian public via the South 
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African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), the BBC and Voice of America.30 
These new media forms offered Malawians a more critical perspective of their 
country’s politics for the first time. 
Although the Banda regime tried to fight a rearguard battle to discredit the 
Catholic hierarchy and the now resurgent democracy movement, it was unable 
to contain the mounting pressure for change that was being unleashed by 
‘Living our Faith’. The democracy movement continued to gather momentum 
and became increasingly independent of its religious origins. As a last act, the 
Banda government called for a referendum in June 1993 to decide whether 
Malawi should maintain the one-party system or adopt multi-party democracy. 
The mere fact that the authoritarian regime was forced to take this measure 
demonstrated that President Banda and the MCP no longer enjoyed the absolute 
power that had characterized Malawian politics for the previous three decades.  
The democracy movement’s ultimate victory came in June 1993 when the 
electorate voted by a margin of two to one in favour of multi-party democracy. 
Faced with this result, the government was finally forced to open up the po-
litical space by legalizing opposition party politics as well as relaxing the rules 
that had been used to silence dissenting voices. The 1993 referendum was fol-
lowed by democratic elections on 20 May 1994. In a further repudiation of 
Banda, the UDF’s Bakili Muluzi won a majority share of the presidential vote 
to become the country’s first democratically elected president while his party 
scooped a majority of the seats in the new National Assembly.31 Within two 
years of the release of ‘Living our Faith’, Malawi had abandoned authoritarian 
rule and embraced democratic politics, sweeping the old guard out of power. 
From the preceding discussion it is clear why the democratization process in 
Malawi can be considered a three-actor game. The first player, the authoritarian 
regime, employed strategies to maintain its hold on power. Through its historic 
intervention, the Catholic Church became the second major player in the game, 
challenging the authority and legitimacy of one-party rule in a way that created 
opportunities for the emergence of the democracy movement. Combined, the 
Church and the democracy movement were able to compel the ruling elites to 
open up the political space, which culminated in the 1993/1994 transition to 
democracy. The sequence is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 Model of the transition to democracy in Malawi 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Without the Catholic Church’s intervention, it would have been very diffi-
cult for the democracy movement to organize against Malawi’s authoritarian 
regime. The Church’s challenge to authoritarian rule played a critical role in 
preparing the way for the emergence of the democracy movement, which then 
pressurized the authoritarian regime to embark on a process of institutional 
change. This eventually led to the transition to democratic rule. Unlike the 
predictions in the literature that social movements are preceded by institutional 
change that leads to their creation, the Malawian case suggests that the process 
of institutional change only came about after the new democracy movement had 
already emerged. 
Beyond ‘Living our Faith’:  
The Catholic Church and the democracy movement after 1992 
In addition to its pointed criticism of the legacy of authoritarian rule, a central 
message in the 1992 pastoral letter was self-admonition by the Catholic clergy 
of their silence during the thirty years of one-party rule. The bishops described 
this silence during Banda’s dictatorial rule as ‘a failure on the Church’s spiritual 
mission as proponents of the common good and that … it is no longer 
“pastoral” to sit back and pretend not to see problems in our society’.32 The 
Church’s silence during one of Malawi’s darkest political periods was, there-
fore, portrayed as a sign of acquiescence on the part of the Church to the dicta-
torship and human-rights abuses that characterized this time. 
As well as offering a moral impetus for the emergence of the democracy 
movement, ‘Living our Faith’ signalled a new direction for the Catholic Church, 
shifting from an entity that focused exclusively on the spiritual realm to a new 
mission that sought an active role in the political arena. This new interventionist 
mission has been demonstrated by the issuance of pastoral letters that comment 
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on current socio-political affairs. Between 1992 and 2008, Malawian prelates 
issued a total of eighteen pastoral letters, most of which offered some sort of 
political content. The most frequently recurring themes involved urging the Ma-
lawian public to exercise their right to vote, reducing corruption; advocacy for 
equitable development; information about the meaning of freedom and demo-
cracy; and criticism of anti-democratic traits in government. 
To demonstrate that the Catholic Church’s political engagement after 1992 
had taken on a more permanent form, it established a number of bodies that 
would play an active role in the socio-political arena. These included the 
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), which was established in 
the second half of 1992 to contribute ‘to the common effort of the Episcopal 
conference and the whole Catholic Church … in the creation of a just and 
peaceful Malawian society that promotes integral development and lasting 
peace’.33 With branches in every Catholic parish across the country, the CCJP 
provides the Catholic Church with a grassroots network that can be easily mo-
bilized to promote democratic governance. The significance of this grassroots 
network was arguably best illustrated between 2001 and 2003 when the ruling 
UDF party attempted to remove the constitutional provision that limits any 
sitting president to serving a maximum of two five-year terms. While the 
Catholic bishops expressed their opposition to the proposal in their 2001 and 
2002 pastoral letters, the CCJP took the matter further by taking the lead in a 
public debate against the proposal and claiming that it would ‘bring Malawi 
back to the dark age of dictatorship’.34 As part of the campaign, the CCJP 
mobilized other pro-democracy actors under the common banner of the Church-
NGO Consortium that went on to run a series of public demonstrations and 
lobbied MPs to vote against the proposals. The sustained lobbying and public 
demonstrations eventually contributed to the defeat of the proposal when it 
came before Parliament in July 2002.35  
The Malawi Catholic Church’s quest to identify with the democracy move-
ment was also demonstrated through the establishment of media ‘houses’ that 
offer a faith-based perspective on contemporary socio-political issues. These 
include three radio stations and a printing press that specializes in publishing 
newspapers, magazines, books and political literature. One of these is the 
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Lamp,36 a monthly magazine that publishes semi-academic articles on Malawi’s 
democratic process, as well as pamphlets on themes such as ‘building the 
country under democracy’ and ‘lessons on democracy.’37 The overall impact of 
these contributions is difficult to quantify but they have undoubtedly had a 
positive effect in nurturing democracy in Malawi. 
While this socio-political engagement continues to offer Malawians impor-
tant lessons about democracy, the Catholic Church’s engagement since ‘Living 
our Faith’ has not elicited the same level of public action as its 1992 pastoral 
letter did, with the possible exception of the interventions during the third-term 
proposals. This is perhaps not entirely surprising. After nearly three decades of 
sustained and unrelenting suppression of critical voices, the Church was 
uniquely placed in 1992 as one of the few platforms from which criticism of the 
one-party regime could be made without being silenced. Much of the power of 
the 1992 pastoral letter, therefore, lay in the fact that it voiced what everyone 
knew but few dared to say. Given the nature of democracy as a public good,38 it 
was not surprising that very few people were prepared to risk the wrath of the 
authoritarian regime by organizing for political change. The Catholic Church’s 
institutional autonomy from the one-party state, on the other hand, provided an 
enabling context for it to challenge the hitherto invulnerable face of authori-
tarian rule and create opportunities for the emergence of a strong democracy 
movement. Although the clergy continue to occupy a respected place in Mala-
wian politics, they are now just one of many actors in the liberalized political 
arena. The fact that the interventions by the Malawi Catholic Church after 1992 
did not elicit the same level of response as ‘Living our Faith’ can be attributed 
to the success of the original intervention. Having created the space for the 
democracy movement to emerge, the Church was able to take more of a back 
seat in the democratic arena.  
Explaining the Malawi Catholic Church’s shift from a passive to an 
active political mission 
While the important role the Catholic Church played in the emergence of the 
democracy movement in Malawi has been demonstrated, the question still 
remains as to why, given the long years of authoritarianism, the bishops only 
intervened in 1992 to spark off the process that led to the eventual rupturing of 
authoritarian rule. In taking on the might of the Banda regime, the Catholic 
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bishops obviously put themselves at significant risk. As Chakanza and Mitchell 
observed, the ruling party’s initial response to the 1992 pastoral letter was one 
of defiance.39 The bishops were immediately arrested by the state police and 
placed under house arrest and an emergency session of the ruling MCP sug-
gested that the bishops be killed and the Catholic Church banned. 
Various circumstances, I would argue, combined to enable the Church to 
step in and challenge the Banda regime in 1992 in a way that had not been 
possible before. The first point to note is that the Catholic Church’s intervention 
in the Malawian political arena in 1992 was partly a reflection of new theo-
logical developments within the Catholic Church worldwide: the Church was 
starting to embrace political engagement as part of its overall mission. Tracing 
its origins to the events of Vatican II, this new theology represented a trans-
formation of the Church’s understanding of its role in politics, shifting from a 
largely passive political entity to one of engagement in the quest for the pro-
motion of the common good.40 Rejecting the notion that the Church should 
restrict its actions only to the religious field, Vatican II advocated ‘acts of 
resistance when the rule of law is to be defended against abuses perpetrated by 
those who exercise public authority’.41 In the 1980s, this position was reiterated 
by Pope John Paul II, who urged the clergy to advocate for the ‘reform of unjust 
structures – in particular their political institutions’, and to ‘replace corrupt, 
dictatorial and authoritarian forms of government by democratic and partici-
patory ones’.42 In the Malawian case, the Catholic clergy were similarly called 
upon by John Paul II to stand up against ‘injustice and oppression’ when the 
pontiff visited the country in May 1989.43 
Embracing this new political activism, Catholic clergy in various parts of the 
world played a central role in nurturing movements that helped to bring down 
dictatorial regimes. In Latin America, for example, Catholic ‘liberation theo-
logy’ was influential in the democracy movements that ousted the military re-
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gimes in the region.44 On the African continent, Catholic clergy played similar 
roles in challenging authoritarianism in countries such as Zambia, Ivory Coast, 
the former Zaire, Congo Brazzaville, Togo and Mali, to mention but a few 
examples.45 Criticism of authoritarian rule by the Catholic prelates in Malawi in 
the early 1990s was therefore part of a global activism by the Catholic Church, 
whose strength and influence had already been demonstrated in other parts of 
the world, as well as elsewhere in Africa. 
While these developments were taking place within the Catholic Church, 
events on the international stage, particularly the end of the Cold War, com-
bined to further weaken authoritarian rule in Africa and in the developing world 
in general. In the post-Cold-War era, authoritarian regimes could no longer be 
supported for simply favouring one side in the Cold War. Western aid donors 
made the introduction of democratic reforms a condition for the continued 
receipt of aid. In the case of Malawi, the Paris Donor Club’s meeting of 11-13 
May 1992, exactly two months after the release of ‘Living our Faith’, decided to 
withhold all budgetary aid pending the introduction of political reform and a 
greater respect for human rights.46 This suspension of aid weakened the 
authoritarian regime still further and increased opportunities for democracy 
groups to mobilize for institutional change. While it could be argued that the 
suspension of aid alone could have precipitated the emergence of a democracy 
movement, the sequencing of events in Malawi, where the suspension of aid 
came after the clergy had already intervened, meant that the donors’ decision 
could only buttress a process that had been initiated by the Catholic prelates.  
The importance of the Church in acting as the initiator of political change 
has to be understood within the context of authoritarian rule itself. While the 
authoritarian regime went to great lengths to insulate itself by eliminating in-
dependent centres of power, the Church, especially the Catholic Church, re-
mained one of the few independent centres left. Indeed, in the run-up to the 
1961 elections when the majority black population were allowed to vote for the 
first time, the Catholic Church did not side with the MCP, the then main 
nationalist movement, preferring instead to support the Christian Democratic 
Party (CDP) whose leader, Chester Katsonga, was himself a practising Catho-
lic.47 Although it would be simplistic to suggest that the Catholic Church always 
had a fractious relationship with the Banda regime, it nonetheless enjoyed a 
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higher level of autonomy from the state than other mainstream churches did in 
this period. For example, the CCAP Church, to which Banda and some of his 
senior lieutenants belonged, was more supportive of Banda as a person and of 
his government.48 The power of the Catholic Church as a key player in the 
political arena was buoyed by the growth in its membership over time. Al-
though the Catholics were not the first Christian missionaries to arrive in what 
is present-day Malawi, the Catholic Church’s membership has grown to three 
million out of a total population of about thirteen million, making it the coun-
try’s single largest Christian denomination.49  
The relative autonomy and independence of Malawi’s Catholic Church as a 
countervailing force to authoritarianism was bolstered by its international char-
acter. The sense of belonging and accountability within a wider community of 
faith gave it an enhanced sense of independence within the highly totalitarian 
social and political structures prevailing in Malawi at the time. The significance 
of this international support was well demonstrated in the aftermath of ‘Living 
our Faith’ when messages of support for the bishops came from sister churches 
and interest groups in Malawi, Africa as a whole, the Vatican, the UK, the US, 
Canada and Europe.50 Not only did these messages express solidarity with 
Malawi’s bishops, they also implored Banda to desist from using the draconian 
methods that he had relied on for so long to eliminate his opponents. 
The downside of the Catholic Church’s political activism 
While the Catholic Church’s socio-political activism initially contributed a great 
deal to the process of democratization in Malawi, its high-profile presence in 
the political arena since 1992 seems to have exacted some costs, particularly 
regarding developments in the democracy movement. A number of the key pro-
democracy actors always now appear to wait and to take their cue from the 
Church before initiating any meaningful political action of their own because 
the Church, in the past, was seen to be at the heart of the movement. So do-
minant was the role of the Catholic Church in the political arena that Immink 
and Chigona suggest that ‘it has become accepted that the participation [of the 
Catholic Church] is almost essential to the process of consolidating democracy 
in Malawi’.51 This over-reliance on the Church was demonstrated, for example, 
                                                          
48  See M. Kansilanga, ‘Church and politics in Malawi today’ (Address to the CCAP 
General Synod Human Rights Workshop, Chongoni, 8 November 1995, mimeo).  
49  World Council of Churches, (http://www.oikoumene.org/en/member-churches/ 
regions/africa/malawi.html). 
50  Chakanza, ‘The pro-democracy movement’. 
51  B. Immink & G. Chigona, ‘Between Apathy and Participation: The role of civil 
society and faith communities’, in M. Ott, B. Immink, B. Mhango & C. Peters-
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during the third-term debates between 2001 and 2003. Although the discussion 
on a possible third term for Muluzi started way back in 2000, civil-society 
organizations only began to seriously mobilize against the proposal after the 
Catholic prelates issued their 2001 pastoral letter criticizing the proposed 
constitutional amendments. And where the Catholic Church has remained silent 
on controversial political issues, such as the constitutional violations by Bingu 
wa Mutharika (President Muluzi’s successor and a practising Catholic himself), 
the rest of the democracy movement has been equally silent. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate how the Catholic Church served as 
an important stakeholder in precipitating the events that led to the emergence of 
the democracy movement in Malawi in 1992. While it would be a gross over-
simplification to attribute the entire transition to democracy and its survival 
solely to the Catholic Church’s political engagement between 1992 and 2008, 
no account of the process of democratization can ignore the significance of the 
Catholic Church’s interventions, which began with the release of the historic 
1992 ‘Living our Faith’ pastoral letter. In a tightly controlled political system 
where political opposition was likely to result in a violent death, the pulpit be-
came a powerful platform for criticism of authoritarian rule. 
This chapter has also discussed the concept of ‘path dependence’ in the 
sense that if a democracy movement has received support from the pulpit, the 
men of robes remain central in nurturing it despite claims that the Church is 
apolitical and regardless of the emergence of new civil-society players, includ-
ing political parties. Democratic progress in Malawi continues to be closely 
linked to the Catholic Church and the key challenge for the Catholic prelates 
remains when to let go and allow the democracy movement to wean itself from 
its spiritual origins. While the Church remains an active participant in the poli-
tical arena, its participation is stunting the growth and maturity of democracy in 
Malawi. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Berries (eds), The Power of the Vote: Malawi’s 2004 parliamentary and presidential 
elections (Kachere, Zomba, 2005), p. 139. 
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Bare-foot activists:  
Transformations in the Haratine 
movement in Mauritania* 
 
Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem 
 
 
Slavery was a widespread phenomenon in much of pre-colonial 
Africa but Mauritania stands out as one of the few African 
countries where it persisted as an entrenched institution even in 
post-colonial times. Mauritania also offers a rare example of an 
emancipation movement founded and run by slaves, ex-slaves 
and descendants of slaves.1 This pioneering social movement 
enabled people of servile origins to carve out a place for their 
protest actions in the public sphere. Previously, there had been 
isolated cases of slave revolts but El-Hor, an organization 
founded in March 1978 by activists of slave descent, developed 
into a social and political movement that ultimately entered the 
corridors of political power. El-Hor (‘freeman’ or ‘emancipa-
ted’ in Arabic) aimed to further the ‘liberation and emanci-
pation’ of the ‘heirs of slavery’.2 
This chapter does not intend to primarily document the his-
tory of this struggle as such, even though it is not widely known. 
Instead, it analyzes the transformations undergone by the Ha-
ratine movement since its first actions in 1980. To this end, I 
describe the trajectory of the collective action as it developed at 
the interface between society, politics and the struggle for civil 
                                                    
*  Article translated from French by Noal Mellott (CNRS, Paris). 
1  Roger Botte, ‘De l’esclavage et du daltonisme dans les sciences sociales. Avant-
propos’, Journal des Africanistes, 70, 1-2 (2000), p. 13; Éric Komlavi Hahonou, 
‘Cultures politiques, esclavage et décentralisation. La revanche politique des des-
cendants d’esclaves au Bénin et au Niger’, Politique africaine, 111 (2008), pp. 169-
186. 
2  A. Daddah, ‘Les héritiers de l’esclavage. La longue marche des Haratines’, Le 
Monde Diplomatique, November 1998. 
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and human rights. The focus is on the movement’s origins and 
the successive changes in its form of organization, types of 
actions and the outcome of its activism. 
Context and origins 
Located between the Western Sahara to the north and the Senegal River to the 
south, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania has a population of about three 
million.3 Its geographical position between the Arab world of North Africa and 
Black Africa explains some of the ambiguities in Mauritania’s complex national 
identity: Arab or/and African? Mauritanians are divided along lines of race and 
ethnicity as well as social status. In terms of race, the main division is between 
Black African Mauritanians or Afro-Mauritanians and so-called ‘White’ Arab-
Berbers or Moors. Given the lack of official up-to-date statistics, it is assumed 
that nearly 30% are ethnic Black Africans (in particular, Haalpulaar, Soninke 
and Wolof). Arab-Berber Moors make up the majority of the population and 
refer to themselves as bidhân (‘Whites’) even though more than half of them 
are, in fact, Black Moors. 
In terms of social status, the legacy of slavery is still a crucial factor in the 
social hierarchy of Mauritanian society today. Among both the Afro-Mauri-
tanians and the Moors, there is a clear divide between the masters and the slaves 
or people of slave descent. Although this social division is often expressed in 
racial terms – white masters and black slaves – race and class do not fully 
coincide. More than half of the Moors are Black Moors or Haratine, a group 
primarily made up of slaves (âbid; singular: ‘âbd) and of persons freed from 
slavery (hratîn, singular: hartâni) and their descendants. In Afro-Mauritanian 
society, masters and slaves have the same skin colour and servitude is less 
visible than in Moorish society. Activists claim that more than half of the total 
population is of servile origins, but this remains disputed. 
Moorish society has always practised ‘chattel slavery’,4 usually based on 
racial differences (Black slaves with Arab-Berber masters) and covered by a 
conservative interpretation of Islamic law. The considerable number of former 
slaves is evidence that slavery prevailed on a large scale and for a long time. 
This chapter focuses on the emancipation movement among the Haratine. Moor 
slaves and ex-slaves have no common cause with the Afro-Mauritanian slaves 
and although they share the stigma of servile status, they are divided by lan-
guage and historical experience. Among Afro-Mauritanians, slavery is less 
                                                    
3  Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem, ‘Mauritania, a Saharan frontier state’, Journal of North 
African Studies, 10, 3/4 (2005), pp. 491-506. 
4  Joel Quirk, Unfinished Business: A comparative survey of historical and contempo-
rary slavery (UNESCO, Paris, 2008), pp. 105-107. 
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visible and the main features of servitude have been more or less successfully 
challenged by the authorities since the colonial period. Being of slave status 
carries a social and cultural stigma but it is not formally entrenched in the same 
way as in Moorish society. Paradoxically, this makes it more difficult for Afro-
Mauritanians to organize in an emancipatory movement. The Haratine not only 
had the advantage of carrying more demographic weight but also had a more 
tangible cause as their subordinate status was an overt, undeniable fact. 
Slavery past and present  
In the traditional nomadic environment, slaves were ineluctably assigned the 
hardest tasks.5 They experienced ‘social death’6 and total economic exploitation 
and in terms of Islamic law were considered legal minors.7 Questioning the legi-
timacy of slavery has often been considered going against the national religion. 
Under Islamic law, slaves are not free to marry, cannot own goods in their own 
name or inherit property. Nor can they dispose of their own children or bear 
testimony before a court of law. Freedom and emancipation are valid only if 
duly granted by the master. The sale or conveyance of slaves as well as jus pri-
mae noctis were practised until recently. Slaves laboured under a kinship sys-
tem that was all the more fictive since they belonged – in both senses of the 
word – to their master’s family.8 
Slaves and former slaves do not exist in the Arab-Berber group alone. Servi-
tude was solidly rooted in the rigid social hierarchy of all groups in Mauritanian 
society regardless of ethnic origin.9 The stigma of enslavement represented a 
widespread symbolic form of violence. When asked about this, El-Hor’s his-
toric leader, Messaoud Ould Boulkhier, declared: 
                                                    
5  Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, Nomadisme, islam et pouvoir dans la société maure 
précoloniale (XIe-XIXe siècles). Essai sur quelques aspects du tribalisme (Univer-
sity of Paris V, Paris, PhD dissertation, 1985), p. 453. 
6  Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
MA, 1982). 
7  Meskerem Brhane, Narratives of the Past, Politics of the Present: Identity, sub-
ordination and the Haratines of Mauritania (University of Chicago, Chicago, PhD 
Dissertation in Political Science, 1997). 
8  Benjamin Acloque, Identité et statut de dépendant en Mauritanie. L’exemple de 
l’identité sociale des Hratin dans le système segmentaire et hiérarchique Bidan 
(University of Paris X-Nanterre, Paris, Masters thesis, 1995), p. 41. 
9  Ousmane Kamara, ‘Les divisions statutaires des descendants d’esclaves au Fuuta 
Tooro mauritanien’, Journal des Africanistes, 70, 1-2 (2000), pp. 265-289; Yaya Sy, 
‘L’esclavage chez les Soninkés: du village Paris’, Journal des Africanistes, 70, 1-2 
(2000), pp. 43-69; and Olivier Leservoisier, ‘“Nous voulons notre part!” Les am-
bivalences du mouvement d’émancipation des Saafaalbe Hormankoobe de Djéol 
(Mauritanie)’, Cahiers d’études africaines, 179-180 (2005), pp. 987-1014. 
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Slavery also exists among Black Africans […] I prefer my condition to theirs. The 
Black African slave, in his society and mind, is forced to die a slave; and his 
children too. Whereas I, a Haratine, am fighting to break out of this condition, they 
prefer presenting it as a specifically Moorish case and refuse to talk about what is 
happening among themselves.10 
The country’s successive governments have never addressed the issue of 
slavery as such regardless of the ethnic groups involved. The colonial admi-
nistration widely tolerated such practices11 and traditional slavery survived for a 
long time in post-colonial Mauritania. The public authorities have always 
adopted an ambiguous stance, combining denial, embarrassment and laisser-
faire.12 
Year after year, organizations involved in the fight against slavery are still 
reporting dozens of cases, although they usually refrain from estimating the 
number of victims. Mauritania is presented as an extreme case when it comes to 
slavery13 and sometimes, in a simplified manner,14 as an absolute counter ex-
ample.15 The aspiration to freedom still encounters barriers in odd situations in a 
country where, despite laws on abolition, the Constitution’s preamble recog-
nizes Sharia law as the main legal system. As applied by the customary courts, 
the pro-slavery interpretation of a not very codified Islamic law has led to 
litigation and disputes, sometimes inextricably in matters of inheritance, marri-
age, child custody, land ownership and salaries.16  
The sizeable community that is descended from slaves still forms the coun-
try’s most underprivileged social category.17 The Haratine experience inferior 
economic, social and political conditions and if they are free, their freedom is 
                                                    
10  Interview with Messaoud Ould Boulkhier in L’Autre Afrique, 57, 6 August 1997, p. 
26. 
11  El Kehel Ould Mohamed El Abd, Colonisation française et mutations sociales en 
Mauritanie: Cas de l’esclavage en milieu maure, 1900-1960 (University of Nou-
akchott, Nouakchott, Master’s thesis in History, 1987). 
12  Mohamed Lemine Ould Ahmed, L’abolition de l’esclavage en Mauritanie (Univer-
sity of Dakar, Dakar, Master’s thesis in International Relations, 1983), pp. 5-6. 
13  Amnesty International, Mauritania: A future free from slavery? (Amnesty Internati-
onal, London, 2002). 
14  Thierry Desjardins, ‘Mauritanie: 700.000 esclaves qui veulent le rester’, Le Figaro, 
8 December 1995; Samuel Coton, Silent Terror: A journey into contemporary 
African slavery (Harlem River Press, New York, 1998). 
15  Kevin Bales, Disposable People: New slavery in the global economy (University of 
California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1999). 
16  Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem, ‘Droit du statut personnel et équivalence citoyenne en 
République Islamique de Mauritanie. Le cas du mariage’, La Pensée, 336 (2003), 
pp. 37-53. 
17  E. Ann McDougall, ‘Living the legacy of slavery: between discourse and reality’, 
Cahiers d’études africaines, 179-180 (2005), pp. 957-986. 
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usually meaningless owing to their low economic status since they have sub-
altern jobs in urban or rural areas. Strongly marked by current and past slavery, 
their emancipation is limited due to the poverty in which most of them still live. 
Since political or legal emancipation has never been fully enforced, other 
factors have rekindled the debate about the abolition of slavery and bringing the 
Haratine issue to public attention.18 The Haratine community has been political-
ly shaped through struggles that have developed out of social, political and even 
ecological changes that need to be studied.19 
An unlikely cause? 
It is usually, and rightly, claimed that several factors have contributed to the 
emergence of the Haratine cause. Severe droughts in the 1970s undermined the 
conditions underlying both slavery and the agro-pastoral economy that corres-
ponded to the traditional way of life.20 By forcing most of the nomads to move 
to urban areas, this environmental catastrophe left many slaves destitute. Then 
the war in the Sahara, in which Mauritania was involved from 1975 to 1978, 
levied a large number of troops from among the Haratine who, in turn, gained a 
degree of collective emancipation. Finally but to a lesser degree, several young 
Haratine graduates decisively increased their group’s social visibility. It was no 
accident that El-Hor came into being in 1978, the year in which all these pro-
cesses came to a head. 
Collective demands on behalf of both slaves and former slaves were voiced 
in a society used to the liberation of individual slaves as they were manumitted 
or ran away. Apart from a few isolated and sporadic revolts, an organized 
challenge had never been mounted to the institution of slavery. It had barely 
figured on the leftist agenda advanced by young political activists during the 
period of unrest between 1968 and 1974; and the arguments used by local 
Marxist groups usually omitted it. Preferring the classical dichotomy bour-
geoisie/proletariat, the major underground movements at the time – the Parti 
des Kadihines (PKM) and Mouvement national démocratique (MND) – mainly 
sought to provoke the neo-colonial authorities. However, the few people with 
                                                    
18  Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem (ed.), Les trajectoires d’un État-frontière. Espaces, 
évolutions politiques et transformations sociales en Mauritanie (Codesria, Dakar, 
2004). 
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slave origins who became involved in these movements gained basic training in 
methods of collective organization. 
The educated members of the Haratine elite established El-Hor on 5 March 
1978. Among its best-known leaders were Messaoud Ould Boulkheir (a civil 
servant), Boubacar Ould Messaoud (an architect), Mohamed Ould Haimer (a 
primary-school teacher), Boydiel Ould Houmeid and Achour Ould Samba (who 
would later be civil servants) and Mohamed Lemine Ould Ahmed and El Kehel 
Ould Mohamed El Abd (who would become academics). The movement also 
received support from several school teachers and students. 
Before examining the organization’s initial actions and transformations, let 
us take a look at its founding charter that formulated a sense of identity and set 
a political agenda. 
Haratine nationalism: El-Hor’s charter 
El-Hor’s charter (a preamble and three articles) was circulated clandestinely, 
like many other political tracts at that time. In addition to demands concerning 
the abolition of slavery, it offered a genuine plan for an infranational ‘imagined 
community’21 founded on a ‘moral ethnicity’.22 According to the preamble, ‘the 
Haratine of Mauritania are still subject to forms of domination, oppression and 
exploitation’ in spite of national and international legal measures. There was 
therefore the ‘necessity of their collective consciousness and unified struggle’. 
This moral ethnicity did not aim to include all Mauritanians of slave descent, 
only those who shared a common Moorish ethnicity as well as a knowledge of 
Arabic. The key to liberation was to develop awareness among the Haratine: 
cognitive liberation was a precondition for social action. 
After the first article stating the movement’s name, the two other articles 
were devoted respectively to ‘general political orientations’ and ‘objectives’. In 
proclaiming their movement’s absolute autonomy – ‘El-Hor does not identify 
itself with any other organization or movement’ – the authors claimed that their 
actions were ‘national, non-racial, anti-segregationist and anti-chauvinistic’. El-
Hor called upon ‘all persons of goodwill, individual, collective, national, for-
eign and international, for support in the just struggle to uphold inalienable 
human rights’ (II-3). Article III states the reasons underlying the movement’s 
existence: 
                                                    
21  B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of na-
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Fundamentally inspired by religion, exacerbated by an abusive interpretation of this 
religion by the privileged social strata, and maintained owing to the ambiguity or 
even the nearly complete silence in the country’s legislation, the inequalities from 
which the Haratine suffer are not just economic, social, political and religious. They 
are also, and above all, inherent in a mentality with deep roots due to centuries of 
psychological conditioning. Fighting against all that is El-Hor’s raison d’être. 
Regarding the system of land tenure, the manifesto calls for reform so that 
those who work the land (i.e. the Haratine) own it themselves. Secondly, El-Hor 
announced its intention to fight slavery and all forms of unpaid labour, pro-
mising to focus on combating discrimination in education, which was especially 
important for the Haratine, and in particular those in rural slave ghettos (adwa-
ba, singular: adabay). Blaming the government for its ‘policy of obstruction’ 
that kept the Haratine out of decision making, El-Hor demanded an ‘actual 
participation in the exercise of power at all levels’, starting with the (then 
single) party, the civil service and elective offices. 
What stands out in this charter is the rejection of an Islam that endorsed 
slavery and justified the inferiority of the Haratine. It thus asked the Haratine to 
categorically oppose this religious conception. El-Hor demanded the abolition 
of slavery and devoted its efforts to modernizing Islamic law and jurisprudence. 
It asked the government to ‘remove all the contradictions that exist between 
Muslim and modern law, in particular those having to do with the slave status, 
namely: the problems related to the incapacitation of slaves (property rights, 
testimony, inheritance) and to matrimony (marriage, concubinage)’. This re-
presented ultimately a twofold form of subversion. The movement not only 
claimed to propose its own interpretation of Koranic law – one squarely op-
posed to the jurisprudence used in local Islamic circles – but did so from a 
social position – slave or freed slave – that was the least ‘qualified’ to make 
such an interpretation. 
The charter’s final article focused on the Haratine identity. The Haratine 
were ‘insoluble’ in any other ethnic group in Mauritania even though they be-
long, it is clearly stated, to the Moorish community. El-Hor opposed dividing 
the Haratine into sub-groups according to their degree of bondage or freedom, 
in particular the difference between those emancipated long ago (khadhara), 
recently (hratîn) and those who were still slaves (âbid). The nascent organiza-
tion deliberately used general language in an effort to be inclusive and claimed 
to represent a homogeneous community that saw status differences as secondary 
in comparison to an identity labelled ‘Haratine’. However this label was not 
chosen at random since it refers literally to emancipated slaves. In fact, the 
charter uses the word ‘slavery’ only once, to categorically reject slavery. After 
explaining how the Haratine identity set this group apart from other Mauri-
tanians, it concluded by proclaiming the cultural and historical specificity of the 
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Haratine. It was El-Hor’s duty, through its programme, to consolidate this spe-
cificity and obtain recognition for it.23 
El-Hor intended less to overturn Mauritania’s power structure or society than 
to become a full-fledged active part of it. The Haratine movement did not dev-
elop a radical or revolutionary vision. In later texts, El-Hor glorified fraternity 
with the Haratine, stating that it did not intend to seize power, even though its 
demands upset traditional and established holders of power.24 
The charter galvanized Mauritanian society. Having successfully carved out 
a place for itself in the public sphere, El-Hor advanced its cause in the field 
through actions. It diffused its slogans in areas traditionally settled with slaves 
(adwaba) and on the impoverished margins of the urban areas where the Hara-
tine were concentrated. It organized demonstrations and, by setting up ‘cells’, 
built up a territorial network through its work of conscientization (wake-up 
campaigns). Meanwhile, El-Hor was explaining the conditions of the Haratine 
to political organizations and officials although raising the taboo on talking 
about slavery met with circumspection and sometimes even hostility. 
A subversive movement: El-Hor as seen by others 
The Mouvement de libération et d’émancipation des Haratines was launched 
while a single party was in power. The Parti du peuple mauritanian had 
managed to incorporate nearly all protest movements since 1974 and given that 
the major political issue at the time was the country’s involvement in the war in 
the Sahara, domestic politics were relatively calm. In this context, the public 
authorities wondered whether the time was ripe for a debate on the Haratine 
cause. However politicians were all baffled by, or even fearful of, an endo-
genous movement that was led by, and based on, an elite drawn exclusively 
from within the Haratine community. Small political groups saw the movement 
as serious competitor in a potential segment of the political market place. 
What irritated people even more was the movement’s claim that it had 
authentic roots in Mauritania, whereas most of the underground ‘parties’ (the 
MND as well as Black African or Arab-Mauritanian nationalists) embraced 
imported ideologies (proletarian internationalism, pan-Africanism, Nasserism, 
Baathism). El-Hor accused certain rivals of being ideological foreigners without 
any attachment to a genuinely national cause. 
Another annoyance was that the Haratine wanted to assert themselves as a 
new autonomous national force in a context where political groups formed on 
an ethnic basis were vying for this community’s support. The Moorish elite saw 
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El-Hor as a threat of discord within a purportedly unified community. In their 
view, the formation of a movement of Moors of servile descent undermined the 
automatic majority of the Arab-Berber group. They did not perceive the issue in 
terms of an oppressive ruling class and a subjected underclass campaigning for 
full civil and social rights. In this perspective, El-Hor disadvantageously com-
plicated the situation given the delicate ethnic balance in a country where the 
only noteworthy cleavage in their eyes was between Moors and Black Mauri-
tanians.25 The Haratine movement arose at a time when Black Mauritanian 
nationalists were not very active, and the latter did not accept the creation of an 
organization for a group that they had hoped to rally so as to tip the population’s 
racial balance in their favour. Their concern was even more justified since El-
Hor was established during a war to acquire territory inhabited by White Moors 
in the Western Sahara. With the obvious demographic consequences, Black 
Africans were rightly fearful in case they definitively remained a minority in the 
country. 
This generally hostile reception did not hinder the new movement. Due to 
the relative diversity of the Haratine, the utopia of a unified community had, of 
course, limited appeal and the majority of the people targeted were not parti-
cularly influenced by El-Hor’s arguments. Through a window of opportunity, 
the organization managed to obtain results, sometimes because of its sweeping 
actions during the first years of its existence. 
A successful movement: Time to act 
The Haratine movement emerged as the regime of Moktar Ould Daddah, Mauri-
tania’s first president, was drawing to a close. The president was ousted by a 
coup on 10 July 1978, an event that overshadowed the slave revolts that were 
being quelled in various localities.26 Like other small political groups, El-Hor 
organized a demonstration in favour of the new authorities and even signed, in 
the name of the Haratine community, a petition supporting them. It thus pre-
sented itself as a player on the national scene. 
Meanwhile, El-Hor’s activists were making themselves heard international-
ly. An awareness campaign was launched to reach out to the media and relevant 
NGOs, and it soon bore fruit. Anti-Slavery International, based in London, 
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started to work with El-Hor to assess the scope of slavery,27 as can be seen in its 
report on Mauritania.28 
However the real opportunity to go public came two years after the or-
ganization’s creation, in July 1980, when the power of the state was shaken due 
to difficulties ending the country’s involvement in the war in the Western 
Sahara. In April 1979, Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla had replaced 
colonels Moustapha Ould Mohamed Saleck and Mohamed Mahmoud Ould 
Mohamed Louly, the two successive heads of state since 1978. A specific event 
pushed El-Hor to organize protest demonstrations in several big towns includ-
ing Nouakchott, Rosso and Nouadhibou after news broke of the sale of a slave 
named M’Barka in the town of Atar (Adrar) in February 1980. After activists 
were arrested, El-Hor were taken to court in Rosso in March 1980. 
In this famous case and in line with argumentation frequently used after-
wards, the Mauritanian authorities made it a crime to raise the issue of slavery. 
El-Hor’s founding members (Boubacar Ould Messaoud, Boydiel Ould Hou-
meid, Achour Ould Samba and Samory Ould Beye as well as several other 
persons) were arrested, imprisoned, interrogated and finally arraigned before a 
military tribunal that held special hearings in Rosso. Most of the accused wil-
lingly admitted what they had done and that they had belonged to the move-
ment.29 They managed to turn the trial into a grandstand for their cause and it 
became an opportunity far beyond anything the anti-slavery activists could have 
hoped for and made a strong impact on the media. El-Hor’s leaders received 
prison sentences of up to three months but the publicity surrounding around the 
trial would soon have spectacular effects both nationally and internationally. 
The march towards abolition  
The government of Ould Haidalla seemed to have decided to respond to Hara-
tine demands and, in addition to the trial’s impact and international support, the 
campaigns launched by El-Hor soon proved effective. In June 1980, the orga-
nization published a tract listing the major problems related to the continuation 
of slavery and asked the government to address these grievances.  
As a result of international pressure and instability on the domestic front, the 
government responded rapidly and forcefully.30 Hardly able to do otherwise, it 
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was moving towards the formal abolition of slavery. It started by consulting 
ulemas. Their approval was less than outright and their fatwas were reserved. 
None proclaimed that slavery was illegal under Islam, but neither did any go so 
far as to advise against the proposed measure. Given the ambiguity of the 
doctors of Sharia law, the Home Office issued a statement on 3 June 1980 that 
instructed the regional authorities to combat an ‘anachronistic practice’. On 5 
June 1980, the Comité militaire de salut national, the governing body at the 
time, adopted a declaration abolishing slavery. The government newspaper en-
thusiastically explained the measure by borrowing from El-Hor: ‘Since all Mus-
lims are equal before Allah, there is no reason some of them should be enslaved 
by others’.31 
Activists criticized all these efforts as being legally worthless and the autho-
rities were forced, sixteen months later, to go a step farther and issue a decree 
abolishing slavery on 9 November 1981.32 Its four short articles were ambi-
guous, oddly providing for state compensation for the ‘persons entitled’, i.e. the 
masters. Nonetheless, this order clearly signalled a victory for El-Hor. The law 
recognized that there were still slaves being treated like someone else’s personal 
property since their owners were to be compensated for their losses.33 
Later, Ould Haidallah’s government issued its famous order for land reform 
in June 1983. Since land was to be held by individuals, the tribal authorities’ 
traditional property rights were to be abolished. This law was supposed to allow 
slaves to own the land they worked34 and was one of President Haidalla’s last 
political acts before he was ousted by Colonel Mâaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya 
on 12 December 1984. Taking into account the momentum gathered by the 
movement in the Haratine community, the new head of state appointed Messa-
oud Ould Boulkhier as Minister of Rural Development. This founding member 
of El-Hor received, it was claimed, the symbolically important assignment of 
land reform because there was to be a new policy of improving the conditions 
of the Haratine at the local level. 
Beyond its symbolism, this appointment marked a turning point. First of all, 
it opened up access to decision-making positions to the Haratine elite. Secondly, 
it was evidence of the determination to endorse at least some of the conclusions 
drawn up by El-Hor. And finally, it signalled government recognition of El-Hor 
as a legitimate representative and spokesman of the Haratine community. Since 
then, no government has been formed without including at least some persons 
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from this community,35 preferably from among El-Hor’s founding members. 
This involvement in government considerably affected the movement’s institu-
tionalization and political prospects during Mâaouya Ould Taya’s long term in 
office (1984-2005) and even beyond. 
‘Slaves’ in power, ‘slaves’ of power 
A major objective of El-Hor’s founding charter seemed to have been achieved: 
persons from among the Haratine were now holding top positions. The process 
of turning the Haratine leadership into ‘officials’ was seen literally and the 
movement’s request to share the national pie among the country’s ethnic, tribal 
and social constituents started to be realized.36 Since then, nearly all of the 
movement’s outstanding members have held important positions in government 
and the Haratine movement can lay claim to considerable political advances. 
During the experimental municipal elections organized by Ould Taya in late 
1986, El-Hor was less successful but was able to measure the support it had in 
the country. By sponsoring candidates, it gained electoral experience that would 
prove useful later.37 Beyond the pursuit of personal careers, what was important 
about this involvement in politics was the position that the Haratine were work-
ing out in the recurring debates on Mauritania’s national identity. 
The experience gained in management and political office-holding spawned 
rivalries for the control of a movement increasingly involved in politics in the 
second half of the 1980s when the racial divide between Arab-Berbers and 
Afro-Mauritanians resurfaced along with the related issues of power-sharing 
and national identity. 
Identity politics and the Haratine cause  
The Forces de libération africaines de Mauritanie (FLAM), formed in 1986, 
signalled a radicalization of the claims made by Black African nationalists. In 
its famous ‘Manifesto of the Oppressed Negro-Mauritanian’, this new group 
called for armed struggle against Ould Taya’s regime. The resurgence of the 
question of Black African minorities and their hostility towards the government, 
which was accused of being racist and of being monopolized by the White 
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Moors, took a decisive turn in October 1987 with the failed coup by Haalpulaar 
officers. The three major instigators were tried by a military tribunal, sentenced 
to death and executed shortly afterwards. Dozens of presumed accomplices 
were thrown into prison and the Black African peril was declared a ‘menace to 
state security’. 
During all this, the long-standing debate on the country’s identity was still 
raging. Two radical groups – the Moors and the Black African Mauritanians – 
were trying to win the Haratine community’s support. An Arab nationalism of 
many forms (Nasserism, Baathism, etc.) was thriving, even in the military, op-
posing the idea of an African identity for Mauritania. In this tense atmosphere, 
El-Hor tried to present itself as separate from these competing nationalisms that 
were trying to recuperate  the Haratine movement. From its very foundation, the 
organization had, in principle, adopted a position on the question of identity that 
was reflected in its well-known slogan: ‘Arab but Black, Black but Arab’. 
Nevertheless, a debate flared up within the organization. Among El-Hor’s few 
official declarations on this question was one from Boubacar Ould Messaoud 
(who would later head SOS Esclaves) to a Senegalese newspaper:38 
My skin is not a political programme […] They are trying to establish a link be-
tween the activism of a few persons who have proclaimed themselves the spokes-
men of a Black Mauritanian pseudo-community and the problem of slavery […] In 
1980, the fight against slavery was [led by] El-Hor, not them. 
This heated controversy took a new turn following the clash between Mauri-
tania and Senegal in April 1989, as citizens from each county living in the other 
were targeted. During these so-called ‘events’, as was the case during similar 
riots in 1966, the Haratine were accused of taking part in acts of violence 
against Black Africans, Senegalese and Mauritanians. It was even claimed that 
some Haratine had joined in the riots because of the aggression in Dakar against 
Bilal Ould Werzeg, a diplomat at the embassy and a founding member of El-
Hor.39 Whatever the case, the expulsion of nearly 80,000 Black African Mauri-
tanians to Senegal and Mali caused unprecedented humanitarian problems while 
shortly afterwards, in 1990/1991, about 300 Black African soldiers fell vicitm 
during a bloody purge when they were accused of being antinationalistic and of 
supporting FLAM’s ‘extremist’ doctrines. The death toll continued to rise. 
Black African nationalists did not give up on recruiting the Haratine for their 
combat. In 1990 FLAM’s newspaper was tellingly called Bilaal after the first 
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slave to convert to Islam and who became a well-known follower of the 
Prophet.40 
Contradictions were emerging within El-Hor at this time. Some of the 
leaders supported the regime while others did not want to have anything to do 
with the military. The movement was also suffering from rivalries based on 
regions (east vs. southwest), language education (Arabic vs. French) or even 
ideologies. The desertion in 1990 of some of the leaders to join a group of 
Baathist Moors was seen as a defeat by some Haratine activists who wanted to 
remain equidistant from both Arab and Black African nationalisms. 
The Haratine leadership remained divided over the question of whether to 
carry forward the symbolic issue of slavery. Since its foundation, the movement 
had often discussed if it should have a political or a social calling and this 
question was emerging once again. A rift was opening between a so-called radi-
cal wing that advocated pursuing this struggle and a more moderate wing for 
whom the Haratine issue was no longer political but social and economic. 
Positions hardened as a political strategy was hammered out and regardless of 
whether or not most of the Haratine felt represented by El-Hor (a hard-to-
answer question), the organization turned out to be less of a federating, unifying 
force when circumstances forced it to position itself in a new political arena. 
El-Hor, power holder or democratic opposition?  
Before democratic fever broke out in Africa, part of El-Hor was increasingly at 
odds with Ould Taya’s regime. In late 1990, certain members of the radical 
wing demanded political pluralism, blaming the authorities for undermining El-
Hor’s ticket (led by Messaoud Ould Boulkheir) during the 1990 municipal 
elections in Nouakchott. While several founding members sided with the regime 
(Boydiel Ould Houmeid, Mohamed Lemine Ould Ahmed, Sghair Ould Mbareck 
and Mohamed Ould Haimer), an active minority (Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, 
Boubacar Ould Messaoud and Omar Ould Yali) did not. The latter were among 
the leaders who sent open letters (‘from 50’, then ‘from 150’) to the head of 
state asking him to open political doors. Boubacar Ould Messaoud, who was 
thought to be close to the authorities, paid the price for this and was imme-
diately dismissed from the official position he held. 
Under mounting pressure from within and outside the country, President 
Ould Taya declared a pluralistic democracy on 15 April 1991. After laws in-
stalling a multiparty system were passed, Ould Taya’s opponents joined the 
Front démocratique uni pour le changement (FDUC) in July 1991. This party 
included most of the political forces that wanted to put an end to the military 
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regime and, once legalized under its new name of Union des forces démocra-
tiques (UFD), the front became the principal opposition party. Created for the 
presidential and legislative elections in 1992, the UFD was co-directed by 
Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, which was undoubtedly the reason why the issue of 
slavery had a place on the party’s platform and it condemned violations of the 
human rights of Black African Mauritanians, civilians and soldiers. 
The UFD supported an independent candidate, Ahmed Ould Daddah, for the 
presidential election on 24 January 1992 since support for Ould Boulkheir’s 
candidacy had not been unanimous. The UFD did not survive Ould Daddah’s 
defeat in an election that was only just won by Ould Taya under tense and 
dubious conditions. A new party, Union des forces démocratiques/Ère nouvelle 
(UFD/EN), formed around Ould Daddah but the leaders of El-Hor felt cramped 
in this new organization and, in 1993, dissatisfied with the handling of the Hara-
tine question, El-Hor published a long document recounting its fight and dis-
cussing its uncomfortable position inside the party.41 However its representa-
tives did not quit the UFD/EN until 1994 and they created Action pour le chan-
gement (AC) in August 1995 with Messaoud Ould Boulkheir as president.42 
Autonomy in party politics and the rekindled debate on slavery 
The Haratine movement was now deeply entrenched in party politics. Though 
founded by persons of different origins, the AC was the first party actually 
controlled by Haratine. Since it accepted forming an alliance with Black Afri-
can nationalists who had previously been activists in the UFD, its creation was 
seen as a radicalization of El-Hor. The AC was the first party to present a 
platform that gave priority to the fight against slavery and the advancement of 
the Haratine. Given the context, the party’s creation was hugely significant and 
as an authoritarian restoration was taking place, the regime was cleverly man-
oeuvring to ‘pass the democratic test’ and enhance its image outside the 
country. Above all, it was acquiring a reputation of stability in a region that was 
relatively less secure.43 Mauritania established diplomatic relations with Israel, 
thus improving its relations with the United States and muting the frequent 
criticism directed at it from America. 
El-Hor apparently realized that its cause had not only been watered down 
owing to its involvement in party politics inside the country but had also been 
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hijacked by political groups outside the country, in particular Black African 
Mauritanians in the USA.44 The creation of the AC and, in the same year, of 
SOS Esclaves has to be understood in this context. The Confédération libre des 
travailleurs de Mauritanie (CLTM) was also set up under the leadership of 
Samory Ould Bèye, one of El-Hor’s founding members. 
These political changes were occurring while the terms of the debate about 
the Haratine problem and slavery were slowly shifting. Since democratization in 
1991, two opposite positions on slavery had formed in the country’s inde-
pendent media. According to El-Hor activists in opposition, slavery still existed 
as a practice and as a system of values fostered by a lack of action by the 
authorities. According to the regime’s supporters, slavery had vanished and any 
actions should be directed at its mainly economic and social after-effects. 
Mentioning the existence of slavery amounted to an attack on national unity. 
The activists who adopted the first position were accused of manufacturing a 
fake problem for political purposes. The El-Hor faction that had joined the re-
gime was even assigned the task of confronting their brothers in arms about this 
question. A Comité pour l’éradication des séquelles de l’esclavage en Maurita-
nie (CRESEM) was formed for this purpose in the mid 1990s and in 1997 it 
received the public support of the head of state who, during a famous speech, 
criticized politicians’ exploitation of slavery’s after-effects, setting off a major 
national debate that reflected, once again, a hardening of positions on the is-
sue.45 
This tension eventually affected the AC’s political prospects. Having won 
but a single seat (Kébé Abdoulaye) in the 1996 parliamentary elections, the 
party was not represented in the National Assembly by anyone from El-Hor. In 
the more legitimate 2001 legislative elections however, it won four seats in 
parliament, including that of the charismatic Messaoud Ould Boulkheir. 
The UN conference in Durban on racism and xenophobia (August-Septem-
ber 2001) provided El-Hor activists with a platform for reaching the inter-
national media. Since the early 1990s, the issue of slavery in Mauritania had 
been monopolized by Afro-Mauritanian activists abroad who had presented the 
issue in black-and-white terms. In their simplified version, in which all Afro-
Mauritanians were the slaves of the Arabs, there was obviously no role for El-
Hor.46 El-Hor activists used the Durban conference to censor the regime’s 
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authoritarian restoration in Mauritania and its treatment of ‘bare-foot activists’, 
as Messaoud Ould Boulkheir and his comrades referred to themselves.47 Re-
elected in 1997 for a new six-year term, Ould Taya spared his opponents no 
pity. The UFD/EN was outlawed in January 2001. The AC’s turn came in 
January 2002 after Ould Boulkheir railed in parliament against the persistence 
of slavery and criticized the lack of development programmes targeting the 
Haratine population. 
Feeling the brunt of the government’s harsh decisions, party leaders began 
looking for a new framework for action. The creation of a new party, the Con-
vention pour le changement, was refused and it was not until 2003 that the pro-
Libyan Arab nationalists of the Alliance populaire progressiste (APP), an elitist 
party that was losing momentum, proposed that Messaoud Ould Boulkheir and 
his Haratine companions join it along with Black Africans. This improbable 
alliance of usually competing micronationalisms had two consequences. On the 
one hand, it enabled El-Hor to present itself as a bridge between all the political 
persuasions in Mauritania and, on the other, it allowed ‘Arabists’, who auto-
matically became a minority in the party’s leadership, to change their ideology 
and appeal. Messaoud Ould Boulkheir became the APP’s president, and El-Hor 
its driving force. 
From 2003 to 2005, the political climate in Mauritania deteriorated. Ould 
Taya was re-elected president in controversial conditions for a third term in 
November 2003. Several attempted coups were foiled between June 2003 and 
August 2004 and Ould Taya was not ousted until 3 August 2005 by Colonel Ely 
Ould Mohamed Vall and his Comité militaire pour la justice et la démocratie. 
The democratic revival and El-Hor’s prospects 
After removing Ould Taya, Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall managed an 
exemplary transition towards democracy by March 2007. A coalition headed by 
an elected president, Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdellahi, came to power. Messaoud 
Ould Boulkheir and his party, the APP, held a special place in this coalition. 
The APP had won only five seats in the 2006 parliamentary elections and did 
not score well in the presidential elections, winning only 7% of the votes. 
Nevertheless, Messaoud Ould Boulkheir unexpectedly decided to endorse Sidi 
Ould Cheikh Abdellahi during the run-off in the presidential election in 
exchange for a few ministerial positions for the APP and the speakership in the 
National Assembly for himself. He also demanded that parliament adopt as its 
very first text a law criminalizing slavery with sanctions against those guilty of 
it. In compliance with this pre-election deal, the new government passed a bill 
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on 9 August 2007 that made slavery a crime.48 The APP immediately held a 
meeting at which Ould Boulkheir declared, ‘After this act, only someone who 
wants to be a slave will be!’ 
This controversial statement shocked the leaders of SOS Esclaves, who had 
actively lobbied for this law against slavery, but with little success. They had 
failed to amend it and so to allow NGOs to be party to lawsuits about slavery. In 
fact, during all this, the leadership of SOS Esclaves proved that it was tech-
nically competent and endowed with a fighting spirit that only a few of El-Hor’s 
leaders could match. It became obvious that politicians from the Haratine com-
munity were no longer the driving force for progress on this hugely symbolic 
question. 
The Haratine social movement was shifting away from politics and political 
parties and towards advocacy and activism. This remarkable shift mainly af-
fected SOS Esclaves, as my current research on this NGO shows. 
From politics to advocacy, the ultimate transformation? 
The development of the activism characteristic of SOS Esclaves represents one 
of the most important transformations undergone by the Haratine movement. By 
dramatizing the issue of slavery, this humanitarian human-rights NGO took the 
campaign back to its roots. Absorbed by politics, El-Hor was no longer the sole 
standard-bearer of the Haratine cause. SOS Esclaves came into being in 
February 1995 when, as we have already seen, political protest was more or less 
stifled due to the vigorous authoritarian restoration. The same process led both 
to the creation of the AC and underlined the commitment of Boubacar Ould 
Messaoud, the founding president of SOS Esclaves, to the struggle for human 
rights in Mauritanian society. 
With the support of Messaoud Ould Boulkheir (El-Hor’s charismatic leader 
and moral authority), Boubacar Ould Messaoud, an architect by education and a 
key figure in the struggle against slavery, wanted to launch a fight distinct from 
El-Hor’s. And with encouragement from various s political sources, he thought 
an NGO could best broaden the struggle against slavery beyond the category of 
the Haratine. SOS Esclaves was a suitable name because it expressed a sense of 
urgency and danger.49 The issue of slavery had to be moved out of the con-
strained game of politics and the intention was to bring together the descendants 
of masters and of slaves and place the issue on the national agenda. 
However this NGO’s founding took place amid suspicion and prohibitions. 
Some of El-Hor’s original leaders did not accept this new project, seeing it as a 
means whereby Boubacar Ould Messaoud would take control of an agenda that 
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had been jointly drawn up, and orient it in a different direction. As for the 
government, it was opposed to the new NGO and SOS Esclaves’s first press 
conference was banned.50 The only genuinely positive response came from out-
side the country, where the defence of human rights and the ‘actions of civil 
society’ were current catch-phrases. 
New methods in a new framework of action 
From the start, SOS Esclaves wanted its actions to be different from the familiar 
forms of mobilization. A natural action was to update information about clear 
and indisputable cases of slavery, with the goal being to present names and 
faces to personify the Haratine problem. The organization helped victims, con-
tacted lawyers to defend them and inveighed against the judicial system’s ‘com-
plicity’. It undertook and supported court actions and awareness campaigns and, 
in 1995, it circulated a ‘note of information on slavery in Mauritania’, which 
prefigured its annual reports. As of 1996 every report mentioned between thirty 
and forty cases ranging from servile, unpaid labour to fugitive slaves, land 
seizures, undue influence in matters of inheritance and separated families whose 
members were divided among ‘masters’. The reports even mentioned acts of 
kidnapping, illegal restraint, usurpation and physical violence. Some cases were 
settled through the organization’s interventions but the government was usually 
blamed for its lack of determination to eradicate these phenomena, punish of-
fenders or protect victims in compliance with the many, already enacted, laws 
and legal measures. 
The reports also contained analyses and concrete proposals for eradicating 
slavery.51 It is interesting that the arguments used by SOS Esclaves reformulate 
the fundamental issues at stake. For them, emancipation does not mean an end 
to servitude insofar as other sorts of bonds still chain freed slaves to their 
former masters. Officially freed slaves are even more enslaved if society pro-
vides no means of guaranteeing real economic, social and psychological eman-
cipation.52 
SOS Esclaves owes part of its audience to the suits that the authorities 
brought against it after French television (FR3) broadcast a documentary about 
slavery in Mauritania. Boubacar Ould Mesaaoud presented presumed slaves to 
the cameras and, as a result of this, was arrested, judged and, in early 1998, 
sentenced to thirteen months imprisonment for ‘belonging to an unrecognized 
association’ along with Fatimata Mbaye (a lawyer), Cheikh Saad Bouh Kamara 
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(a teacher) and Ibrahim Ould Ebetty (a lawyer). Although the Court of Appeals 
upheld the sentence on 24 March 1998, the accused were granted remission 
following pressure from various international organizations. SOS Esclaves 
gained visibility in the international media. 
International backing has in fact always been a strategic point in the orga-
nization’s support and legitimacy. SOS Esclaves has benefited from its alliance 
with Conscience et résistance, an organization in exile whose founder and 
leader, Jemal Ould Yessa, headed the European chapter of SOS Esclaves for a 
long time. Born into an emir’s family in Tagant in central Mauritania, Ould 
Yessa is very active on the international scene and his support has lent credi-
bility to the organization as he is one of the very few descendants of the Moor 
nobility to become an activist in an anti-slavery organization.53 
At the national level, very few Haratine activists have rallied around Bouba-
car Ould Messaoud, whose personality has strongly marked SOS Esclaves and 
spurred criticism. For the president of this NGO, activism seems to have 
become a life-time career and he has repeatedly emphasized that ‘Slavery is not 
a hobby horse but a personal obsession’.54 El-Hor’s long-time activists seldom 
join SOS Esclaves, which they see as the business of a comrade who has turned 
commitment into a solitary fight. Nonetheless, criticism of Ould Messaoud’s 
motivations or sincerity has not stopped the organization from obtaining recog-
nition and registering successes. 
Recognition  
The national and international recognition now enjoyed by SOS Esclaves is out 
of proportion with El-Hor’s. The latter has remained an informal organization 
that has splintered into sub-groups and is deeply involved in politics. It is no 
accident that, while on a trip to the US in March 2008, the president of SOS 
Esclaves was asked to speak in the prestigious Woodrow Wilson Center for 
International Scholars (Washington, DC) and the Open Society Institute (New 
York). The Washington Post devoted a whole page to him under the headline 
‘How one brave man helped end slavery in his country’.55 In its 2007 report on 
trafficking in human beings, the US State Department presented Ould Messaoud 
as one of the world’s seventeen ‘heroes’ working to put an end to modern forms 
of slavery.56 This recognition came but a few weeks after SOS Esclaves was 
nominated for Anti-Slavery International’s 2008 award. 
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Since 2003 requests from abroad for alternative human-rights reports to 
those coming from the government have led to SOS Esclaves becoming in-
creasingly indispensable. Under pressure from different international sources, 
Ould Taya’s government was forced to grant it authorization in May 2005 and, 
as we have seen, SOS Esclaves was, after the military putsch of 3 August 2005 
that ousted Ould Taya, associated with policies to extend rights and freedom. 
Since 2007, its president and its secretary-general have been members of the 
Commission nationale des Droits de l’Homme (CNDH) that is funded by the 
government and reports to the prime minister. The CNDH has not only in-
veighed against the persistence of problems related to slavery but also helped 
settle several cases.57 Ironically, this official commission is chaired by the well-
known and respected Mohamed Said Ould Hamody, a journalist and former am-
bassador who is none other than the son of the famous Hamody Ould Mah-
moud. The latter, who died in 1969, was one of the very few Haratine who 
made a fortune in the 1940s and 1950s and naturally – like any wealthy man of 
his day – owned several slaves.58 
SOS Esclaves may not, however, be the final form of mobilization for the 
Haratine cause. Groups of this sort are now proliferating and claim to be 
reviving and radicalizing the cause. Internationally, there is Moctar Teyeb’s 
hyperactivism in the United States.59 Claiming to be from El-Hor, he has 
become associated, under ambiguous circumstances, with an organization called 
the American Antislavery Group, which is active in Sudan. He even held the 
title of outreach director in this NGO in 2000 before being heard by the US 
Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations.60 He set up the Haratine Institute, 
and persons with similar claims have set up another institute of this sort in 
France. In Mauritania, young activists, some of them previously from El-Hor or 
SOS Esclaves, recently created small groups with names such as Conscience 
haratine or IRA. They are trying to adapt their message to trends in the country 
or, at least, to advance their personal careers in politics. It is too soon to say 
anything about their impact or prospects. However they are evidence of the 
resilience of the Haratine movement and its ability to innovate. 
                                                                                                                               
 0.3565332.html, June 4, 2008. 
57  Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007-2008 (CNDH, 
Nouakchott, June 2008), pp. 21-23. 
58  E. Ann McDougall, ‘A topsy-turvy world: Slaves and freed slaves in the Mauri-
tanian Adrar, 1910-1950’, in S. Miers & R. Roberts (eds), The End of Slavery in 
Africa (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, 2005), pp. 362-390. 
59  See the interview with Moctar Teyeb, ‘Slavery is a state of mind’, Middle East 
Quarterly, December 1999. 
60  William Finnegan, ‘A slave in New York: From Africa to the Bronx, one man’s long 
journey to freedom’, The New Yorker, 24 January 2000, pp. 50-61. 
 The Haratine movement in Mauritania 177
Conclusion 
All things considered, the actions taken by the Haratine movement have finally 
placed the question of improving the situation of the social strata made up of 
slaves and their descendants on the national political agenda. The movement’s 
itinerary has been deeply shaped over the years by a confluence of factors and 
shifts of positions in Mauritanian politics. Both El-Hor and SOS Esclaves have 
played a crucial role in increasing awareness of the cause they defend and have 
managed to obtain recognition for this social category in politics. Despite its 
institutional weakness as a result of its emergence as an underground move-
ment, the Haratine movement has been institutionalized by labour unions, poli-
tical parties and society in general. 
Nowadays, there are doubts about whether the Haratine movement is a 
single cause since ever more diverse actors are now conveying its themes and 
messages. In addition, the diversified Haratine community has changed inde-
pendently of the political struggles centred on it. As a consequence, and despite 
the prestige that El-Hor’s founding members enjoy in national politics, it cannot 
be concluded that they have fully succeeded in creating a ‘moral ethnicity’ uni-
fied around an identity in the pursuit of a common cause. And in spite of the 
current promotion of the Haratine cause as an outstanding example of a human-
rights struggle, these changes are not likely to depoliticize an issue that runs so 
deep in debates about Mauritania’s identity, current situation and prospects. 
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Much recent scholarship about Islam among youth has tended 
to privilege so-called political Islam or Islamism and the radi-
calization of Muslim youth. In this chapter, I shift the focus 
away from such objects of study to consider a new Islamic 
organization in Nigeria called NASFAT (Nasr Allah al-Fatih 
Society of Nigeria) that exhibits some features of a social move-
ment. NASFAT also clearly illustrates the influence of Pente-
costalism on Muslim religious practice with some even refer-
ring to the organization as ‘Islamic Pentecostalism’. NASFAT’s 
founders intended the organization to be both non-sectarian 
and non-political. Like some other modern Islamic movements, 
NASFAT has focused on questions of piety and ethics and has 
been very active in social and economic activities. However, 
NASFAT’s development of business activities, which it has 
sought to explicitly link with Islam, has been rather distinctive, 
helping to define it as an Islamic social movement. Given the 
limited attention to such contemporary Islamic organizations 
and social movements, which challenge some conventional 
terms and categories of analysis of Islam, Muslim youth and 
social movements, the chapter is a preliminary attempt to trace 
                                                          
1  I am most grateful to Professor Amidu Sanni of Lagos State University for intro-
ducing me to members of the NASFAT leadership. I am also grateful to Lateef 
Oladimeji for introducing me to NASFAT members in Abuja and would like to 
thank Ruth Marshall for her insightful analyses of Pentecostalism and Nigeria that 
helped me develop some of the ideas discussed in this chapter. Amidu Sanni, Rosa-
lind Hackett, Rüdiger Seesemann, and LaRay Denzer offered useful commentary on 
earlier drafts. I remain responsible for any deficiencies. 
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the history of NASFAT and set it within the larger social and 
historical context. 
 
Young people – whether considered as a demographic group, a generation or a 
segment of consumer society – have captured the imagination and, not infre-
quently, the opprobrium of social and political commentators for several dec-
ades now. At least since the Iranian Revolution, there has also been con-
siderable interest in Muslim youth in the world. From the time of the Palestinian 
intifada when young people were key actors to the events of September 11, 
2001 when young Arab hijackers engaged in spectacular acts of terrorism, Islam 
and especially young Muslims have been key objects of attention and have 
faced heightened levels of scrutiny.2 This degree of interest in young Muslims 
and their activities is unlikely to abate any time soon. 
Given this excessive interest in young Muslims, it is not surprising that much 
recent scholarship about Islam among youth has tended to privilege so-called 
political Islam or Islamism and various trajectories of the radicalization of Mus-
lim youth in volatile and unstable settings in the world.3 This is not least the 
case for Nigeria, especially in the predominantly Muslim north of the country 
where, for several decades, Muslim youth have been prominent religious and 
political activists.4 Since the 1980s, there have been waves of Muslim radical-
ism in Nigeria from the millenarian Maitatsine movement to the more recent 
self-styled Nigerian Taliban. Following the extension of sharia to cover cri-
minal law in twelve northern states beginning in 1999, scholars and other com-
mentators have focused with great intensity on Islam and Muslims in northern 
Nigeria.  
In this chapter, I shift the focus away from such objects of study, which are, 
of course, not without interest or importance,5 to consider a new Islamic orga-
                                                          
2  See Ted Swedenburg, ‘Imagined youths’, Middle East Report, 245 
(http://www.merip.org/mer/mer245/swedenburg.html, 2007). 
3  See, for example, Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The search for a new ummah 
(Hurst, London, 2004); cf. Linda Herrera & Asef Bayat (eds), Being Young and 
Muslim (Oxford University Press, Oxford, forthcoming in 2010).  
4  See, e.g., Roman Loimeier, Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Ni-
geria (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, 1997); Ousmane Kane, Muslim 
Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A study of the society for the removal of inno-
vation and reinstatement of tradition (Brill, Leiden, 2003); Murray Last, ‘Towards a 
political history of youth in Muslim Northern Nigeria 1750-2000’, in Jon Abbink & 
Ineke van Kessel (eds), Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, politics and conflict in Africa 
(Brill, Leiden, 2005), pp. 37-54; Conerly Casey, ‘Marginal Muslims: Politics and the 
perceptual bounds of Islamic authenticity in northern Nigeria’, Africa Today, 54, 3 
(2008), pp. 67-92. 
5   See Jon Abbink’s contribution in this volume.  
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nization in Nigeria called NASFAT that exhibits some features of a social 
movement. As sociologist Charles Kurzman has noted, social movement theo-
rists have until recently largely ignored the Muslim world (with the possible 
exception of Iran) since social movements defined in relation to Islam generally 
‘appear to be, and [might even] claim to be, so different from the secular, West-
ern, left-liberal norms that social movement theorists generally espouse’.6 In 
turn, scholars of Islam and contemporary Muslim societies have almost com-
pletely ignored research on social movements.7 
I suggest that the study of new Islamic movements and social movement 
theory could be brought together for mutual benefit. The founders of the new 
Islamic organization of NASFAT were involved in one of Nigeria’s largest and 
oldest Islamic organizations, which has been an important conduit for Muslim 
activism and proselytizing as well as occasional radical trends. NASFAT’s 
founders launched an Islamic organization that has become dynamic, influential 
and perhaps one of the largest in contemporary Nigeria. They intended 
NASFAT to be both non-sectarian and non-political. Over time and like some 
other modern Islamic movements, NASFAT has focused on questions of piety 
and ethics and has been deeply involved in social and economic activities. How-
ever, NASFAT’s recent development of business activities, which it has sought 
to explicitly link with Islam, has been rather distinctive, helping to define it as 
an Islamic social movement. Given the limited attention to these kinds of Is-
lamic organizations and social movements, which clearly challenge some con-
ventional terms and categories of analysis of Islam, Muslim youth and social 
movements, the following is a preliminary attempt to trace the history of 
NASFAT and set it within the larger social and historical context.  
The context for a new organization 
Nigeria currently has a population estimated at more than 140 million, with 
many claiming that it is about evenly divided between Christians and Muslims. 
Some even aver that Muslims might constitute a slight majority. Commentators 
are nevertheless nearly unanimous in noting the importance of religion in con-
temporary Nigeria. Numerous reports of Muslim-Christian tensions and conflict 
                                                          
6  Charles Kurzman, ‘Conclusion: Social movement theory and Islamic studies’ in 
Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism: A social movement theory approach 
(Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2004), pp. 289-303.  
7  For notable exceptions, see Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism: A social 
movement theory approach (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2004). None of 
the contributors, however, considers Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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in various parts of the country notwithstanding,8 Muslims and Christians have 
long lived side by side in many places in Nigeria and one can sometimes even 
find Muslims and Christians within the same family. Some Nigerians have tried 
to fuse Islam and Christianity, as the name of the religious group ‘Chrislam’ in 
the southwest of the country suggests. But such efforts towards religious fusion 
or synthesis seem to be rather exceptional and increasingly so. In many places, 
there has been intense competition and higher levels of tension within and be-
tween different confessional groups. Given the mutual demonization by certain 
Christians and Muslims in Nigeria in recent years, such competition and ten-
sions contribute to what Murray Last has called ‘an economy of panic’ that has 
been rather volatile.9 
The 1970s oil boom, the subsequent massive investments in education, the 
unprecedented spread of the mass media and increased urbanization have all 
had a profound effect on Nigerian society and the practice of religion in parti-
cular. Although political liberalization came relatively late to Nigeria in the late 
1990s, Muslim and Christian associational life flourished under the long periods 
of repressive military rule. While there has been considerable research on recent 
Christian developments in the country and in the historically Muslim north, 
particularly in the major urban centre of Kano, there has been much less re-
search on Muslims living outside northern Nigeria.10 
The new Muslim organization founded in 1995 is known as NASFAT;11 an 
acronym of the Arabic portion of the organization’s full name, Nasr Allah al-
Fatih Society of Nigeria. Nasr Allah means literally ‘the help of God’ and is a 
phrase that occurs several times in the Qur’an.12 Al-Fatih, means ‘the victori-
ous’. The entire phrase in Arabic could be translated into English as ‘the help of 
                                                          
8  See Toyin Falola, Violence in Nigeria: The crisis of religious politics and secular 
ideologies (University of Rochester Press, Rochester, NY, 1998); Rosalind I.J. 
Hackett, ‘Managing or manipulating religious conflict in the Nigerian media’, in 
Jolyon Mitchell & Sophia Marriage (eds), Mediating Religion: Conversations in 
media, religion and culture (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 2003), pp. 47-64; Murray 
Last, ‘Muslims and Christians in Nigeria: An economy of political panic’, The 
Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 96, 392 (2007), 
pp. 605-616; Adam Higazi, ‘Violence urbaine et politique à Jos (Nigeria), de la 
période coloniale aux élections de 2007’, Politique africaine, 106 (2007), pp. 69-91. 
9   Murray Last, ‘Muslims and Christians in Nigeria’. 
10  There has also been little research on Muslim-Christian relations in Africa more 
generally. See Benjamin F. Soares (ed.), Muslim-Christian encounters in Africa 
(Brill, Leiden, 2006). 
11  See Amidu Sanni’s brief discussion of NASFAT in Amidu Sanni, ‘Challenges and 
realities in the healing and power accession custom of the Yoruba Muslims of 
Nigeria’, Journal of Oriental and African Studies, 15 (2006), pp. 145-156. 
12  It occurs in sura 10 of the Quran, which most commentators agree refers to the 
surrender of Mecca to Muhammad. 
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God is victorious’. However, in NASFAT’s print media it is translated as ‘there 
is no help except from Allah’. 
It is useful to think of this new Islamic organization as a social movement 
and a specifically Islamic social movement, which can only be understood with-
in Nigeria’s plural and complex religious landscape and in relation to some of 
the socio-economic changes over the past two decades. The organization-cum-
social-movement NASFAT was founded away from the historically Muslim 
northern part of Nigeria in the religiously plural southwestern region of the 
country that today is called Yorubaland. Southwestern Nigeria is a region where 
Muslims, Christians and practitioners of African traditional religions have lived 
together since the nineteenth century with the rise of Christianity. During that 
period, Christianity and Islam spread simultaneously.13 Over time, Muslims, 
Christians and practitioners of African traditional religion – so-called Yoruba 
religion in this particular setting – have borrowed and appropriated from each 
other in ways that have invited admiration or scorn depending on one’s per-
spective. Although Yoruba religion14 and Christianity are both well-developed 
fields of study, Islam among the Yoruba – half of whom are estimated to be 
Muslims – remains curiously understudied.15  
While the boundaries between different religious groups in southwestern 
Nigeria have been shifting and unstable over time, there are several important 
developments in relation to which NASFAT’s rise must be understood. First, 
given the religiously plural landscape of southwestern Nigeria, Muslims from 
elsewhere in the country along with some Yoruba Muslims have at times dis-
paraged the practice of Islam in Yorubaland as less ‘pure’ than elsewhere, more 
prone to ‘mixing’ with non- or un-Islamic elements, and so forth. For example, 
Muslims in northern Nigeria make constant reference to the nineteenth century 
– the jihad led by Uthman dan Fodio with his allegedly unwavering commit-
ment to extirpate the un-Islamic and the polity, the Sokoto Caliphate that ensued 
                                                          
13  See J.D.Y. Peel, ‘The pastor and the babalawo: The interaction of religions in nine-
teenth-century Yorubaland’, Africa, 60, 3 (1990), pp. 338-369; Ibid., Religious 
Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
2000). 
14  For some of the most recent studies of Yoruba religion, see Jacob K. Olupona & 
Terry Rey (eds), Orisa Devotion as World Religion: The globalization of Yoruba 
religious culture (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2008). 
15  For exceptions, see T.G.O. Gbadamosi, Growth of Islam among the Yoruba, 1841-
1908 (Longman, London, 1978); Patrick J. Ryan, Imale: Yoruba participation in the 
Muslim tradition, a study of clerical piety (Scholars Press, Missoula, MT, 1978); and 
H.O. Danmole, ‘Religious encounter in southwestern Nigeria: The domestication of 
Islam among the Yoruba’, in Jacob K. Olupona & Terry Rey (eds), Orisa Devotion 
as World Religion: The globalization of Yoruba religious culture (University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2008), pp. 202-220. 
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– when they talk about Islam and being Muslim today. And many Nigerian 
Muslims think that Uthman dan Fodio and his legacy (however it may be 
interpreted) should be the model applied across the board, also in places such as 
Yorubaland. But Islam has been present for a very long time in southwestern 
Nigeria and many Muslims there, including many Yoruba, are proud and not 
infrequently defensive of their religious traditions. They are also sometimes 
resentful that Muslims from elsewhere would deign to impose a model on them 
or denigrate the way they practise Islam. Be that as it may, many Muslims in 
southwestern Nigeria have been at the forefront of efforts to change or ‘reform’ 
the practice of Islam from within their own communities. As Stefan Reichmuth 
has observed, ‘many educated Yoruba Muslims have been striving [especially] 
since the seventies to establish distinctly Islamic patterns of personal and com-
munal life’.16 Many Yoruba Muslims have wanted to affirm Islam and being 
Muslim. In doing so, they have frequently sought to distance themselves from 
Yoruba ‘traditional’ religion, as well as the Christianity of Christian Yoruba, 
many of whose followers embraced and benefited from Western education 
much earlier than Muslims. 
Second, in recent years the rapid rise and spread of Pentecostalism in Nigeria 
and its increased presence in the public sphere have fundamentally altered the 
country’s religious landscape. As we know from the work of various scholars,17 
Pentecostalism has drawn many people in southwestern Nigeria away from the 
mainline Protestant churches, the Roman Catholic Church as well as from 
African independent churches. Muslims in southwestern Nigeria have been in 
constant contact with Pentecostalism, which now saturates public life. Many, 
particularly young Muslims, have been attracted to Pentecostal services and 
activities with their lively worship, leadership roles and the health and wealth 
gospel. The appeal of Pentecostalism makes quite a number of Nigerian Mus-
lims uneasy. In some ways, one could speak about the pentecostalization of 
Christianity in Nigeria. Other Christian churches, including the Roman Catholic 
Church, have revitalized their own charismatic traditions and appropriated Pen-
tecostal styles and techniques to various degrees. This is also the case for some 
Muslims in Nigeria. Many Nigerians – Muslims and Christians alike – actually 
                                                          
16  See Stefan Reichmuth, ‘Education and the growth of religious associations among 
Yoruba Muslims: the Ansar-Ud-Deen Society of Nigeria’, Journal of Religion in 
Africa, 26, 4 (1996), pp. 365-405, quoted on p. 387. 
17  See Ruth Marshall-Fratani, ‘Mediating the global and the local in Nigerian Pente-
costalism’, Journal of Religion in Africa, 28 (1998), pp. 278–315; Rosalind I.J. 
Hackett, ‘Radical Christian revivalism in Nigeria and Ghana: Recent patterns of 
conflict and intolerance’, in Abdullahi A. An-Na’im (ed.), Proselytization and Com-
munal Self-Determination in Africa (Orbis Books, Maryknoll, NY, 1999), pp. 246-
267. 
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refer to organizations like NASFAT (sometimes with derision) as ‘Pentecostal 
Islam’ or ‘Islamic Pentecostalism’ and its members as ‘Born-Again Muslims’, 
and NASFAT helps to illustrate quite clearly some of the influence of Pente-
costalism on Muslims, their religious practices and organizations.  
Beginnings and raison d’être 
In 1995 a group of ten young Yoruba men founded NASFAT, which they had 
originally conceived of as a prayer group for Muslim men who regularly met to 
pray together. In the following year, they decided to incorporate NASFAT as a 
formal organization. It is important to note that only one of the original found-
ers, Abdullah Akinbode (b. 1957), seems to have had any formal, advanced 
Islamic religious training, or what we might call Islamic scholarly credentials. 
He obtained a BA in Islamic Studies from the University of Lagos (UNILAG), 
the massive state university in Lagos, Nigeria’s most important economic centre 
and possibly its largest city, and then subsequently went on to complete MA 
studies in international law and diplomacy there too. Like Akinbode, the other 
founders of NASFAT were also Yoruba Muslims and university graduates and 
were all professionals working in banking and other modern sectors of the eco-
nomy.  
It is striking how NASFAT’s founders are sociologically quite similar to 
some of the other new Muslim intellectuals18 elsewhere in Africa and further 
afield in the Muslim world whose educational training in modern subjects often 
sets them apart from existing Muslim scholars – the ‘ulama – whose classical 
training is frequently restricted to traditional religious subjects, curricula and 
methods.19 However, unlike the lumpenintelligentsia, Olivier Roy’s rather dis-
paraging moniker for some of the new Muslim intellectuals in the world today, 
the group of Yoruba Muslims who founded NASFAT were either solidly mid-
                                                          
18  On new Muslim intellectuals, see René Otayek, ‘Introduction: des nouveaux intel-
lectuels musulmans d’Afrique noire’, in René Otayek (ed.), Le radicalisme isla-
mique au sud du Sahara: Da'wa, arabisation et critique de l’Occident (Karthala, 
Paris, 1993), pp. 8-18; Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, Trans. C. Volk 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994). 
19  There have been many important transformations in ‘traditional’ Islamic education 
in Nigeria that are beyond the scope of this chapter. See, for example, Stefan Reich-
muth, ‘The modernization of Islamic education: Islamic learning and its interaction 
with “Western” education in Ilorin, Nigeria’, in Louis Brenner (ed.), Muslim Identity 
and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
1993), pp. 179-197; Muhammad Sani Umar, ‘Education and Islamic trends in North-
ern Nigeria: 1970s-1990s’, Africa Today, 48, 2 (2001), pp. 127-150; Ibid., ‘Profiles 
of new Islamic schools in Northern Nigeria’, The Maghreb Review, 28, 2-3 (2003), 
pp. 145-169. 
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dle class or, like most Western-style educated Nigerians and regardless of their 
religious background, aspired to the kind of middle-class lifestyle for which 
their modern Western-style university education prepared them, and to which 
they usually felt entitled. 
With the serious economic decline following the fall in oil prices in the 
1980s, the failure of the developmentalist model of the state and the further 
economic downtown during the years of chaotic military rule in 1990s, many 
Nigerians yearned for some semblance of normality and prosperity. Ruth Mar-
shall has argued that ‘Pentecostalism and new Islamic movements ... [have] 
pose[d] one of the greatest threats ever to its [the Nigerian state’s] goal of 
national unity and ideologies of development’.20 Islamic movements such as 
NASFAT (like Pentecostalism) have certainly become much more visible in the 
Nigerian public sphere. As the state has cut back on or stopped providing 
certain services, some religious organizations have stepped in to provide key 
services in the areas of health, social welfare, education and even security.21 
Rather than posing any kind of threat to national unity or even to state-pro-
mulgated ideologies of development, NASFAT has not only assisted in pro-
viding some of the much-needed and desired social services (see below) but has 
also helped to nurture and sustain ideologies of development and promote ideals 
of national unity.  
Abdullah Akinbode, the one founder with Islamic scholarly credentials, who 
now has the title of NASFAT’s ‘Chief Missioner’ and is the general overseer of 
the organization’s activities, has explained that he and his friends wanted to 
found a new organization that met their own needs after leaving university. 
While they were students, they had been active in the Muslim Students’ Society 
(MSS) of Nigeria, the major Muslim students’ group that Yoruba Muslims 
founded in the 1950s. It subsequently spread to university campuses throughout 
the country and, in the process, students helped to transform the MSS into a 
national Muslim students’ association, thereby shedding any identification 
solely with the Yoruba. Various Muslim activist groups have emerged from the 
MSS, including the Muslim Brothers, a large group that sought inspiration from 
the Iranian Revolution to transform Nigerian society, as well as various other 
groups that have splintered from the Muslim Brothers.22  
                                                          
20  See Marshall-Fratani, ‘Mediating the global and the local in Nigerian Pentecostal-
ism’, p. 282.  
21  For case studies of such processes among Muslims in Africa, see Benjamin F. 
Soares & René Otayek (eds), Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa (Palgrave Mac-
millan, New York, 2007). 
22  On the MSS, see Stefan Reichmuth, Islamische Bildung und soziale Integration in 
Ilorin (Nigeria) seit ca. 1800 (LIT Verlag, Münster, 1998). Although the history of 
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The founders of NASFAT have stated that they wanted to found a modern 
organization that specifically addressed the needs and interests of Muslim 
youth. In a recent interview with a Nigerian journalist, Akinbode explained:  
At a point, we realised that it is not always easy for young people to comfortably be 
with older people with their peculiar ideas. I for one, cannot be in the same group 
with somebody who is 60, 70 or even 80 years old and you want me to be saying no 
to certain things he wants to do. He is used to the old fashion. The best thing for me 
is to come out of those societies and form my own with people who share the same 
values as me so that I will not be disrespectful to the elders. I will have more affinity 
with people of like minds and without condemning what the elders are doing we can 
carry on with our own ways. It is more of a way of conforming to modernity without 
losing trend with the dictates of Islam.23  
As this clearly indicates, Akinbode and his peers saw their elders as being 
out of step with modernity. They were actively seeking a way to reconcile Islam 
and being Muslim with the modern society – frenetic, urban southwestern Ni-
geria – in which they were living. In founding a new Islamic organization, they 
were actually following the well-trodden path taken by many Muslims in this 
part of the country. There are many existing Islamic organizations in Nigeria, 
including the large and diverse modernist Islamic educational institutions and 
organizations that usually promote Western education, which have been active 
in Yorubaland since the first half of the twentieth century. Such organizations 
include the modernist Ansar-Ud-Deen Society of Nigeria (‘Helpers of the 
Religion’ Society) founded in Lagos in the 1920s24 and Anwar-Ul-Islam (‘The 
Lights of Islam’), an organization for members of the Indian Ahmadiyya sect, 
which has been around in West Africa since the first decades of the twentieth 
century.25 Like its predecessors, NASFAT was also a new organization that 
targeted, at least initially, Muslim youth who fashioned themselves as modern, 
aspiring to achieve what NASFAT considers ‘conformity with modernity’. Un-
like those Nigerians of a more uncompromising ‘maximalist’ or radical bent,26 
they aim not to be ‘disrespectful’ of their elders. In other words, they try not to 
                                                                                                                                               
these other Islamic organizations in Nigeria remains to be written, see the references 
in note 4  
23  Ernest Omoarelojie, ‘Why NASFAT is growing’, The News  
(http://thenewsng.com/interview/why-nasfat-is-growing/2009/02, February 9, 2009). 
24  See Reichmuth, ‘Education and the growth of religious associations among Yoruba 
Muslims’. 
25  Although the study of the Ahmadiyya in Africa remains to be written, see Humphrey 
Fisher, The Ahmadiyya: A study in contemporary Islam on the West African coast 
(Oxford University Press for the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Re-
search, London, 1963).  
26  On ‘maximalist’ styles of religion, see Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking about 
religion after September 11 (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003). 
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publicly condemn or malign elders whose views and practices they might not 
like. Moreover, unlike more radical Muslim (and also some Christian) indivi-
duals, groups and organizations, NASFAT does not expect its members to reject 
or anathematize fellow Muslims who do not share their views.27 In fact, some of 
NASFAT’s officially stated ‘moral imperatives’ and ‘shared values’ include 
‘being caring, humane and tolerant’ towards others. NASFAT members are en-
joined to ‘protect human dignity, and maintain and uphold the human rights of 
all persons’ and ‘respect the diversity of all cultures and religions’.28 Such ideas 
about tolerance, human rights and respect for cultural and religious diversity are 
clearly unlike some of the Pentecostal and Islamic discourse in Nigeria that dis-
plays a marked tendency to demonize the religious other as well as African 
traditional religion and its practitioners.  
At the same time, NASFAT’s founders have emphasized how they wanted to 
found an Islamic organization that was non-hierarchical in nature. Today, its 
leaders and publications note that they want to avoid practices such as ‘hero-
worship’ and ‘ostentation’, which they claim ‘can hinder the attainment of our 
collective aspirations’.29 Given Nigeria’s reputation – indeed notoriety – for its 
‘big men’ with their great wealth (however amassed), lavish lifestyles and cote-
rie of clients, not to mention rampant and often brazen corruption, it is perhaps 
not surprising to see members of a new religious organization such as NASFAT 
rejecting the ‘worship’ of such persons and their public ostentation, as well as 
warning of the dangers and temptations of corruption. This eschewing of osten-
tation (and, by extension, corruption) is not unlike the rejection of materialism 
associated with Pentecostalism in earlier periods in Nigeria.30 One might also 
read it as an overt rejection of the ostentation associated with the so-called 
gospel of prosperity and public displays of excessive consumption that have 
recently spread among Pentecostals in Nigeria and elsewhere. As already noted, 
NASFAT was founded at a time when the Pentecostal presence in the public 
sphere was increasingly pronounced. Moreover, Pentecostals’ extensive use of 
mass media and their organizational acumen have helped to infuse urban land-
                                                          
27  This is one reason why it would be not only imprecise but also misleading to call 
NASFAT ‘fundamentalist’ as some have. See, for example, Kate Meagher, ‘Manu-
facturing disorder: Liberalization, informal enterprise and economic “ungovernance” 
in African small firm clusters’, Development and Change, 38, 3 (2007), pp. 473-503.  
28  These themes are repeated in NASFAT’s promotional materials. See also 
NASFAT’s Code of Conduct (NASFAT Society, Lagos, 2005). 
29  I have heard NASFAT members and leaders make such statements. The quotations 
are from the webpage ‘About NASFAT’, on NASFAT Nigeria’s website 
(http://www.nasfat.org/about.php). See also NASFAT’s Code of Conduct (NASFAT 
Society, Lagos, 2005). 
30  See Marshall-Fratani, ‘Mediating the global and the local in Nigerian Pentecos-
talism’. 
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scapes with their presence.31 Many young Muslims have been exposed to and, 
without necessarily ‘converting’, have participated in the ostentatious activities 
of Pentecostals that have helped to index their success.  
It is noteworthy, however, how NASFAT’s stated aversion to ostentation 
and so-called hero-worship is also directed in part towards existing Islamic re-
ligious practices and Muslim religious leaders, some of whom have earned a 
reputation for ostentation and conspicuous consumption. In launching 
NASFAT, its founders were consciously seeking to distance their organization 
from the Sufi orders, which have long had a prominent place in Nigeria and in 
the southwestern part of the country in particular.32 In general, Sufi orders are 
organizations that are premised on a hierarchy along with the notion that certain 
Muslims – often called saints – are closer or have special access to God and his 
favour. Ordinary Muslims frequently take the founder of a Sufi order or a 
branch of such an order, his descendants and/or deputies as potential intermedi-
aries with God or as possessors of special, secret knowledge. Many Muslims 
treat Sufi leaders with great respect and accord them all sorts of privileges, 
including considerable material resources. Indeed, this is the case for the Tija-
niyya, including the branch of the Tijaniyya in Africa propagated by Ibrahima 
Niasse (d. 1975), who hailed from Kaolack in Senegal. Ibrahima Niasse’s 
branch of the Tijaniyya – variously called the Tijaniyya Niassène or the Ibra-
himiyya – has been the most prominent branch of the Tijaniyya in Nigeria, 
including southwestern Nigeria, and in Africa more generally for decades. 
Critics of the Sufi orders and the Tijaniyya in particular frequently condemn 
those involved in Sufi orders of encouraging ‘saint-worship’, which they expli-
citly equate with ‘hero-worship’. Such hero-worship is precisely what NASFAT 
states it would like to avoid in its modern version of Islam. 
In contrast to Sufi-informed ideas about religious hierarchy, the presumed 
need to defer to others higher up in such a hierarchy, and the special training 
one ostensibly requires from a Sufi master to advance within the hierarchy, 
NASFAT’s founders explicitly talk about the ‘equality of all Muslims’ or at 
least the potential equality of all Muslims.33 This emphasis on the equality of all 
Muslims would seem to be an attempt to downplay potential differences be-
tween Muslims, whether linguistic, ethnic, regional or sectarian. Such differen-
                                                          
31  See Ibid.; Hackett, ‘Radical Christian revivalism in Nigeria and Ghana’. 
32  See, for example, Abner Cohen’s classic study of Hausa migrants in southwestern 
Nigeria. Abner Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: a study of Hausa mi-
grants in Yoruba towns (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1969). 
33  This theme recurs in much of the NASFAT literature and on the NASFAT Nigeria 
website. It is noteworthy that there is no explicit rejection of Sufism or Sufi orders in 
NASFAT’s literature.  
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ces have sometimes been key factors in various intra-Muslim debates and con-
flicts that have played out in the country.34  
Taken together, the challenge to existing religious hierarchies, the implicit 
rejection of Sufi orders, the assertion of the equality of all Muslims and the 
rejection of ostentation, along with its ideas about rights and respect, illustrate 
how NASFAT as an organization is advocating modernist and reformist views 
of Islam. Such views have become increasingly popular throughout the Muslim 
world, including elsewhere in Africa. However as Roman Loimeier has argued, 
local and regional contexts invariably influence modernist and reformist posi-
tions and their development over time.35 Indeed, the form that such modernism 
and reformism has taken bears the imprint of the Nigerian context and south-
western Nigeria in particular. In many places in the contemporary world, mod-
ernist and reformist Muslims are vehemently opposed to celebrations of the 
mawlid, the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. Reformists usually argue that 
such practices are not Islamic. In their way of thinking, they are unlawful inno-
vations that diverge from correct Islamic practice (Arabic: bid’a). This is, for 
example, the perspective of the massive Nigerian reformist Islamic organiza-
tion, the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition, 
better known as Izala, which has been particularly active in northern Nigeria. 
Interestingly, NASFAT, unlike other organizations such as Izala, is not expli-
citly opposed to celebrations of the mawlid. In fact, like Sufi orders in Nigeria 
and elsewhere, NASFAT actually organizes gatherings for communal prayer 
during the mawlid where speakers emphasize the Prophet Muhammad and his 
exemplary life, which, they claim, all Muslims should strive to emulate in their 
own lives.  
Much like the Sufi orders and other modernist and reformist organizations, 
NASFAT places great emphasis on piety and the correct practice of Islam. In 
contrast to the Sufi orders, there are no special, secret practices for initiates. 
NASFAT considers all Muslims as equal and therefore potentially perfectible. 
Each individual NASFAT member is enjoined to adhere to ‘the Holy Qur’an 
and the sunnah’, that is, the traditions of Prophet Muhammad. Although this is 
stated to be a collective endeavour for the organization’s members, in practice it 
is a form of personal piety that is incumbent upon individual members. Indeed, 
it takes the form of individual obligations to apply Islam in one’s life and by 
extension to encourage those around one to do the same. Such Islamization 
                                                          
34  This is an area that requires much more research. See, for example, Murray Last, 
‘Muslims and Christians in Nigeria: An economy of political panic’; Susan O’Brien, 
‘La charia contestée: Démocratie, débat et diversité; musulmane dans les “États 
charia” du Nigeria’, Politique africaine, 106 (2007), pp. 46-68. 
35  Roman Loimeier, ‘Patterns and peculiarities of Islamic reform in Africa’, Journal of 
Religion in Africa, 33, 3 (2003), pp. 237-262. 
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‘from below’ contrasts sharply with efforts to impose Islam from above as, for 
example, in the so-called sharia states in northern Nigeria and other self-styled 
Islamic states around the world. Although the individual Muslim is a key focus 
of NASFAT, being a member of the organization is also important, an issue to 
which we now turn. 
Membership and activities 
Several commentators, including the NASFAT leadership, readily point out that 
NASFAT’s membership is largely comprised of members of the elite, including 
well-educated Muslims who are professionals, business leaders, government 
officials, doctors, lawyers and engineers.36 This might even be the impression 
one has if one attends, for example, NASFAT services in Abuja, the federal 
capital of Nigeria where one can encounter many middle-class professionals, 
businessmen, civil servants working in government ministries and educators in 
attendance. However, in other places where I have attended NASFAT meetings, 
for example in neighbourhoods of Lagos, members and attendees clearly come 
from a wider array of socio-economic backgrounds.   
Today, NASFAT claims more than one million members in Nigeria in more 
than 180 chapters throughout the country but also abroad in such places as At-
lanta, Houston, London, Seville and The Hague.37 Since NASFAT’s founding, 
dense networks of relations have developed between members of the organiza-
tion. Although NASFAT has spread rapidly and widely since it was founded in 
the mid-1990s,38 it remains very much a Yoruba Muslim organization, arguably 
even a form of Yoruba Muslim cultural nationalism. It can be found anywhere 
where there are large concentrations of Yoruba in Nigeria and in the diaspora, 
and most members seem to be Yoruba. The Yoruba focus of the NASFAT is 
evident in some of the organization’s publications, for example, its official 
prayer book that contains prayers in Arabic, presented in Latin transliteration 
alongside Yoruba translations. No African languages other than Yoruba seem to 
be used in NASFAT’s official publications.  
In some ways, NASFAT has become a veritable social movement though 
perhaps not as conventionally understood in social movement theory. Given the 
secular and Western orientation of most social movements’ theorizing, Islamic 
social movements with their anti-secular and sometimes outright illiberal goals 
                                                          
36  See Ernest Omoarelojie, ‘Why NASFAT is growing’. 
37  A list of chapters is available on the NASFAT website (www.nasfat.org). 
38  A splinter group, led by the organization’s first chief missioner, broke away from 
NASFAT and founded Al-Fatih Ul-Quareeb Islamic Society of Nigeria, and another 
organization emerged in turn from that organization. Such developments are beyond 
the scope of this chapter.  
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have been difficult to incorporate into such theory and therefore have usually 
been ignored. While not espousing explicitly illiberal goals, NASFAT neverthe-
less challenges the secular and Western biases of social movement theory with 
its restrictive understanding of what might constitute a social movement and the 
goals and objectives of group social action.  
It is striking that NASFAT has goals and objectives that are at once modest 
and yet far-reaching. NASFAT’s promotional materials repeatedly stress that 
the organization intends to be ‘pace-setting’. Its stated mission is: ‘To develop 
an enlightened Muslim Society nurtured by a true understanding of Islam for 
the spiritual upliftment and welfare of mankind’.39 According to Nigerian ob-
servers of NASFAT, the organization appears to have no distinct creed or doc-
trine and, in fact, seems to advocate what Dale Eickelman has called a ‘generic’ 
Islam of universals – prayer, fasting, charity and so forth.40 This generic Islam is 
compatible with modernity and living in a society in which there has been in-
credible political, social and economic uncertainty over the past few decades. It 
almost seems to follow that the organization focuses considerable attention on 
promoting its code of conduct, ethics and lifestyle. In this way, NASFAT is in 
keeping with some wider trends in the Muslim world where many Muslims 
have been increasingly concerned with questions about ethics and piety.41 
NASFAT is involved in activities that are ostensibly a means to reach the 
goal of ‘an enlightened Muslim society’. These activities include da’wa (Ara-
bic), that is, the call or invitation to Islam, including instruction in the basics of 
Islam (prayer, fasting during Ramadan, the paying of alms or tithing, etc.), 
Islamic educational and Arabic language classes for children and adults, and all-
night prayer sessions (which are also associated with Sufi orders and Pentecos-
talism). There is nothing particularly unusual about any of these religious 
activities for the promotion of a generic Islam of assumed universals, not least 
for a modern Islamic organization or Islamic movement beginning with the 
Muslim Brotherhood founded in Egypt in the 1920s. Indeed, such religious 
activities are a good illustration of Islamization ‘from below’. It is also not out 
                                                          
39  The quotes are from ‘Profile’ (n.p., n.d.), a glossy promotional flyer obtained from 
the NASFAT World Headquarters in Ilupeju, Ikeja in January 2008. On Yoruba 
conceptions of enlightenment and related ideas, see J.D.Y. Peel, ‘Olaju: A Yoruba 
concept of development’, The Journal of Development Studies, 14 (1978), pp. 135-
165.  
40  Dale F. Eickelman, ‘National identity and religious discourse in contemporary 
Oman’, International Journal of Islamic and Arabic Studies, 6, 1 (1989), pp. 1-20.  
41  Cf. Roy, Globalised Islam; René Otayek & Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Introduction: Islam 
and Muslim politics in Africa’, in Benjamin F. Soares & René Otayek (eds), Islam 
and Muslim Politics in Africa (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007); Benjamin 
Soares & Filippo Osella, ‘Islam, politics, anthropology’, Journal of the Royal An-
thropological Institute (N.S.), 15, S1 (2009), pp. 1-23.  
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of the ordinary that NASFAT’s da’wa activities are on the whole specifically 
geared towards other Muslims. In other words, da’wa activities do not appear to 
target Christians but are undoubtedly aimed at those Muslims who might be 
interested in Pentecostalism and might even convert from Islam to Christianity. 
As mentioned earlier, some Yoruba Muslims worry about the exposure of 
fellow Muslims to Pentecostalism. 
In addition to such religious activities with the ultimate goal of ‘spiritual up-
liftment and [the] welfare of mankind’, in NASFAT’s way of thinking da’wa is 
also felt to encompass economic empowerment. In fact, one of the organiza-
tion’s explicitly stated and oft-repeated ‘strategic objectives’ is ‘to promote 
[the] economic empowerment of our members’.42 Such economic objectives are 
somewhat unusual for an Islamic organization, and especially for an Islamic 
social movement in the Nigerian context. However, it is not unlike the trend 
towards what some have called ‘market Islam’ in places such as Indonesia 
where Muslims are enjoined to discipline themselves in accordance with the 
demands of the market in neoliberal capitalism.43 In an official NASFAT pub-
lication, ‘economic empowerment’ is actually listed second – after ‘recitation of 
a prayer book’ – in a list of da’wa activities. The da’wa activities around 
economic empowerment actually come in the list prior to ‘usrah [Arabic: 
family] classes’ where the ‘basic fundamental of Islaam [sic] are discussed on a 
weekly basis’.44 Commenting on Nigeria’s economic problems, NASFAT indi-
cated that ‘Due to [the] high rate of joblessness among Muslims, our secretariat 
[NASFAT] took it upon itself to source for employment vacancies from various 
companies for members and Muslims in general’.45 It seems that economic 
empowerment comes prior to and is imperative for spiritual ‘upliftment’ and 
general welfare. In this way, NASFAT explicitly links economics with ques-
tions of ethics. Despite its reputation for having many well-connected and well-
educated members with good, well-paid jobs, the vast majority of NASFAT’s 
current members in Nigeria seem to be, like many Nigerians, facing daunting 
economic obstacles and high levels of insecurity. However, NASFAT seems to 
hold out the promise to its members that individual ethical reform and economic 
empowerment go hand in hand.  
                                                          
42  ‘Profile’ (n.p., n.d.).  
43  Cf. Daromir Rudnyckyj, ‘Market Islam in Indonesia’, Journal of the Royal Anthro-
pological Institute (N.S.), 15, S1 (2009), pp. 182-200, and Patrick Haenni, Islam de 
marché: L’autre révolution conservatrice (Seuil, Paris, 2005). 
44  ‘Profile of Nasrul-lahi-l-Fathi Society’ (n.p., n.d.), a four-page document printed on 
NASFAT letterhead, obtained from the NASFAT World Headquarters in Ilupeju, 
Ikeja in January 2008. 
45  Ibid. 
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What makes NASFAT somewhat atypical at least as an Islamic organization 
in the broader Nigerian context is its active involvement in social welfare and 
health-related activities. In addition to the free medical services that it provides 
its members, NASFAT also organizes regular health initiatives – for example, 
blood-pressure monitoring and diabetes tests – that its members need and want. 
NASFAT is also known as a venue for people to deal with ‘spiritual afflictions’, 
to use the Nigerian language for spiritual insecurity and crises, which might be 
as much socio-economic as individual. Members are cautioned against resorting 
to ‘magical practices’, ‘occult knowledge’, sorcery and charms. While this is 
similar to widespread Pentecostal discourse in Nigeria, NASFAT articulates 
such warnings less vehemently than Pentecostals, for whom these practices are 
a major preoccupation. Instead of using ‘magical practices’, members are en-
couraged to engage in prayer and modern health-seeking behaviour via the 
services NASFAT provides.46 It also organizes vocational training for its mem-
bers, as well as marriage counselling services. Like many other religious organi-
zations in Nigeria, NASFAT is thus involved in realms – such as health, and 
social and economic welfare – that transcend the narrowly religious.  
One feature that certainly distinguishes NASFAT from other Islamic organi-
zations in Nigeria and other Islamic social movements is the active and serious 
business plan that its leaders and promotional materials frequently highlight. 
Such plans have evolved over time and the organization has recently started to 
engage in large-scale income-generating activities. According to Akinbode: 
But the bottom line is that we don’t want to be stereotypical by doing things the old 
fashioned way. We don’t want to go cap in hand as we did before for alms. The alms 
we are collecting could be invested and with the profit we make from it we can do 
certain other things. That is why we took the option of going into business.47 
Here, Akinbode is pointing to the insufficiency of relying solely on the com-
pulsory alms (Arabic: zakat) that Muslims are supposed to give and the need for 
active investments that generate profits for reinvestment in the organization. 
Massive numbers of Nigerian Muslims perform the hajj every year, and 
NASFAT has launched a travel agency, Tafsan (NASFAT spelled backwards), 
that arranges travel for the pilgrimage. Aside from providing such potentially 
profitable services that are specifically religious, NASFAT also produces and 
markets a non-alcoholic malt beverage, Nasmalt, the profits from which are 
destined for da’wa, which includes economic empowerment. In accordance 
with the ban in Islamic jurisprudence on charging interest on loans, NASFAT 
had a cooperative bank that was subsequently transformed into a community 
                                                          
46  These references to magic and the occult come from NASFAT’s Code of Conduct 
(NASFAT Society, Lagos, 2005). 
47  Ernest Omoarelojie, ‘Why NASFAT is growing’. 
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bank, Tafsan. With more than 150,000 depositors, Tafsan Community Bank 
offers interest-free loans.48 There is a potentially large and lucrative market 
among Muslims in Nigeria for such Islamic banking services. NASFAT has 
also recently founded its own university, Fountain University, a name that does 
not clearly index that it is Islamic. The university, just one of many in the bur-
geoning private educational sphere amid public-sector educational decline, is 
located in Osogbo in Osun State and has recently received accreditation from 
the Nigerian government.  
Central to all of NASFAT’s business plans has been a sophisticated market-
ing plan that has helped to turn NASFAT into a known brand, recognizable in 
the crowded religious and media landscapes in southwestern Nigeria. Over the 
past few years, the branding and extensive marketing that NASFAT has devel-
oped has been a key element in its success in gaining public recognition. The 
branding of NASFAT includes a stylized logo with the NASFAT acronym in 
black typeface and the Islamic star and crescent motif in green. This appears on 
nearly everything NASFAT produces, distributes and sells. The NASFAT logo 
is becoming ubiquitous and is prominently placed on all media associated with 
the organization, as well as on all of the organization’s promotional materials, 
signboards, posters, newspaper columns, bumper stickers, books, pamphlets, 
clothing, caps, key chains and handkerchiefs. Although the commercially mar-
keted and profit-seeking venture Nasmalt beverage, Tafsan Tours & Travels and 
Fountain University do not feature the NASFAT logo, they often appear along-
side the NASFAT logo in NASFAT promotional materials. The branding of 
NASFAT seems to be so important – and potentially profitable – that improper 
use of the brand and logo is clearly spelled out in NASFAT’s 2005 Code of 
Conduct.  
To accommodate the busy work schedules of most Nigerian Muslims and to 
compete with or offer an alternative to church services, NASFAT holds weekly 
meetings on Sundays. This is of course quite unusual for a Muslim group since 
most Muslims gather for communal prayers at midday on Fridays. Although 
there are other Muslim organizations in Nigeria (e.g. Al-Usrah based in Port 
Harcourt) that also hold Sunday-morning services, NASFAT seems to be the 
largest Muslim organization to do so. Like their Christian neighbours, NASFAT 
members also meet on Sunday mornings. The children learn the Qur’an while 
the adults listen to sermons and recite praise of the Prophet Muhammad, with 
their Sunday worship culminating in a communal prayer (salat). The weekly 
meetings also include prayer requests and testimonials, which are not ordinarily 
associated with Muslim religious activities and public worship in particular. 
After the communal prayer, people return home for Sunday lunch. NASFAT 
                                                          
48 ‘ Profile of Nasrul-lahi-l-Fathi Society’ (n.p., n.d.). 
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members are enjoined to wear white garments at the weekly services, something 
reminiscent of the hajj where people are required to wear white, showing that 
all Muslims are equal. However their white clothing looks similar to the ‘white 
garment’ worn by members of some African independent churches in Nigeria, 
and many Nigerians readily point this out. Those attending NASFAT services 
dressed all in white are, nevertheless, clearly distinct from many Nigerian 
Christians (men and women) who take great care to dress up in their finest 
clothes for church services at mainline Protestant, Pentecostal and Roman 
Catholic churches. 
It is perhaps NASFAT’s decision to hold its largest weekly gatherings on 
Sundays that has invited so much attention from non-members. As I noted ear-
lier, many Muslims in Nigeria question Yoruba Muslims’ ways of being Mus-
lim. In fact, some non-Yoruba Nigeria Muslims look down on NASFAT, and its 
members are aware of this. The following remarks from a northern Nigerian 
Muslim intellectual are fairly typical. He told me that NASFAT is ‘not very 
orthodox’. He claimed that NASFAT is essentially a Muslim Yoruba ‘response 
to Christianity’, whose members dress all in white, meet on Sundays and be-
have like Christians. In his view, NASFAT was too anchored in the Yoruba 
context and too mimetic of Christianity to be able to create and sustain universal 
appeal. In his view, NASFAT was destined to remain an exclusively Yoruba 
Muslim movement. Indeed, I have heard many Nigerians readily state that 
NASFAT is largely a Yoruba Muslim phenomenon and possibly even an ata-
vistic form of ‘Islamic Pentecostalism’.  
Conclusion 
NASFAT cannot be reduced to a ‘response’ to Christianity among the Yoruba 
or to trends in Pentecostalism. Its rise and rapid spread can only be understood 
within the recent social, political and economic context of Nigeria and the his-
tory of Yorubaland in particular. As I have shown, there is a very long tradition 
of Muslim youth founding new modern Islamic organizations in which they 
seek to distance themselves from their elders and partake in modernity and the 
opportunities it affords. Founded at a particular historical moment, NASFAT 
brought together Yoruba Muslims who sought to distinguish themselves from 
various others. These include fellow Yoruba who are Christians in all their 
denominational diversity but especially Pentecostals, other Muslims, Yoruba 
and non-Yoruba, including those who have called loudly for the implementation 
of sharia, and, last but not least, the ostentatious, that is, those social actors who 
are ubiquitous in contemporary Nigeria. Cognizant of the challenging circum-
stances most Nigerians face, NASFAT’s leadership has devoted considerable 
attention to promoting ideas of unity, tolerance of one’s fellow Muslims and 
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non-Muslims, the provision of services the state has been unable or unwilling to 
provide, and an active engagement in business ventures with a view to facing 
the difficult economic conditions in the country, especially the chronic un- and 
underemployment of Nigeria’s thwarted middle classes. NASFAT has been able 
to mobilize many people, combining individual attempts to reform the self 
ethically and advance economically. This particular case study illustrates how a 
new Islamic movement has been able to successfully organize and mobilize 
many Nigerian Muslims and seems to be helping them manage some of the 
serious social and economic challenges they face without necessarily leading to 
the kind of headline-grabbing social action that we have come to expect as 
evidence of a social movement and effective collective action. Given the pau-
city of interest on the part of social movement theorists in Islam, Muslim youth 
and Africa for that matter, such a case study of a new Islamic organization in 
Nigeria has much to teach these theorists about social movements in which 
religion is a key factor in social mobilization and action. At the same time, 
scholars of Islam and contemporary Muslim societies should accept the chal-
lenge to more actively engage with social movement theory from which they 
also stand to benefit, not least in the important endeavour of comparative re-
flection and theorizing.  
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The United Democratic Front, formed in South Africa in 1983 
to coordinate protest against a new constitution that co-opted 
Coloureds and Indians but excluded Africans from political 
representation, has been lauded as a model of a successful 
social movement. The UDF served as an umbrella forum for 
hundreds of organisations, including student movements, youth, 
women, churches, trade unions as well as community based 
organisations. While the affiliates pursued their own agenda, 
the UDF infused these struggles with a broader meaning. The 
UDF’s vision of a new society was not limited to ‘one man, one 
vote’ and legal equality: it aspired to an egalitarian, non-racial 
society in which participation would be more important than 
the political pluralism of liberal democracy.  
South Africa’s post-apartheid constitution has been praised 
worldwide as a state-of-the-art model of liberal democracy, but 
it is quite remote from the grassroots democracy envisaged in 
the 1980s. Inequality has increased post-1994, in spite of con-
siderable accomplishments in sectors such as infrastructure, 
housing, water and electricity and social welfare. Did the 
leaders of the UDF and the ANC betray the goals of the 
liberation struggle when they joined the comfortable life of the 
middle class and the business elite? Or did South Africa realis-
tically have no other options available amidst the triumphant 
neo-liberalism of a rapidly globalizing world? This chapter ex-
plores the legacy of the UDF: how do former activists make 
sense of present-day South African society?  
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Introduction 
The United Democratic Front, formed in South Africa in 1983 to coordinate 
protest against a new constitution that co-opted Coloureds and Indians but 
excluded Africans from political representation, was the most inclusive social 
movement in South African history. The UDF served as an umbrella forum for 
hundreds of organizations involving youth, women, churches and trade unions, 
community-based organizations and student movements. These organizations 
each pursued their own agenda, ranging from free text books in schools to 
liberation theology and campaigns for lower rents and safer streets, but affili-
ation with the UDF infused these issues with a broader meaning. While tackling 
bread-and-butter matters, millions of South Africans felt themselves part of the 
liberation movement against apartheid. The UDF’s vision of a just society was 
not limited to ‘one man, one vote’ and legal equality but aspired to a non-racial, 
egalitarian society in which participation and communalism would be the key 
values rather than the political pluralism and free-market principles of liberal 
democracy.  
The UDF leadership emphasized that the Front was not a substitute for the 
banned liberation movements but it would hold the fort until the African Na-
tional Congress could resume its rightful position. The ANC leadership in exile 
had given its blessing to the formation of the UDF as a broad front to coordinate 
the anti-apartheid struggle inside South Africa, while the ANC continued its 
underground activities as well as the armed struggle. However during the 1980s, 
the UDF developed its own distinct political culture. Its major goals were 
shared by all affiliates but modes of expression and political action varied 
considerably between affiliates as well as between the different geographical 
regions. 
The ban on the African National Congress was lifted in 1990 and the UDF 
was disbanded in the following year. Its activists joined the scramble for posi-
tions within the ANC and subsequently in the government of the post-apartheid 
South Africa, at national, provincial and local level. While their primary goal – 
the abolition of apartheid – has been accomplished, post-apartheid South Africa 
is a far cry from the erstwhile ideal of an egalitarian non-racial society. The 
1996 constitution has been praised worldwide as a state-of-the-art model of 
liberal democracy, but it is quite remote from the egalitarian grassroots demo-
cracy envisaged in the 1980s. Inequality has increased since 1994 in spite of 
considerable accomplishments in areas such as infrastructure, housing, water, 
electricity and social welfare. 
Did the leaders of the UDF and the ANC betray the goals of the liberation 
struggle when they joined the comfortable life of the middle classes and the 
business elite? Or did South Africa realistically have no other options available 
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amid the triumphant neo-liberalism of a rapidly globalizing world? This chapter 
explores the UDF’s legacy and considers how former activists are making sense 
of present-day South African society. There is a burgeoning academic and 
popular literature on the subject ranging from political economy perspectives to 
cultural studies. The case for ‘betrayal’ is argued by Patrick Bond, John Saul 
and many others,1 while authors like John and Jean Comaroff and Steven 
Robins take a different perspective and focus on the upsurge of identity politics 
in post-apartheid South Africa.2  
I have opted here to focus on the perspectives and interpretations formulated 
by former UDF activists. The chapter is based on a research project in which I 
am revisiting the people and places that feature in my book on the United 
Democratic Front.3 Interviews for the book were conducted in 1990-1991 with 
the national leadership of the UDF in Johannesburg and with local activists in 
three case studies in the Western Cape, Sekhukhuneland (then part of the 
Lebowa Bantustan and now a rural area in Limpopo Province) and Kagiso and 
Munsieville, twin African townships to the west of Johannesburg. The inter-
views in the follow-up project were conducted in the same locations between 
2006 and 2008.  
Mission accomplished or vision betrayed? 
The 25th anniversary of the founding of the UDF on 20 August 2008 provided 
an excellent opportunity to gauge a range of opinions on the Front’s legacy. 
Founding members profoundly disagreed on the crucial question about whether 
the UDF’s mission had been accomplished or whether the ANC-in-government 
has betrayed their vision of a just society. Significantly, the commemorations 
were not only used to express nostalgia but also to voice a widely felt need for a 
new type of social movement, in the tradition of the UDF, to tackle current 
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concerns such as HIV/AIDS, xenophobia, poverty, housing, public safety, 
health care and the crisis in education. 
On the day of the anniversary, the Rocklands Civic Centre in Mitchells 
Plain, a largely Coloured working-class town near Cape Town, filled with a 
nostalgic crowd that came to pay tribute to the ideals and values of the UDF. It 
was at exactly this place that some 12,000 people had gathered 25 years earlier 
for the UDF’s launch under the slogan ‘Apartheid divides, UDF unites’. The 
launch of the UDF was the largest political gathering since the 1950s. In the 
course of the 1980s the UDF would develop into a very inclusive movement 
accommodating a wide range of activists and activities from prayer services, 
militant marches, strikes and boycotts to attempts at an insurrectionary takeover 
of power. 
Those who gathered at Rocklands in 1983 saw themselves as part of the 
liberation movement that would free South Africa from apartheid. By contrast, 
the 2008 gathering was organized by the provincial government of the Western 
Cape, which invited eminent speakers such as the Minister of Finance Trevor 
Manuel who had been prominent in the UDF leadership in the 1980s. Among 
the notable absentees was Dr Allan Boesak, a patron of the UDF, and in the 
1980s one of its most eloquent spokesmen. In newspaper interviews, Boesak 
explained why he boycotted the anniversary celebrations: 
The celebrations (…) are not so much about the achievements of the UDF, since 
those achievements have all but disappeared from our political life, but more about 
campaigning for the next elections. I am uncomfortable with the thought that the 
same political party which moved with such unseemly haste to disband the UDF 
soon after the return of the exiles now celebrates the UDF as if it still existed.4 
However another UDF founding member Minister of Defence Mosiuoa 
‘Terror’ Lekota retorted that the UDF had achieved all of its goals. The UDF 
was launched to oppose the 1983 constitution and ‘to appeal for the release of 
the prisoners, the return of the exiles and to start negotiations. There was 
nothing else that the UDF was supposed to achieve.’5 
Allan Boesak chose his own platform to lambaste the ANC for its betrayal of 
the UDF’s legacy. In his keynote address at the annual Ashley Kriel Memorial 
Youth Lecture at the University of the Western Cape, Boesak received rousing 
applause when he described South Africa’s political situation as a ‘real and 
ticking time bomb’ fuelled by the anger and frustration of those who had be-
come disillusioned by unfulfilled promises and the greed of ‘drunk with power’ 
politicians. He accused leading members of South Africa’s new elite of aban-
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doning non-racialism ‘for selfish politics and lust for power’.6 A crowd of over 
2,000 largely middle-aged former activists chanted the familiar ‘Boesak, 
Boesak’ when the cleric entered the hall. Allan Boesak has a longstanding love-
hate relationship with the ANC that dates from his conviction on charges of 
fraud and theft. He served one year of his six-year sentence and was released on 
parole in May 2001. Boesak then returned to a career in the church. Questions 
and comments after his speech made it clear that there was considerable pres-
sure on Boesak to take up a leadership position once again.7 In a series of recent 
speeches and interviews, he spoke of a sense of alienation among Coloured 
people. While the UDF accommodated cultural diversity, thus providing a poli-
tical home for African, Coloured, Indian and White South Africans, the ANC 
today is widely perceived as being a bastion of a more exclusive brand of Afri-
can nationalism. 
In his keynote speech at the official anniversary celebrations in Mitchells’ 
Plain, Trevor Manuel also struck a critical note while painting a rather romantic 
picture of comradely solidarity and unity of purpose during the days of struggle 
in the 1980s. Manuel referred to the commitment, sacrifice and comradeship of 
the 1980s and regretted the demobilization of popular organizations in the 
1990s. By relying excessively on the institutions of the state to deliver develop-
ment, community organizations had ‘sat back and allowed ourselves to be para-
lysed’. He criticized the lack of commitment in crucial sectors of the public 
service, notably education and health, and noted that ‘the bulk of what we 
started remains incomplete’. Reminding his audience that revolutions are an 
ongoing process, he warned that ‘revolutionary flames are extinguished by self-
serving individuals and greed. We must know this and stop the hatred, bullying 
and personal enrichment.’ 
Manuel’s speech was delivered during an episode of unprecedented factional 
quarrelling and backstabbing within the ANC, which in the following month 
(September 2008) would result in the ousting of President Thabo Mbeki and the 
ascent to power of Jacob Zuma’s faction. It is perhaps against this background 
that his overly romantic notions of comradeship in the UDF can be explained:  
We were armed with an unbreakable trust in each other – the trust had a name – 
‘comradeship’. It allowed us to believe in each other and know that our backs would 
always be covered by those whom we called ‘comrade’. Beyond that fundamental 
trust in each other, we were armed with self-belief – the path we were pursuing had 
never been walked. 
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The phrase lauding the ‘unbreakable trust’ had other former UDF Western 
Cape activists sniggering. Although there is considerable nostalgia for the UDF 
days, activists acutely remember the factionalism and rivalry. Unlike Boesak, 
Manuel did not blame the ANC for disbanding the UDF but noted that UDF 
organizations had ‘erred in giving up real power’ after the exhilarating times of 
South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994. 
Organizations began to whither away. Our means, the street committees and the 
civics were replaced with a false belief that elected councils were sufficient, and that 
the legislation calling for participatory democracy would be adequate. (…) We must 
now realise that the dream of a developmental state cannot ever be attained merely 
by parliament – we need public servants as the agents for transformation. (…) Laws 
alone are insufficient. We must get the institutions of the people to work. We must 
change the relationship between the state and public servants from one shaped by 
industrial relations to one where the measure is transformation for development. 
In conclusion, Manuel stressed that the power won through the ballot box 
‘needs to be supplemented by the means of organized communities acting with 
government. Our power will mean nothing if we fail to reignite the self-belief in 
our people.’8  
Trevor Manuel and Johnny Issel were the two delegates from the Western 
Cape who travelled to Johannesburg in July 1983 to discuss the launch of the 
UDF with activists from Johannesburg and Durban. The factionalism in the 
UDF Western Cape is sometimes linked with their names: Isselites versus Tre-
vorites. Tensions focused on the display of ANC symbols at public gatherings 
and later on recruitment in the armed struggle.9 Issel insisted on the public 
display of ANC symbols, while Manuel wanted to proceed more cautiously. 
Similar disagreements occurred elsewhere about whether priority should be 
given to building strong grassroots organizations or flag waving and popular-
izing the ANC. If the UDF openly identified with the ANC, it ran the risk of 
being banned before it properly took off. Issel is clear about his priorities: ‘I 
was building the ANC: nothing would stand in my way. I used whatever was 
available. (…) I was a commander.’10 
While Trevor Manuel embarked on a highly successful career, serving in 
every cabinet after 1994, Johnny Issel could not find a place for himself in post-
apartheid society. Issel, who describes himself as a professional activist, had 
expected the anti-apartheid struggle to culminate in an insurrection and not in 
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liberal democracy. He served for a while in the provincial legislature of the 
Western Cape but could not cope with party discipline. Subsequently he went 
into business but left South Africa in 2004 to spend a few years in Europe. ‘I 
did not succeed in politics and neither in business. That challenged me to take 
stock of myself.’ After suffering a couple of strokes and other health problems 
in London in 2006, he embarked on a ‘spiritual journey that has given me calm-
ness’.  
At the time of my interview in Cape Town (September 2008), Johnny Issel, 
once a fiery activist steeped in Marx and Lenin, was into Buddhism. He had re-
covered sufficiently to be able to walk and suggested that I take him to Kirsten-
bosch Botanical Garden for the interview. Walking in these spectacularly 
beautiful gardens, we stopped to look at a framed photograph of Nelson Man-
dela. Stooping over the picture, Issel murmured: ‘Is that not a pity that a man 
like Mandela is associated with the ANC?’ I could not help laughing, and re-
marked that Mandela’s entire life had been devoted to the ANC. He replied that 
he was not joking: ‘It is a pity, what would Mandela think about the ANC 
today?’ Johnny Issel, a lifelong professional activist, is no longer a member of 
the ANC and did not attend the UDF’s 25th anniversary celebrations in Mit-
chells Plain: ‘I was not invited, while I single-handedly organized the launch of 
the UDF’. He now believes that the UDF should have continued after 1990 as it 
was a ‘wonderfully broad movement’ and that the ANC forced the UDF to dis-
band because the ANC leadership, on their return from exile, saw the internal 
mass movement as a threat.11 
For a cabinet minister, Trevor Manuel was, and still is, unusually frank in 
acknowledging the shortcomings of the ANC-in-government and in criticizing 
the complacency, self-interest, corruption, greed and self-enrichment that have 
characterized much of the public sector and significant sections of the ANC 
leadership since 1994. A common element in Manuel and Boesak’s speeches is 
the need for a reinvigoration of civil society. While some dream of a renewed 
United Democratic Front, many more former activists are discussing the need 
for new social movements that are not adversarial to the ANC government but 
generate sufficient popular pressure to keep the government on track while en-
couraging more initiatives from below. 
The need for a new UDF type of social movement was discussed in more 
detail at yet another commemorative event. Speaking at Belgravia High School 
in Athlone, another largely Coloured suburb of Cape Town, Andrew Boraine, 
treasurer of the UDF Western Cape from 1983 to 1985, member of the UDF 
National Executive and underground ANC activist in the late 1980s, stressed 
the need for a new United Front. The UDF stood for inclusive politics, non-
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racialism and alliances with all kinds of different partners who could further the 
anti-apartheid cause. 
Today, the situation is different. We have a more narrow, exclusive, racially-based 
politics. There is extreme intolerance for dissenting views. There is an acute hostility 
in the ANC towards civil society. The government is not focused on building non-
racialism. There is a widespread sense of alienation, of exclusion from the political 
process. We are now living through the disaster of factional politics. People are 
chosen because they belong to the right camp, not on the basis of any merit. Nothing 
can be more dangerous for South Africa’s future. The sense of accountability that 
characterized the UDF gave way to an attitude of arrogance towards communities. 
Honest criticism is deflected. 
Summing up the conclusion of his speech, Boraine recalled how he stressed 
the need for a new United Front to unite forces against poverty, and for jobs and 
skills. He believed that the disbanding of the UDF in 1991 had been inevitable. 
In other parts of South Africa, the UDF had dissolved spontaneously as activists 
flocked to the ANC. It was only in the Western Cape that its disbanding had 
been contentious but maintaining the UDF Western Cape would have meant in 
practice that it would have become a Coloured wing of the ANC, which would 
have been irreconcilable with its principle of non-racialism. 
The problem was that civil society was disbanded. The ANC saw no need for an 
autonomous civil society, because it assumed that ‘the ANC was the people’, but 
that was true for only a short while. 
In retrospect, Andrew Boraine believes that UDF activists made a funda-
mental mistake when they allowed the ANC to impose its hegemonic project 
and bring all organizations into line with the ANC.  
The internal movement gave in too easily to the exiles returning. And who were 
these people? Essop Pahad was for ten years the editor of the Marxist Review in 
Prague. We used to read it religiously, but it was rubbish of course. (…) But we 
were so much in awe of the ANC leadership that we did not question any of it.12 
Boraine was not calling for a resurrection of the UDF but for new networks 
and a more inclusive and cooperative mentality. However, calls for a new type 
of United Front reverberated even after the commemorations were over. After 
the dramatic ousting of Thabo Mbeki from the presidency, rumours about ini-
tiatives to launch a new party or movement in the tradition of the UDF kept 
appearing in the media.13 In October, a new party was indeed formed under the 
name Congress of the People (COPE), after the historic meeting in Kliptown 
where the Freedom Charter was adopted in 1955. Terror Lekota, UDF publicity 
secretary in the 1980s and Minister of Defence in Mbeki’s cabinet, became the 
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chairman, while Allen Boesak agreed to campaign for COPE in the Western 
Cape. However, COPE does not seem to want to cast itself as the UDF’s suc-
cessor. 
As is evident from the above, core UDF activists hold different perspectives 
about what constitutes the legacy of the UDF. While Johnny Issel was aiming 
for insurrection and a socialist revolution, Trevor Manuel and Andrew Boraine 
speak of the need to safeguard liberal democracy. Moreover, former UDF ac-
tivists in the Western Cape are fairly unique in their nostalgia for the 1980s. The 
UDF Western Cape was dominated by Coloured and White activists, while 
Africans were not very prominent. In most other regions, the African activists in 
the UDF saw little or no distinction between the UDF and the ANC. For them, 
the UDF was founded as a temporary front for the banned ANC. Although I 
found widespread discontent about unfulfilled promises, there was little dis-
agreement about the ANC’s hegemonic project.  
The different perspectives on the nature of the UDF can, in part, be ex-
plained by the demographics of the Western Cape. As a consequence of the 
Coloured Labour Preference policies, Africans formed a small minority in the 
Western Cape. In terms of apartheid policies, the Western Cape was to become 
an unofficial homeland for Coloured people: in 1980, Coloureds made up 54% 
of the population of the Western Cape, while Whites constituted 32%. The 
Coloured working class remained politically aloof, while Coloured intellectuals 
were more inclined towards Trotskyite organizations such as the Unity Move-
ment. The ANC did have a presence in the African townships but the African 
population of the Western Cape formed a small minority of largely unskilled 
labour for a long time. 
With the massive influx of Africans from the impoverished Eastern Cape, 
the Western Cape experienced a rapid Africanization, a process that continued 
at an accelerated pace in the 1990s and beyond. Stark changes in the demo-
graphic balance have no doubt contributed to a sense of alienation among 
Coloured people. This has been exacerbated by the ANC’s affirmative action 
policies, which demand that the demographic profile be reflected in the employ-
ment profile in both the public and the private sector. In practice, this means 
that Coloured jobseekers in the Western Cape are now often bypassed in favour 
of African applicants.  
The sense of frustration and alienation expressed by former UDF activists in 
the Western Cape has to be put into a wider perspective. The Western Cape is 
not representative of South Africa as a whole. Trevor Manuel, Allan Boesak 
and Johnny Issel were all classified as ‘Coloureds’ in apartheid terminology, 
while Andrew Boraine was a white student leader. My interviews with former 
UDF activists from Cape Town’s African townships did not reveal similar 
levels of dissatisfaction. Although discontent is rife in other parts of South 
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Africa too, this is expressed in different ways. Before analyzing the different 
perspectives of the UDF’s legacy in more detail, I will briefly sketch its history 
and adhere to a somewhat chronological order while specifically addressing the 
themes outlined in the introduction: (i) the UDF’s historical origins; (ii) the way 
it mobilized support and its support base; (iii) how the Front framed its mes-
sage; (iv) the way the UDF related to other social movements; and finally (v) 
why it ceased to exist.  
What was the UDF? 
Origins  
After the banning of the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist 
Congress in 1960, the ANC leadership regrouped in exile. The armed struggle 
and campaigns to isolate apartheid South Africa through boycotts and sanctions 
dominated its strategy for the first two decades of its existence. In the 1980s 
however, the leadership in exile took the strategic decision to rebuild mass-
based organizations inside the country. The UDF grew out of locally based 
initiatives but consultations were held with the leadership in exile as well as 
with the ANC underground. 
During the 1970s, collective protest in South Africa was undertaken by two 
distinct social categories: black workers and black students. Their protest ac-
tions remained isolated phenomena rather than part of a coordinated rebellion. 
The 1980s however witnessed the growth of a broad-based social movement 
that mounted a sustained challenge to the apartheid state. From 1979 onwards, 
student activists actively sought to link up with community and workers’ pro-
tests. School boycotts, rent and bus boycotts and the campaign against the im-
posed ‘independence’ of the Ciskei Bantustan all contributed to a new sense of 
optimism about the potential for mass mobilization and organization. Protest 
politics was shifting from uncompromising non-collaborationism to a more 
pragmatic result-oriented approach. By taking up the bread-and-butter issues 
that occupied people’s minds at the local community level, activists succeeded 
in broadening popular organizations and involving a wide range of residents 
who would otherwise have been reluctant to become involved in overtly con-
frontational politics. 
In the Western Cape, 1979 was a legendary turning point in popular politics. 
During a strike at a pasta factory, African and Coloured workers joined forces 
and linked up with community activists to organize a seven-month nationwide 
consumer boycott of the company’s products. Students were drawn into the 
workers’ struggle and workers became more politicized. This pattern of action, 
which brought victory for the unions, became a model for subsequent action, 
although another strike in 1980 in the meat industry ended in defeat for the 
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unions. Elsewhere in South Africa, civic organizations began to emerge around 
1980. ‘Civics’, as they came to be known, were local neighbourhood associ-
ations that took up residents’ concerns about rents, electricity, transport, safety 
on the streets and education. 
Around 1980 only the churches, the emerging independent trade unions and 
the (racially segregated) student organizations had a nationwide following. Stu-
dent organizations proved important as recruiting and training grounds for ac-
tivists. The Congress of South African Students (COSAS), formed in 1979, 
initially aimed to draw high-school students into community issues but after 
1983 focused solely on school and student matters and limited its membership 
to high-school students. The now-excluded older and more experienced former 
students were instrumental in forming youth congresses, which took off in mid-
1983 with the youth playing a crucial role in the rebellion of the 1980s. 
From 1981-1982, many of these organizations became involved in discus-
sions on the formation of a United Front to counter government plans for li-
mited constitutional reforms. However, problems arose during these discussions 
regarding non-racial organizations that included white members, such as the 
South African Council of Churches (SACC) and the recently formed Federation 
of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). The role of the white student orga-
nization NUSAS, a UDF affiliate, was also contentious.  
Ultimately, it was a call by Allan Boesak in early 1983 that would be re-
membered as the impetus to form the United Democratic Front. The UDF was 
set up as an ad hoc alliance with the limited goal of countering the consti-
tutional proposals of the governing National Party. The new constitution en-
visaged a tricameral parliament that would incorporate Indians and Coloureds in 
separate chambers, while whites would retain ultimate control. Africans would 
remain excluded from national politics: their separate ethnic ‘national destinies’ 
were to be pursued in the context of the Bantustans. As the government had 
come to accept the presence of Africans in urban areas as a permanent feature of 
a modern, industrialized state, urban Africans were to be given a very limited 
form of self-rule by elected town councils. These Black Local Authorities were 
responsible for raising their own revenue and the resulting rises in rents and 
service charges proved instrumental in igniting the township revolts of the mid 
1980s. 
FOSATU decided against affiliation with the UDF, wanting to maintain the 
autonomy of workers’ organizations and to be able to take part in wider popular 
struggles on its own terms. The United Front formula posed the risk of workers 
being swamped by populist politics, as had happened to ANC-aligned unions in 
the 1950s. The smaller Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) affiliated to 
both the UDF and the Black Consciousness-oriented National Forum but ceased 
active participation in 1985, giving priority to merger negotiations with 
208 van Kessel 
FOSATU. Most community unions, which were organized along community 
rather than industry-sector lines, did however join the UDF. 
The national launch of the UDF on 20 August 1983 in Mitchells Plain was 
attended by about a thousand delegates, representing some 575 community 
organizations, trade unions, sporting bodies and women’s and youth organiza-
tions. As more organizations joined, UDF spokespersons measured the strength 
of the Front in a convenient shorthand: 600 organizations representing 2 million 
people. However, of the 575 organizations represented at the launch, 235 were 
branches of the Western Cape Inter Church Youth, a recently founded body of 
which not much was heard in subsequent years. The formula was eminently 
suitable for public-relations purposes and the UDF would stick in popular me-
mory as a front representing some 600 organizations and 2 million people.  
The UDF’s first test of strength was the campaign for a boycott of the tri-
cameral elections and the municipal elections for the Black Local Authorities. 
The boycotts were a resounding success. The state’s efforts to co-opt Coloureds 
and Indians and a small elite of urban Africans had evidently failed. Widespread 
school boycotts accompanied the campaigns. Running parallel to the election 
boycotts and school protests, a third source of unrest was locally based com-
munity protest against increases in bus fares and rents. A series of township 
revolts began on 3 September 1984 with a two-day stay-away from work in the 
townships of the Vaal Triangle, a heavily industrialized region south of Johan-
nesburg, in protest against rent increases. The Vaal uprising left 26 people dead 
and more than 300 injured. By the end of the 1980s the number of ‘victims of 
the unrest’ had exceeded 5,000. 
These disparate strands of protest came together in a major stay-away from 
school and work in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area on 5 and 6 
November 1984. Significantly, FOSATU and CUSA participated in an overtly 
political protest action for the first time. COSAS activists were instrumental in 
the preparations. This joint effort by students and workers provided the basis for 
optimistic strategizing about the emerging student-worker alliance. By the end 
of 1984 it was clear that South Africa had entered a phase of unrest that would 
be more serious than the Soweto Uprising of 1976. 
After the successful boycott campaigns of the tricameral elections, the UDF trans-
formed itself from being an ad hoc alliance into a more permanent movement that 
addressed a broad range of issues. It took the Front about six months to reorientate 
itself and develop a new agenda. Meanwhile, dozens of townships were the scene of 
escalating and sometimes violent protests against the Black Local Authorities and 
their attempts to raise revenue to cover their administrative costs. Local protest was 
mostly led by civic associations. Although most – but by no means all – civics were 
affiliated to the UDF, the Front had little control over local protest actions. From 
1985 onwards however, the UDF leadership began to realize more clearly the mo-
bilizing potential of bread-and-butter issues. Civics that dealt with everyday con-
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cerns could attract large numbers of not strongly politicized township residents. But 
political guidance was needed to infuse local struggles with a broader meaning. 
Through the UDF, disparate struggles regarding housing, transport, education and 
the cost of living could be seen as part of the fight against both apartheid and capi-
talism.  
In July 1985, the funerals of three assassinated civic leaders from the small 
town of Cradock in the Eastern Cape drew a crowd of around 40,000 amid a 
massive display of ANC and SACP (South African Communist Party) flags. On 
21 July 1985, the government declared a partial state of emergency and thou-
sands of people were detained. In August, COSAS became the first UDF affi-
liate to be declared an unlawful organization. Two major treason trials ensured 
that a substantial part of the UDF leadership was taken out of circulation. 
During the first two years, the Front was largely reactive but after 1985 the 
UDF no longer limited itself to reacting to and protesting against government 
policy. In numerous places, activists started undertaking a far more ambitious 
project: the construction of a new, egalitarian and morally just society. Civics 
were transformed into ‘organs of people power’.  
The first State of Emergency (July 1985 - March 1986) did not crush the 
rebellion but instead inspired new tactics. Consumer boycotts were introduced 
as a new political weapon, and with mass gatherings prohibited, street commit-
tees proliferated. Boycotts were hailed as an essentially peaceful Gandhian 
tactic of passive resistance but the enforcement of boycotts frequently entailed 
the use of physical force and harsh punishments. Successful boycott campaigns 
conducted by broad-based township organizations relying on participatory 
structures of decision-making served to reinforce the political and moral autho-
rity of the civics and other movements that stood for an alternative social order. 
Conversely, coercion, intimidation and abuse by undisciplined youth weakened 
support for boycotts. In several places, white-owned businesses proved ready to 
negotiate but local victories were necessarily limited without back-up from cen-
tral or local government. 
With school boycotts becoming a chronic rather than intermittent means of 
protest, the Soweto Parents’ Crisis Committee was formed in September 1985 
with the aim of encouraging high-school students back into school. Eventually, 
in December 1985, the ANC gave its blessing to the parents’ initiative, which 
later widened into a nationwide campaign under the banner of the National Edu-
cation Crisis Committee (NECC). The NECC supported the students’ demands 
but transformed the slogan ‘No Education before Liberation’ into ‘People’s 
Education for People’s Power’. Its efforts met with only partial success. 
Boycotts gave ordinary people a sense of power. Many activists believed 
that a phase of ‘dual power’ had arrived and that a revolutionary takeover was 
imminent. But the pattern of resistance was uneven and coordination was lack-
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ing. It was not the UDF itself but local affiliates and people loosely associated 
with the UDF that wielded power in the townships. Officially, the UDF stuck to 
non-violent methods but the leadership was reluctant to condemn excesses such 
as the ‘necklacing’ (a car tyre doused with petrol) of suspected informers. On 
the one hand it feared alienating militant youth but on the other the leadership 
doubted its own capacity to exercise control over its unruly followers. When 
ANC President Oliver Tambo finally condemned necklace executions in 1986, 
his pronouncement had no visible impact inside South Africa. 
More durable than the fledgling structures of people’s power was the 
workers’ power that manifested itself in a new giant federation of trade unions, 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). On 1 December 1985, 
over 10,000 people attended the launch of COSATU in Durban. In contrast to 
its predecessor FOSATU, the leadership of the 33 COSATU unions held that 
unions ought to be involved in community struggles and the wider political 
arena. 
 
People’s Power 
The State of Emergency was lifted in March 1986. With rebellion spreading to 
remote corners of South Africa, boycotts flaring up intermittently, mounting 
international solidarity campaigns and increasing signs of nervousness among 
white businesses, the UDF felt confident that ‘the people’ would soon be 
empowered to shape their own destiny. 1986 marks the height of ‘People’s 
Power’, of the belief that representatives of the people, even ‘the people them-
selves’, were marching to take control of ‘liberated areas’. Liberated areas were 
defined in geographical terms and, as with townships, became no-go areas for 
the police. But the term could equally apply to spheres of life where ‘the peo-
ple’ were taking over, such as schools, the community media or organs of popu-
lar justice. People’s courts signified perhaps the most fundamental challenge to 
state authority as they exposed the lack of legitimacy of the apartheid state’s 
criminal justice system. In some townships, people’s courts were widely ap-
preciated for their role in curbing crime, disciplining unruly youth and solving 
domestic conflicts. But elsewhere, these courts were resented for their harsh and 
arbitrary punishments and, if they were run by youth, they lacked legitimacy in 
the eyes of older residents. 
The second State of Emergency, imposed nationwide on 12 June 1986 and 
lifted only in 1990, virtually amounted to military rule. Dozens of national and 
regional UDF leaders were detained, along with some 25,000 other South Afri-
cans, many under the age of 18. State repression was combined with a shady 
system of unofficial repression and activists became targets of faceless death 
squads and vigilantes. In October 1986, the UDF was declared an ‘affected 
organization’ and was thus prohibited from receiving overseas funds. Many 
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affiliates and sympathetic organizations (churches, human-rights organizations, 
etc.) were, however, able to maintain access to foreign funding. 
Although the UDF was badly hit, the State of Emergency did not bring 
township life back to ‘normal’. Rent boycotts continued and provided a key 
rallying point for township activists. Street committees organized youth bri-
gades to prevent the eviction of rent defaulters and where electricity had been 
cut off, volunteers moved in to reconnect township houses. Rent boycotts ac-
quired their own momentum. Even without its political content, this tactic had 
obvious advantages as it augmented family income. Consumer and bus boycotts 
flared up intermittently but township residents began to show signs of exhaust-
ion and a loss of patience with the ‘rule of the comrades’, young militants who 
often used heavy-handed and coercive methods. The fate of the UDF seemed 
sealed when it was effectively banned in February 1988. UDF leaders not in 
detention went into hiding. Youth organizations adapted to a semi-underground 
existence, but most civics ceased to function. 
This period of despair and forced inactivity had a sobering effect on leading 
activists. When new political space opened up in 1989, they emerged from 
detention and hiding with a new realism. No longer intoxicated by views of 
imminent liberation and insurrectionary bids for power, they set out to rebuild 
organizations. 
In the early months of 1989, the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) as-
serted itself on the streets of the big cities. The main components of this flexible 
alliance were the UDF, COSATU and church leaders. The MDM and the rem-
nants of the Black Consciousness Movement organized the Conference for a 
Democratic Future in December 1989, which called for a non-racial constituent 
assembly to draw up a new constitution. This year of transition from semi-lega-
lity to a fully legalized status for the ANC, SACP and the PAC was character-
ized by a new mood of pragmatism and a series of local negotiations prepared 
the way for talks on the central issue of state power.  
 
Disbanding the UDF 
After the lifting of the ban on the ANC in January 1990, the release of Nelson 
Mandela and his co-accused from prison and the return of the ANC leaders 
from exile, UDF activists deferred to the leadership of the historic liberation 
movement. In popular imagination, the ANC leaders in exile and those on 
Robben Island had acquired the status of larger-than-life heroes. Two sections 
of the UDF – youth congresses and women’s’ organizations – merged almost 
immediately with the ANC Women’s League and the ANC Youth League. 
Within the UDF, three options were discussed: (i) disbanding; (ii) transforming 
itself into a coordinating structure for civil-society organizations; or (iii) waiting 
and making a decision later. 
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The argument for disbanding the UDF was that the Front had served its pur-
pose and the ANC could now resume its rightful place. The UDF’s continued 
existence would only cause duplication and confusion. The second option was 
to transform the UDF into a coordinating structure for civics, student organiza-
tions, religious bodies and those youth and women’s organizations that decided 
against merging with the Women’s’ League and the Youth League. This posi-
tion was favoured both by activists, who argued that an umbrella structure was 
needed to exercise hegemonic control, and by the proponents of an autonomous 
civil society. The wait-and-see option prevailed in 1990 but in 1991 the UDF 
decided to disband. Dissolution had become a foregone conclusion, as the 
UDF’s most capable activists had been absorbed into the ANC. Paradoxically, 
the lifting of the ban on the ANC had a demobilizing effect: many people be-
lieved that they could now rely on the ANC to solve their problems. The UDF 
officially disbanded on 20 August 1991, exactly eight years after it had been 
launched. A dissenting voice came from Allen Boesak who believed that Col-
oured people in the Western Cape would be left without a political home as they 
saw the ANC as an African-dominated movement. The exiles and former pri-
soners who dominated the ANC Western Cape showed little understanding of 
local dynamics. His position that the UDF should be dissolved gradually as the 
need for it disappeared was not shared by other UDF activists.  
 
Mobilizing a mass following: Methods and means 
One of the characteristics of the UDF was its adroit use of a broad variety of 
media. Links with student organizations on campus and different resource cen-
tres offered access to facilities for printing, photocopying, printing T-shirts etc. 
The UDF and its affiliates produced vast numbers of posters, newsletters, com-
munity newspapers, ideological treatises, banners and T-shirts, which resulted 
in a high level of visibility. 
The UDF leadership displayed a keen awareness of the importance of public 
relations. It was able to count on sympathetic coverage in many domestic 
publiccations and in the international press. Where the ANC had a mixed re-
ception due to its commitment to armed struggle, the UDF gained nearly uni-
versal popularity in the world’s media.  
The use of low-threshold campaigns that focused on people’s immediate 
daily concerns rather than on high-brow politics proved appropriate when or-
ganizing large numbers of township residents. In the second half of the 1980s, 
violent repression by the security forces angered many ordinary people who 
until then had not been particularly politicized. Feeling under threat from a vin-
dictive police and faceless death squads, township residents developed a strong 
sense of community.  
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In the early years, the UDF was largely dependent on local donations but 
from 1985 foreign funding started flowing, transforming the UDF from a move-
ment that relied on volunteers and spontaneity to a more bureaucratically run 
organization employing considerable numbers of organizers. Foreign funding 
paid for some of the members’ transport and accommodation costs at national 
and regional conferences, and for telephone and fax bills. The availability of 
(overseas) funding was thus crucial to the project of building a nationwide poli-
tical movement. According to Azhar Cachalia, the UDF’s treasurer, ‘a lot more 
than half’ of the UDF’s funding came from abroad.14 
Inevitably, control over resources, notably funding, was a source of dispute 
between UDF regions and UDF Head Office, as well as between and within 
affiliates. Compared to trade unions or the ANC after the ban on it was lifted, 
the UDF was run on a very modest budget. In 1989-1990, the UDF had an in-
come of about R.1.7 m, excluding grants for specific expenses such as the Con-
ference for a Democratic Future. Numerous affiliates, like community news-
papers, advisory offices and civic organizations, had their own sources of local 
and/or foreign funding, allowing them a considerable degree of autonomy. 
 
Making sense: Framing the message 
The UDF not only coordinated and directed internal resistance to apartheid but 
also provided a cultural framework that lent a wider meaning to a variety of 
local struggles. By participating in rent boycotts, stay-aways, boycotts of white-
owned businesses and school protests, people not only addressed their imme-
diate concerns but played their own part in the struggle for a new social, poli-
tical and economic order.  
The UDF’s vision was for an egalitarian, non-racial society with a strong 
emphasis on grassroots participation. Participation was more important than 
pluralism. This vision of a just society also had a strong moral component and 
religious inspiration and legitimation were characteristics of many activities. 
UDF followers were not only engaged in a struggle against apartheid and capi-
talism but also against the forces of evil. 
Although its leadership clearly identified with the banned ANC, they initial-
ly decided against adopting the Freedom Charter. Advocating the Freedom 
Charter would probably have invited state repression and limited the Front’s 
possibilities of expanding beyond the known Charterist organizations. Only in 
August 1987 after COSATU had adopted the Freedom Charter did the UDF 
follow suit. Oliver Tambo’s message on 8 January, broadcast on the anniversary 
of the founding of the ANC, provided a sense of direction to UDF activists who 
religiously tuned in for the latest guidelines. Affiliates and regions maintained 
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their own lines of communication with the ANC centres in exile. They all 
claimed to be toeing the line prescribed by the organization.  
 
Alliances: Inclusion and exclusion 
The UDF never had a constitution, only a set of Working Principles that stated 
that affiliates would retain their organizational autonomy. The UDF’s umbrella 
formula proved eminently suitable for combining a broad range of organiza-
tions, from middle-class whites to rural African youth. The Front’s formula 
enabled people to identify with the banned ANC but without exposing them-
selves to state repression. It allowed for organizational flexibility and accommo-
dated a range of manifestations of protest and rebellion, from prayer services to 
militant youth actions. The UDF configured visions of an alternative social, 
political and economic order without imposing a political orthodoxy on its hete-
rodox following. 
Although the UDF as a multi-racial, multi-class alliance was undoubtedly 
the most inclusive movement in South African history, it could not claim to 
represent all the peoples of South Africa. In terms of race and ethnicity, it was 
truly inclusive. The main trade unions however opted to remain outside the 
UDF ambit, even though a fairly good working relationship developed in the 
second half of the 1980s. Liberal whites were reluctant to fully associate with 
this increasingly radical social movement but found a common platform on 
human-rights issues. Big business (which was, by definition, white business) 
could not be an ally in view of the UDF’s anti-capitalist platform. However the 
Front did attempt, with some success, to lure business away from the apartheid 
government’s disastrous policies.  
Some sections of South African society were notably absent from both UDF 
structures and discussions on organizational strategy. The independent African 
churches, domestic workers, farm workers, migrant workers and squatters re-
mained on the margins. The UDF’s own principles excluded Bantustan-based 
structures, such as Inkatha. Some of the heirs of the Black Consciousness 
Movement, notably AZAPO (Azanian People’s Organization) formed their own 
platform in the National Forum, but this never developed into a mass move-
ment. 
UDF legacies 
From universalism to particularism: What happened to non-racialism? 
The struggle against apartheid was framed in terms of universal values. The 
ANC-in-exile campaigned to have apartheid condemned as a crime against 
humanity. Nowadays ANC politicians make frequent recourse to the particu-
larist values of Africanist ideologies, advocating ‘African solutions for African 
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problems’ or invoking ‘African traditions’. In the case of Zimbabwe, the call for 
‘African solutions’ – meant to delegitimize policy interventions from the West – 
often comes from the very same politicians who once campaigned for sanctions 
and boycotts of apartheid South Africa. 
A recent example is a statement by Cassel Mathale, the ANC’s candidate for 
the Limpopo premiership. As the Mail & Guardian reported, Mathale is a di-
rector of at least ten companies in the mining, construction, farming and 
hospitality sectors, some of which have benefited from lucrative government 
contracts in Limpopo. ‘This thing of conflict of interest is just a fabrication’, 
Mathale said. ‘As Africans we must not allow that. We should allow everyone 
to go into government. (…) The most important thing for us [as politicians] is to 
disclose our business interests to the public.’15 In the 1980s, activists claimed 
their rights as South Africans and as fellow human beings. Now apparently, a 
prospective premier claims that ‘as an African’ he cannot be bothered with con-
cerns about conflicts of interest. 
African nationalism seems set to become the new hegemonic discourse. It 
may indeed provide the glue by securing the loyalty of the ANC’s main con-
stituency but in the process another cherished principle of the liberation strug-
gle, non-racialism, is increasingly coming under pressure. Numerous Coloured, 
Indian and White UDF activists have become disillusioned with the exclusive 
brand of African nationalism that has succeeded Mandela’s Rainbow Nation. 
Although they may be quite content with their careers and current status in so-
ciety, they are no longer active members of the ANC. The UDF provided them 
with a political home but their initial enthusiasm for the ANC was dampened by 
a sense of non-belonging. In 2007, journalist Ryland Fisher, a former UDF 
activist in the Western Cape, published a book entitled Race. In the intro-
duction, he argues that issues of race, racism and race-consciousness continue to 
pervade every corner of South African society. Like many Coloured students of 
his generation, Fisher adopted the identity of ‘black’, influenced by the writings 
of Steve Biko.  
Recently, however, I have noticed that people who used to accept me as black now 
refer to me as coloured and, by that action, exclude me and others who may or may 
not look like me from the majority of South Africans once again.16 
 
Have the erstwhile ideals of a participatory, egalitarian society been betrayed? 
Whatever happened to socialism? 
The participatory ethos is no longer as central as it was in the 1980s, although 
there are numerous interesting initiatives ranging from ward committees to PPP 
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(Public Participation and Petitions) units at provincial government level to the 
recently introduced community development workers. In many cases, however, 
these lines of communication amount to a top-down exercise in the management 
of public opinion. 
As in the 1980s, I encountered a profound distrust of pluralism in my recent 
interviews in 2006-2008. ANC politicians in Sekhukhuneland tend to view op-
position as illegitimate. It is acceptable to have the Democratic Alliance in Cape 
Town as that is something for whites, anyway. However, in one’s own district, 
municipality or constituency, rival political parties such as the PAC and 
AZAPO ought to be silenced, sidelined or even ‘crushed’. The distinct historical 
traditions in different parts of South Africa have produced different understand-
ings of the concept of ‘democracy’. The ANC has been deeply rooted in Sekhu-
khuneland for at least half a century. When I conducted my research in 1990-
1991 into UDF affiliates such as the Sekhukhune Youth Organization (SEYO), 
I found that many activists had never heard of the UDF. Through their activities 
in youth movements, they belonged to ‘the organization’, and ‘the organization’ 
was the ANC.  
Activists in Kagiso in the 1980s were organized in a civic association called 
the Krugersdorp Residents’ Organization (KRO) that was affiliated to the UDF. 
Most township activists saw themselves as KRO activists. The Africanist ten-
dency in Kagiso organized a rival civic association. The Western Cape lacks a 
strong ANC tradition but has a long history of fragmented political opposition 
as well as religious diversity. In the 1980s, UDF activists in the Western Cape 
were not inclined to accommodate political rivals in the anti-apartheid struggle 
but nowadays most former activists here view political pluralism as an essential 
characteristic of constitutional democracy. 
About 1990, activists framed their aspirations in Marxist terms. When asked 
about his vision for South Africa, Maurice Nchabeleng, a youth leader in Se-
khukhuneland, stated: ‘I want the dictatorship of the proletariat’. Looking back, 
he now reformulates his ambitions at the time as: ‘We wanted to go to the place 
of the whites’.17 
Activists wanted a better life modelled on the comfortable lifestyle of white 
South Africans. This aspiration was framed in the dominant discourse of the 
liberation struggle at that time, i.e. a mix of Marxism and African nationalism. 
Marxism seemed to make eminent sense as an analysis of South African society 
and it also assured, with scientific certainty, that the class struggle would lead 
the workers to victory. Being versed in Marxism added to one’s prestige as an 
‘advanced cadre’. 
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Nowadays, becoming rich and focusing on individual advancement have be-
come acceptable aspirations in ANC circles. Former activists frame their hopes 
in today’s dominant terminology. But have the aspirations really changed? Or is 
it the mode of expression that has changed?  
Egalitarian ideals are currently out of fashion. Among various former ac-
tivists, Mrs Thatcher’s TINA (There Is No Alternative – to the free market and 
liberal orthodoxy) has become received wisdom. Others do indeed speak of 
betrayal but more often than not they feel betrayed by former comrades rather 
than by more abstract ANC policies. Some critics of the neo-liberal order seem 
genuinely committed to their belief in a more just society but others just want a 
share of the riches. A former youth leader in Sekhukhuneland eloquently ex-
pressed his frustrations: 
Self-proclaimed communists have become capitalists. The ANC has become a bour-
geois national democratic movement. Only people with money own the ANC. The 
SACP has become a forum for people who missed out on opportunities and posi-
tions. Some of them know nothing about communism.18  
Still versed in Marxism, Moss Mabotha had a ready explanation: ‘one’s 
world outlook is determined by one’s class position’. But in spite of all the 
articulate criticism, the bottom line of his resentment is that he wanted to be part 
of the good life. He admitted to being jealous: ‘I also want to be rich’.  
Although many former activists expressed a sense of dissatisfaction, their 
discontent was more often than not focused on former comrades in the struggle 
rather than on ANC policies per se. Youth leader Silas Mabotha, now a high-
school principal in Sekhukhune, remarked that relations of trust among former 
comrades have been undermined: ‘We cannot even advise former comrades 
because they suffer from paranoia. They think you are after their job.’ Silas 
Mabotha, a respected militant and articulate youth activist, is no longer active in 
the ANC, ‘just like most of us’. The ANC government, he complains, follows a 
capitalist agenda:  
The BEE (Black Economic Empowerment) is nothing else but building a black 
bourgeoisie. Unemployment is growing while some people become super rich. We 
see privatization, and casualization of labour. That is not what we fought for, pri-
vatization. They are trying to do away with government altogether.  
However Silas Mabotha also wants to share in the fruits of liberation: ‘We 
are worried that they will have run out of Mercedes before our turn has come’.19  
Activists’ networks in the 1980s were characterized by strong bonds of soli-
darity, and differences in socio-economic status between activists were gene-
rally quite modest. The stark increase in socio-economic differentiation since 
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1994 has put considerable strain on comrades’ networks. Can solidarity net-
works survive when members find themselves in vastly different positions? Is 
jealousy perhaps a means of keeping members in check and reminding them of 
their obligations towards group members?  
 
Whatever happened to constitutionalism? 
Why would the ANC want to undermine the very constitution that it fought for? 
In the political crisis that unfolded in the wake of ANC President Jacob Zuma’s 
corruption trial, attacks on the courts by leading ANC personalities were fairly 
common place. Newspaper editorials and political analysts warned that the in-
dependence of the judiciary was at stake and wondered why the ANC would 
want to undermine the very constitution that it had fought for.20 But this argu-
ment is based on incorrect assumptions. 
The ANC accepted the constitution as part of the negotiated transfer of 
power but a liberal democratic constitution was not among the goals of the li-
beration struggle. Neither the ANC nor the UDF envisaged a system of liberal 
democracy. In the 1980s, ‘liberal’ was a term of abuse. The UDF’s preferred 
mode of governance was popular democracy, modelled on that in Cuba, the 
German Democratic Republic or Frelimo’s Mozambique. 
The present South African constitution has been praised worldwide as a 
model of liberal democracy but liberal democracy was not what spurred on the 
masses who took to the streets in the 1980s. The clauses about gender equality, 
gay rights, the abolition of the death penalty and the legalization of abortion 
would in all likelihood not survive a referendum. However, the fundamental 
flaw in the view of many black South Africans is the property clause: a con-
stitution that protects the ill-gotten gains of centuries of dispossession and 
apartheid lacks legitimacy. Did the Freedom Charter not promise that South 
Africa’s national wealth, ‘the heritage of all South Africans, shall be restored to 
the people’? 
New social movements 
While former activists met in late August 2008 to share nostalgic reminiscences 
of struggle solidarity, unity and clarity of purpose in UDF days, the ANC went 
through its worst crisis since 1994. In the aftermath of Thabo Mbeki’s forced 
resignation as president on 20 September 2008, disgruntled ANC members dis-
cussed their options: to break away and found a new party or to attempt to 
recapture the ANC? Others spoke of the need for new social movements. One 
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such initiative, which aspires to operating in the tradition of the UDF, is the 
Coalition for Social Justice. 
The Coalition for Social Justice was formally launched on 25 June 2008 in 
Saltriver, a suburb of Cape Town, in response to a series of xenophobic attacks 
on foreign nationals in the Western Cape. When the government’s reaction to 
the refugee crisis was slow and haphazard, individuals and local organizations 
began providing humanitarian relief. As the announcement of the public launch 
of the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) stated:  
Lack of faith in the government, city, big business and even civil society has led us 
to respond individually and voluntarily. The Social Justice Coalition is an independ-
ent group that believes in freedom, equality, non-violence and [a] human rights 
framework that respects among others, the right of every person to life, dignity and 
access to health care. We commit ourselves to build a Social Justice Coalition that 
promotes a ‘Marshall Plan’ for development in South and Southern Africa based on 
prioritizing and meeting the needs of the poor and steadily and visibly reducing 
social inequality. 
The core organization in this new coalition is the Treatment Action Cam-
paign (TAC), itself a coalition of individuals and organizations that have suc-
cessfully campaigned for adequate health care and access to anti-retrovirals for 
those with HIV. The TAC’s campaign strategies were modelled on the UDF 
model of social activism, employing a broad range of tactics including mass 
protests, petitions, recourse to the courts, expert lobbies and international pres-
sure on the South African government.  
SJC meetings have attracted sizable crowds of young people as well as a 
number of prominent South Africans with good track records in human rights 
and anti-apartheid activism. Apart from the refugee crisis, the SJC has also 
highlighted the perceived laxity of the Mbeki government in addressing the 
crisis in Zimbabwe and the attacks on the judicial system following Jacob 
Zuma’s court case.21 
Media reports on the SJC often associate this new broad-based initiative with 
the legacy of the UDF. The SJC is of course not the only new social movement 
to spring up in post-apartheid South Africa. As described by Richard Ballard et 
al., three overlapping but distinct types of struggle emerged when the honey-
moon period of Mandela’s presidency was over:22 
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• Initiatives were directed against various government policies. The classic 
case here is the opposition by the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy 
that represented the post-apartheid government’s decision to engage with 
trade liberalization and pursue economic growth as the mechanism for faci-
litating employment, and thereby promote redistribution. 
• Other struggles focused on government failures to meet basic needs and 
address socio-economic rights. The most noted examples are the Landless 
People’s Movement and the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) that res-
pectively address the slow pace of land redistribution and the government’s 
failure to respond adequately to the HIV/AIDS crisis. 
• Some struggles emerged to directly challenge the local enforcement of 
government policies and to resist government attempts at repression. The 
Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, the Concerned Citizens Group and the 
Anti-Eviction Campaign are all attempts to organize poor and marginalized 
communities to resist local, provincial and national government attempts to 
cut off electricity and water, and evict residents. 
 
In most cases however, these movements and organizations address a single 
issue. Attempts at building a broader platform that addresses a range of issues 
have been few and far between. Here the Social Justice Coalition may possibly 
provide an impetus towards a broader-based movement. 
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‘Campus Cults’ in Nigeria: 
The development of an  
anti-social movement 
 
Stephen Ellis 
 
 
Nigerians have become concerned by the problem of ‘campus 
cults’ – initiation societies rooted in the country’s university 
and college campuses that are part-student club and part 
criminal gang. Some religious authorities regard certain of the 
campus cults as ‘satanic’ by reason of their activities and 
rituals. The anti-social aspects of these organizations are large-
ly attributable to their manipulation by military governments as 
a counter to conventional student organizations. The campus 
cults are quite literally an example of an anti-social movement. 
 
 
For the last decade or so, Nigerians have been concerned with the problem of 
‘campus cults’. This is the name given by the press to certain student organiza-
tions that have proliferated on university campuses and that have become asso-
ciated with a wide range of abuses and crimes, including murder. As time has 
gone by, people who joined such cults during their student years have graduated 
and advanced in their careers to the point that the existing campus groups are 
now connected to networks of cult members with senior positions in business or 
government. ‘Campus cults’, may, therefore, have their organizational centres 
in the nation’s universities but their networks have spread through state and 
society.  
Christian Pentecostal preachers in particular regard student cults, many of 
which bear ghoulish and gothic names, as manifestations of Satanism and call 
on cult members to break their links with them. Billboards on campuses warn 
about the dangers of such groups and urge students to shun them. Exactly how 
many distinct campus cults exist is impossible to say with precision but there 
would appear to be more than a hundred, with many thousands of members. 
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Membership appears to be overwhelmingly male but there are also organiza-
tions that are exclusively for women. 
Cults of this nature can hardly be called social movements since they are 
closed rather than open, and serve private interests rather than aspiring to work 
for the common good. By most accounts, however, things were not always this 
way. The organizations called ‘campus cults’ today represent a perverse and 
destructive aspect of a student movement that is otherwise social in its orienta-
tion. ‘Campus cults’ have developed at the heart of the wider student move-
ment. The nature of this relationship is such that it raises questions concerning 
the character of social action in Nigeria generally.  
Nigeria’s first university was established in Ibadan in 1948 and was origi-
nally known as University College, only later being renamed the University of 
Ibadan. After independence in 1960, the number of universities mushroomed, 
especially during the oil boom of the 1970s when the government founded 
universities in every part of the country. More recently, various individuals, 
corporations and religious bodies have established private universities, to the 
extent that there are now almost 100 universities recognized by the Nigerian 
Universities Commission, as well as 100 polytechnics and 150 technical col-
leges. Despite this growth, demand for one of the estimated 148,000 annual 
university places remains fierce and the expansion in the number of universities 
has, in fact, damaged students’ job prospects, with graduate unemployment now 
estimated at about 60%.1  
The Pyrates and its offspring 
Nigeria’s first main nationalist party, the National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroons (NCNC), recruited heavily among students.2 It was in this context 
that in 1953 (or, in some accounts, 1952), University College Ibadan witnessed 
the foundation of a new type of student club conceived along the lines of an 
American student fraternity or a British university social club. Founded by 
seven undergraduates, it was known as the Pyrates Confraternity. According to 
a later analyst, who received an official appointment to investigate campus 
cults, the Pyrates originally aspired to ‘a social liberating role’, and represented 
‘an attempt to create a better society’.3 It aimed to galvanize the fusty, Ox-
bridge-style atmosphere of what had been Nigeria’s only university for some 
twelve years and to lobby for a more radical university politics generally. The 
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leader of the group was the young Wole Soyinka, who would later become a 
Nobel laureate. Embarrassed by what some student confraternities were to be-
come, Soyinka has written a defence of the Pyrates in which he emphasizes the 
organization’s youthful innocence.4 As new universities were created, the Py-
rates became popular on many of the new campuses, founding a branch, for 
example, at the University of Nigeria at Nsukka that was opened shortly after 
independence.  
Nigerian student politics in the 1960s and 1970s, as in many other countries 
in Africa and indeed other parts of the world, were dominated by a rhetoric of 
radicalism. The most influential student leaders were stridently anti-colonialist. 
Marxism, pan-Africanism and opposition to apartheid in South Africa became 
favoured themes of student activists. The 1962 abrogation of the Anglo-Nige-
rian defence agreement, negotiated on the eve of independence, was attributed 
in part to pressure from student opinion.5 As the number of students increased 
with the opening of new universities, the National Union of Nigerian Students 
(NUNS) became directly involved in national politics, being invited to join the 
1977 Constituent Assembly that was discussing a new constitution that would 
accompany a return to civilian rule, replacing the military administrations that 
had run Nigeria since the country’s first coup in 1966. However, the military 
government under General Olusegun Obasanjo, who led the country from 1977 
to 1979, became so annoyed by the students’ radicalism that it proscribed the 
NUNS and detained its president, Segun Okeowo. Radical university lecturers 
in Ibadan, Lagos, Calabar and at Ahmadou Bello University in Zaria were de-
tained or fired.6  
The Pyrates was generally in sympathy with the radical turn taken by student 
politics and remained an influential force within the student movement. Ben 
Oguntuase, a Pyrate in the early 1970s, later recalled that the confraternity was 
at that time the driving force in student politics at the University of Ibadan.7 
Another ex-member recalled the Pyrates in those days as offering ‘an avenue to 
express strong feelings about the happenings in society’,8 still assuming the role 
of social gadfly that the organization had had at its inception. According to 
Oguntuase, by the early 1970s, members of the Pyrates wore uniforms for for-
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mal ceremonies and followed rules that were enforced by the society’s officers, 
which could even include beatings. Initiation involved signing a pledge in red 
ink and drinking a Bloody Mary, a cocktail made with tomato juice. Some non-
members are said to have believed that the drink was made with real human 
blood, perhaps an understandable misapprehension given the Pyrates’s mock-
piratical rituals and their reported use of violence for disciplinary purposes.9 
During the 1970s, there was a growth in student confraternities that had a 
direct genealogical connection to the Pyrates. In 1971 or 1972 (sources vary on 
the date) an internal disagreement led to a dissident group leaving or being 
expelled from the Pyrates and founding a new confraternity known as the 
Buccaneers.10 Thereafter, at a time when student numbers were increasing 
rapidly, there were further splits. Many of the new groups continued to show an 
ideological orientation, like the Black Axe, a group aligned with the fashionable 
philosophy of black consciousness.11 The new confraternities, like their fore-
bears, continued to regard themselves as fighters for justice.12 
It was not only Nigerian campuses that were changing radically during these 
years, but society as a whole. The 1967-1970 civil war, successive military 
coups after 1966 and the development of an oil industry that had not existed 
when the Pyrates was established all contributed to a loss of the relative aura of 
innocence that had surrounded the Pyrates’s early years. The rise of new student 
confraternities was part of a vogue for new civic and philosophical associations 
more generally. Many of the new associations and social clubs that were estab-
lished in these years reflected people’s attempts to address the problems of life 
in Nigeria’s burgeoning cities, such as the burial societies and other mutual help 
societies that, in the absence of affordable commercial insurance, were a means 
of spreading risk.13 Since many parts of Nigeria have the tradition of initiation 
societies, the plethora of new societies that came into existence in the 1970s no 
doubt owed something to people’s general familiarity with the idea of social 
action through membership of a specific group. ‘Social clubs’, notes one writer, 
‘may be regarded as open and more practical versions’ of the initiation societies 
that have such a long and important history.14  
Sites of new forms of sociability and new ideologies, Nigeria’s new univer-
sity campuses also witnessed the rise of new religious groups. Most notable 
were the new Pentecostal churches that constituted autonomous spaces of reli-
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gious practice. Pentecostal student groups emerged as perhaps the most power-
ful youth movement the country had seen since independence, to the extent that 
they soon eclipsed the secular student movement. The universities of Ibadan 
and Ile-Ife became ‘hotbeds of Pentecostalism’.15 On campuses with a signifi-
cant presence of Muslim students, new Islamic movements became popular too, 
contesting the sufi brotherhoods that were closely connected to traditional forms 
of patronage and that young reformers criticized as inconsistent with correct 
forms of Islamic practice. 
Changes in the associational life of millions of Nigerians in the 1970s were 
inseparable from the country’s oil boom. The country’s emergence from civil 
war was accompanied by a rapid growth in oil production. When the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised its prices fourfold in 
1973, Nigeria also witnessed a massive and sudden increase in state revenues. 
Oil money flowed, generating a mania for wealth.16 In the scramble for a part of 
the oil riches, which were distributed essentially across the state, Nigeria’s tra-
ditional agricultural staples suffered alarming falls in production. A US diplo-
mat quoted a conversation he had had with Nigeria’s top financial civil servant 
in December 1973, coincidentally the very month of the first OPEC price rise. 
The American reported his Nigerian interlocutor as acknowledging ‘with dis-
arming frankness’ that the government ‘knows perfectly well that its dev-
elopment policies are contributing to an exacerbation of income disparities in 
Nigeria, but accepts this as part of the price of rapid development. The next 
generation [he added] will have to deal with the consequences.’17 The writer 
Chinua Achebe, addressing an audience at Lagos University, had a dark fore-
boding. ‘God forbid’, he said, ‘that we should be the generation that had the 
opportunity to create Africa’s first truly modern state but frittered away the 
chance in parochialism, inefficiency, corruption and cynicism.’18 
The turn to violence 
Even before oil had become king, Nigerian political parties were, in the words 
of the military leader Murtala Muhammed, ‘in fact little more than armies 
organized for fighting elections’. Winning elections was ‘a life and death strug-
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gle’.19 The advent of expensive oil only heightened this effect. Control of the 
revenues was concentrated at the core of the state, which received the royalties 
and taxes from oil. The soldiers who controlled the state from 1966 to 1979, and 
the civilian ‘super permanent secretaries’ who were so influential in the Federal 
Military Government, decided who received what, when and how. When the 
country finally returned to civilian rule after the 1979 elections, there was a 
further expansion of the state patronage system that was based increasingly on 
oil wealth. A rapid fall in the price of oil in the early 1980s, for which the 
government had made no provisions, resulted in a political crisis. The inevitable 
military coup came on 31 December 1983.  
It is generally agreed that the oil boom of the 1970s, followed by the sudden 
puncturing of the economic bubble created by high prices, transformed Nigerian 
society. A population whose ambitions had been stimulated by oil money was 
cruelly disappointed by its sudden disappearance. It was in this period that, by 
most accounts, Nigeria began to acquire an ugly reputation as the home of the 
international advance-fee frauds known as ‘419’.20 A later head of Nigeria’s 
anti-corruption agency, Nuhu Ribadu, was to state with regard to the civilian 
government of 1979-83:  
Let us call a spade a spade. This is the period when we started hearing about 419, it 
is the period we started having drug problems. It is a period when Majors (in the 
army) started buying property in London.21 
This was also the period when there was a disturbing turn in the behaviour 
and reputation of the student confraternities that had flourished within the wider 
student movement in more optimistic times. Some of the new confraternities, 
like the Vikings, continued to give themselves names redolent of the original 
Pyrates and its offshoot, the Buccaneers. The latter spawned the Black Axe, 
soon joined by the Red Beret and many other newcomers. Holding their meet-
ings at night and in secret, some of the new groups became associated with the 
rising number of violent attacks on university campuses. Their behaviour 
moved far beyond the light-hearted mock-sinister that had been the original 
style of the Pyrates. There were increasingly incidents of student clubs inflicting 
serious bodily harm on members as punishment or in the course of initiation 
ceremonies, fighting with rivals on campus, and being associated with violence 
generally. One ex-member of a student group recalled initiation as consisting of 
three weeks of what he called ‘rigorous and heartbreaking activities’, whose 
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purpose was ‘to toughen the heart of the otherwise innocent looking boy’,22 
similar to basic military training or initiation into one of the traditional secret 
societies that have been powerful in Nigeria since pre-colonial times. During 
their induction ceremonies, many of the new confraternities made use of reli-
gious objects, universally referred to in Nigeria as juju, which further strength-
ened the resemblance with initiation into a traditional power society. So worry-
ing did campus violence become that the Pyrates leadership announced its in-
tention to withdraw from university campuses entirely and to relaunch the group 
as an adult society called the National Association of Sea Dogs. This it did, but 
in reality student Pyrates continued to operate on Nigerian campuses, disre-
garding its national leadership.  
Nevertheless, there were people who took quite a positive view of what were 
now becoming called ‘campus cults’, recalling their origins in the idealism and 
social activism of an earlier generation. Philip Aghedo, a member of the Bucca-
neers for some fifteen years after being introduced by his uncle at the University 
of Benin in 1981, maintained that, in his day, candidate members of the Bucca-
neers were vetted for their intelligence and good behaviour before being invited 
to join. Aghedo stated with regard to the student confraternities: 
They train you to be useful to yourself and the society because the thinking govern-
ing conduct of the cult is that there must be somebody controlling the environment 
otherwise the environment will be controlling itself and there could be anarchy. If 
the cults fail to exercise some level of control in University, the lecturers and ad-
ministrators can do whatever they like and get away with it.23  
He attributed the violent clashes that occurred between rival groups to the 
fact that they were competing with each other in the unregulated social envi-
ronment formed by students on campus.  
In 1999, a single incident attracted the attention of the government and the 
media to just how serious the rivalries on university campuses had become. At 
Obafemi Awolowo University in Ile-Ife, a forty-strong war party from the 
Black Axe confraternity, some of them armed with machine-guns, attacked 
leaders of the student union who had complained to the university authorities 
about the cultists’ activities. The five or more fatalities included the university’s 
chief security officer. There were suspicions that the murderous activities of the 
Black Axe might have been associated with outside forces that had an interest in 
asserting control on the university campus. Groups like the Black Axe at Ile-Ife 
were recruiting local thugs to provide themselves with extra manpower to rein-
force their presence in inter-group conflicts. They were also visiting herbalists 
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in search of powerful amulets to protect themselves in fights, thus coming into 
contact with networks influential in a wider criminal and political underworld.24 
It was often said that the membership of campus cults was drawn disproportion-
ately from children from elite families. The respected former vice-chancellor of 
Ibadan, Professor Ayo Banjo, noted that the leaders of confraternities or cults 
on campus – it is hard to know what to call them at this stage of their existence 
– systematically targeted first-year students from rich families, attempting to 
recruit them as part of a long-term strategy to strengthen their social networks. 
A common technique was for the leaders of a campus cult to invite a freshman 
to join an innocuous-sounding club. If the newcomer showed interest, he was 
subjected to increasing degrees of intimidation and blackmail, including kid-
napping and physical violence, in an effort to coerce the recruit into full mem-
bership.25  
Cults and student politics 
The shocking Ile-Ife killings, occurring shortly after Nigeria’s return to civilian 
government after an almost unbroken fifteen years of military rule, stimulated 
widespread public debate. Discussion soon spread from the campus cults them-
selves to the wider social environment in which they had arisen. It was gener-
ally recognized that the degeneration from student activism to murderous gang-
sterism was a reflection of the moral condition of the nation. Among those who 
have investigated campus cults, there is a consensus that the transformation 
from student activism to something less social and more violent was a devel-
opment inseparable from wider tendencies in Nigerian society. 
More specifically, the degeneration from confraternity to cult was a conse-
quence of the policies adopted by some of the military governments that domi-
nated Nigeria with only brief interruption from 1966 to 1999. General Oba-
sanjo’s banning of the National Union of Nigerian Students during his first 
period as head of state between 1976 and 1979 was the first of several attempts 
by the military to assert control over the universities. Even in secondary 
schools, there were cases of military governments drafting soldiers to work as 
teachers in an attempt to impose a military discipline on impressionable young 
minds. Former Buccaneer Philip Aghedo believed that the military, sent to in-
stitutions of learning in various capacities, ‘unwittingly taught the youngsters 
the art of weapon handling and management’.26 Professor Ayo Banjo has broad-
ly agreed with this analysis, noting that many cultists ‘admired the machismo of 
the tough military men, who ordered things to be done with immediate effect 
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and brutally swept all obstacles out of their way’.27 Still more damagingly, 
military governments sometimes gave covert support to campus groups as a 
means of destabilizing student unions, which were feared by the military men 
on account of their political radicalism.28 In 1991, for example, during the rule 
of the Machiavellian General Ibrahim Babangida, student cults were used to 
destabilize student organizations on the Ile-Ife campus that had been agitating 
for improved bursaries.29 University administrators, often appointed for their 
loyalty to the military government rather than for any academic or managerial 
qualifications, played one faction off against another among the students at their 
institutions. Secretive confraternities were instruments in the hands of vice-
chancellors concerned primarily with political control of their campuses.  
In these circumstances during the last two decades of the twentieth century 
when Nigeria was dominated by military governments with a general contempt 
for education combined with a fear of student radicalism, the campus confrater-
nities were able to use violence and manipulation to become kingmakers in 
student politics. The rewards could be quite substantial for aspiring entrepre-
neurs of power and violence. Some youngsters became professional students, 
staying on campus year after year, collecting protection money and building up 
powerful personal followings. Once student associations had become not only 
politicized but also militarized, it was a short step to their being used for in-
strumental purposes in personal quarrels. Wole Soyinka notes the case of a uni-
versity vice-chancellor who used one student confraternity or cult as a personal 
strong-arm squad to attack faculty members opposed to him.30 By 2002, there 
were reports of former cult members being recruited by an incumbent state 
governor in the southeast, where shrines and secret societies play a key role in a 
particularly thuggish political system, as do goon-squads acting on behalf of 
politicians and even businesspeople.31 Some cultists, having made connections 
with politicians and other powerbrokers during their time in student politics, 
have gone on to pursue careers in politics, government or the professions, while 
retaining their membership of their society. This means that some campus cults 
have developed into networks of influence that pervade wider sections of soci-
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ety. But they remain oriented to the interests of their members rather than to any 
wider social project. This is in contrast to the original Pyrates Confraternity, 
which aspired to pursue what its members perceived to be a progressive agenda 
for the improvement of society as a whole. Members of the Black Axe and no 
doubt some other groups are to be found as far away as the Netherlands, en-
meshed in a small and often vulnerable Nigerian diaspora.  
Perhaps the ultimate transformation of student confraternities into violent 
gangs has taken place in the Niger Delta, where a complex low-intensity war is 
involving dozens of armed factions. Researchers have identified over a hundred 
specific armed groups, many of them descended from university societies or 
modelled on them,32 administering secret oaths of allegiance and relying heavily 
on violence. Alongside these – or perhaps intertwined with them, much as the 
original campus confraternities were intertwined with the official student unions 
– are militant groups that cultivate a more conventional guerrilla image, like the 
Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) or the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) that have conducted an armed cam-
paign that has at times pitted them against the state and the oil companies. In the 
micropolitics of the federal and state government, the oil companies and local 
interest groups, shifting allegiances may cause some cults to become affiliated 
to larger groups, and even to work as enforcers for politicians, particularly dur-
ing election campaigns.  
In the convoluted and violent politics of the Niger Delta, the main distinction 
between the different types of organization is the quality of the individual alle-
giance prevailing within them. In the case of a cult, initiation is deemed to be 
for life and individuals seeking to renounce their allegiance may be subject to 
drastic punishment. Some of the cults operating in the Niger Delta are reported 
to have initiation rituals that can even include the murder of a member of the 
recruit’s own family. Membership of such cults may range from a couple of 
dozen to several thousands. Some are pro-state or pro-government; some are 
anti-state, while others have no clear political objectives.33 Individual organiza-
tions can be placed on a spectrum going from groups with political aims to 
purely criminal associations. At various times, their main occupations might be 
fighting each other for turf (necessary for access to oil-smuggling routes or 
other forms of enrichment), peddling the cocaine that is imported in bulk to pay 
for smuggled oil, and working for politicians as enforcers. Many of them make 
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more or less explicit use of techniques of spiritual protection, such as bullet-
proof charms and amulets. 
In June 2004, the Nigerian government passed a law known as the Secret 
Cult and Similar Activities Prohibition Act that banned some one hundred 
named groups.34 Others not named by the Act continued to exist and be in-
volved in criminal activities. A former student cult member, looking back some 
years previously on his experiences, did not exaggerate when he noted: ‘It has 
ceased to be play. It is war.’35 
Society and anti-society 
Initiation societies are a historically ingrained form of organization, particularly 
in southern Nigeria, and in pre-colonial times they played a key role in govern-
ance. In some circumstances these societies constituted a check on the power of 
the chiefs and kings and they often played a role in the administration of justice, 
and sometimes in commerce and trade. Under colonial rule, which was imposed 
in Nigeria during the twentieth century, the position of traditional initiation 
societies was distinctly ambiguous. At one and the same time, the logic of the 
British system of Indirect Rule was to reinforce institutions that played an es-
tablished role in local government but also to treat these same institutions with a 
degree of hostility on account of their lack of transparency and their association 
with practices deemed by the colonial authorities to be unacceptable, including 
enslavement and various types of judicial killing. In fact, some traditional ini-
tiation societies continued to flourish during colonial times and played an im-
portant role in early nationalist politics.36 
Since the 1950s, growing corruption in Nigerian politics, fuelled by vast oil 
wealth, has created an environment in which traditional or not-so-traditional 
secret societies have been able to flourish as lynch-pins of patrimonial politics 
in a complex system whereby the formal, legal dispositions of state power are 
intertwined with informal networks, some of them regulated in time-honoured 
fashion via the institutions of traditional religion.37 Senior politicians and offi-
cials may, in addition to the public office they hold, also have a status within 
formal but nonetheless unpublicized organizations, ranging from traditional 
shrines to international networks such as the Freemasons or the Rosicrucians. 
Such networks are considered not only as a useful means of dispensing political 
patronage but, in many cases, also as channels for attaining esoteric power.  
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More than thirty years ago, the Nigerian government professed itself to be 
greatly perturbed by the existence of secret societies that were judged to be 
pervasive in places of public employment, including the civil service and the 
army. The army chief of staff was quoted as describing secret societies as ‘a 
cancer which has eaten deep into all ranks of the Nigerian army’.38 They were 
also said to have penetrated the ranks of High Court judges, the police, and even 
church leaders. In July 1977, the Federal Military Government issued a formal 
ban on public servants joining secret societies, concerned by evidence that 
members of secret societies protected one another and helped each other 
achieve positions of influence.39 It was apparently as a consequence of this blan-
ket ban on secret societies that the Pyrates was banned on some campuses: some 
fifteen students, for example, were arrested at the University of Calabar and the 
Calabar College of Technology in 1977 for being members of the Pyrates.40 In 
general, however, the government’s official hostility to secret societies at that 
time was not directed principally towards the universities where such bodies 
were in their infancy and not yet deemed to be a public nuisance, but towards 
the civil service and other branches of the state. 
In view of this history, the story of Nigeria’s campus cults needs to be 
understood in a broader social and political perspective. This includes an appre-
ciation of how the country’s political and civil society has been influenced by 
closed associations or initiation societies, and how these have been used or 
abused over a long period by politicians and others avid for power. As one jour-
nalist correctly observed, ‘it is … rather hypocritical that that society condones 
savage tendencies within itself while wishing the campuses to eradicate these 
same tendencies’.41 Although certain key moments can be identified in this 
longer history of the coexistence of different forms of power, it has been, in 
retrospect, quite a steady process. While the colonial government banned 
certain traditional societies and shrines on the grounds of their association with 
such criminal practices as enslavement or the taking of human life, many such 
institutions in fact continued surreptitiously, existing within the bowels of Indi-
rect Rule. Post-colonial governments in Nigeria, like their colonial forebears, 
sometimes declared themselves shocked to discover the degree to which insti-
tutions of state that had been conceived in the formal mode proper to a modern 
nation-state had in fact been infiltrated by networks of power with a different 
pedigree and no legal standing. From time to time, a scandal exposes this imbri-
cation of different channels and practices of power to public view, and politi-
cians duly call for the law to be enforced in all its majesty. But implementing 
                                                          
38  Quoted in Tai Solarin, ‘Belief in secret cults’, Nigerian Tribune, 16 February 1976. 
39  Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, p. 8. 
40  Daily Times, 27 January 1977. 
41  Quasim Odunmbaku, ‘A tale of two cults’, This Day, 17 August 1999. 
 ‘Campus cults’ in Nigeria 233 
the law, even when appropriate, is extraordinarily difficult when it comes to 
dealing with secretive networks that have penetrated the state itself and that 
may be ruthless in their mode of operation. 
The July 1977 ban on secret societies, announced at the height of Nigeria’s 
first and most lethal oil boom, marked the point when government at its most 
senior level officially became concerned by the influence of secret societies. 
This was also the period when student confraternities were beginning to prolif-
erate following the initial split of the Buccaneers from the Pyrates, the first of 
many organizations to be spawned in this way. Furthermore, it was the first 
period of spiritual awakening on the university campuses that had proliferated 
in the previous decade. The campuses became the mainspring of the Pentecos-
talist movement that has become so widespread and influential throughout 
Nigerian society. It was in the mid 1970s that Reverend Benson Idahosa, who 
was later to become the most famous of all Nigerian Pentecostalist preachers 
and the founder of a university that bears his name, first held services of clean-
sing for members of secret societies.42 It is not just that the Pentecostalists and 
the cultists happened to be expanding their activities during the same period. 
Instead, there is an intimate connection between the two as they competed not 
only for the bodies but also the souls of students in their formative years, and 
the nation’s future elite. In Pentecostal theology, the fight with the cultists is a 
battle with the forces of Satan and of darkness that threaten Nigeria. In the vo-
cabulary of the social sciences, it is a struggle between a broad social movement 
on the country’s university campuses that is oriented towards self-improvement 
and social action by means of both student unions and religious groups versus 
the activities of clandestine groups that have become dedicated to the narrow 
self-interest of their members and that are the very opposite of a social move-
ment. The competition between these forces has been manipulated by powerful 
people, including military governments concerned with defending themselves 
against student radicalism and demobilizing social movements of many sorts, 
and also unscrupulous university administrators and even academic staff con-
cerned with protecting their position within their institutions. Since Nigerians 
generally consider power not only in material terms but also in spiritual ones, 
the conflict between Pentecostalism and secret societies, even those with no 
apparently religious leaning, is couched in theological rhetoric. At stake are the 
hearts and minds of Nigeria’s future ruling class. 
The contests between rival networks of power and their religious, political 
and legal dimensions also reflect different visions and traditions of social 
action. Nigeria has a liberal constitution that provides for political expression 
through the conventional channels of party politics and parliamentary represen-
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tation. At various times in the past, both under colonial rule and subsequently, 
large numbers of Nigerians have mobilized for political purposes in forms usual 
in liberal democracies, through trade unions, public-interest groups and so on. 
Military governments in particular often abhorred such activity, which could 
easily have threatened their own existence, and took steps to make social mobi-
lization as difficult as possible. The closed and hidden groups of various sorts, 
ranging from simple personal networks to organized groups such as traditional 
initiation societies, religious networks and student confraternities, were some-
times used for this purpose. In passing, it should be remembered that the con-
stitution explicitly bans secret societies.43  
The fact that initiation societies have historically existed in southern Nigeria 
does not mean that the presence of quasi-traditional groups will always be felt. 
Such groups have been encouraged and instrumentalized for specific reasons, 
sometimes by the country’s most powerful rulers. Nigeria is what it is today in 
the twenty-first century as a consequence of these actions, not simply because 
of the legacy of history. 
It is interesting to note that most reports of student cults emanate from 
southern Nigeria, which is also the area where initiation societies were most 
powerful in pre-colonial times. However Wole Soyinka, in characteristically 
combative style, has attacked the notion that student cults are less rampant in 
the north than the south. He quotes the case of the Gamji cult, which is said to 
have been favoured by senior figures in Northern Nigeria, and manipulated by 
General Abacha in his bid to prolong his tenure of power in the 1990s.44 He also 
points to the existence of the so-called ‘Kaduna mafia’,45 the grouping of north-
ern potentates often regarded as perhaps the most important enduring informal 
structure of power in Nigeria. However, while Soyinka’s examples demonstrate 
that Northern powerbrokers are adept at forming discreet associations to further 
their collective interests, he does not demonstrate that universities in Northern 
Nigeria are as likely as Southern institutions to host student ‘cults’. This appar-
ent difference appears to reflect the distinctive historical trajectories of state 
formation in the North and South. Broadly speaking, the favoured strategy for 
two centuries of pursuing political hegemony in Northern Nigeria has been via 
the language and organizational structures associated with Islam, and this has 
served many Northern elites well. Since the establishment of Nigeria by British 
decree in 1914, Southern elites have generally found it more difficult to estab-
lish a hegemonic position. Individuals have often had recourse to unofficial 
power structures, such as secret societies, to advance their position. Although 
                                                          
43  Section 38, sub-section 4 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(1999). The full text is available at www.nigeria-law.org. 
44  Soyinka, Cults, p. 78. 
45  Ibid. 
 ‘Campus cults’ in Nigeria 235 
they have been generally successful in this undertaking at regional or local 
level, Southern Nigerian politicians have generally been unsuccessful in estab-
lishing a hegemonic position that would enable them to challenge the Northern 
grip on the power of the Nigerian state. Moreover, the imbrication of official 
and unofficial networks has resulted in enormous bureaucratic inefficiencies 
and has led to widespread demoralization. New religious movements in both 
North and South Nigeria represent campaigns not only of spiritual renewal but 
also the creation of spaces of autonomous action intended to be free from the 
moral complexities engendered by Nigeria’s politics over the last fifty years.46 
The analogy made by one journalist is very apt: ‘Cultism is to the cultists 
what plotting is to the military [:] top secret’.47 Particularly under General Ibra-
him Babangida (1985-1993), Nigeria was subject to a style of rule whereby 
‘direct disbursals and administrative favours were increasingly supplanted by 
politically-influenced arbitrage in a variety of domestic markets’, a process 
more simply described as ‘zaïrianization’.48 Nigeria’s recent history has been 
one of social fragmentation that at times has been the deliberate strategy of 
elites insecure in their legitimacy. It has also been the instrument of less power-
ful citizens who have discovered that attachment to particular networks, in-
cluding those in the form of a secret society, is an outstanding way of obtaining 
a slice of the national cake, which is the summit of Nigerian political activity. 
Far from being immune to this process, the universities, as a breeding ground of 
the national elite, have been important sites. It is small wonder that the move-
ments with nationwide social aspirations that flourished in the first years of 
nationalism have been snuffed out, to be replaced by the factionalized and par-
ticularist politics of networks or by the religious language of renewal articulated 
by both Islamist and Christian reformers. 
                                                          
46  Cf. Ruth Marshall, Political Spiritualities: The explosion of Pentecostalism in Ni-
geria (Chicago University Press, Chicago, forthcoming). 
47  Bayo Oguntunase, ‘The problems of cultism in Nigeria (1)’, National Concord, 29 
June 1998. 
48  Peter Lewis, ‘From prebendalism to predation: The political economy of decline in 
Nigeria’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 34, 1, 1996, p. 97. The reference to 
‘zaïrianization’ is on page 80. 
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Annex 
List of groups banned under the Secret Cult and Similar Activities 
Prohibition Law 200449 
Agbaye 
Airwords 
Amazon 
Baccaneers (Sea Lords) 
Barracuda 
Bas 
Bees International 
Big 20 
Black Axe 
Black Beret Fraternity 
Black Brasserie [sic] 
Black Brothers 
Black Cats 
Black Cross 
Black Ladies 
Black Ofals 
Black Scorpions 
Black Sword 
Blanchers 
Black Bras 
Blood Suckers 
Brotherhood of Blood 
Burkina Faso: Revolution 
    Fraternity 
Canary 
Cappa Vandetto 
Daughters of Jezebel 
Dey Gbam 
Dey Well 
Dolphins 
Dragons 
Dreaded Friends of 
    Friends  
Blood Hunters 
Eagle Club 
Egbe Dudu 
Eiye of Air Lords 
    Fraternity 
Elegemface 
Executioners 
Fangs 
FF 
Fliers 
Frigates 
Gentlemen’s Club 
Green Berets Fraternity 
Hard Candies 
Hell’s Angels 
Hepos 
Himalayas 
Icelanders 
Jaggare Confederation 
KGB 
King Cobra 
KlamKonfraternity 
Klansman 
Ku Klux Klan 
Knite Cade 
Mafia Lords 
Mafioso Fraternity 
Malcolm X 
Maphites /Maphlate 
Mgba Mgba Brothers 
Mob Stab 
Musketeers Fraternity 
National Association of 
Adventurers 
National Association of 
    Sea Dogs 
Neo-Black Movement 
Night Mates 
Nite Hawks 
Nite Rovers 
Odu Cofraternity 
Osiri 
Ostrich Fraternity 
Panama Pyrate 
Phoenix 
Predators 
Red Devils 
Red Fishes 
Red Sea Horse 
Royal House of Peace 
Royal Queens 
Sailors 
Scavengers 
Scorpion 
Scorpion 
Scorpion Fraternity 
Sea Vipers 
Soiree Fraternity 
Soko 
Sunmen 
Temple of Eden Fraternity 
Thomas Sankara Boys 
Tikan Giants 
Trojan Horses Fraternity 
Truth Seekers 
Twin mate 
Vikings 
Vipers 
Vultures 
Walrus 
White Bishop 
 
                                                          
49  Osaghae et al., ‘Youth militias, self determination and resource control struggles in 
the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria’. 
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